LANCE HAWKINS V. JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE MERIT BOARD; JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY; POLICE MERIT BOARD
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RENDERED: March 3, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002753-MR
LANCE HAWKINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-2840
V.
JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE MERIT
BOARD; JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY;
and SPECIAL JEFFERSON COUNTY
POLICE MERIT BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, AND VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; GUIDUGLI and TACKETT, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an opinion and
judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court in a police
disciplinary proceeding.
The court adjudged that appellant Lance
Hawkins should be terminated from his employment as a Jefferson
County policeman, thereby reversing the findings and order of a
special Jefferson County Police Merit Board (special board) which
limited his discipline to suspension periods of thirty-nine days
and twenty days.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm in
part, and vacate and remand in part.
On January 19, 1995, Police Chief Leon Jones ordered
Hawkins to be suspended without pay for a period of twenty
consecutive days beginning January 20.
The suspension stemmed
from two separate incidents, as well as the failure to be
truthful during the ensuing investigation.
During one of the
incidents, Hawkins provided a twenty-year-old female with alcohol
and allowed her to remain on the premises where the alcohol was
served.
The other incident involved Hawkins’ failure to take
action or to leave the premises when marijuana was smoked at a
social gathering.
Hawkins chose not to exercise his KRS
78.455(1) option to appeal his twenty-day suspension to the
Jefferson Police Merit Board (regular board).
Thus, Hawkins’
suspension period was completed by mid-February.
Next, in March 1995, Hawkins was interviewed by
officers of the department’s internal affairs unit regarding a
complaint that he had shared a bed and had sexual contact with a
fifteen-year-old female.
Hawkins denied the charge, but after an
investigation the officers determined that he had been untruthful
with them regarding the incident.
As a result, the Acting Chief
of Police, Charles Loeser, Jr., advised Hawkins in writing on
April 21, 1995, that pursuant to the authority vested in him by
KRS 78.445(1), Hawkins’ employment was immediately terminated.
In accordance with KRS 78.455(1), Hawkins timely requested the
regular board to review Acting Chief Loeser’s disciplinary
action.
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Meanwhile, being dissatisfied with the limited
discipline imposed upon Hawkins on January 19, the Jefferson
County Judge/Executive ordered the regular board to investigate
that disciplinary action and other matters relating to Hawkins’
conduct as a policeman.
On April 19, 1995, after completing its
investigation, the board on its own initiative filed charges
against Hawkins pursuant to KRS 78.450.
These charges in part
duplicated those set out in the disciplinary letters of January
19 and April 21.
Further, the board filed a new charge of
dereliction of duty, relating to Hawkins’ alleged failure to
appear as a witness in court on numerous occasions.
Subsequently, for reasons which are unclear to us, it was
apparently agreed that the regular board members would disqualify
from hearing either Hawkins’ appeal from the April 21 termination
letter, or the charges filed on the board’s own initiative.
Instead, the county judge/executive appointed special board
members to conduct both hearings.
By agreement, the requisite
hearings were deferred until December 11 and 12, 1996, pending
the outcome of a felony charge on which Hawkins was acquitted.
First, a hearing was conducted on December 11 regarding
Acting Chief Loeser’s termination of Hawkins’ employment stemming
from the incident involving the fifteen-year-old female.
After a
recess at the conclusion of the hearing, the special board orally
announced on the record that although it was upholding the acting
chief’s finding of guilt in regard to Hawkins’ untruthfulness, it
would impose only a sixty-day suspension rather than upholding
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the acting chief’s decision to terminate Hawkins’ employment.
After being informed the next day that, pursuant to the regular
board’s regulations, a sixty-day suspension would result in
Hawkins’ termination, the special board reduced the suspension
period to thirty-nine days.
The special board then conducted a hearing on December
12 on the regular board’s new charge regarding the alleged
dereliction of duty.
At the conclusion of that hearing, the
special board orally announced that it was finding Hawkins guilty
of that charge, but that it would impose no additional discipline
beyond a twenty-day suspension.
The special board concluded that
the remaining charges raised by the regular board had been
resolved either on the previous day or by the January suspension.
On May 12, 1997, the special board rendered written
findings and an order suspending Hawkins for thirty-nine days
without pay, effective December 11, 1996, based upon the charge
involving the fifteen-year-old female.
He was also suspended for
twenty days without pay, effective December 12, 1996, based upon
the dereliction of duty charge.
Moreover, the special board
reaffirmed the discipline meted out by Chief Jones on January 19,
and it essentially declined to impose any additional discipline.
Once again, apparently satisfied with the discipline
meted out to him, Hawkins did not appeal to the circuit court
from the special board’s findings and order.
However, deeming
themselves aggrieved by the special board’s order, both the
regular board and Jefferson County, by and through its current
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police chief, appealed to the circuit court, naming Hawkins and
the special board as respondents.
On October 28, 1998, the court
entered an opinion and judgment reversing the special board’s
decision, and ordering the reinstatement of Hawkins’ earlier
termination.
This appeal followed.
At the outset, we note that the parties have raised no
issues regarding the special board’s twenty-day suspension of
Hawkins on the dereliction of duty charge.
Hence, we must affirm
so much of the court’s judgment as upholds that disciplinary
action.
We also note that the regular board clearly was not
entitled on April 19, 1995, to charge Hawkins on its own
initiative regarding the same incidents for which Chief Jones
disciplined him on January 19, 1995.
KRS 78.455(2) expressly
provides that disciplinary action taken by a police chief
pursuant to that statute shall be final, except to the extent
that a suspended officer or employee requests the board to review
the suspension.
Since Hawkins did not seek such a board review,
it is clear that the twenty-day suspension imposed by Chief Jones
became final and that the board could not revisit the same
incident some three months later by filing charges on its own
initiative.
Indeed, to conclude otherwise not only would violate
the express provisions of KRS 78.455, but it would also offend
all of our notions of fairness and due process, and it would
amount to arbitrary action in violation of Section 2 of
Kentucky’s constitution.
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Given these conclusions, it follows that we need only
address the merits of the issues raised regarding the special
board’s thirty-nine-day suspension of Hawkins relating to the
incident involving the fifteen-year-old female, and the circuit
court’s decision to set aside that suspension and to reinstate
Acting Chief Loeser’s penalty of termination.
First, Hawkins contends that neither the regular board,
nor the county and its present police chief, had standing to
appeal from the special board’s final order.
We disagree.
The regular board was a party to the proceedings below,
as it filed charges against Hawkins and thus was aggrieved by the
special board’s decision.
Further, since Hawkins’ employment was
terminated on April 21 by Acting Chief Loeser, his successor in
office, Chief Ricucci, was entitled to appeal on behalf of the
county and the former acting chief from the special board’s
decision to reduce the penalty of termination to a
thirty-nine-day suspension.
In short, both the regular board and
Chief Ricucci, on behalf of the county, clearly had standing to
appeal from the special board’s adverse decision.
See Duvall v.
Helm, Ky. App., 623 S.W.2d 234 (1981).
Next, Hawkins contends that the circuit court erred by
finding that the board acted arbitrarily both by making the
initial sixty-day suspension effective on December 11, 1996,
rather than on the April 1995 date when the termination letter
was served, and by then reducing the sixty-day suspension to
thirty-nine days.
The penalty’s effective date is important
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because a board regulation provides for the automatic termination
of the employment of any officer who is suspended for a total of
sixty or more days during a twelve-month period, and Hawkins
already had been suspended for twenty days beginning January 20,
1995.
Arguing in reverse, appellees assert that the board had
no authority on December 12, 1996, to reduce the period of the
suspension which it announced one day earlier.
Further, they
assert that the sixty-day suspension must stand as of April 21,
1995, with the result that Hawkins runs afoul of the board’s
sixty-day regulation, and the termination of his employment is
mandated.
We conclude, however, that this argument is unsound
and that the court erred by adopting it.
An administrative agency such as the special board
speaks only through its written records.
Oral statements made at
the conclusion of a hearing and transcribed by a court reporter
do not amount to such written records.
Instead, the board must
make written findings and issue an order from which an appeal may
be taken.
See Pearl v. Marshall, Ky., 491 S.W.2d 837 (1973).
Until such findings and a final order are entered, the board may
reconsider and change its decision.
See Union Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, Ky., 271 S.W.2d 361
(1954).
Thus, the special board clearly was authorized on
December 12 to reconsider and reduce the suspension decision
which it verbalized one day earlier, as it had not yet rendered
written findings and an order.
We hold, therefore, that the
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court erred by finding that the special board in any way acted
arbitrarily by finally fixing Hawkins’ suspension at thirty-nine
days.
It thus follows that it is irrelevant whether the
thirty-nine-day suspension period commenced in April 1995 or in
December 1996, as the automatic termination regulation is simply
inapplicable since the total suspension period in any event
amounts to less than sixty days.
Further, we note in passing
that the relied-upon regulation’s validity may be subject to
challenge on the ground that nothing in Chapter 78 expressly
authorizes the termination of a merit employee simply because he
or she is suspended for sixty or more days during a twelve-month
period.
See Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Board, Ky.,
751 S.W.2d 23 (1988).
Finally, Hawkins contends that the court erred by
finding that the special board utilized the wrong standard in
reducing his penalty from termination to a thirty-nine-day
suspension, and by finding that the special board’s decision to
reduce the penalty was arbitrary.
For the reasons stated
hereafter, we vacate and remand for further proceedings as to
this issue.
KRS 78.455(1) provides that if the board determines
that the police chief’s action was “unjustified or unsupported by
proper evidence,” it may set aside the order and impose a
different penalty.
In reaching such a conclusion, the board
obviously must support its decision with adequate findings which
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are based upon the cases’s particular facts and circumstances.
See City of Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 454
(1990).
Here, the special board found that a thirty-nine-day
suspension was appropriate in regard to the incident involving
the fifteen-year-old female, but it made no findings whatsoever
as to whether the acting chief’s decision to terminate Hawkins
was “unjustified” in light of the facts and circumstances
presented by the proof.
Such findings were statutorily required
before the board could set aside the acting chief’s penalty and
impose a lesser penalty.
Moreover, in the absence of such
findings, neither the circuit court nor this court may provide
meaningful appellate review of the board’s decision.
Thus, the
issue as to the appropriate penalty must be vacated and remanded
to the circuit court.
The circuit court in turn should remand
the issue to the special board, with directions to reconsider the
penalty issue in a manner consistent with the views stated
herein.
In summary, we affirm the twenty-day suspension meted
out by Chief Jones on January 19, 1995, as well as the twenty-day
suspension regarding the dereliction of duty as ordered by the
special board on May 12, 1997.
Further, we affirm the special
board’s finding that Hawkins was untruthful in regard to the
incident involving the fifteen-year-old female.
However, we
vacate the circuit court’s judgment reinstating the penalty of
termination set forth in Acting Chief Loeser’s letter of April
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21, 1995, and we remand the penalty issue to the circuit court
with directions that the matter be remanded to the special board
for adequate findings in that vein and the entry of an
appropriate order based upon those findings.
We further direct
the circuit court on remand to enter an amended judgment herein,
dismissing all of the charges filed by the regular board on April
19, 1995, except the charge relating to the dereliction of duty.
For the reasons stated, we affirm in part, and vacate
and remand in part for further proceedings consistent with our
views.
TACKETT, J., CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE MERIT
BOARD:
Mark L. Miller
Louisville, KY
Larry C. Ethridge
Louisville, Ky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY:
David Leightty
Louisville, KY
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