HUGH APPLEBY, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 21, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002875-MR
HUGH APPLEBY, JR.
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 98-CR-00065 AND 98-CR-00066
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; KNOPF and McANULTY, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
by the Russell Circuit Court.
Appellant was convicted by a jury
of first-degree sexual abuse and of being a second-degree
persistent felony offender (PFO II).
the court imposed a ten-year sentence.
The jury recommended and
On appeal, appellant
contends (1) that the court erred by admitting certain evidence
and by failing to properly instruct the jury, (2) that
prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and (3) that the verdict was
coerced.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
The parents of a ten-year-old boy, A.B., reported his
suspected sexual abuse to the Kentucky State Police.
Detective
Lisa Rudzinski interviewed the child, his parents, and appellant.
As a result of her investigation, Detective Rudzinski presented
the case to the Russell County Grand Jury, which returned an
indictment charging appellant with first-degree sexual abuse.
At trial, A.B. testified regarding particular events
that occurred while he was at his grandmother’s home during the
early spring of 1998.
The child recalled an occasion when
appellant entered the bathroom and lowered his pants while the
child was seated on the commode.
The child described to the jury
how appellant instructed him to spread his legs and touched his
“private area.”
According to the child, while appellant kept his
hand bearing down on the child’s shoulder, “[s]omething just shot
out of him.
private.”
I don’t know what it was . . . . [c]ame from his
Detective Rudzinski also testified regarding the
portion of her investigative report which concerned the
“bathroom” incident.
At the conclusion of the trial the jury
convicted appellant, and he was sentenced to serve ten years’
imprisonment.
This appeal followed.
First, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury as to the lesser included offense of
attempt to commit first-degree sexual abuse.
Appellant argues
that the evidence would have supported a finding that something
other than a completed act of sexual abuse occurred, or that he
had contemplated such an act but stopped short of carrying his
plan to fruition.
warranted.
Thus, he urges that an attempt instruction was
We disagree.
We agree with the trial court that the testimony at
trial was not so equivocal that it left a lingering doubt as to
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whether appellant merely started but did not complete the charged
offense.
We are mindful that
[o]ur law requires the court to give
instructions “applicable to every state of
case covered by the indictment and deducible
from or supported to any extent by the
testimony.” Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329
S.W.2d 57, 60 (1959). It is irrelevant that
the evidence from the parties does not
indicate the need for a particular
instruction. The determination of what
issues to submit to the jury should be made
based upon the totality of the evidence.
Reed v. Commonwealth, Ky., 738 S.W.2d 818, 822 (1987).
Here, appellant denied ever having touched the child in
a sexual manner or entered the bathroom wherein A.B. claimed to
have been sexually abused.
In short, appellant effectively
denied having engaged in any criminal act and, at the close of
the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, he moved the court for a
directed verdict of acquittal, claiming that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that any offense occurred.
During a bench conference regarding the motion, the
trial judge paraphrased the substance of the victim’s testimony
as follows:
Alright, here’s what he said, I took
copious notes as always. It was related it
was in the Spring, he was at his
grandmother’s house and he was using the
bathroom, the defendant walked in on him,
asked him to spread his legs. He touched him
around his stomach and he touched a little
bit in the private area. Then . . . the
testimony the defendant ejaculated. Some
activity and something shot out of him from
the private area, he felt a grasp.
I believe, of course, the appropriate
definition that’s set forth for sexual
contact means any touching of the sexual or
other intimate parts of a person done for the
purpose of gratifying the sexual desires of
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either party, and so forth. It did, if you
accept that testimony. I’m not saying it’s
the gospel truth or anything but I think
there’s sufficient evidence to proceed. The
motion for a directed verdict is hereby
overruled.
The court’s summary of the facts is fully supported by the
record.
It is therefore clear that the court did not err by
failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempt, as
the evidence established either that no offense occurred, or that
the charged offense was completed.
There was simply no basis in
the evidence to support an instruction on the lesser included
offense of attempt.
Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
admitting certain evidence which was previously ordered excluded.
We disagree.
As noted earlier, A.B. testified that appellant entered
the bathroom, commanded him to spread his legs, touched his
“private parts” and then, while holding A.B. by the shoulder,
sexually gratified himself.
However, Detective Rudzinski’s
written report did not include a specific reference to the
“touching of private parts” in the paragraph addressing the
“bathroom” incident, although it made such references in regard
to other incidents.
The detective concluded her report with the
following statement:
The victim alleged that the suspect fondled
the victim’s penis while the victim was
staying at the suspect’s residence. The
suspect also exposed his genitals to the
victim and asked the victim to put his penis
in the suspect’s butt. The victim did not.
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Detective Rudzinski further reported the date and time of the
alleged occurrences to be “[b]etween March 28, 1998, and April 4,
1998, at various times.”
Prior to trial, the court ruled that the portions of
Detective Rudzinski’s notes that did not specifically address the
“bathroom” incident were inadmissible.
Accordingly, her
testimony on direct was confined to the specific paragraph
dealing with the bathroom incident.
However, when the detective
was called as a witness by the defense, she was presented with
her entire report and counsel asked whether, “[a]t any time, at
least on that investigation, that you have there, that you typed
up and you reported, and in the grand jury concerning the
bathroom, at any time, in there, was there any mention from
[A.B.] to you about being touched on any of his private areas?”
(Emphasis added.)
Although the detective limited her response
specifically to the statements regarding the “bathroom” incident,
upon cross-examination the Commonwealth delved further into the
report’s contents as a whole:
COMMONWEALTH: Is anywhere in there in your
report does it refer to him touching his
private part . . . ?
DEFENSE: Objection Your Honor.
COURT: You can approach.
COMMONWEALTH: He’s opened the door judge.
COURT: I’m going to permit the question.
DEFENSE: Again we would strongly, object
. . . for the record.
COURT: Overruled.
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COMMONWEALTH: Does, stated in your report
anywhere that he touched his private area or
anything to that effect?
. . . .
COMMONWEALTH: Did [A.B.] state that the
defendant touched his private part?
DEFENSE: Judge, it’s hearsay, it hasn’t been
. . . .
COURT: Overruled, it’s been opened, you
opened the door. Overruled.
DETECTIVE: It does state that in my report,
yes.
COMMONWEALTH: Could you read that?
COURT: No, sustained.
to the reading of it.
Objection sustained as
COMMONWEALTH: Okay, did you state in your
report that [A.B.] stated Appleby touched my
private . . . ?
DEFENSE: Judge?
COURT: Objection sustained.
COMMONWEALTH: No further questions.
Appellant argues the trial court erred by permitting
the Commonwealth to pursue the quoted line of questioning, in
contravention to its own prior ruling.
However, appellant’s
counsel clearly opened the door for the Commonwealth to inquire
whether the report, as a whole, contained any reference to A.B.
having stated that appellant had touched his private areas by
asking the detective whether, “at any time, in [her report], was
there any mention from [the victim] to you about being touched on
any of his private areas?”
To conclude otherwise would sanction
the defense in misleading the jury to believe that A.B. never
made any allegations to the detective of conduct of this nature.
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Moreover, our supreme court “has repeatedly held that,
when the defendant only introduces part of a document or record,
the Commonwealth can introduce other portions to refute that
offered by the defendant.”
Crane v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833
S.W.2d 813, 817 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1069, 113 S.Ct.
1020, 122 L.Ed.2d 167 (1993).
As such, we believe that when
appellant advanced a wide-open inquiry into the contents of the
detective’s report, the Commonwealth became entitled to pursue
that line of examination on cross-examination.
In other words,
since appellant chose to delve into the report’s entire contents
on direct examination, it was entirely proper for the trial court
to then permit the Commonwealth, on cross-examination, to inquire
into other matters included within the report and relevant to the
issues at trial.
Next, appellant contends that the Commonwealth engaged
in prosecutorial misconduct by impermissibly bolstering and
rehabilitating Detective Rudzinski’s testimony.
However, since
this argument merely reiterates the above-addressed contention,
that the trial court erred in ruling that appellant opened the
door to further inquiry into the detective’s written report, we
need not readdress this issue in a different context.
Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
failing to grant his motion for a mistrial, resulting in the jury
being coerced to reach a verdict.
We disagree.
After deliberating for three hours, the jury sent a
note to the judge stating “[w]e’re at a dead-end.
if we never agree on a verdict?”
What happens
The court responded by reading
the jury the charge set forth in RCr 9.57(1), and the jury
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retired for further deliberations.
Approximately one hour later,
the jurors informed the court they were “deadlocked.”
At this
point, appellant made a motion for a mistrial which the court
denied.
Instead, the court sent the jury out for dinner.
Following dinner and further deliberations, the jury returned a
guilty verdict.
RCr 9.57(1) states that the court may give a special
instruction to a jury if it is unable to reach a decision and the
court determines that further deliberations might be useful.
Here, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s
determination that deliberations after dinner might be useful.
Certainly, nothing about the court’s decision smacks of coercion.
Moreover, the instruction given to the jury conformed to RCr
9.57(1).
Hence, we conclude that there is no basis for
appellant’s claim of coercion.
Finally, appellant argues that the cumulative effect of
the complained-of errors prejudiced his substantial rights.
However, we disagree since we have concluded there is no merit in
any of appellant’s contentions.
on his right to due process.
Thus, there was no infringement
See McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
721 S.W.2d 694, 701 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059, 107
S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987).
The court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul J. Neel, Jr.
Louisville, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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