LARRY ADKINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 11, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003019-MR
LARRY ADKINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. JACKSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-00082
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
BARBER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by Larry Adkins from an order
of the Jessamine Circuit Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42.
In August 1994 Adkins was indicted for two counts of
first-degree sodomy (KRS 510.070) and 206 counts of first-degree
sexual abuse (KRS 510.110).
The complaining witness was Adkins’
daughter, who was less than twelve years old at the time of the
incidents.
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth dismissed 186 of the
sexual abuse counts.
On January 30, 1995, Adkins stood trial,
and was convicted, on the remaining counts.
He was sentenced to
two life terms on the sodomy counts, to run concurrently, and
five years on each of the sexual abuse counts, to run
consecutively for a total of 100 years, to be served concurrently
with the life sentences.
sentencing issues.
On direct appeal, Adkins appealed only
The Supreme Court affirmed his sentence, but
remanded for entry of a judgment clarifying that the sexual abuse
sentences were to run concurrently with the life sentences.
On September 25, 1998, Adkins filed a motion to vacate
his conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42.
On October 29, 1998, the
trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, entered an
order denying Adkins’ motion.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Adkins raises seven issues.
First, Adkins
contends that the trial court erred in denying his RCr 11.42
motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
RCr 11.42
requires a hearing "if the answer raises a material issue of fact
that cannot be determined on the face of the record."
11.42(5);
RCr
Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742, 743
(1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S.Ct. 703, 126 L.Ed.2d
669 (1994).
If the record refutes the claims of error, there is
no need for an evidentiary hearing.
Id.
A hearing is also
unnecessary where the allegations, even if true, would not be
sufficient to invalidate the conviction.
Brewster v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 863 (1986); Bowling v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 545, 549 (1998).
In ascertaining
whether the movant in an RCr 11.42 proceedings is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, "[o]ur review is confined to whether the
motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively
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refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the
conviction."
Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322
(1967) (citations omitted).
Because, as further explained below, all of the issues
raised by Adkins are refuted by the face of the record or, even
if true, would not invalidate the conviction, the trial court did
not err in denying Adkins’ motion without conducting an
evidentiary hearing.
Adkins’ second and third arguments contend that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
In order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a person must
satisfy a two-part test showing (1) that counsel's performance
was deficient, and (2) that the deficiency resulted in actual
prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);
Gall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986).
Unless the movant
makes both showings, he cannot prevail in his attack.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
"The burden of
proof [is] upon the appellant to show that he was not adequately
represented by appointed counsel."
445 S.W.2d 878, 879 (1969).
Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
A reviewing court, in determining
whether counsel was ineffective, must be highly deferential in
scrutinizing counsel's performance, and the tendency and
temptation to second guess should be avoided.
Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311 (1998).
Harper v.
We must look to the
particular facts of the case and determine whether the acts or
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omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.
Id.
Adkins first alleges ineffective assistance because
trial counsel failed to object to a line of questioning by the
Commonwealth concerning Adkins’ testimony that his daughter’s
allegations against him were fabricated by his ex-spouse because
his daughter wanted to live with him “full time” and he intended
to seek sole custody of her.
Specifically, Adkins contends that
the Commonwealth’s questioning to the effect that “If your
daughter really loved you and wanted to live with you, why then
would it be necessary for you to go to court to fight for
custody” misstated child custody law. Adkins contends that
because the parties had joint custody of the victim, a
modification of custody would have necessarily required
additional court proceedings.
Mennemeyer, Ky. App. 887
See, e.g.,
Mennemeyer v.
S.W.2d 555 (1994).
Adkins alleges that
not only did the Commonwealth misstate the relevant law in its
questioning, but, in addition, “forcefully and continually
badgered” him on this misstated point.
We have reviewed the Commonwealth’s cross-examination
of Adkins, and the events did not occur as described by Adkins in
this argument. Adkins did raise the issue that his daughter
wanted to live with him and that he was considering filing for
residential custody of the child.
While the Commonwealth did
challenge Adkins regarding this claim, the Commonwealth did not
noticeably misstate the law as identified by Adkins, nor did it
badger Adkins on the point.
Trial counsel did not engage in
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deficient performance by failing to object to the Commonwealth’s
line of questioning relating to Adkins’s intent to seek custody
of the victim.
Adkins’ second allegation of ineffective assistance
concerns trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury
instructions.
Specifically, Adkins contends that the
instructions failed to adequately segregate the individual counts
so as to assure that a single incident of abuse did not result in
a conviction for both a sodomy count and a sexual abuse count,
thereby subjecting Adkins to double jeopardy.
Where the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that counsel erred by
failing to object to jury instructions, it must first be shown
that the jury instructions were given in error. Commonwealth v.
Davis, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 9 (1999).
The instructions in this case adequately distinguished
and segregated the conduct involving the sodomy charges from the
conduct involving the sexual abuse charges.
Kentucky favors
bare-bones jury instructions, with the details to be fleshed out
in arguments.
(1997).
Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817, 823
The instructions here met this standard, and, when
coupled with the closing arguments, the jury was informed
concerning the point that a single incident of abuse could not
support a conviction for both sodomy and sexual abuse.
Next, Adkins contends that subjecting him to lifesentences for his sodomy convictions was cruel and unusual
punishment.
Adkins alleges that “there was absolutely no
evidence produced at trial where the victim was shown to have
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been damaged either physically or mentally,” and “those convicted
of actually murdering an individual are many times sentenced to a
mere twenty years.”
“It is not the purpose of
RCr 11.42 to permit a
convicted defendant to retry issues which could and should have
been raised in the original proceeding, nor those that were
raised in the trial court and upon an appeal considered by this
court.”
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky. 788 S.W.2d 500, 501 (1990).
This is an issue which could have been raised on direct appeal.
Moreover, Adkins was convicted of two counts of sodomy and twenty
counts of first-degree sexual abuse.
After consideration of
concurrent sentencing, he was sentenced to one life term.
Under
parole guidelines, Adkins will be eligible for parole after
serving twelve years. See Land v. Commonwealth, Ky., 986 S.W.2d
440, 442 (1999) (citing Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 844 S.W.2d
391 (1992)).
Given the number of offenses and the gravity of the
offenses, the sentence assessed against Adkins does not amount to
cruel and unusual punishment.
See Land v. Commonwealth, supra.
(Sentence of life without possibility of parole for rape does not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment).
Next, Adkins contends that he was convicted on false
and perjured testimony.
Specifically, Adkins alleges that State
Trooper David Goldsy falsely testified that it took law
enforcement officials “a week or more” to locate him after
warrants were issued, thereby implying that Adkins had fled,
when, according to
Adkins, he was arrested only two days
following the issuing of the warrants.
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Adkins additionally
asserts that the Commonwealth “solicited this perjured testimony
in an attempt to further inflame the jury.”
Goldsy’s alleged
false testimony is not a basis for post-conviction relief by an
RCr 11.42 motion. “[P]erjured testimony will not be a basis for
impeaching a jury verdict in an RCr 11.42 proceeding.”
Commonwealth v. Basnight, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 231, 238 (1989).
In addition, it appears that Adkins did in fact quit his job and
leave the county in the wake of the indictments.
In the overall
context of the trial, we are unpersuaded that the alleged
misstatements of Goldsy, if in fact false, was of sufficient
consequence to alter the outcome of the trial.
Next, Adkins contends that a jury member was improperly
influenced by a member of the victim’s family.
Specifically,
Adkins contends that on several occasions, during recesses,
Raymond Reed, an uncle of the victim’s mother, was seen having
conversations with a jury member.
First, this is an issue which
could have been raised on direct appeal and is not a proper issue
to raise in an RCr 11.42 motion.
Brown v. Commonwealth, supra.
Further, only the violation of a constitutional right which
affected the legality or fairness of the trial would impair the
validity of a judgment or sentence.
404 S.W.2d 280, 281 (1966).
not rise to that level.
Dupin v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Without more, this allegation does
In Dupin it was alleged that one of the
jurors was related to a prosecuting witness.
Dupin held that
“[t]he simple assertion of the existence of this fact does not
raise a constitutional question or form the basis for relief
under RCr 11.42.”
The facts alleged here are no worse than those
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alleged in Dupin, and, in addition, there is scant, if any,
support for Adkins’ allegation that a member of the victim’s
family attempted to influence a juror.
Finally, Adkins contends that he was denied a fair
trial because an observer at the trial would listen to various
witnesses testify and then relay to upcoming witnesses the
previous testimony so that the witnesses could “keep their
versions straight.”
Adkins fails to identify who this person
was; he does not provide video citations referencing this
conduct; he does not provide supporting affidavits in
corroboration of this allegation; the likelihood of this
occurring over the trial court’s admonitions is remote, and, in
summary, this is a bare, unsupported, allegation.
“[M]eager
allegations [are] insufficient to require the circuit court to
grant an evidentiary hearing.”
S.W.2d 273, 274 (1971).
Wedding v. Commonwealth, Ky., 468
“Conclusionary allegations which are not
supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary hearing
because
RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the
function of a discovery.”
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975
S.W.2d 905, 909 (1998).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jessamine
Circuit Court denying the RCr 11.42 motion of the appellant is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Larry Adkins, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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