SHAWNTA ROBERTSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 19, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002940-MR
SHAWNTA ROBERTSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN R. JAEGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00132
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MCANULTY AND COMBS, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
This is an Opinion Affirming the trial court’s
denial of a motion for directed verdict and jury verdict of
second-degree manslaughter against Appellant Shawnta Robertson.
Robertson was pulled over during a traffic stop at 2:00
a.m. on January 4, 1998.
The record shows that Robertson was
suspected of drunk driving at the time he was signaled to pull
over.
The police officer instituting the stop stated that he had
suspicion of DUI and possession of an illegal substance.
While
in police detention, but prior to being arrested or handcuffed,
Robertson ran from the police officers who had pulled him over.
He fled onto a bridge crossing the Ohio river.
Robertson soon
gave up his attempt to flee and was arrested and handcuffed by
the police officer.
While Robertson was fleeing, the arresting officer
radioed for assistance.
Police officers from another department
coming from the Cincinnati side of the bridge got out of their
vehicle and joined in the chase.
At an undisclosed time during
or shortly after the chase of Robertson, a Covington Police
Officer, (Officer Partin), disappeared.
It was eventually
assumed that he had stepped into a gap in the Ohio River bridge,
fell through to the river below and drowned.
Apparently, Officer
Partin misjudged the width of an opening in the pavement over
which he was crossing while joining in the chase of Robertson.
Police officers who testified at trial stated that foot
pursuits were not uncommon in that location.
The officers stated
that they were aware of the gap in the bridge between the
pavement and the sidewalk.
Both Robertson and the arresting
officer stepped from the pavement to the sidewalk without
difficulty during the chase.
The witnesses testified that it was
necessary for anyone to step over this narrow gap in order to
move from the pavement to the sidewalk.
No witnesses saw or
heard Officer Partin fall from the bridge.
One officer saw him
vault over the barrier between the pavement and the sidewalk
“like he’d done it a million times”, but did not see him either
fall or make it onto the sidewalk.
Immediately after his arrest, Robertson was given a
Miranda warning.
He stated that he did not know that Officer
Partin had joined in the chase, and did not learn that he had
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fallen from the bridge until after he was arrested.
was later charged with three misdemeanors,
Robertson
driving under the
influence (first offense), disregarding a traffic control device,
and possession of marijuana.
Robertson was indicted in March,
1998, and charged with second-degree manslaughter, pursuant to
KRS 507.040, in the death of Officer Partin.
Five months later the badly deteriorated body of
Officer Partin was found in the Ohio River.
Following an
autopsy, it was concluded that Officer Partin had drowned.
No
evidence was available as to the cause of the fall.
Additionally, no evidence was found showing whether Officer
Partin was ill so as to cause the fall, whether he was conscious
when he fell, or conscious when he hit the water.
The
Commonwealth accused Robertson of wanton or reckless conduct
causing the death of the officer.
Robertson was sentenced to six
years on the charge of second-degree manslaughter.
At trial, both Robertson and the arresting officer
testified that they did not know that the Covington Police
Officer was attempting to assist in the chase, or that Partin had
fallen off the bridge.
Robertson testified that he did not know
Partin had fallen until some time after he was arrested and
placed into the police officer’s vehicle.
The law holds that “a
person’s state of mind may be inferred from actions preceding and
following the charged offense.”
S.W.2d 209, 212 (1997).
Parker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 952
The evidence showing Robertson’s state
of mind at the time of the charged offense shows that he was
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aware that he was under police detention, and that he
intentionally fled from the arresting officer.
Robertson asserts that his conduct did not cause
Officer Partin’s death.
Robertson was on the sidewalk of the
bridge when Partin decided to join in the chase and was not in a
situation which should have exposed the officer to the risk of
falling.
Officer Partin’s fall was the result of an accident,
Robertson argues, and was not intentionally caused by his
actions.
However, as the Commonwealth argues, Robertson knew or
should have known that when he fled from the detention of the
arresting officer, that the police officers would attempt to
follow him.
Robertson first fled into heavy traffic on the paved
portion of the bridge, before moving over the barrier and onto
the sidewalk.
His conduct exposed the chasing officers to the
risk of harm from various sources, including motor vehicles,
roadway defects, and accidental injury.
A person is properly found guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree where he wantonly causes the death of another
person.
KRS 507.040(1).
Robertson asserts that his actions were
not the cause of Officer Partin’s death, and that he did not act
in a wanton manner.
KRS 501.020 defines the terms wanton and reckless as
follows:
(3) “Wantonly” - A person acts wantonly with
respect to a result or to a circumstance
described by a statute defining an offense
when he is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists. The risk must be of
such nature and degree that disregard thereof
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constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation. . . .
(4) “Recklessly” - A person acts recklessly
with respect to a result or to a circumstance
described by a statute defining an offense
when he fails to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur
or that the circumstance exists. The risk
must be of such nature and degree that
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the
situation.
Id.
The jury was given definitions of both of these actions,
and could have found Robertson innocent or guilty merely of
reckless conduct.
The jury found that Robertson had acted
wantonly and should, therefore, be found guilty of second-degree
manslaughter.
A defendant should be held liable for a charged offense
where the elements of the offense have been proven.
KRS 501.060
provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Conduct is the cause of a result when it
is an antecedent without which the result in
question would not have occurred . . . .
(3) When wantonly or recklessly causing a
particular result is an element of an
offense, the element is not established if
the actual result is not within the risk of
which the actor is aware or, in the case of
recklessness, of which he should be aware
unless:
(a) The actual result differs from the
probable result only in the respect that a
different person or different property is
injured or affected or that the probable
injury or harm would have been more serious
or more extensive than that caused; or
(b) The actual result involves the same
kind of injury or harm as the probable result
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and occurs in a manner which the actor knows
or should know is rendered substantially more
probable by his conduct.
Id.
It is uncontroverted that Robertson had no specific
intention to harm Officer Partin, but the record shows that he
did engage in behavior that was unreasonably dangerous to
officers who chose to follow him on foot.
The specific injury to
Officer Partin may have been unforeseeable, but could be found a
probable result of Robertson’s behavior.
A defendant may be
found guilty where the act he performs or the injury he causes is
within the ambit of the applicable statute.
Welch, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 280, 281 (1993).
Commonwealth v.
In the present case,
Robertson’s actions rose to the level of wanton conduct so as to
support a verdict of manslaughter in the second degree.
The Commonwealth claims that even though Robertson did
not intend to kill Officer Partin, he was aware of and
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
his conduct would result in the death of another person.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1998).
Elliott
Robertson had
no weapons, and took no aggressive action against the officer.
He was running on the sidewalk of the bridge when it is presumed
that Officer Partin fell.
The fact that Robertson fled lawful
police detention at night, over a bridge and uneven pavement, and
through heavy traffic, shows that he wantonly or recklessly
exposed the officers chasing him to a substantial and
unjustifiable risk.
This conduct rises to the level of wanton
action.
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A person is “presumed to intend the logical and
probable consequences of his conduct.”
Ky., 979 S.W.2d 106, 110 (1998).
Hudson v. Commonwealth,
The record contains substantial
evidence showing that although traveling across the bridge on
foot was a safe and common occurrence, certain risks were
inherent in moving from the pavement to the sidewalk.
The gap
through which Officer Partin is presumed to have fallen is fortyone inches wide at some points.
The risk that someone involved
in the chase might fall through a gap in the bridge or otherwise
suffer injury was great.
Some type of injury to the officers
following Robertson was a logical or probable consequence of
Robertson’s actions.
Wanton conduct is not limited to certain
defined circumstances, but exists whenever an individual exposes
another to a substantial and unjustified risk of injury or death.
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to such a charge.
Hancock v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 998 S.W.2d 496, 498 (1998).
The Commonwealth asserts that Robertson’s behavior, in
running away from the officer who had performed the traffic stop
prior to any arrest taking place, was a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would have observed,
and that therefore Robertson should be found to have recklessly
or wantonly caused the death of Officer Partin.
The law is
clear in holding that a person be aware of and consciously
disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct
will cause the death of another person in order to be found
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree.
Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 860 (1985).
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Gray v.
“[I]f the defendant
did not intend to kill, and if his mental state with respect to
the victim’s death was neither wanton nor reckless, the death was
accidental and the defendant is not guilty of any degree of
homicide.”
(1998).
Elliott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 416, 419
Evidence which meets this standard must clearly show
that the defendant knew or should have known that his actions
were likely to kill another person, such as firing a pistol into
an occupied vehicle, or setting an occupied house on fire.
See
Nichols v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 932 (1983).
In the present case, Robertson fled police detention,
which was not the action of a reasonable and prudent person
following a traffic stop.
By taking such action, Robertson
assumed the risk that his wanton or reckless conduct could cause
injury to those pursuing him.
For this reason, the jury’s
verdict must be affirmed.
This Court notes that Robertson was not under arrest at
the time he ran from the police officer.
The uncontroverted
evidence is that he ran as the police officer was beginning to
search and handcuff him.
To support a conviction for second-
degree manslaughter, the prosecution must show that the
foreseeable consequence of a criminal act was the death of a
person.
Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 830 S.W.2d 877, 878 (1992).
The elements of the crime charged include both certain specified
criminal conduct and necessary consequences.
Id.
Running from a
police officer while being questioned is wrongful, as Robertson
was in police detention at the time he attempted to flee.
Robertson was not acting in a reasonable or prudent fashion when
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he fled from the investigating officer.
Thus evidence existed
under which Robertson could be found guilty of second degree
manslaughter.
Robertson claims that the trial court erred in failing
to grant his motion for directed verdict.
A motion for directed
verdict was made based upon the record and Robertson claimed that
the prosecution’s case and the testimony at trial did not support
a finding of wanton or reckless conduct on his part.
The
evidence at trial showed that Robertson fled police detention,
exposing officers pursuing him to a risk of injury or death.
For
this reason, Robertson was not entitled to have his motion for
directed verdict granted by the trial court.
Under Kentucky law, a directed verdict should only be
entered where it would be unreasonable for the jury to find the
defendant guilty of the charged offense.
Yarnell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 834, 836 (1992).
On a motion for
directed verdict the trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth.
credibility and weight of evidence are jury matters.
Questions of
Estep v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191, 193 (1997). The defendant
should be granted a directed verdict only where the prosecution
has produced nothing but a “mere scintilla” of evidence of guilt.
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 8l6 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
The
Commonwealth presented more than a scintilla of evidence
supporting a finding of guilt in the present case.
For this
reason, Robertson is not entitled to reversal of the denial of
the motion for directed verdict.
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COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MCANULTY, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Michael C. Lemke
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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