COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. TERRY ANDERSON
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RENDERED: MARCH 31, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED PUBLISHED: June 2, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002588-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00212
v.
TERRY ANDERSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The appellant, the Commonwealth of Kentucky (the
Commonwealth), appeals from an order of the Simpson Circuit Court
granting the appellee, Terry Anderson (Anderson), a new trial.
Anderson filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that one of
the jurors was disqualified pursuant to KRS 29A.080.
Having
reviewed the record on appeal, we vacate the order of the circuit
court.
On December 17, 1997, the Simpson County Grand Jury
indicted Anderson on one count of attempted murder.
proceeded to trial.
The case
At the conclusion of a two-day trial, the
jury found Anderson guilty of assault in the second degree and
recommended that he be sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.
On
July 22, 1998, the court entered its final judgment, setting out
Anderson’s conviction of second-degree assault in the case and
sentencing Anderson to five years’ imprisonment.
However, the
court postponed imposition of his sentence pending the
Presentence Investigation Report.
Anderson filed a motion for a
new trial on July 23, 1998, on the ground that one of the jurors,
James Thomas Stanley, had been convicted of a felony and was
therefore statutorily disqualified from serving on a jury under
KRS 29A.080.
The Commonwealth argued that Stanley was not
disqualified from serving on a jury because his civil rights had
been restored by executive order issued by the Governor of the
Kentucky on June 30, 1997.
The court entered a bench order on
September 29, 1998, granting Anderson’s motion for a new trial
and setting aside his conviction and sentence.
This appeal
followed.
We will first address Anderson’s argument that the
Commonwealth lacked authority to seek appellate review of the
circuit court’s order granting him a new trial.
He contends that
the Commonwealth can seek appellate review of an order granting a
new trial only for purposes of certifying the law.
We disagree.
In Commonwealth v. Brindley, Ky., 724 S.W.2d 214 (1986), the
Supreme Court addressed this issue and held:
It is our opinion that Section 115 of the
Kentucky Constitution, founded in the
prohibition against double jeopardy, does not
prevent an appeal by the Commonwealth when a
jury has returned a verdict of guilty which
has been set aside by a ruling of law to a
postverdict motion. If error was made in
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such ruling as determined on appeal, the
verdict is simply reinstated.
Id. at 216.
Thus, the Commonwealth has the right to one appeal
in all criminal cases except in cases where an appeal would
violate double jeopardy principles.
“[T]he Commonwealth has the
same right unless the appeal of a defendant’s sentence should be
considered an “appeal from a judgment of acquittal.”
Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 50, 53 (1998).
Collins v.
The Commonwealth’s
appeal is properly before this court.
We now turn to the issue of whether the court erred in
granting Anderson’s motion for a new trial.
The Commonwealth
contends that the court abused its discretion in setting aside
the jury’s verdict and in ordering a new trial.
It argues that
Juror Stanley was qualified to sit on the jury because his civil
rights had been restored to him by executive order and that there
is not a distinguishable difference between a “pardon” and a
“restoration of civil rights.”
KRS 29A.080 sets out the impediments disqualifying one
from jury service.
This statute provides in pertinent part that
a prospective juror is disqualified from serving on a jury if he
“[h]as been previously convicted of a felony and has not been
pardoned by the Governor or other authorized person of the
jurisdiction in which he was convicted.”
29A.080(2)(e).
(Emphasis added.)
KRS
In the case before us, it is undisputed that
Stanley had been previously convicted of a felony and that he
failed to disclose this information on his jury qualification
form.
However, in 1997, his civil rights were restored by an
executive order of the Governor.
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Thus, the dispositive issue on
appeal is whether that restoration has removed Stanley’s
disability to serve as a juror.
Section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution vests the
Governor with the power to “remit fines and forfeitures, commute
sentences, grant reprieves and pardons.”
A pardon relieves a
person of all penal consequences of his criminal act:
“the
effect of the pardon is that, so far as the violation of the
criminal law, the offense against the public, is concerned, he is
to be looked upon as innocent thereof.”
128 Ky. 779, 109 S.W. 337, 338 (1908).
Nelson v. Commonwealth,
Furthermore, “[t]he
pardoning power of a Governor of a state or territory is confined
in its operation to offenses against the laws of that state or
territory.”
Arnett v. Stumbo, 287 Ky. 433, 153 S.W.2d 889, 891
(1941).
A person convicted of a felony is excluded from voting
(Section 145 of the Kentucky Constitution) or from seeking and
holding public office (Section 150 of the Kentucky Constitution)
unless his civil rights have been restored by executive pardon.
Thus, the Governor is empowered by Sections 145 and 150 “to lift
the disabilities prescribed in them from the shoulders of the
convict and to restore him to full and complete rights of
citizenship.”
Arnett, supra at 891. (Emphasis added).
The
power of restoration of civil rights is separate and distinct
from the cancellation or expunging of culpability contained in
Section 77 of the Constitution.
Arnett, supra at 890.
The executive clemency provided for in Sections 145 and
150 allows the chief executive to restore the lost rights of
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citizenship to a convicted felon so that he or she may thereafter
possess such rights as though no conviction had ever occurred.
Id.
However, unlike a pardon pursuant to Section 77, a
restoration of civil rights under Sections 145 and 150 does not
remove the guilt of the offender or the penalty for the offense.
An executive order issued pursuant to Section 145 and 150 only
restores an individual’s rights under Kentucky Law without
expunging all record of the fact of his guilt.
KRS 29A.080 disqualifies a convicted felon from serving
on a jury unless he has been pardoned by Governor.
This statute
does not specify or require that a pardon be issued pursuant to
Section 77 of the Constitution to remove a convicted felon’s
disqualification from serving on a jury.
We hold that “pardon”
as used at KRS 29A.080 encompasses an executive order restoring
an individual’s civil rights.
By executive order issued pursuant
to Sections 145 and 150, Juror Stanley was restored to the full
and complete rights of citizenship in this jurisdiction.
As a
full citizen of the Commonwealth of the Kentucky, he was
qualified to serve as a juror.
Accordingly, we find that the
court — no doubt exercising an abundance of caution — nonetheless
erred in granting Anderson’s motion for a new trial.
We
reinstate his conviction and sentence.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order
of the Simpson Circuit Court and remand this case for
reinstatement of the conviction of Terry Anderson.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Morris Lowe
Bowling Green, KY
Vickie L. Wise
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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