PATRICIA SHEA v. BANK ONE, KENTUCKY NA AND KELLY SERVICES, INC.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 28, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002499-MR
PATRICIA SHEA
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN SCHROERING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-05354
BANK ONE, KENTUCKY NA AND
KELLY SERVICES, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Patricia Shea (Shea) appeals from an opinion order
of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered September 8, 1998, granting
summary judgment in favor of Bank One, Kentucky NA (Bank One) and
Kelly Services, Inc. (Kelly).
We affirm.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must consider
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d
476 (1991).
Kelly, a temporary services agency, placed Shea for
employment with Bank One in March of 1996, in its operations center
at Fourth Avenue and Ormsby in Louisville.
At the time, Kelly had
filled over 400 temporary positions with Bank One.
Shea worked in
Bank One's Processing Center Research Department under the direct
supervision of Roger Duncan (Duncan).
Angela Hensley (Hensley), a
Kelly manager, maintained an office at this location and supervised
the "start-up" period between Shea and Bank One.
Hensley also
handled employee complaints from the Kelly temporary staff with Bank
One.
In September of 1996, Bank One was closing the Research
Department.
Shea was aware that the department was closing and that
her assignment was ending.
On September 30, 1996, Shea's assignment
in the Processing Center ended and Duncan released Shea from her
duties.
On that same day, Shea faxed a complaint to Hensley claiming
that she had been sexually harassed by Duncan.
The basis of her
complaint stemmed from three separate incidents of physical contact
and several instances of verbal name-calling.
Shea claimed that
Duncan had grabbed her buttocks on two separate occasions and that he
had grabbed her right breast on another occasion to "see if they were
real."
In addition, Shea claimed that Duncan routinely referred to
her as "slut" and "tramp" in the workplace.
On October 1, 1996, Bank One and Kelly undertook a joint
investigation in response to Shea's allegations.
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Even though her
assignment with Bank One was scheduled to end, Bank One reassigned
Shea to another Bank One facility where she began work the next week.
Following the investigation, Bank One formally reprimanded Duncan and
notified him that future inappropriate behavior would result in
immediate discharge.
Shea continued working for Bank One until
December, 1996, when she left voluntarily for another job.
She
admits that after filing her complaint, she was not subjected to
further harassment.
After receiving a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC,
Shea filed a complaint against Bank One and Kelly alleging sexual
harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress on
September 18, 1997.
Following extensive discovery, Kelly and Bank
One filed motions for summary judgment in August, 1998.
Bank One
and Kelly argued that Duncan's behavior did not constitute sexual
harassment.
In support of their argument, Bank One and Kelly pointed
out that Shea admitted in her deposition that she and Duncan had a
"joking" relationship and that she sometimes referred to him as
"snaggletooth" and "slut puppy."
They also claimed protection under
the affirmative defense set out by the United States Supreme Court in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington
Industries, Inc., 524 U.S. 742 (1998), (Faragher/Burlington), because
Bank One had a sexual harassment policy in place that Shea did not
utilize.
On September 8, 1998, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Bank One and Kelly.
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This appeal followed.
Shea argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the
portion of her complaint alleging sexual harassment. 1
The questions
presented to us are: (1) whether Duncan's conduct constituted sexual
harassment; and (2) whether Bank One and Kelly satisfied the
affirmative defense set out in Faragher/Burlington.
Shea cites
Kirkwood v. Courier Journal, Inc., Ky.App., 858 S.W.2d 194 (1993),
for the proposition that claims of workplace sexual harassment are
rarely summarily dismissed when colorable evidence of harassment is
presented.
Shea further contends that Bank One and Kelly did not
meet their burden of proof under the Faragher/Burlington standard. We
disagree.
We will address first the issue of whether Duncan's
conduct constituted sexual harassment.
The Kentucky Civil Rights Act
(KRS Chapter 344, et. seq.) strives to minimize invidious
discrimination in the Commonwealth.
Specifically, KRS 344.040
provides in pertinent part:
It is an unlawful practice for an employer:
(1) . . . to discriminate against an individual
with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of the individual's . . . sex . . . ;
or
1
Shea does not argue in her brief that the trial court erred
with regard to its ruling on the issue of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, Therefore, we will not consider that issue on
appeal. Milby v. Mears, Ky. App., 580 S.W.2d 724, 727 (1979) (a
reviewing court will confine itself to errors pointed out in the
briefs and will not consider issues which are not raised on appeal).
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(2) To limit, segregate, or classify employees
in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive an individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
status as an employee, because of the
individual's . . . sex . . . .
As quoted above, KRS 344.040, closely mirrors similar
language in Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act.
Court held in Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc.,
Our Supreme
Ky., 840 S.W.2d
814 (1992), that federal court decisions construing federal antidiscrimination law should serve as guidelines for interpretation of
our state anti-discrimination laws.
Thus, we may draw on the federal
body of sexual harassment law to help formulate the Commonwealth's
sexual harassment standards.
To establish a claim for sexual harassment based upon
hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the
conduct in question was unwelcomed, (2) that the harassment was based
on sex, (3) that the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe
to create an abusive working environment, and (4) that some basis
existed for imputing the liability to the employer. Kauffman v.
Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1992).
The United
States Supreme Court first set out the standard for hostile work
environment sexual discrimination under Title VII in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Sexual harassment, the Supreme
Court noted, included:
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature.' . . . [S]uch
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sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited
'sexual harassment,' whether or not it is
directly linked to the grant or denial of an
economic quid pro quo, where 'such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
477 U.S. at 65(citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Guidelines, 29 CFR § 104.11(a)(1985)).
In order to be actionable, the "hostile environment
harassment" must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
The United States Supreme
Court elaborated on this "sufficiently severe or pervasive" standard
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993),
noting that
the Vinson standard:
takes a middle path between making actionable
any conduct that is merely offensive and
requiring the conduct to cause a tangible
psychological injury. . . .Conduct that is not
severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work
environment--an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive--is beyond
Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim
does not subjectively perceive the environment
to be abusive, the conduct has not actually
altered the conditions of the victim's
employment, and there is no Title VII
violation.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
In addition to requiring
that the harassment be both objectively and subjectively offensive,
the Supreme Court held that all circumstances must be considered in
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determining whether an environment is "hostile" including "the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it reasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." Id. at 23.
Federal circuit courts have elaborated on the
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" standard as well.
The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that in order to be deemed "pervasive"
the harassment must be "repeated and continuous; isolated acts or
occasional episodes will not merit relief ...." Torres v. Pisano, 116
F.3d 625, 631 (2nd Cir. 1997), (citations omitted).
The rational
behind requiring that the harassment be "sufficiently severe or
pervasive" was stated succinctly by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals:
A claim for a sexually hostile working
environment is not a trivial matter. Its
purpose is to level the playing field for women
who work by preventing others from impairing
their ability to compete on an equal basis with
men. One must always bear this ultimate goal
in mind. A hostile environment claim embodies
a series of criteria that express extremely
insensitive conduct against women, conduct so
egregious as to alter the conditions of
employment and destroy their equal opportunity
in the workplace. Any lesser standard of
liability, couched in terms of conduct that
sporadically wounds or offends but does not
hinder a female employee’s performance, would
not serve the goal of the equality. In fact, a
less onerous standard of liability would
attempt to isolate women from everyday insults
as if they remained models of Victorian
reticence.
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DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal Police Officer's Assoc., 51 F.3d 591,
593 (5th Cir. 1995).
Applying these standards to the case at hand, we find that
Shea has shown that Duncan's conduct constituted hostile work
environment sexual harassment.
Shea alleges that Duncan grabbed her
buttocks on two separate occasions and that he grabbed her right
breast on another occasion.
In addition she alleges that Duncan
referred to her as "slut" or "tramp" weekly or every other week for
three or four months.
We believe that there is sufficient evidence
of severe and pervasive conduct which constitutes sexual harassment
as contemplated by both the United States Supreme Court as well as
our Court system.
The fact that Shea admitted to having a joking
relationship with Duncan does not automatically mean that she was not
offended by his conduct.
At best, it only creates a question of fact
which is properly left to the jury to resolve.
However, even if Shea could establish a case of sexual
harassment, Bank One and Kelly still would not be vicariously liable
for Duncan's conduct pursuant to the Faragher/Burlington affirmative
defense.
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court created an
affirmative defense for employers who are sued for sexual harassment.
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and
Burlington Industries, Inc., 524 U.S. 742 (1998), which were decided
on the same day, the Supreme Court held that an employer could not be
held vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor,
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provided that no tangible employment action such as discharge or
demotion had occurred, where the employer establishes that:
1. the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and
2. that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 30; Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 20.
We believe that Bank One and Kelly established the
Faragher/Burlington affirmative defense in the case sub judice.
First, Bank One did not discharge Shea, even though her position had
been terminated.
Instead, she was moved to another Bank One facility
where she held a position with similar job responsibilities.
Thus,
the affirmative defense is available to Bank One and Kelly.
Second,
the parties do not dispute the fact that once Shea filed the
complaint on September 30, 1996, Bank One and Kelly launched an
immediate investigation into the circumstances surrounding her
allegations.
The result of this investigation was that Bank One
formally reprimanded Duncan.
Finally, Shea did not take advantage of Bank One and
Kelly's respective policies against sexual harassment during the
course of the alleged harassment even though she was aware of the
policy.
The policies were in place to prevent such a situation.
When one fails to take advantage of the employer’s anti-sexual
harassment policies, that individual cannot then gain by his/her
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failure to act. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 30; Burlington Industries,
524 U.S. at 20.
Bank One and Kelly cannot be held vicariously liable for
Duncan's conduct in that they established reasonable policies to
prevent and correct any alleged sexually harassing behavior as set
forth in Faragher/Burlington.
The trial court appropriately granted
summary judgment in favor of Bank One and Kelly.
For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the trial court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, BANK ONE:
Thomas E. Clay
Sean Ragland
Louisville, KY
Michael A. Luvisi
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KELLY
SERVICES, INC.
Raymond C. Haley III
Matthew R. Westfall, Jr.
Louisville, KY
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