SHARON MCCORD v. JAMES CORNELIUS
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 1, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003061-MR
SHARON MCCORD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE MARY L. COREY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-FD-001964
v.
JAMES CORNELIUS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: This is an appeal from an order of the Jefferson
Family Court which increased appellant’s child support
obligations, modifying them retroactively to the date of the
filing of the original motion for modification.
The appellant is
challenging the Jefferson Family Court’s order that the child
support payments are retroactive to July 15, 1997.
We affirm.
Appellant Sharon McCord and appellee James Cornelius
were divorced in 1995, at which time the appellee was awarded
sole custody of their three daughters.
Subsequently, on July 15,
1997, Appellee filed a motion to modify child support.
On
January 30, 1998, the trial court ordered that the parties come
to an agreement on a modified child support amount, or it would
remand the matter to the Commissioner to recalculate an amount
based upon both parties' earnings.
The parties never reached an
agreement, nor did the appellee ever present his 1997 tax return
to the appellant as ordered by the court.
Subsequently, on July
8, 1998, during a hearing on other issues, the Judge asked
whether the child support recalculation was ever agreed upon.
Appellee's counsel responded that his client had not “pushed” for
the modification and said he would get the tax forms to him.
The
court instructed the parties to add the motion for modification
to the issues for the Commissioner’s determination.
The Commissioner filed a report on September 1, 1998,
and recalculated the amount of child support.
On November 5,
1998, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to
recalculate child support, and ordering modification in the
amount recommended by the trial commissioner, effective July 15,
1997.
This appeal followed.
The appellant contends that the Court erred in
modifying the child support in favor of the appellee
retroactively to the date of the original motion for
modification.
However, KRS 403.213(1) clearly provides that,
“the provisions of any decree respecting child support may be
modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the
filing of the motion for modification and only upon a showing of
a material change in circumstances that is substantial and
continuing.”
See Pretot v. Pretot, Ky. App., 905 S.W.2d 868
(1995); Giacalone v. Giacalone, Ky. App., 876 S.W.2d 616 (1994).
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The law of the Commonwealth clearly states that retroactive child
support payments are due subsequent from the time of the original
motion for modification.
Id.
Thus, the trial court correctly
determined that the appellant must pay retroactive child support
payments as of July 15, 1997.
In addition to the provisions of KRS 403.212(1), the
Court’s order of January 20, 1998, put the appellant on notice
that the child support modification would be retroactive to the
filing date.
The trial court's order stated that it was a final
and appealable order.
From this point forward, the then unpaid
periodical payments for child support became vested.
v. Heisley, Ky. App., 676 S.W.2d 477 (1984).
See Heisley
In Heisley, the
Court stated: “Any payments which may have become due previous to
such modification constitute a fixed and liquidated debt in favor
of the judgment creditor against the judgment debtor.”
Id. at
477, citing Stewart v. Raikes, Ky., 627 S.W.2d 586, 587 (1982).
The appellant argues that the appellee is not entitled
to a modification of child support based upon the appellee’s
failure to act.
Foremost, the appellant’s argument is based upon
the appellee’s failure to turn over his 1997 tax return, which
appellant alleges was intentional, and which the appellant
contends prohibited any possible calculation of a modification of
child support.
The appellant argues that the appellee thereby
waived the retroactive child support beginning July 15, 1997.
Waiver is intentional relinquishment of a known right, or such
conduct as warrants inference of such surrender, and it is not
essential to its application that prejudice result to the party
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in whose favor waiver operates.
United States Fidelity and Guar.
Co. v. Miller, 237 Ky. 43, 34 S.W.2d 938, 940 (1931).
The
appellee did not intentionally relinquish the right to child
support or display any conduct where any such relinquishment
could be inferred.
Furthermore, the appellee did finally produce
his 1997 tax return to the Commissioner at the hearing for
recalculation of modified child support, yet the return was not
actually even used in the calculations.
Secondly, the appellant argues that the appellee is
estopped from collecting any retroactive child support based upon
his failure to act.
Estoppel is based upon the principle that
one who failed to act when he should have acted should not reap a
profit to the detriment of his adversary.
Ky., 408 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1966).
situation.
Sizemore v. Bennett,
Estoppel does not apply in this
The appellant has not shown that the appellee’s
withholding of the income tax form was detrimental.
The trial
court ordered that if the parties did not reach an agreement, it
would recalculate the amount, which the court did.
at all times obligated to pay the child support.
Appellant was
Thus, the
appellee’s inaction did not subject the appellant to any greater
obligation than she was already under.
Moreover, the appellee is
not reaping a profit in this situation, but is only receiving the
child support owed.
The appellee is raising three teenage
daughters on a meager amount of child support.
The appellee is
entitled to an increase in child support from the appellant.
403.213(1) clearly governs this situation with regards to
retroactive child support payments.
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KRS
The statute is not sympathetic to lengthy disputes
between ex-spouses nor is it bothered with defenses of waiver or
estoppel.
KRS 403.213(1) clearly provides that any increase
shall apply only to installments accruing subsequent to the
filing of the motion for modification.
620.
Giacalone, 876 S.W.2d at
The appellant’s contention that the retroactive child
support payments owed to the appellee should be barred because of
waiver and estoppel fail based upon KRS 403.213(1) and the case
law of the Commonwealth.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven A. Snow
Shelbyville, Kentucky
James W. Dunn
Connelly, Kaercher & Stamper
Louisville, Kentucky
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