ROOSEVELT QUINNEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NOS. 1998-CA-002867-MR & 1999-CA-001335-MR
ROOSEVELT QUINNEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST A. JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000721
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART; AFFIRMING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: Roosevelt Quinney entered a conditional guilty
plea to amended charges of illegal possession of a controlled
substance, illegal possession of drug paraphernalia while in
possession of a firearm, illegal possession of marijuana while in
possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.
Additionally, the judgment was amended to
reflect that the offense of illegal possession of a controlled
substance was not while in possession of a firearm.
The court
sentenced appellant to ten years in prison in accordance with the
conditional plea agreement.
from that judgment.
This case consolidates two appeals
At issue in the first appeal (1998-CA-002867-MR) is
whether the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing on appellant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained
in the search of his residence pursuant to a warrant.
The
Commonwealth maintains that a defendant is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing unless he makes a preliminary showing of an
intentional or reckless false statement in the affidavit for a
search warrant.
The trial court agreed and denied the motion to
suppress without an evidentiary hearing.
We believe that the
court held the appellant to a standard he was not required to
meet in order to obtain a hearing on his motion to suppress.
Therefore, we reverse.
A search warrant was executed at the residence of
appellant and Bertie Yelverton.
The warrant was issued based
upon the affidavit of a police detective.
In the affidavit, the
detective states that he received information from a confidential
informant and from police officers that drug trafficking was
taking place at that residence.
The detective states that he
conducted surveillances of the residence on five separate dates
in January, 1997.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress on December 18,
1997, on the grounds that 1) the affidavit was based on
information provided by a confidential informant, 2) the
information provided by the informant was vague, 3) the affidavit
did not assert whether the informant had proved to be reliable,
4) the affidavit failed to name the person to be searched, and 5)
there was no probable cause to search the residence.
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In
addition, on the same date, appellant filed a motion to reveal
the identity of the confidential informant.
The Commonwealth
responded on January 8, 1998, asserting that appellant was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
That case held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments entitle
a defendant to a veracity hearing if the defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that the affiant knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, included
in the affidavit a false statement which was necessary to the
finding of probable cause.
Id. at 171-172, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 682.
At a hearing on appellant's motion to suppress,
appellant asserted that a hearing was commonly allowed under
these circumstances.
Appellant asserted a desire to subpoena the
officers who executed the search warrant.
The Commonwealth
argued that under Franks a defendant is not allowed a hearing of
any sort without an allegation of a false statement.
The court
agreed that Franks precluded a hearing on the suppression motion.
The trial court informed appellant that Franks required that he
make a preliminary showing of falsity before he would be entitled
to an evidentiary hearing.
The trial court ruled that it would
allow defense counsel to do “whatever she needs to do to make her
record,” but first required a written response from the defense.
Appellant filed a written response on January 27, 1998,
which asserted that the rule cited from Franks was not the
standard adopted for suppression issues and that he was still
entitled to a hearing on his motion to suppress.
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In June, 1998,
appellant obtained new counsel (his third) and again requested an
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress.
The trial court
overruled appellant's motion to reveal the identity of the
confidential informant on June 3, 1998.
In a motion filed on
June 10, 1998, appellant raised new theories for suppression of
evidence based on alleged delay in securing the warrant,
unreasonable time and manner of execution, and a search in excess
of the scope of the warrant.
Appellant filed a supplemental
motion alleging that the affidavit for the warrant failed to
establish probable cause.
The Commonwealth again responded that
appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on
Franks.
Thereafter, appellant endeavored to make a preliminary
showing of false statements in the search warrant affidavit.
Appellant filed a second supplement to the motion to suppress
evidence on July 22, 1998.
Therein, appellant asserted that the
search warrant contained intentional or reckless false statements
and omissions.
Further, he alleged that the affidavit was
insufficient to establish probable cause even if the
“deficiencies” he alleged were corrected.
The court held a
hearing on August 10, 1998, in which it denied the motion to
suppress on appellant's arguments regarding the delay in securing
the warrant, the time and manner, and scope of the search
conducted.
The court denied appellant the opportunity to make a
Franks offer of proof because appellant had not served the
Commonwealth with notice.
Finally, appellant filed a sealed
motion on August 13, 1998, in which he argued that he was
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entitled to an evidentiary hearing without a preliminary showing,
and in the alternative, requested to be allowed to make a
preliminary showing in an ex parte hearing.
On August 20, 1998, the trial court entered an opinion
and order.
The court determined that a Franks “preliminary
showing” was required in Kentucky, but Franks did not provide for
an ex parte hearing.
The court went on to examine the offer of
proof made by appellant regarding falsehoods and omissions in the
warrant affidavit.
The court concluded that none of the
inaccuracies or omissions could be considered deliberate or made
with reckless disregard, but were negligent or innocent mistakes.
The court concluded that appellant was not entitled to a hearing
on his motion to suppress evidence from the search.
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in not
granting a hearing pursuant to RCr 9.78.
The Commonwealth claims
that appellant received all of the hearings to which he was
entitled.
After reviewing the record of the motions and
hearings, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying
appellant an evidentiary hearing.
A defendant may challenge
various aspects of the search in seeking suppression, such as the
magistrate's determination of probable cause, as in this case.
See Beemer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665 S.W.2d 912 (1984).
Appellant challenged the probable cause determination and the
information provided by the confidential informant.
These are
different allegations than those which require a Franks-type
inquiry.
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Furthermore, RCr 9.78 grants a defendant a hearing on a
motion for suppression of evidence.
The rule states that if a
defendant moves to suppress evidence consisting of the fruits of
a search, the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing
outside the presence of the jury and enter findings of fact into
the record.
court.
“RCr 9.78 places affirmative duties upon the trial
The rule does not require that the defendant move for an
evidentiary hearing.”
473, 481 (1999).
Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d
According to RCr 9.78, if the accused at
"anytime" before or during trial makes a request, the trial court
"shall conduct a hearing."
S.W.2d 426, 433 (1982).
Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634
RCr 9.78 mandates that the trial court
hold an evidentiary hearing outside of the presence of the jury
on a motion to suppress evidence.
Thus, we find that it was error for the trial court to
require the defendant to jump through additional hoops to receive
a hearing on his motion to suppress.
An evidentiary hearing is
mandated under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The trial court
should have granted an evidentiary hearing to appellant on the
issues he raised in his initial motion to suppress as well as
those that the court entertained thereafter.
Although, the trial
court held some hearings on appellant's motions, the court never
permitted appellant an evidentiary hearing as specifically
requested.
In the second appeal (1999-CA-001335-MR), appellant
alleges that the trial court improperly denied shock probation on
the basis that the court lost jurisdiction over the case when
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appellant took an appeal.
A review of the trial court's order in
this case reveals that, although the trial court expressed
reservations about its jurisdiction, appellant's shock probation
motion was denied on the merits.
The trial court stated that
appellant, in his motion,
made no attempt to show any change of
circumstances since the time of sentencing.
At that time, the Court determined that,
based on the Defendant's prior record, it was
necessary for him to serve ten years in the
penitentiary. The Court has no reason to
alter that conclusion.
The court thereafter cited cases which said that it was not
within the court's jurisdiction to take any action once an appeal
had been perfected.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that it had no jurisdiction to consider his shock
probation motion.
He alleges that the court did not rule on the
merits due to the fact that it concluded it had no jurisdiction.
We find from the above ruling that the trial court
considered the merits of appellant's motion for probation and
denied the motion based on his prior record.
The trial court
ruled on the motion despite its conclusion that it had lost
jurisdiction.
A trial court may give multiple or alternative
grounds for its decision, and we are bound to affirm if any of
the grounds are valid.
Furthermore, the trial court did have
jurisdiction according to the terms of KRS 439.265 to consider
the shock probation motion.
Thus, appellant has already received
consideration of his shock probation motion by a court with
proper jurisdiction, and he is not entitled to any other relief.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel T. Goyette
Bruce P. Hackett
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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