LEROY STICKLER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003113-MR
LEROY STICKLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00367
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Leroy Stickler appeals from an order of the
Kenton Circuit Court denying his motion to alter, amend, or
vacate sentence brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
After reviewing the record, we affirm.
On the afternoon of June 24, 1995, Alan Schiering met
Richard Carratt and Roy Marshall while he was purchasing some
vodka at a liquor store in Covington, Kentucky.
During their
conversation, Schiering agreed to accompany the two men to a
campsite where they were living temporarily.
Schiering drove to
a restaurant, left his vehicle in the parking lot, and the three
men walked to the campsite located behind the floodwall on the
banks of the Ohio River.
Upon arriving, Schiering saw a couple
of other persons at the campsite.
The three men proceeded to
talk and drink alcohol for a few hours during which time Leroy
Stickler, who was also living at the camp, joined in the
activities.
At some point after Schiering had become somewhat
intoxicated, he was beaten several times and approximately $30 in
cash and his car keys were taken from his pockets.
Schiering was
beaten so severely that he lost consciousness several times.
He
suffered a broken arm, a broken hand, a broken nose, and numerous
cuts and bruises.
Schiering had been kicked and beaten with
fists and a blunt object.
Carratt and Marshall left the area in
Schiering’s car while Stickler remained at the campsite until
late that evening.
Carratt and Marshall were arrested a short
time later after being stopped by the police going the wrong way
on a street not far from the location of the campsite.
On the early morning of the next day, Schiering was
awakened by Ray Lute, who was also staying at the campsite and
had witnessed some of the beatings.
Lute contacted the police,
who found Schiering at the campsite at approximately 2:00 a.m.
He was taken to the hospital and received medical care for his
injuries.
After obtaining a search warrant, the police returned
to the campsite at approximately 12:30 p.m. on July 25, and
seized several items including three backpacks, a three-footlong wooden club, and a pair of fingerless gloves.
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Two of the
backpacks contained items with the names of Carratt and Marshall
on them.
The wooden stick had the name LEROY carved into it.
Lute initially indicated that he had no information about the
incident, but later he told the police that he had witnessed
some of the beatings.
He identified Stickler as one of the
participants and the owner of the wooden stick.
Carratt,
Marshall, and Stickler were later charged with beating and
robbing Schiering.
On July 13, 1995, the Kenton County District Court
waived the case to the grand jury after conducting a preliminary
hearing.
On August 11, 1995, the Kenton County Grand Jury
indicted Stickler on one felony count of complicity to commit
robbery in the first degree (KRS 515.020 and KRS 502.020), and
one felony count of assault in the first degree (KRS 508.010).
Following a two day trial, the jury found Stickler guilty of both
offenses and recommended concurrent sentences of ten years on
each offense.
On April 15, 1996, the trial court sentenced
Stickler to serve two concurrent ten year sentences for robbery
and assault consistent with the jury’s recommendation.
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
The
Stickler v.
Commonwealth, 96-CA-000124-MR (rendered April 10, 1998).
On October 9, 1998, Stickler filed an RCr 11.42 motion
seeking reversal of his conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.
He also filed a motion for appointment of
counsel and a motion for an evidentiary hearing.
On November 16,
1998, Stickler filed a motion for a default judgment for the
Commonwealth’s failure to file a response to the RCr 11.42 motion
within the twenty-day time period set out in RCr 11.42(4).
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On
November 18, 1998, the trial court entered an order summarily
denying the RCr 11.42 motion.
On November 19, 1998, the
Commonwealth filed a response to the RCr 11.42 motion.1
On
November 25, 1998, the trial court denied the motion for a
default judgment.
This appeal followed.
Stickler complains on appeal that the trial court erred
by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion and
failing to appoint counsel.
A movant is not automatically
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion.
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 901, 904 (1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1023, 119 S. Ct. 1263, 143 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1999).
An evidentiary hearing is not required on an RCr 11.42 motion
where the issues raised in the motion are refuted on the record,
or where the allegations, even if true, would not be sufficient
to invalidate the conviction.
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky. 975
S.W.2d 905, 909 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025, 119 S. Ct.
1266, 143 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1999); Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981
S.W.2d 545 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026, 119 S. Ct. 2375,
144 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1999).
Furthermore, there is no constitutional right to an
attorney in a post-conviction collateral proceeding.
Harper v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 318 (1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1056, 119 S. Ct. 1367. 143 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1999);
Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 9, 11 (1999).
1
While the
Although the Commonwealth’s response was officially filed
one day after the court’s order denying the motion was entered,
the certificate of service indicates that the response was mailed
to Stickler on November 18. Thus, the Commonwealth probably had
not received notice of the trial court’s order prior to preparing
and filing its response.
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Court in Ivey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 599 S.W.2d 456 (1980),
indicated that appointment of counsel for indigent defendants may
be necessary under state law in an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the
Kentucky Supreme Court later tempered its pronouncements in Ivey
by holding that appointment of counsel is not required where the
substantive claims are refuted on the face of the record or
appointment of counsel would be futile.
Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336 (1984).
Commonwealth v. Stamps,
See also Hopewell v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 687 S.W.2d 153 (1985).
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a person must satisfy a two-part test showing both that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
resulted in actual prejudice resulting in a proceeding that was
fundamentally unfair.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1986); Foley v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 878, 884 (2000).
The burden is on
the defendant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
assistance was constitutionally sufficient or that under the
circumstances counsel’s action might be considered “trial
strategy.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065;
Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1998), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ____, 120 S. Ct. 110, 145 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1999);
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d at 912.
A court must be
highly deferential in reviewing defense counsel’s performance and
should avoid second-guessing counsel’s actions based on
hindsight.
Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 315; Russell, Ky. App., 992
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S.W.2d 871, 875 (1999).
In assessing counsel's performance, the
standard is whether the alleged acts or omissions were outside
the wide range of prevailing professional norms based on an
objective standard of reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65; Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836
S.W.2d 872, 878 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S. Ct.
1857, 123 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1993); Harper v. Commonwealth, 978
S.W.2d at 315.
In order to establish actual prejudice, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981
S.W.2d 545, 551 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026, 119 S. Ct.
2375, 144 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1999).
A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of
the proceeding considering the totality of the evidence before
the jury.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
See also Moore, 983 S.W.2d at 484, 488; Foley, 17 S.W.2d at 884.
Stickler identifies three instances of alleged attorney
incompetence.
First, he contends that counsel was ineffective
for failing to move to exclude or object to the use of several
photographs of the campsite taken by the police on the afternoon
following the incident that were admitted into evidence.
He
asserts that because the photographs were taken some twelve hours
after the incident and the campsite was not secured during that
time period, the photographs should not have been utilized or
introduced as evidence at trial.
He states that Lute admitted
having cleaned up the campsite and moving the wooden stick.
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Photographs are commonly admitted into evidence as
demonstrative evidence on the theory that they are a graphic
portrayal of oral testimony used merely for illustrative purposes
to assist the jury.
618 (1980).
Litton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 616,
Photographs may also be admitted as substantive real
evidence when used as probative evidence depicting the actual
occurrence of the event.
As with other tangible items,
photographs are subject to proper authentication.
1001 and KRE 901.
See, e.g., KRE
With photographs used as demonstrative
evidence, proper authentication involves competent testimony that
the photographs constitute a fair and accurate representation of
what they purport to depict or the scene about which the witness
is testifying.
See Litton, 597 S.W.2d at 618; Parker v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 209, 213 (1997); cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1122, 118 S. Ct. 1066, 140 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1998); Clay v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 200, 204 (1993)(involving
videotape); KRE 901(b)(1).
Photographs are also subject to the
requirement that they be relevant and more probative than
prejudicial.
See, e.g., Gorman v. Hunt, Ky., 19 S.W.3d 662, 669
(2000); Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 676 (1990),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 831, 112 S. Ct. 107, 116 L. Ed. 2d 76
(1991); KRE 403.
Photographs of a scene may be excluded if it
has been so substantially rearranged or altered that the changes
invalidate the value and competence of the photographs.
See
Henderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 454, 460-61 (1974).
On the other hand, “[t]he mere fact that a photograph was taken
at a time different from the date of the incident in question
does not render it inadmissible if it can be established as a
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substantial representation of the conditions as they then
existed.”
Turpin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 352 S.W.2d 66, 67 (1961).
A variance in the accuracy of a photograph generally goes to the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.
S.W.3d at 669.
Gorman, 19
Proper authentication and admission of
photographic evidence is largely within the discretion of the
trial court.
Litton, 597 S.W.2d at 620, Tumey v. Richardson, 437
S.W.2d 201, 205 (1969); Parker, 952 S.W.2d at 213.
Stickler argues that defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of
the crime scene photographs.
He contends that the photographs
were not an accurate representation of the crime scene because it
had not been secured by the police to prevent alterations and Ray
Lute had “cleaned up” the area between the time of the assault
and the taking of the photographs.
A review of the trial,
however, reveals that several witnesses including Office Teal
Nally, who was the first policeman on the scene the night of the
incident, Alan Schiering, Ray Lute, and Roy Marshall identified
the crime area utilizing the photographs.
Each was questioned by
both the prosecutor and defense counsel about various aspects of
the events that night with reference to the photographs.
In
fact, it was defense counsel who introduced a few of the crime
scene photographs and Stickler himself utilized several of the
photographs and a hand-drawn diagram of the campsite area during
his direct examination.
Where photographic evidence is used for
illustrative purposes to assist the witnesses in describing the
events, as in this situation, the scene or object depicted need
not be exactly the same as at the time of the offense as long as
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it is an otherwise fair and accurate representation of what it
purports to be.
The fact that some items had been moved by Ray
Lute did not render the photographs inadmissible because the
scene was still in substantially the same condition.
Any
alterations go to the weight to be given the photographs rather
than their admissibility.
Moreover, Stickler was able to testify
that there had been changes in the scene and noted those during
his testimony.
He has not identified any alteration in the crime
scene as depicted in the photographs that materially affects the
validity of the testimony.
Defense counsel’s use of the
photographs during her questioning of the various witnesses
constituted an intentional trial tactic subject to deference by
the courts.
Stickler has not shown that counsel’s actions were
constitutionally deficient for failing to challenge admission of
the crime scene photographs, or that he suffered any prejudice by
their admission.
Stickler also alleges that counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to admission into evidence of the wooden stick
and fingerless gloves.
He argues that these items were
inadmissible because they were left unattended for twelve hours
after the incident and Lute admitted moving the stick.
Stickler
asserts that “there was nothing whatsoever proving that the stick
and glove in question were used in the alleged crime against the
victim.”
He points to the fact that the blood serological
examination by the state chemist was inconclusive for the EAP
(erythrocyte acid phosphatase) genetic marker or specific blood
type.
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At trial, Ray Lute testified that the wooden stick,
which had the name LEROY carved into it, was Stickler’s, and that
Stickler had told him that he used the stick to beat the victim
because Schiering was making too much noise and calling for help.
Lute also stated that the fingerless gloves belonged to Stickler
and that appellant had worn them the night of the assault.
Dr.
Miller, who treated Schiering in the emergency room, testified
that Schiering’s hand and wrist injuries and red marks on his
back were consistent with being struck with a hard, blunt object.
Schiering testified that he had been beaten with a pipe or hard
object.
Even though the inconclusive test results for
determining a specific blood type prevented the state chemist
from directly linking any blood on the stick to the victim, he
did testify that the tests revealed there was human blood on the
stick and gloves.
Any ambiguity present because of the
inconclusive aspects of the tests went to the weight of the blood
evidence, not the admissibility of the two items.
Stickler also
admitted that the wooden stick belonged to him while denying
ownership of the gloves.
Based on the above testimony, there clearly was
sufficient evidence to support admission of the wooden stick and
the gloves as being connected with the robbery and assault
offenses.
The probative value of these items was not
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
Defense
counsel properly attacked the lack of direct evidence linking
these items to the crimes.
In addition, the stick and gloves
were properly seized pursuant to a search warrant.
-10-
Counsel was
not deficient for failing to object to or seek suppression of the
wooden stick and the fingerless gloves.
Stickler also argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to present evidence impeaching Ray Lute’s testimony
concerning whether or not he was drinking on the night of the
incident.
He states that counsel should have called two of the
investigating officers, Detective Bo McKiddy and Lieutenant
Steven Wills, to rebut Lute’s testimony at trial that he was not
drinking that night.
In support of his position, Stickler points
to testimony at the preliminary hearing in the district court
during which Det. McKiddy testified that Lt. Wills indicated to
him (McKiddy) that Lute told Lt. Wills that he (Lute) could not
give a statement because he was intoxicated, but that he would go
to the police station and give a statement at a later date.
Lt.
Wills was called as a witness by the defense at the trial but
defense counsel did not ask him about Lute’s alleged statement to
him about drinking that night.
Det. McKiddy was not called as a
witness at trial.
There are several problems with Stickler’s argument.
First, Det. McKiddy stated at the preliminary hearing that he had
no contact with Lute until July 6, 1995, and that he never asked
Lute whether he had been drinking on the night of the incident,
so any information he had about a statement by Lute on this issue
would have been inadmissible hearsay from a third party.
Thus,
McKiddy would not have been able to offer competent testimony on
this issue.
Second, a careful reading of the preliminary hearing
testimony and Lt. Wills’s investigative report reveals that on
July 5, 1995, Lt. Wills went to the campsite and spoke with Lute
-11-
about inconsistencies between his June 25, 1995, statement and
the victim’s statements.
It was on that occasion that Lute
admitted not telling the police all he knew about the incident
because he was afraid of being charged as a participant in the
assault but that he would give a fuller statement at the police
station at a later date.
Lt. Wills’s notes state that at that
time, he observed that Lute had been drinking.
The reference to
Lute’s drinking by Det. McKiddy at the preliminary hearing
involved the July 5, 1995, conversation between Lt. Wills and Ray
Lute, not Lute’s drinking activity on the night of the incident.
There is nothing in Lt. Wills’s investigative notes suggesting
that Lute had been drinking on June 24-25, 1995, the night of the
incident.
The documents offered by Stickler do not support his
contention that Det. McKiddy or Lt. Wills could have offered
admissible, relevant testimony to impeach or rebut Lute’s
testimony that he had not been drinking on the night of the
assault.
Other testimony at the trial during the crossexaminations of Officer Nally and Roy Marshall also supported
Lute’s assertion that he had not been drinking on the night of
the incident.
the witnesses.
Defense counsel raised this issue with several of
Stickler has not shown that defense counsel
should have called Det. McKiddy or asked Lt. Wills to provide
evidence to impeach Ray Lute on whether he was drinking on the
night of the assault or that counsel was deficient in her attempt
to challenge Lute’s assertion.
Finally, Stickler maintains that the trial court should
have conducted an evidentiary hearing, appointed counsel to
-12-
represent him on his RCr 11.42 motion, and granted him a default
judgment.
All of his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, however, are refuted on the face of the record because
he has failed to present sufficient evidence indicating that
counsel rendered deficient performance.
Therefore, the court was
not obligated to conduct a hearing or appoint counsel.
In
addition, while RCr 11.42(4) states that the Commonwealth shall
have twenty days to file an answer, a response is considered
permissive, not mandatory.
Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439
S.W.2d 776 (1969); Ramsey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 399 S.W.2d 473
(1966); cert. denied, 395 U.S. 865, 87 S. Ct. 126, 17 L. Ed. 2d
93 (1966).
Stickler was not entitled to a default judgment.
The
trial court did not err in denying Stickler’s RCr 11.42 motion
without a hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Kenton Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Leroy Stickler, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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