MUHAMMAD T. RASHAD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 19, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002726-MR
MUHAMMAD T. RASHAD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST A. JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-000564
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART - REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE AMD GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Muhammad T. Rashad (Rashad) brings this appeal
from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion
for credit of 293 days spent in jail prior to final sentencing on
several felony charges.
Having reviewed the record, including
the video recordings of the motion hearings, the parties’
arguments, and the law, we affirm in part and reverse in part,
and remand with directions.
In this case, Rashad was charged with five counts of
criminal possession of a forged instrument II (KRS 516.060),
theft by deception over $300 (KRS 514.040(1)(a)), and with being
a persistent felony offender I (PFO) (KRS 532.080).
After his
initial arrest he was released from jail but failed to appear at
his next court hearing.
A bench warrant was issued for his
arrest and Rashad was arrested on the above charges on
November 30, 1997.
Bond was set at $5000 full cash.
Rashad was
unable to post the bond and was held in jail until September 18,
1998, when he was sentenced to two years imprisonment based upon
a negotiated plea agreement with the Commonwealth.
To complicate
the matter, at the time of his arrest on the felony charges,
Rashad also had an outstanding district court arrest warrant for
misdemeanor non-support.
While being held on the felony charges, Rashad entered
a guilty plea to the misdemeanor non-support charge on March 16,
1998, and was sentenced to one year in jail.
Thereafter, on
September 18, 1998, when he was sentenced on the felony charges1,
he sought credit for the entire 293 days he was held in jail
(December 30, 1997 to September 18, 1998).
The trial court in
its judgment of conviction stated “[Rashad] shall be entitled to
credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing, said time
to be calculated by the Division of Probation and Parole.
532.120.”
(Emphasis original).
KRS
Probation and Parole had
determined that Rashad was entitled to credit of only 4 days on
his felony conviction.
The remaining days, according to
Probation and Parole, were to be credited towards his misdemeanor
sentence.
Rashad argued that the trial court had not followed
1
As a result of the plea agreement Rashad pled guilty to the
five counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument II and
one count of theft by deception over $300. He was senteced to
two (2) years on each offense, with the time to run concurrent.
The PFO I was dismissed.
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the proper law in this matter.
Based upon this argument the
trial court requested the Division of Probation and Parole to
check the records again to determine the amount of time which
Rashad should receive as credit towards his felony sentence.
After further review and after a hearing on the matter, the trial
court made a final determination that Rashad should have received
credit for ten (10) days on the felony conviction.
This appeal
followed.
Originally Rashad argued that he was entitled to credit
for the entire 293 days held prior to sentencing.
However, in
his reply brief he concedes that possibly he should only be
credited for the time from arrest (November 30, 1997) until the
time of the plea to the misdemeanor charge (March 16, 1998).
Having thoroughly reviewed this matter and the applicable law, we
believe this position to be accurate.
We agree with Rashad that
both KRS 532.110(1)(a) and KRS 532.120(3) apply to this case.
However, we do not concede that either would require the outcome
Rashad originally sought.
KRS 532.110(1)(a) requires that when
multiple sentences are imposed, a definite sentence must run
concurrently with an indeterminate term and that both sentences
shall be satisfied by service of the indeterminate term.
Thus,
once Rashad was sentenced on the felony charges his misdemeanor
charge began to run concurrently with his felony conviction.
However, prior to sentencing on the felony charges, Rashad was
serving time only on the misdemeanor non-support conviction.
Thus, his argument that the trial court must run the time for the
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misdemeanor concurrent with the felony time prior to his plea and
sentence is simply inaccurate.
KRS 532.120(3) requires that:
Time spent in custody prior to the
commencement of a sentence as a result of the
charge that culminated in the sentence shall
be credited by the court imposing sentence
toward service of the maximum term of
imprisonment. If the sentence is to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment, the time
spent in custody prior to the commencement of
the sentence shall be considered for all
purposes as time served in prison.
The commentary to this subsection indicates that “an offender be
given credit for all time spent in custody prior to the
commencement of his term of imprisonment.
The provision imposes
a duty upon the trial judge to see that the credit is properly
given.”
Again, we agree with Rashad’s contention that it is the
duty of the trial judge to give him credit for the time he served
in jail prior to sentencing on the charges for which he is
sentenced.
Obviously the question becomes how much time served
should be credited to the misdemeanor conviction and how much
time to the felony conviction.
He is entitled to credit only for
the time spent in custody during that period related to each
conviction.
He is not entitled to credit for time spent in
custody if that period was related to a separate conviction.
See
Martin v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 262 (1997); Belt v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 2 S.W.3d 790(1999); Handley
v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 653 S.W.2d 165 (1985); Houston v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 641 S.W.2d 42 (1982).
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In this case, Rashad was arrested and held on a $5000
cash bond on the felony charges.
Although he was also served
with the misdemeanor warrant at that time, no one can seriously
argue that he was being held solely because of the misdemeanor
offense.
As such, Rashad should have been credited with the time
served between November 30, 1997 and March 16, 1998, towards his
felony conviction.
However, once Rashad pled guilty to the non-
support charge on March 16, 1998, and was sentenced to one year,
he began serving the misdemeanor sentence and no additional
credit should be assigned to his felony charges.
See, Houston,
supra; Martin, supra; and Belt, supra.
On appeal Rashad also contends that the trial court
violated the separation of powers provisions of the Kentucky
Constitution by improperly delegating judicial authority to the
department of probation and parole.
Rashad admits that this
issue was never presented to the trial court and not preserved.
We agree.
However, even if it had been preserved, we can hardly
agree that by requesting the Department of Probation and Parole
to prepare a pre-sentence investigation report or by asking the
Department to recalculate Rashad’s credit time spent in custody
amounts to the improper delegation of judicial power alleged.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part that
portion of the Jefferson Circuit Court order denying Rashad
credit for time served after his March 16, 1998, plea and
sentence on the misdemeanor charge, and reverse and remand with
directions that Rashad receive credit towards his felony sentence
for the days served from November 30, 1997 to March 16, 1998.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Chief Appellate Defender
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Kathleen A. Pakes
Assistant District Defender
Louisville, KY
William L. Daniel, II
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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