RAJESH G. SHAH v. JOHN R. CLARK, M.D.
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RENDERED: February 25, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002595-MR
RAJESH G. SHAH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1998-CI-000426
v.
JOHN R. CLARK, M.D.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This appeal arises from the September 23, 1998,
summary dismissal of Rajesh Shah’s medical malpractice suit
against John R. Clark, M. D.
Shah’s suit alleges that, by
failing to diagnose and treat Shah’s meningitis, Clark caused
Shah’s permanent injury from that illness to be worse than it
otherwise would have been.
The trial court dismissed the suit as
untimely under KRS 413.140(1)(e), the statute of limitations for
medical malpractice claims.
Shah maintains, among other
assertions of error, that the trial court misapplied the
discovery rule (KRS 413.140(2)) and the doctrine of tolling
during disability (KRS 413.170), both of which create exceptions
to the otherwise strict statutory rule barring untimely claims.
As there are factual questions persisting that are material to
the correct application of these statutes, we reverse the summary
judgment and remand.
The facts may be quickly summarized.
Because we are
reviewing a summary judgment against Shah, it is upon his account
of what happened that we must principally rely.
On the evening
of February 16, 1997, Shah’s parents took him to the emergency
room at Columbia Hospital in Frankfort, Kentucky.
Shah was
suffering from fever, stiffness, headache, and vomiting.
Reddish-purple lesions had appeared on his hands and feet.
He
had become weak and lethargic to the extent that he found it
difficult to walk.
Dr. Clark, who was on duty in the emergency
room that night, examined Shah and, when he could not determine
the cause of Shah’s symptoms, arranged to have him transported to
the Chandler Medical Center at the University of Kentucky.
Dr.
Clark’s examination did not indicate that Shah was suffering from
meningitis, but the transfer certificate did direct that Shah be
seen by an infectious disease specialist.
Shah was transferred
approximately 2 1/2 or 3 hours after arriving at the emergency
room.
Several hours later, during the early morning of February
17, 1997, a specialist at the medical center diagnosed Shah with
meningitis.
Shah remained under treatment at the medical center
for several weeks, during much of which time he was in serious
condition and unaware of his circumstances.
Before his condition
stabilized, Shah suffered extensive scarring, muscle atrophy,
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permanent pain in his extremities, and the loss of his right
index finger and two of his right toes.
Following his release from the Medical Center in late
March 1997, Shah learned that prompter identification and
treatment of his meningitis might have made his bout with the
illness less severe and might have mitigated its permanent
effects.
On February 10, 1998, he brought suit against Columbia
Hospital Frankfort.
He alleged that the hospital, by and through
its agents, servants, employees, and ostensible agents, had been
negligent in his care and treatment on February 16, 1997.
On
March 30, 1998, he filed a separate claim on virtually the same
grounds against Clark.
The two suits were eventually
consolidated, but it is only the suit against Clark that is now
before us.1
The trial court ruled that Shah’s claim accrued on
February 16, 1997, when his condition was not correctly diagnosed
and treatment was delayed, that being the point at which “the
fact of injury [was] known.”
The limitations period for medical
negligence claims being one year, the trial court ruled that
Shah’s claim against Clark was untimely.
The court rejected
Shah’s contention that the claim did not accrue until after the
end of March 1997, when Shah had learned that Clark’s failure to
diagnose meningitis may have aggravated the illness.
“The cause
of action accrued when the Plaintiff was treated by the Defendant
and there was nothing to prevent the Defendant from obtaining
1
Our authority to address the matter has been properly
invoked pursuant to CR 54.02.
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that knowledge. . . .
Since the Plaintiff knew or should have
known that he was treated by Dr. Clark on February 16, 1997, the
cause of action accrued on that date.”
The court also rejected
the contention that the limitations period was tolled during
Shah’s hospitalization.
Whatever may have been his incapacity
during that period, the court reasoned, it was not such as to
deprive Shah of the awareness that he had been injured, and that
awareness commenced the limitations’ clock.
Under this state’s rules of practice, summary judgments
are to be granted cautiously; they are appropriate only when it
appears impossible for the non-movant to prove facts establishing
a right to relief or release, as the case may be.
Because
summary judgments involve no fact finding, this Court reviews
them de novo, in the sense that we are to assess without
deference the conclusions of law of the trial court.
As did the
trial court, we ask whether material facts are in dispute and, if
not, whether the party moving for judgment is clearly entitled
thereto as a matter of law.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
For the reasons that
follow, we are persuaded that this strict standard was not met
and that summary judgment was granted inappropriately.
KRS 413.140 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) The following actions shall be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of action
accrued: . . . (e) An action against a
physician, surgeon, dentist or hospital
licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216 for
negligence or malpractice. . . . (2) In
respect to the action referred to in
paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this
section, the cause of action shall be deemed
to accrue at the time the injury is first
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discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been discovered[.]
Section 2 of the statute just quoted is a statement of the
“discovery rule” first applied judicially in Kentucky by the then
Court of Appeals in Tomlinson v. Siehl, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 166
(1970) and Hackworth v. Hart, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 377 (1971), then
adopted by the legislature in its current form in 1972.
Under
this rule, a cause of action does not accrue, for statute of
limitations purposes, “until the plaintiff discovers or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not only
that he has been injured but also that his injury may have been
caused by the defendant’s conduct.”
Perkins v. Northeastern Log
Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809, 819 (1991).
“Injury” is a notoriously ambiguous word in the law.
Among other things, it can mean either physical damage to person
or property or the wrongful invasion of a legally protected
interest.
Given this ambiguity, courts have had some difficulty
applying the discovery rule.
Before his cause of action may be
said to accrue, must the medical-malpractice plaintiff have
reason to think that his interest has been wrongfully invaded and
that the defendant was the invader?
Or does the cause of action
accrue, as the trial court held, as soon as the plaintiff has
reason to know that his person has been damaged, whether
wrongfully or not, in conjunction with the defendant’s care?
This problem was obliquely addressed by our Supreme Court in
McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Corp., Ky., 799
S.W.2d 15 (1990).
In that case the Court deemed malpractice
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actions based on patients’ deaths to have accrued at the time of
death.
The fact of death, according to the Court, provided the
plaintiffs with sufficient notice of possible wrongdoing to
impose upon them the duty to investigate.
dissenting opinion, id. at 20.
See Justice Lambert’s
Indirectly, therefore, McCollum
recognizes that, under the discovery rule, a malpractice action
does not accrue until the plaintiff has sufficient reason to
suspect a wrong.
Our Supreme Court reached a similar result in
Underhill v. Stephenson, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 459 (1988), where a
professional negligence action against a hospital nurse was held
not to have accrued under the discovery rule of KRS 413.245 until
the plaintiffs had acquired information suggestive of the nurse’s
wrongdoing.
This construction of the discovery rule is consistent
with that of other courts.
The Supreme Court of Florida, for
example, after wrestling mightily with the question, held that
knowledge of the injury as referred to in the
[discovery] rule as triggering the statute of
limitations means not only knowledge of the
injury but also knowledge that there is a
reasonable possibility that the injury was
caused by medical malpractice. The nature of
the injury, standing alone, may be such that
it communicates the possibility of medical
negligence, in which event the statute of
limitations will immediately begin to run
upon discovery of the injury itself. On the
other hand, if the injury is such that it is
likely to have occurred from natural causes,
the statute will not begin to run until such
time as there is reason to believe that
medical malpractice may possibly have
occurred.
Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 181-82 (Fla. 1993) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The alternative, as the
Florida Court observed, is to encourage everyone who has had an
adverse result from a medical procedure to “retain an attorney
immediately and start subpoenaing medical records.”
Id. at 181.
This does not mean that the statute of limitations
remains untriggered until the plaintiff becomes fully aware of
his cause of action.
Under this “discovery rule,” once a party
knows or reasonably should have known both
that an injury occurred and that it was
wrongfully caused, that party has an
obligation to inquire further to determine
whether an actionable wrong has been
committed. . . . The term “wrongfully caused”
does not mean knowledge of negligent conduct
or knowledge of the existence of a cause of
action. . . . The term refers instead to the
point in time when the injured person becomes
possessed of sufficient information
concerning the injury and its cause so that a
reasonable person would be put on notice to
determine whether actionable conduct was
involved.
Bradtke v. Reotutar, 574 N.E. 2d 110, 113 (Ill.,
1991)
(citations omitted); see also Gregory v. Poor, 862 F. Supp. 171
(W.D.Ky. 1994) (construing Kentucky’s discovery rule as including
this discovery-of-a-possible-wrong element).
Should the possibility of negligence have occurred to
Shah on February 16, when no one had yet determined what was
wrong with him, or even on February 17 when the specialist at the
University of Kentucky Medical Center diagnosed meningitis, but
Shah’s prospects for recovery were still completely speculative?
We are not persuaded that, as a matter of law, it should have.
Giving Shah the benefit of the doubt, as we are obliged to do on
review of a summary judgment against him, it seems reasonable for
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him to have believed, for some time at any rate, that his
distress was the natural result of a serious illness rather than
the consequence of negligence.
Just when he became possessed of
sufficient information reasonably to suspect otherwise is a
question of fact that must be tried.
There is likewise a question of fact concerning Shah’s
soundness of mind during his illness, and this question
implicates KRS 413.170.
As provided by that statute,
if a person entitled to bring an action . . .
was, at the time the cause of action accrued,
. . . of unsound mind, the action may be
brought within the same number of years after
the removal of the disability.
Shah maintains that the statute of limitations was tolled under
this statute while he was hospitalized because during that period
he was of unsound mind, being often feverish, distracted by pain,
or heavily sedated.
The trial court seems to have concluded that
the disability alleged by Shah is not the sort of disability
contemplated by the statute.
We disagree.
It has been held that, for the purposes of KRS 413.170,
“unsound mind” means “incapable of managing [one’s] own affairs.”
Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, Ky.
297 (1993).
App., 853 S.W.2d 295,
While proof of such incapacity may require more than
medical testimony of depression and emotional distress,
Southeastern Kentucky Baptist Hospital v. Gaylor, Ky., 756 S.W.2d
467 (1988), incapacity is nevertheless a question of fact that
does not depend upon a legal adjudication of incompetency.
Carter v. Huffman, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 690 (1953).
Shah may well be
able to prove that, even after his cause of action accrued under
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KRS 413.140, he was, for some period, mentally incapable of
managing his affairs and thus that the statute of limitations was
tolled.
This issue, too, then, must be tried.
Shah alleges two additional errors, which we shall
address briefly.
As noted above, Shah timely brought suit
against Columbia Hospital Frankfort and its agents and employees.
He apparently was under the mistaken impression that Dr. Clark
was a hospital employee and so did not bring suit against Dr.
Clark individually until the mistake came to his attention
several weeks later.
He claims that Dr. Clark should voluntarily
have made clear his relationship with the hospital, and, because
he did not, should be estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations as a defense.
Shah has not identified the source of
Dr. Clark’s alleged duty to volunteer this information, however,
and has not alleged that Dr. Clark made any affirmative act to
conceal his employment status.
Where a defendant is not under an
affirmative duty to speak, his “mere silence with respect to the
operative fact is insufficient [to create an estoppel].”
v. Alsabi, Ky., 990 S.W.2d 597, 603 (1999).
Gailor
The trial court did
not err, therefore, by permitting Dr. Clark to assert a
limitations defense.
Shah also maintains that he should have been permitted,
pursuant to CR 15.03, to amend his original complaint so as to
include his claim against Dr. Clark.
That claim would then
“relate back” to the date of the original filing and thus be
securely within the limitations period.
Although this procedure
for adding a party has sometimes been allowed, Underhill v.
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Stephenson, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 459 (1988), it is inappropriate
unless the added party acquired notice of the suit within the
limitations period, and unless unusual circumstances excuse the
plaintiff’s failure to bring his entire complaint in time.
Nolph
v. Scott, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 860 (1987); Reese v. General American
Door Co., Ky.
App., 6 S.W.3d 380 (1998).
Shah does not allege
that Dr. Clark had timely notice of the suit, nor are there
unusual extenuating circumstances.
Shah could easily have
discovered Dr. Clark’s relationship with the hospital well before
he did.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
disallowing the amendment.
In sum, it has long been the policy of the courts of
this state that triable issues be tried and not foreclosed by
summary judgment.
We are persuaded that Rajesh Shah has raised
triable issues of fact that are material to the correct
application of the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the
September 23, 1998, summary judgment of the Franklin Circuit
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
On remand, the trial should be bifurcated.
If the
jury determines both that Shah was not of unsound mind during the
relevant period and that he either knew or should reasonably have
known that he may have been wrongfully injured, then his
complaint should be dismissed as time barred.
Otherwise, the
trial shall proceed on the issues of medical negligence and
damages.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan D. Phillips
William P. Swain
Boehl Stopher & Graves
Louisville, Kentucky
C. Thomas Hectus
Ferreri, Fogle, Pohl, &
Picklesimer
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Susan D. Phillips
Louisville, Kentucky
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