UNITED GRAFIX INCORPORATED d/b/a Tri-State Outdoor Advertising Company, Inc. v. GLENN HOUSE; OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE; and BAXTER BLEDSOE, Jr.
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RENDERED: February 25, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003120-MR
UNITED GRAFIX INCORPORATED d/b/a
Tri-State Outdoor Advertising
Company, Inc.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-00161
GLENN HOUSE; OSCAR GAYLE
HOUSE; and BAXTER BLEDSOE, Jr.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
United Grafix Incorporated, d/b/a Tri-State
Outdoor Advertising Company, Inc. (United Grafix) appeals from an
order of the Laurel Circuit Court granting summary judgment to
Glenn House, Oscar Gayle House, and Baxter Bledsoe, Jr.
The
controversy concerns a billboard originally erected and owned by
United Grafix, which the circuit court found to be abandoned.
We
conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
and, therefore, reverse and remand.
In 1958, Wilma Poynter acquired property located
adjacent to Interstate 75 in London, Kentucky.
In 1970, United
Grafix executed a lease with Poynter and erected a billboard on
the Poynter property.
In 1986, United Grafix and Poynter entered
into a new lease for the billboard site.
Under the terms of the
lease, United Grafix was to pay annual rent of $400.00 for a
five-year term beginning on May 31, 1986.
The lease provided
United Grafix with an option to extend the lease for an
additional five years, following the expiration of the first five
years.
Thereafter, the lease was to operate on a year-to-year
basis “under the same terms and conditions, unless either party
serves written notice of termination on the other party not less
than 30 days prior to the end of such term or additional term.”
Poynter died sometime prior to 1990, and United Grafix
was notified by her estate’s attorney that future rental payments
should be forwarded to the estate’s executor.
United Grafix
mailed the rental payments to the executor through 1993.
The
1993 check was endorsed in favor of, and cashed by, “House
Brothers,” a business operated by Glenn House and his brother,
Cloyd House.
No further rent was paid to either the Poynter
estate or to House Brothers in any year after 1993.
The Poynter property had been purchased by Glenn House
and Cloyd House1 on July 22, 1992.
United Grafix contends that
it was first notified of the transfer on March 11, 1996, when it
1
Cloyd House died prior to the filing of this case.
Appellee Oscar Gayle House is the executor of the estate of Cloyd
House.
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received a letter from Glenn House.2
The letter stated, “[i]f
you want to continue with your sign on House Bros[.] property
formily [sic] Wilma Poynter Leas [sic] No. CB-22[,] you should
contact me at once.”
United Grafix contends that upon receiving
the letter, it attempted to contact House, but was unsuccessful.
In the meantime, House leased the billboard to Bledsoe,
and Bledsoe allegedly spent $10,000 to repair and improve it.
On
December 10, 1996, United Grafix mailed a letter to House
offering to execute a new lease for the billboard site.
On
December 11, 1996, Bledsoe sent a letter to United Grafix
informing it that he had worked out an agreement to lease the
location from House, and that it was the position of Bledsoe and
House that the billboard had been abandoned and that they, House
and/or Bledsoe, were the rightful owners of the billboard.
On
December 12, 1996, United Grafix sent a letter to House stating
that it would like to confer with him in person concerning the
sign and the rentals.
House apparently rejected this proposal
and assumed the position that United Grafix had abandoned the
billboard and no longer owned it.
Throughout this time, United
Grafix claims that it continued to lease the billboard to Curry
Oil Company and collect rent on it.
In February 1997, United Grafix filed a complaint in
Laurel Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that it was
the owner of the billboard and therefore entitled to immediate
possession of it.
The appellees filed an answer contending that
2
The appellees allege that there had been earlier
notifications.
-3-
they believed United Grafix had abandoned and given up any and
all rights or interests in the billboard.
After summary judgment
motions were filed by the parties, the trial court entered an
order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees.
In order to qualify for summary judgment, the movant
must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
On appeal,
the standard of review of a summary judgment is whether the trial
court correctly found that there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
The record must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment,
and all doubts are to be resolved in its favor.
Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(1991).
Summary judgment should only be used when, as a matter
of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent
to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor
and against the movant.
Id. at 483, citing Paintsville Hospital
Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985).
The first question concerns the circumstances under
which the lease came to an end.
The appellees contend that the
lease expired on its own terms, and we agree.
One provision in
the lease stated as follows:
After the expiration of the term of this
lease, the lease shall continue in force from
year to year under the same terms and
conditions, unless either party serves
written notice of termination on the other
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party not less than 30 days prior to the end
of such term or additional year.
Since the first five-year term of the lease commenced on May 31,
1986, then the second five-year term commenced on May 31, 1991,
and ended on May 30, 1996, due to its expiration.
As House
served a written notice on United Grafix on March 11, 1996, which
was more than thirty days prior to the end of the term, and since
United Grafix neither paid the rent in advance nor took other
steps to cause the lease to remain in force, the lease expired by
its terms.
This lease provision did not require written notice
by certified mail.3
The trial court further held that United Grafix had, as
a matter of law, abandoned the billboard.
We disagree.
The
terms of the lease provided that “all materials, structures,
equipment and other works placed upon the leased premises shall
remain the property of Tri-State and may be removed by Tri-State
at any time.”
“In order to establish an abandonment of property,
there must be a showing of actual acts of relinquishment,
accompanied with the intention to abandon.”
Elk Horn Coal Corp.
v. Allen, Ky., 324 S.W.2d 829, 830 (1959);
Stinnett v. Kinslow,
238 Ky. 812, 38 S.W.2d 920 (1931);
Sandy River Coal Co. v.
Champion Bridge Co., 243 Ky. 424, 48 S.W.2d 1062 (1932).
“There
is no presumption in law of abandonment or of intention to
3
Although United
the lease by failing to pay
due to default since United
of its default by certified
default.
Grafix had previously defaulted under
rent, the lease was not terminated
Grafix was not given written notice
mail so that it could cure such
-5-
abandon.
The burden is upon him who sets up abandonment to prove
the same by clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.”
Coal Corp., supra
at 831.
Elk Horn
“[A]bandonment of property is an
intentional surrender or relinquishment of a claim or right to
the property.
There must be a concurrence of intention and an
act manifesting that intention.”
S.W.2d 928, 930 (1956);
Harper v. Johnson, Ky., 294
Sandy River Coal Co., supra;
Rice v.
Rice, 243 Ky. 837, 50 S.W.2d 26 (1932).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
United Grafix, there is not clear, unequivocal, and decisive
evidence that it ever surrendered or relinquished its claim to
the billboard or that it ever manifested an intention to do so.
Though the appellees allege that United Grafix manifested an
abandonment of the billboard by its failure to pay rent on the
billboard site, nevertheless, United Grafix was leasing
advertising space on the billboard to Curry Oil Company and was
collecting rent on it.
United Grafix contends, and we must
accept this contention in reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, that it continued to collect rent from Curry Oil
Company through October 1996 and that its rental collections
ceased only when Bledsoe approached Curry Oil Company and
represented that United Grafix no longer owned the billboard.
Inasmuch as United Grafix had an active lease on the
billboard and was generating rental income on the billboard, the
trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the
billboard had been abandoned.
To the contrary, United Grafix’s
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active lease disproves that it had an intention to abandon the
billboard.
The trial court’s decision that the billboard had been
abandoned relied on Coleman v. Owens, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 341 (1953).
Coleman concerned whether a tenant was entitled to remove a coal
loading ramp from leased premises following the expiration of the
lease and considered right of removal issues, beyond the general
abandonment rules discussed above, in a landlord-tenant context.
Coleman states that
[t]he right to remove improvements does not
end on the expiration date of the lease.
Necessarily, the lessee is allowed a
reasonable time within which to effect the
removal. . . . What is considered a
reasonable time may vary according to the
facts and circumstances of each case. A
given period may be considered reasonable
under one situation but may be unreasonable
under another.
Id. at 342.
Under Coleman, therefore, the issue is whether
United Grafix failed to remove, or to seek removal of,4 the
billboard within a “reasonable time” following the expiration or
termination of the lease.
That is a fact issue, and the trial
court erred in making this determination as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Laurel
Circuit Court granting summary judgment to the appellees is
reversed, and this case is remanded for trial on the issue of
abandonment.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
4
At this juncture, United Grafix seeks only to remove
the billboard. It does not seek to continue to lease the
billboard site.
-7-
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
BY SEPARATE OPINION.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.
I
agree with the circuit court that United Grafix Incorporated did
not remove its billboard within a reasonable time after the
termination of its lease and, as a matter of law, abandoned the
improvements.
Therefore, I dissent from that portion of the
Court’s opinion that holds otherwise.
the opinion.
I concur in the balance of
I would, therefore, affirm the summary judgment in
its entirety.
BRIEF AND REPLY BRIEF FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Larry G. Bryson
London, Kentucky
Jennifer S. Nicholson
London, Kentucky
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