DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, and FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE, KENTON CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND DIVISION, and KENTON COUNTY COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, and FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. PATRICIA M. SUMME, CHIEF JUDGE, KENTON CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH DIVISION, and KENTON COUNTY
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RENDERED: December 15, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002500-MR
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, and
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY
v.
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00379
DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE,
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND
DIVISION, and KENTON COUNTY
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
NO.
APPELLEES
1998-CA-002501-MR
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, and
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00324
PATRICIA M. SUMME, CHIEF JUDGE,
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
DIVISION, and KENTON COUNTY
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
APPELLEES
NO.
1998-CA-002502-MR
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, and
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
PATRICIA M. SUMME, CHIEF JUDGE,
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
DIVISION, and KENTON COUNTY
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
NO.
1998-CA-002788-MR
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, and
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00371
PATRICIA M. SUMME, CHIEF JUDGE,
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
DIVISION, and KENTON COUNTY
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
OPINION
REVERSING AND VACATING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
APPELLEES
HUDDLESTON, McANULTY AND MILLER, JUDGES.
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APPELLEES
McANULTY, JUDGE: The consolidated actions in this appeal arose when
the Kenton County Commonwealth's Attorney sought payment from the KRS
31.185 special account for the costs incurred by his office for
copying discovery materials provided to indigent defendants who were
represented by the Kenton County Public Defender Office.
courts granted the motions for reimbursement.
The circuit
We reverse.
In the first of these cases, the Commonwealth's Attorney
filed a motion in the circuit court for an order requiring the Kenton
County Public Defender system to pay for copies received from the
Commonwealth's Attorney's Office for discovery under the rules of
procedure for the fiscal year 1997-1998, in the total amount of
$779.40.
On September 1, 1998, Chief Judge Patricia Summe entered an
order, styled “IN RE: Copies Provided by Kenton County Commonwealth's
Attorneys Office to the Kenton County Public Defender's Office,” that
ordered the Kenton County Public Defender to pay the Commonwealth's
Attorney's Office $779.40 for the “reasonable and necessary” cost of
copying discovery for 1997-1998.
Judge Summe further adjudged that
the amount was to be paid by the Finance and Administration Cabinet
from the special account provided in KRS 31.185 and KRS 31.200.
Thereafter, in three criminal cases involving indigent
defendants, Kenton County circuit courts ordered payment from the
special account for copying costs for discovery in each case, in
amounts ranging from $10.00 to $40.00.
The Finance and
Administration Cabinet and the Department of Public Advocacy
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(hereinafter appellants) appealed the reimbursement orders, which
were consolidated in the present appeal.
We find that review of
appellants' arguments is proper since, although they were not raised
below, appellants were not parties to the underlying criminal cases
and had no opportunity to raise the objections below.
RCr 9.22.
Having reviewed the issues herein and the applicable law,
we conclude that the statutes cited by the circuit court do not
constitute authority for the reimbursement orders.
KRS 31.185 and
KRS 31.200 control when the special account funds are to be paid.
As
will be shown, neither statute applies in this set of circumstances.
We do not find, therefore, that the General Assembly intended these
costs to be paid from the special account.
Appellants argued first that the special account cannot be
charged for copying expenses because indigent defendants are exempted
from such costs by KRS 31.110(1).
That statute provides that a needy
person who has been detained or charged is entitled to attorney
representation.
Further, it provides: “The courts in which the
defendant is tried shall waive all costs.”
Appellants argue that
because this provision does not specifically say “court costs,” the
legislature must have intended it to be more expansive and
comprehensive than a waiver of court costs.
They would have us apply
it to waive the copying costs ordered by the circuit court.
We disagree with this interpretation for two reasons.
First, we note that KRS 31.110(1) clearly states that the court shall
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waive costs.
This must mean court costs, since the use of the word
waive implies that the court shall relinquish its costs as opposed to
costs or expenses owed to others (such as a witness fee or cost of a
transcript).
We believe, therefore, that provision excludes fees
that constitute court costs incident to litigation, or fees to
officers for services.
S.W.2d 998 (1940).
Cf. Stafford v. Bailey, 282 Ky. 525, 138
Secondly, an expansive definition which
discharges all costs incurred in representing indigent defendants
would render the other statutes in Chapter 31 pertaining to expenses
for representation of indigents — KRS 31.185 and KRS 31.100 —
meaningless.
“KRS 31.100, et seq., is a unified enactment[.]”
Morton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 218, 220 (1991).
Each
section of a legislative act should be read in light of the act as a
whole, with a view to making it harmonize, if possible, with the
entire act and with each section and provision thereof.
Comm'n v. Sandman, 300 Ky. 423, 189 S.W.2d 407 (1945).
Kentucky Tax
In order for
the whole act to have meaning, “costs” cannot mean all costs and
expenses.
For these reasons, we reject appellants' expansive
interpretation of KRS 31.110(1), and hold that it does not govern the
issue in the case at bar.
Turning our attention to the two statutes relied upon by
the circuit court, KRS 31.185(1) states:
Any defending attorney operating under the
provisions of this chapter [Department of
Public Advocacy] is entitled to use the same
state facilities for the evaluation of evidence
-5-
as are available to the attorney representing
the Commonwealth. If he considers their use
impractical, the court concerned may authorize
the use of private facilities to be paid for on
court order by the county.
Section (3) of KRS 31.185 dictates that all court orders entered
pursuant to the above provision be paid by the Finance and
Administration Cabinet from the special account; section (2)
establishes the funding for the special account.
As appellants
interpret this statute, it was error for the trial court not to find
that the public defenders were entitled to use state facilities
rather than be charged for copies.
The Commonwealth counters that
this statute has no application because evaluation of evidence does
not encompass the mere copying of discovery compliance materials.
We
agree with the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth correctly asserts that KRS 31.185 was
designed to ensure that indigent criminal defendants have access to
expert assistance for the evaluation of evidence.
In cases applying
KRS 31.185, it has been used to allow defendants either to use state
facilities and personnel for expert assistance, or to pay for a
private facility or private expert.
See Binion v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
891 S.W.2d 383 (1995)(mental health expert witness); McCracken County
Fiscal Court v. Graves, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 307 (1994)(investigative
costs, psychological examination fees, expert psychological witness);
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437 (1987)(crime scene or
ballistics expert); Todd v. Commonwealth, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 242
-6-
(1986)(mental evaluation); Perry County Fiscal Court v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 674 S.W.2d 954 (1984)(psychologist and ballistics expert).
We
conclude that a prosecutor's staff and office equipment are not the
sort of “state facility for the evaluation of evidence” that the
statute was designed to provide to criminal defendants.
Indeed,
furnishing copies of discovery documents does not constitute
evaluation of evidence.
Thus, we hold KRS 31.185 has no application
to this question.
The Commonwealth asserts that the costs are payable
pursuant to KRS 31.200.
That statute states, in pertinent part:
(1) Subject to KRS 31.190, any direct expense,
including the cost of a transcript or
bystander's bill of exceptions or other
substitute for a transcript that is necessarily
incurred in representing a needy person under
this chapter, is a charge against the county on
behalf of which the service is performed;
provided, however, that such a charge shall not
exceed the established rate charged by the
Commonwealth and its agencies.
(2) Any direct expense including the cost of a
transcript or bystander's bill of exceptions or
other substitute for a transcript shall be paid
from the special account established in KRS
31.185(2) and in accordance with the procedures
provided in KRS 31.185(3). (Emphasis supplied.)
We believe that this statute does not provide authorization for the
copying costs either.
It concerns payment only for a necessary
“direct expense” of representation of an indigent defendant by a
public advocate.
The expense incurred by the Commonwealth in making
copies to provide discovery is a direct expense of the Commonwealth.
-7-
Thus, KRS 31.200 does not address the situation in these cases.
We
conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to show a means for
charging the copying expense against the special account within the
statutes which govern it.
Furthermore, we agree that the criminal discovery rules
provide no support for the Commonwealth's Attorney's motion for
payment.
RCr 7.24 requires the Commonwealth “to permit the defendant
to inspect and copy or photograph” discovery materials, “or copies
thereof.”
RCr 7.26 requires the Commonwealth to produce witness
statements and make them “available for examination and use by the
defendant.”
The Commonwealth argues that neither rule requires it to
do photocopying.
This is true.
The rules say that the defendant may
inspect and copy the actual items in the possession of the
Commonwealth, and thus mean that a defendant may take possession of
them.
However, they also allow the Commonwealth to provide copies of
the items in lieu of having the defense take them to inspect, copy
and/or photograph.
As a result, the Kenton County Commonwealth's
Attorney's Office could provide the originals to the defendants, or
prepare copies so as to ensure that the evidence remains in its
custody and control.
The Commonwealth's Attorney elected to prepare
and provide the defense with copies rather than furnish the evidence
to the defendants.
Nothing in the criminal rules places the expense
of this decision by the Commonwealth's Attorney on the defense.
Office expenses of Commonwealth's Attorney's offices in the
-8-
performance of their duties are to be paid by the Commonwealth.
15.750.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and vacate the
orders in these consolidated cases which ordered payment of the
expense of photocopying discovery from the special account of KRS
31.185.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
J. Vincent Aprile II
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Boyce A. Crocker
Frankfort, Kentucky
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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KRS
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