LANA RUE BRADEN (NOW WILSON) v. PAUL E. BRADEN
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RENDERED: April 7, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002890-MR
LANA RUE BRADEN (NOW WILSON)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1986-CI-000122
v.
PAUL E. BRADEN
AND
APPELLEE
NO.
1998-CA-003014-MR
PAUL E. BRADEN
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1986-CI-000122
LANA RUE BRADEN (NOW WILSON)
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE: The parties, Lana Wilson (formerly Braden) and Paul
Braden, were divorced by decree entered October 17, 1986.
They
are before this Court for the second time to contest the effect
and meaning of the property settlement incorporated in that
decree.
In appeal no. 1998-CA-002890, Lana challenges that
portion of the Rockcastle Circuit Court’s October 29, 1998,
judgment denying her claim for interest on Paul’s obligation to
pay her for her share of the marital residence.
Paul, appealing
separately from the same judgment (1998-CA-003014), contends that
the trial court gave him too little credit for payments made in
satisfaction of his obligation and failed to justify its
conclusions with sufficient findings.
We are not persuaded by
Paul’s contentions regarding the evidence.
We agree with Lana,
however, that the trial court misconstrued the property
settlement’s interest provisions.
Accordingly, in Paul’s appeal
we affirm, and in Lana’s we reverse and remand.
The property settlement at issue provides in pertinent
part as follows:
(2) It is agreed by Lana Rue Braden that Paul
E. Braden shall keep the house and lot now
belonging to the parties, 1111 Circle Drive,
Corbin, Kentucky. Lana Rue Braden agrees to
convey all her right, title and interest in
and to said property to Paul E. Braden; and,
Paul E. Braden agrees to execute a second
mortgage on said property to Lana Rue Braden
in the sum of $45,000.00, payable over ten
years with 8% interest thereon. Paul E.
Braden further agrees to pay the existing
first mortgage to First Federal Savings &
Loan Association of Pineville, Ky. Paul E.
Braden further agrees that if he shall at any
time sell the house and lot, that the balance
due on the second mortgage to Lana Rue Braden
will be paid off in a lump sum. If Paul E.
Braden does not sell the house within three
years, he will, upon request of Lana Rue
Braden, pay off the remaining balance of
$45,000.00 mortgage.
(3) Paul E. Braden agrees to execute an
unsecured promissory note to Lana Rue Braden
in the sum of $35,000.00 in addition to the
second mortgage on the above property,
payable over ten years with 8% interest
thereon; and, further agrees to carry life
insurance in the amount of $35,000.00 with
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Lana Rue Braden as the beneficiary thereon
until said note is paid.
In July 1995, Lana brought suit to enforce these
provisions.
October 1993.
She alleged that Paul had ceased making payments in
She sought the full principal balance outstanding
under both clauses plus accrued interest.
the property settlement had been nullified.
Paul maintained that
Lana, it appears,
had resumed living with Paul and their daughter at the Circle
Drive residence in December 1987 and had continued to do so until
late 1989 or early 1990.
During that period Lana had not
asserted any right under the agreement, and apparently she and
Paul had contemplated having their divorce annulled.
Based on
these facts, the trial court ruled that Paul and Lana had
mutually renounced the agreement, and thus that it was no longer
enforceable.
On appeal, this Court reversed.
Distinguishing between
post- and pre-decree attempts to reconcile, the Court noted that
entry of a divorce decree vests the parties’ rights and
obligations thereunder and that decrees are not to be deemed
modified absent a showing of mutual intent clear enough to
satisfy the requirements of CR 60.02.
No express modification,
written or oral, had been alleged, and the attempted
reconciliation, which had never been more than tentative and had
ultimately failed, did not, the Court ruled, provide a sufficient
basis for inferring that intent.
The Court’s order duly became
final (1996-CA-000699-MR; discretionary review denied, 1997-SC800 (01/15/98)), and upon remand, Lana renewed her suit to have
the agreement enforced.
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The contest in the trial court thereupon shifted from
the agreement’s viability to its consequences.
Paul maintained
that Lana assumed a duty under the agreement to deed her interest
in the Circle Drive property to him and that her performance of
that duty conditioned his duty to pay her.
Since she had never
delivered a deed, his duty had remained executory, and no debt
had arisen upon which interest could accrue.
An award of
interest, therefore, at least on the $45,000.00 portion of his
obligation, was inappropriate.
The trial court agreed: “[N]o
interest should be allowable until such time as a deed is
tendered.”
It is from this portion of the trial court’s judgment
that Lana appeals.
Paul correctly asserts that property settlements such
as his and Lana’s are subject, when deemed not contrary to public
policy, to the ordinary rules of contract interpretation.
KRS
403.180(5); Shraberg v. Shraberg, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 330 (1997);
Gray v. Gray, Ky. App., 745 S.W.2d 657 (1988).
There is also
some support in our case law for the position Paul urges.
In
Bryant v. Jones, 255 Ky. 606, 75 S.W.2d 34 (1934), the former
Court of Appeals observed that, “as a general rule, the purchaser
is to be charged with interest from the time the purchase money
should have been paid under the terms of the contract.” 75 S.W.2d
at 37.
In that case, a vendor of realty had promised to convey
an abstract of title and general warranty deed in exchange for
the purchase price.
Under those express terms, the Court ruled,
the purchaser was not to pay the purchase price until the
abstract and deed had been delivered.
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The vendor proved unable
to establish his title and to make the required delivery, and
thus the purchaser’s obligation to pay interest had never arisen,
despite the fact that he had occupied the property at the time
the contract had been entered and had since obtained title by
adverse possession.
Absent such an ultimate failure to perform by the
vendor, however, and unless the contract expressly provides
otherwise, possession by the vendee ordinarily gives rise to the
vendor’s entitlement to interest despite inconsequential delays
in perfecting the transaction.
Wells v. Barnett, Ky., 474 S.W.2d
882 (1972); Miller v. Cavanaugh, 99 Ky. 377, 35 S.W. 920 (1896).
See also “Annotation: Rights as between vendor and vendee under
land contract in respect of interest,” 25 ALR2d 951 (1952) (as
supplemented 1996 and 1999); 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser
§§ 307-312 (1997).
In more general terms, the Restatement (2nd) of
Contracts (1981) expresses the pertinent rules as follows.
§ 225. Effects of the Non-occurrence of a
Condition
(1) Performance of a duty subject to a
condition cannot become due unless the
condition occurs or its non-occurrence is
excused.
(2) Unless it has been excused, the nonoccurrence of a condition discharges the duty
when the condition can no longer occur.
(3) Non-occurrence of a condition is not a
breach by a party unless he is under a duty
that the condition occur.
§ 238. Effect on Other Party’s Duties of a
Failure to Offer Performance Where all or
part of the performances to be exchanged
under an exchange of promises are due
simultaneously, it is a condition of each
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party’s duties to render such performance
that the other party either render or, with
manifested present ability to do so, offer
performance of his part of the simultaneous
exchange.
As Paul correctly notes, it is common in real estate
transactions for the parties to promise to exchange a deed for
payment or for a promise to pay (a note) and for the performance
of those promises to occur simultaneously.
Under the Restatement
provisions just quoted, therefore, his duty to pay and Lana’s
duty to execute a deed were mutually conditioned on the other’s
performance or sufficient offer of performance.
See Mercer v.
Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 300 Ky. 311. 188 S.W.2d 489
(1945); Breckinridge County v. Beard, 233 Ky. 823, 27 S.W.2d 427
(1930).
In
comment a
to § 238, the Restatement observes that
[w]here the performances are to be exchanged
simultaneously under an exchange of promises,
each party is entitled to refuse to proceed
with that simultaneous exchange until he is
reasonably assured that the other party will
perform at the same time. If a party
actually performs, his performance both
discharges his own duty (§ 235(1)) and
amounts to the occurrence of a condition of
the other party’s duty (§ 237). But it is
not necessary that he actually perform in
order to produce this latter effect. It is
enough that he make an appropriate offer to
perform, since it is a condition of each
party’s duties of performance with respect to
the exchange that there be no uncured
material failure by the other party at least
to offer performance. Circumstances
significant in determining whether a failure
is material are set out in § 241. Such an
offer of performance by a party amounts to
the occurrence of a condition of the other
party’s duty to render performance, although
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it does not amount to performance by the
former. Until a party has at least made such
an offer, however, the other party is under
no duty to perform, and if both parties fail
to make such an offer, neither party’s
failure is a breach. . . . When it is too
late for either to make such an offer, both
parties are discharged by the non-occurrence
of a condition. A failure to offer
performance can be cured, if an appropriate
offer is made in time (§ 242). . . .
[emphasis added].
The question is not, therefore, as Paul maintains,
whether Lana performed her promise by tendering a deed, which she
concedes she has not done.
The questions rather, are whether she
has appropriately offered to make a deed, and, if not, whether
her failure to do so in these circumstances was sufficiently
material to suspend Paul’s duty to perform.
We are not persuaded
that the circumstances of this case justify Paul’s reliance on
Lana’s purported failure to tender a deed.
First, the agreement does not expressly provide that
Lana is to tender a deed.
It provides rather that she will
convey her right, title and interest in the property.
Lana
testified without contradiction that she has been ready from the
day the property settlement was entered to sign a deed.
Her
impression, however, was that Paul, who is a lawyer and who
oversaw the drafting of the property settlement, was to prepare
the deed along with the mortgage that he was to give to her in
exchange.
the issue.
Paul never took those steps, and Lana did not force
She remained ready, however, as Paul apparently knew,
to execute a deed at any time.
Nothing that contradicts this
testimony appears in the record.
We thus believe that Lana has
adequately offered to perform, and that Paul’s failure to perform
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is not excused by the alleged non-occurrence of a condition
precedent.
Even if Lana be deemed to have failed to offer
performance, moreover, by failing to draft her own deed and to
proffer it, the failure in these circumstances was immaterial.
Section 241 of the Restatement (2nd) of Contracts (1981)
addresses this point:
In determining whether a failure to render or
to offer performance is material, the
following circumstances are significant: (a)
the extent to which the injured party will be
deprived of the benefit which he reasonable
expected; (b) the extent to which the injured
party can be adequately compensated for the
part of that benefit of which he will be
deprived; (c) the extent to which the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform
will suffer forfeiture; (d) the likelihood
that the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform will cure his failure, taking
account of all the circumstances including
any reasonable assurances; (e) the extent to
which the behavior of the party failing to
perform or to offer to perform comports with
standards of good faith and fair dealing.
Applying these factors in the order presented, we may
observe the following:
(a) Paul has not alleged the loss of any benefit from the delay
in completing the transfer of the real property.
Lana had
surrendered possession of the house to Paul even before entry of
the property settlement, and since then has apparently posed no
obstacle to Paul’s either transferring it or encumbering it,
provided of course that he first pay her or give her the agreed
upon mortgage.
(b) Paul, having not been injured, has no need of compensation.
(c) Lana, on the other hand, has suffered a significant loss: the
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loss of the use of the money Paul agreed to pay her.
As
compensation for that loss, Paul agreed to pay interest.
A
finding at this late date that he is to be excused from interest
payments would thus entail a large forfeiture for Lana.
(d) No reason has been suggested to doubt Lana’s assurances that
she will deliver a deed as soon as Paul is willing to perform his
part of the settlement.
(e) The record provides no reason to think that Lana has not
behaved in good faith and with fairness.
On the contrary, it
appears that Lana has refrained for several years, for Paul’s
sake and the sake of their children, from insisting that Paul
comply with the settlement despite a certain amount of resulting
hardship to herself.
In these circumstances, Lana’s alleged
failure to proffer a deed cannot be said to have borne materially
on the parties’ agreement and thus does not discharge any portion
of Paul’s duty to pay interest.
Cf. Wells v. Barnett, supra.
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the judgment denying
Lana’s claim for interest and remand for a new judgment
recognizing that claim.
As appellant in his turn, Paul maintains that the trial
court failed to give him credit for amounts he has paid toward
the satisfaction of his $80,000.00 total obligation.
At the
hearing on these matters, Lana presented a payment summary, which
she claimed showed the entire amount Paul had paid her pursuant
to their agreement broken down by year.
Much of the hearing
involved testimony concerning the payment amounts reflected on
that summary, and the trial court incorporated the summary
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without change in its findings of fact.
Following trial, Paul
moved pursuant to CR 52.02 and CR 52.04 for additional findings
on these disputed amounts and now objects to the trial court’s
failure to provide specific reasons for rejecting his claimed
payments.
He also suggests that the trial court’s adoption of
Lana’s payment summary violates its duty to make independent
findings.
We are persuaded by none of these contentions.
Paul is correct, of course, to the extent that he
insists that the trial court is required independently to assess
the evidence and to make findings based on that assessment.
Delegations of the duty to make findings of fact, even the
appearance of delegating that duty, has been consistently
criticized.
Callahan v. Callahan, Ky., 579 S.W.2d 385 (1979).
Where it is clear, however, that the trial court’s adoption of a
document prepared by a party is a consequence of, rather than in
lieu of, the court’s independent assessment of the evidence, the
adoption is not improper.
628 (1982).
Bingham v. Bingham, Ky., 628 S.W.2d
That is the case here.
The trial court’s findings,
of which Lana’s summary is only a part, clearly indicate the
court’s belief that Paul did not present a preponderance of
evidence on any of the disputed payments.
The adoption of Lana’s
payment summary, then, as a convenient recapitulation of the
court’s findings, was not improper.
Paul is also correct that CR 52 requires that there be
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings and
that the trial court (preferably before but definitely after a
proper request that it do so) make all the findings necessary to
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support its conclusions.
(1997).
Eiland v. Ferrell, Ky., 937 S.W.2d 713
This latter is not a requirement, however, that the
trial court explain its credibility determinations or its
weighing of the evidentiary facts.
Lawson v. Loid, Ky., 896
S.W.2d 1 (1995); Cherry v. Cherry, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 423 (1982).
It is a requirement, rather, that there be a finding on all the
elements underlying the legal conclusion at issue so that a
reviewing court can understand and assess that conclusion.
Eiland v. Ferrell, supra.
Here, the trial court satisfied these
requirements.
The enforceability of the property settlement having
been upheld during the previous appeal, Paul was presumptively
liable for $80,000.00 plus interest from the date the settlement
was entered.
Payment is an affirmative defense to this
liability, the burden of proving which was Paul’s.
CR 8.03;
George v. Vaughan, 308 Ky. 439, 214 S.W.2d 386 (1948).
Paul
testified that he made certain payments, that Lana converted to
her own use one of his bank accounts and the proceeds from an
insurance policy, and that he gave Lana certain shares of stock.
He presented literally no documentary support for these
assertions.
The only extrinsic evidence he proffered was the
initial, unverified estimate by Lana’s counsel of the payments he
had made during 1987.
admits.
This estimate was more than Lana now
Lana testified, on the other hand, that Paul did not
make some of the payments he claimed, that her initial estimate
had proved wrong, and that the bank account and insurance policy
proceeds had been used for repairs to Paul’s house.
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She admitted
that Paul had given her the stock certificate, but explained
that, because the shares were not properly transferred, she had
never become the beneficial owner.
She documented the payments
she admitted having received and described circumstances in her
relationship with Paul which could be thought to account for his
refusal to abide by the settlement.
The trial court found that
Paul had made the payments Lana documented and reduced his
liability accordingly.
It indicated that Paul had not borne his
burden of proof on his additional claims.
These findings, which
are complete and not clearly erroneous, are supported by
substantial evidence of probative value.
therefore, on appeal.
They are to be upheld,
Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442
(1986); Rogers v. Kasden, Ky., 612 S.W.2d 133 (1981).
In sum, the parties’ property settlement included what
was in essence a loan to Paul of $80,000.00.
The loan, which was
partially secured by Paul’s house, was to bear interest of 8%
from the date the settlement was entered and was to be repaid in
no more than ten years.
Paul does not deny that he has enjoyed
the full benefit of his share of the settlement.
Nor does he
deny that since entry of the settlement Lana has been willing and
able to execute a deed transferring her interest in the marital
residence to him.
Lana’s failure to make and proffer a deed, a
failure which Paul could have had corrected at any time, has not
materially affected Paul’s interest.
We are persuaded,
therefore, that Lana’s failure does not provide grounds for
relieving Paul of his obligation to pay Lana the full value of
her loan.
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We are also persuaded that the trial court did not
clearly err in determining the extent to which Paul has satisfied
his obligation to repay the loan.
Although, as is so often the
case following a divorce, the parties differed, sometimes
painfully so, in their recollections and interpretations of the
facts, there was substantial evidence to support all of the trial
court’s findings, which in turn fully justified its conclusions.
For these reasons, in appeal no. 1998-CA-002890 we reverse the
October 29, 1998, judgment of the Rockcastle Circuit Court to the
extent that it denied Lana’s claim for interest.
new judgment that awards interest in full.
we affirm.
We remand for a
In all other respects
In appeal no. 1998-CA-003014, we affirm the same
judgment, subject to the partial reversal just ordered.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/APPELLANT:
Jean Chenault Logue
Ecton and Chenault
Richmond, Kentucky
Robert M. Braden
Corbin, Kentucky
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