RAUGHN EUGENE LEWIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: February 25, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002620-MR
RAUGHN EUGENE LEWIS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1997-CR-01644
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court denying motions to vacate a judgment of conviction
pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02.
We agree with the trial
court that the appellant’s allegations that his guilty plea was
not knowing and voluntarily entered, and that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel were refuted by the record.
Hence, we affirm.
The appellant, Raughn Eugene Lewis, was indicted by a
Jefferson Circuit Court Grand Jury on the charges of trafficking
in a controlled substance in the first degree (Schedule II,
Cocaine) while possessing a firearm, possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, tampering with physical evidence, possession of
drug paraphernalia while in the possession of a firearm,
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) while in the
possession of a firearm, operating a motor vehicle while licence
is suspended or revoked for driving under the influence,
attempting to elude police, no motor vehicle insurance, and being
a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO II).
Prior to the scheduled trial, Lewis’s counsel filed motions to
suppress evidence seized as a result of an improper stop and a
warrantless search of Lewis’s residence.
Following a hearing,
the trial court denied both motions.
Shortly thereafter, Lewis accepted the Commonwealth’s
offer on a plea of guilty.
The Commonwealth’s offer recommended
that the trafficking charge be amended to illegal possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree (Schedule II, Cocaine)
while in the possession of a firearm.
The Commonwealth further
recommended that the drug paraphernalia and marijuana charges be
amended to simple possession without the firearms enhancement.
The Commonwealth agreed to drop the PFO II charge against Lewis,
and to recommend the minimum sentences and fines on the remaining
charges.
The trial court accepted Lewis’s guilty plea, and
imposed the Commonwealth’s recommended sentences as follows:
five (5) years for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE FIRST DEGREE
(COCAINE); five (5) years for possession of a
Firearm by a Convicted Felon; one (1) year
for Tampering with Physical Evidence; twelve
(12) months for Illegal Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia; thirty (30) days for Illegal
Possession of a Controlled Substance
(Marijuana); a $50.00 fine for Operating a
Motor Vehicle While Licence is Revoked or
Suspended for Driving Under the Influence; a
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$35.00 fine for Attempt to Elude Police; and
a $500.00 fine for No Motor Vehicle
Insurance, to run concurrently for a total of
FIVE (5) YEARS.
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, March 13, 1998
In September 1998, Lewis filed a motion to vacate his
conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42 and/or CR 60.02.
court denied the motions without a hearing.
The trial
Lewis now appeals.
Lewis alleges that his trial counsel coerced him into
pleading guilty.
He further asserts that the guilty plea
proceedings reflect that he was not properly informed of the
facts underlying his guilty plea on the charges of tampering with
physical evidence and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.
During the plea proceedings, Lewis stated that he was not
aware of the firearm, and that it belonged to another person who
lived in the house with him.
Furthermore, he did not mention the
facts underlying the charge of tampering with physical evidence.
In reviewing this motion, the trial court rejected these
arguments, stating that each element of the offenses to which
Lewis pled was detailed either by Lewis himself or by the
Commonwealth.
In addition, the trial court noted that Lewis
waived any issue regarding sufficiency of the evidence by
pleading guilty.
A guilty plea is valid only if it represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to a defendant.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
A particular plea's
validity is determined from the totality of the circumstances
surrounding its making, not by reference to some magic
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incantation recited at the time it was taken.
Kotas v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978).
These
circumstances include the accused's demeanor, background and
experience, and whether the record reveals that the plea was
voluntarily made.
Littlefield v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 554
S.W.2d 872 (1977).
The trial court is in the best position to
determine if there was any reluctance, misunderstanding,
involuntariness, or incompetence to plead guilty.
Id. at 874.
Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of
verity.
Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 54
(1990).
We conclude that Lewis intelligently and knowingly
pleaded guilty.
First, there was no evidence that Lewis’s trial
counsel coerced him into accepting the guilty plea.
During his
guilty plea colloquy, Lewis stated that he was satisfied with the
advice of his trial counsel, and that he was voluntarily
accepting the guilty plea.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth’s offer
exposed Lewis to a considerably lesser sentence than he might
have received had he proceeded to trial and been found guilty.
Where a plea of guilty may result in a lighter sentence than
otherwise might be imposed should the defendant proceed to trial,
influencing a defendant to accept this alternative is proper.
Commonwealth v. Campbell, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 614, 616 (1967).
See
also, Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 860, 864
(1998).
Second, there was sufficient evidence in the record to
support the trial court’s acceptance of Lewis’s guilty plea.
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A
defendant who elects to unconditionally plead guilty admits the
factual accuracy of the various elements of the offenses with
which he is charged.
Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 724
S.W.2d 223, 225 (1986).
Therefore, Lewis may not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence against him on the charges which he
admitted.
In addition, during Lewis’s guilty plea colloquy, the
trial court went over the facts underlying each of the charges.
The Commonwealth represented the evidence it would have presented
had the case gone to trial.
Lewis made no indication that he
wanted to dispute this evidence or to withdraw his guilty plea.
Finally, our review of the record indicates that Lewis’s guilty
plea satisfied the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969).
Consequently, the
trial court did not err in finding that Lewis made a knowing and
voluntary plea of guilty.
Lewis next contends that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance during the suppression hearing.
He argues
that his trial counsel failed to properly research and argue the
suppression issue.
He contends that his trial counsel failed to
argue that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable, based upon
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 470, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 104 S. Ct.
2091 (1984).
Lewis also asserts that his trial counsel failed
to adequately cross-examine Officer Coomer regarding
inconsistencies in his testimony.
For the following reasons, we
agree with the trial court that Lewis failed to present
sufficient evidence to warrant an inference that his trial
counsel was ineffective.
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As noted by the trial court, a motion pursuant to RCr
11.42 is not a substitute for an appeal of the suppression
ruling.
The sole issue before the Court is whether Lewis’s trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance.
To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must show
that his counsel's performance was deficient, and that the
deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984); see also, Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37
(1985).
The standard to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel when a defendant pleads guilty is provided in Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985);
see also, Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 724 S.W.2d 223, 226
(1986).
Lewis must show there exists a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59,
88 L. Ed. 2d. at 210.
Based upon the record, we cannot find that Lewis’s
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Unlike the
circumstances in Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra, the Commonwealth
established that there were exigent circumstances which justified
the warrantless search of Lewis’s residence.
Officer Coomer
testified that he pursued Lewis to his home and followed him into
the house.
He testified that he observed Lewis reach into his
waistband and make a movement as if he were discarding
contraband.
After arresting Lewis, Officer Coomer saw spent
baggies on the floor which were consistent with packaging for
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cocaine.
A further search of the house turned up loose marijuana
and cocaine in a bowl and the gun on a cabinet shelf.
Although
the evidence was conflicting, the evidence supported the trial
court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress.
The result
would not have been different had counsel cited Welsh v.
Wisconsin to the trial court.
Furthermore, Lewis’s trial counsel thoroughly crossexamined Officer Coomer regarding the events leading up to the
search.
Moreover, there is a presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged actions of counsel might be
considered sound trial strategy.
80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90,
Therefore, in the absence of a showing
that some alternative action by counsel would have compelled a
different result, ineffective assistance will rarely be shown.
Robbins v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 719 S.W.2d 742, 743 (1986).
The decision to ask particular questions is a matter of trial
strategy, and we find no reason in this case to second-guess that
choice.
Lewis also argues that his trial counsel misadvised him
regarding the elements of the offenses to which he was pleading
guilty.
As noted above, Lewis presented no evidence supporting
this contention.
The record reveals that Lewis’s guilty plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered.
Therefore, the trial court
did not err in denying his motion to vacate his conviction.
Finally, Lewis asserts that the cumulative effect of
the proceeding errors deprived him of his right to due process of
law.
In view of the fact that the individual allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel are unconvincing, they can have
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no cumulative effect.
905 (1998).
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d
See also McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d
694 (1986); Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997).
Accordingly, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
denying Lewis’s motions to vacate his conviction pursuant to RCr
11.42 and CR 60.02 is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Raughn Eugene Lewis, pro se
Lee Adjustment Center
Beattyville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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