ANITA M. CASTLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: October 27, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003048-MR
ANITA M. CASTLE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES A. KNIGHT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00020
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Anita M. Castle has appealed from the judgment of
the Johnson Circuit Court that convicted her of trafficking in a
controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a school1 and
sentenced her to prison for one year.
Castle concedes that she
failed to object to certain testimony by a police officer that
she claims was inadmissible hearsay, but she contends she is
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1411.
entitled to a new trial under the palpable error rule.2
While we
agree that the testimony concerning Castle having trafficked in
marijuana was inadmissible hearsay, we do not believe that a
manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
Hence, we
affirm.
Castle was indicted on January 20, 1998, by the Johnson
County Grand Jury for allegedly trafficking in a controlled
substance (marijuana) within 1,000 yards of the Paintsville
Elementary School on December 6, 1995.
At the jury trial held on
October 12, 1998, the Commonwealth’s evidence included the
testimony of Kentucky State Police (KSP) Detective Jeff Mayberry;
the testimony of a paid informant, Bill Stacy; testimony of a
chemist from the crime lab; and two tape recordings.
not call any witnesses.
Castle did
The jury convicted Castle and
recommended a one-year prison sentence, which the trial court
imposed on December 7, 1998.
This appeal followed.
Castle raises only one issue on appeal.
She claims,
under RCr 10.26,3 that the admission of Det. Mayberry’s testimony
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 103.
3
See also
RCr 10.26 provides:
A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
(continued...)
-2-
concerning her having trafficked in marijuana constituted
palpable error.
She contends that the palpable error affected
her substantial rights and that a manifest injustice occurred.
Det. Mayberry testified as the Commonwealth’s first
witness and stated that his responsibilities as a detective for
the Kentucky State Police included investigating drug cases in
the eastern part of Kentucky.
He testified that he knew Bill
Stacy as a paid informant for the KSP who lived in Johnson
County.
In reference to Stacy, he stated, “[A]t times he would
introduce me to people that were targets of the drug
investigation we were conducting up here.
Sometimes he would
make drug purchases from the perpetrator or he would introduce me
to them to make a drug purchase.”
The following testimony from Det. Mayberry is at the
center of this appeal:
Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney Brian Sergent:
Q 8
When we refer to you as the controlling
officer, could you explain to the Ladies
and Gentlemen of the Jury exactly how
you control the situation or what
safeguards you take to control the
situation?
Det. Mayberry:
A
Yes sir, The. . . when using a
confidential informant we instruct them
. . . we develop intelligence on persons
that [are] suspected of trafficking in
3
(...continued)
error.
-3-
drugs in whatever area we’re working and
in this case it was Johnson County. We
had information that Ms. King, seated
there, was trafficking in marijuana from
the, I believe it was the El Rancho
Apartments here in Paintsville.4
Castle argues, and the Commonwealth does not disagree,
that the testimony from Det. Mayberry was inadmissible hearsay.
Our Supreme Court in Gordon v. Commonwealth,5 clearly held that
allowing such testimony over the objection of the defendant
constituted reversible error.
While in many respects Gordon is
similar to the case sub judice, Gordon has the significant
distinction of the evidentiary error having been properly
4
While Castle did not object to the above testimony, her
objection to the next question was sustained.
Q 8
Officer, with regards to Ms. Castle,
here, the Defendant, could you explain to us
how that buy occurred or what were the events
that led up to the buy?
A
The. . . in this particular case, Mr.
Stacy was living here in Paintsville on Sixth
Street. He had met and became acquainted
with several people up there who told him
about Ms. King. [Ms. King and Ms. Castle are
the same person.]
By Ms. Chandler: Your Honor, I object.
By the Court:
Sustained.
By Mr. Sergent: Without saying what anyone
told you.
By Mr. Mayberry:
(Answer Cont.) Yes. Leading up to this
purchase, Mr. Stacy had come to know Ms.
King.
5
Ky., 916 S.W.2d 176 (1995).
-4-
preserved.
Thus, the Court’s analysis in Gordon did not involve
the palpable error rule.
In Gordon, the police were also using a paid informant
to make a controlled drug buy from a suspected dealer.
The
informant “had been ‘wired’ with a tape recorder [, but] this
device essentially failed and produced a tape recording of poor
quality.
As such, the evidence at trial was hotly disputed.”
The informant “testified for the Commonwealth that he had made
the cocaine purchase and [Gordon], testifying on his own behalf,
denied it.
Jury assessment of the witnesses’ credibility was
crucial.”6
The Supreme Court discussed the hearsay testimony as
follows:
Appellant claims reversible error
arising out of hearsay testimony given by
Detective Robert Link on direct examination.
The Commonwealth’s first witness was
Detective Link, a narcotics officer for the
City of Russellville Police Department.
Without objection, he testified that in the
course of a county-wide investigation, he had
reason to suspect appellant of drug
trafficking. He was then asked how he
proceeded to further investigate appellant.
In response, Detective Link replied,
On June 4 we did what’s called
preliminary surveillance of the
area around Sportman’s Lounge at
Fifth and Morgan, which we had had
quite a bit of drug activity go on
in that area. Mr. Gordon was
suspected to be selling narcotics
from the Fifth and Morgan Area.
6
Id. at 178.
-5-
Appellant, by counsel, objected on hearsay
grounds and an extensive colloquy then ensued
between counsel for the parties and the trial
court. In essence, appellant claimed that
the answer was based on hearsay statements
and indeed, upon voir dire of the witness,
established that the witness had relied in
part on information from others including
confidential informants. The Commonwealth
contended that the testimony was not hearsay
because it was not offered for the truth of
the matter asserted; that it was only to show
the course of the investigation. The trial
court overruled the objection.7
In reversing Gordon’s conviction and ordering a new
trial, the Supreme Court cited Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law
Handbook,8 Releford v. Commonwealth,9 Sanborn v. Commonwealth,10
and Hughes v. Commonwealth.11
The Court noted that “hearsay may
be admissible to prove why the police acted in a certain manner,
but not to prove the facts given to the officer” and that “such
information is admissible only if there is an issue about the
action of the police officer.”12
The Supreme Court concluded:
In the case at bar, it was not improper
to admit evidence that appellant had become a
suspect in the county-wide drug
investigation. This avoided any implication
that appellant had been unfairly singled out
7
Id. at 178.
8
§ 8.05 (3d ed., 1993).
9
Ky., 860 S.W.2d 770, 771 (1993).
10
Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534 (1988).
11
Ky., 730 S.W.2d 934 (1987).
12
Gordon, supra at 179.
-6-
and explained why the police equipped an
informant with a recording device and money
with which to attempt a drug buy from
appellant. The next question, however, was
utterly unnecessary and unfairly prejudicial.
There was no legitimate need to say or imply
that appellant was a drug dealer or that he
was suspected by the police department of
selling drugs in a particular vicinity. Such
testimony was admittedly based in part on
hearsay and was thus unassailable by
appellant. Admission of this evidence
branded appellant a drug dealer, violated his
right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, denied his right to be tried only
for the crime charged, and in general,
bolstered the credibility of the police
informant to the point where appellant’s
denial of criminal conduct would have
appeared preposterous.13
Based on Gordon, we believe the hearsay testimony from
Det. Mayberry was clearly improper.
If the testimony had been
properly objected to and if it had still been allowed by the
trial court, such a ruling would have constituted reversible
error.
However, we cannot conclude that this unpreserved error
meets the palpable error test.
As our Supreme Court has stated,
the requirement of ‘manifest injustice’ as
used in RCr 10.26 (formerly RCr 9.26) [ ]
mean[s] that the error must have prejudiced
the substantial rights of the defendant,
Schaefer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 622 S.W.2d 218
(1981), i.e., a substantial possibility
exists that the result of the trial would
have been different. Partin v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996). One federal
court has interpreted FRE 103(e), which is
identical to KRE 103(e), as requiring that
the error must seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial
13
Gordon, supra.
-7-
proceedings. United States v. Filani, 74
F.3d 378 (2nd Cir.1996).14
In Partin, supra, the Supreme Court stated that “upon
consideration of the whole case, the reviewing court must
conclude that a substantial possibility exists that the result
would have been different in order to grant relief.
Jackson v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 717 S.W.2d 511 (1986).”15
Based on all of the evidence in the case sub judice, we
hold that it is not likely that without the improper testimony of
Det. Mayberry that the result of the trial would have been any
different.16
While Castle contends that the Commonwealth was
attempting to use the testimony of Det. Mayberry to bolster the
credibility of Stacy, we do not believe that this isolated
improper testimony was so persistent and prejudicial to cause a
manifest injustice.17
While “it was not improper to admit
evidence that appellant had become a suspect in the county-wide
drug investigation[,] . . . [t]here was no legitimate need to say
or imply that appellant was a drug dealer or that [she] was
suspected by the police department of selling drugs in a
14
Brock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 28 (1997).
15
See also Byrd v. Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 272, 276
(1992).
16
See Renfro v. Commonwealth, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 795, 796
(1995).
17
Cf. Schaefer, supra at 219.
-8-
particular vicinity.”18
Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that
this isolated improper testimony was so prejudicial as to
constitute a manifest injustice.
Upon consideration of the whole
case, we cannot conclude that a substantial possibility exists
that the result would have been any different.19
Accordingly, the judgment of the Johnson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MCANULTY, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher F. Polk
Louisville, KY
A.B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Michael G. Wilson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
18
Gordon, supra at 179.
19
Cf. Jackson, supra at 514.
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.