CECIL O. SEAMAN v. K.A.S.P. a/k/a Kentucky Auto Salvage ERIC V. EVANS v. WILLIAM A. DYKEMAN and SARAH M. NIMS
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RENDERED: April 14, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002449-MR
CECIL O. SEAMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-00230
K.A.S.P. a/k/a
Kentucky Auto Salvage
AND
APPELLEE
NO.
1998-CA-002552-MR
ERIC V. EVANS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-00230
WILLIAM A. DYKEMAN and
SARAH M. NIMS
APPELLEES
AND
NO.
1998-CA-002625-MR
SARAH M. NIMS
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-00230
v.
ERIC V. EVANS
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, and KNOPF, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
The appeals in this case involve the division
of $500,000 in attorney fees.
Having reviewed the record, the
arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, we conclude that
the trial court made factual determinations that were supported
by substantial evidence and correctly applied the law.
We
therefore affirm.
In January 1991, Eric V. Evans, an attorney, filed suit
in the Fayette Circuit Court on behalf of Cecil O. Seaman against
Kentucky Auto Salvage Pool (K.A.S.P.) alleging that two guard
dogs owned by K.A.S.P. had attacked seventeen of Seaman’s
weanling horses over a six-week period, resulting in death or
injury to Seaman’s entire 1990 foal crop.
To memorialize the
oral contract agreed upon by Evans and Seaman in November 1990,
Seaman entered into a contingency fee agreement with Evans on
August 15, 1991, under which Evans would receive 33% of all funds
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recovered in the lawsuit, after expenses of up to $15,000 were
deducted.
In November 1991, Seaman contacted Sarah M. Nims, an
attorney and thoroughbred breeder, for a second opinion regarding
the progression of the case.
In January 1992, Evans and Nims
began to work together on the case.
At a pretrial conference on
March 15, 1992, Evans introduced Nims to the trial court as his
co-counsel.
On April 14, 1992, Nims formally entered her
appearance of record as one of Seaman’s attorneys on a form
prepared by Evans’s office.
Nims claimed she had an agreement
with Seaman that she would receive one-third of Evans’s fee.
Evans, however, apparently had no knowledge of this agreement.
In the two months immediately following Nims’s
appearance of record, differences of opinion between Seaman,
Evans, and Nims arose.
In early May 1992, with the trial set for
June 1, Evans informed Nims and Seaman that he wanted to hire
Margaret Kannensohn to be lead trial counsel.
Seaman was not
agreeable to this and, fortunately for Seaman and his attorneys,
K.A.S.P. filed a motion for a continuance of the trial which was
granted.
On June 8, 1992, Evans sent Seaman a letter stating
that he would continue as Seaman’s counsel only if Nims withdrew
as counsel, all deposition costs were immediately paid, and
Seaman allowed Kannensohn to be co-counsel at the trial.
The
letter stated that unless there was strict compliance with his
conditions, Evans would withdraw from the case and would file an
attorney’s lien for fee in the circuit court.
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When it became
apparent that the matter was not going to be resolved, Evans
withdrew as counsel for Seaman and filed an attorney’s lien for
33a % of the proceeds recovered in the case.
Nims, who apparently continued to have an amicable
relationship with Seaman, remained as counsel of record following
Evans’s withdrawal.
Due to her lack of trial experience,
however, Nims sought, with Seaman’s approval, another attorney to
try the case.
In August 1992, William Dykeman agreed to become
Nims’s co-counsel.
Dykeman and Seaman entered into a fee
agreement whereby Dykeman would be entitled to 16.66% of the
money recovered in the case as his fee.
Dykeman and Evans
thereafter apparently agreed that they would share equally in
one-third of any recovery.
Summary judgment was subsequently granted in favor of
K.A.S.P., but the summary judgment was reversed by this court and
the case was remanded for trial.
After the recusal of the judge
who had ruled on the summary judgment motion, the case was tried
before a jury over a two-week period in late October 1996.
At
the conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered a unanimous
verdict in favor of Seaman and against K.A.S.P. in the amount of
$1,950,000.
A judgment was entered for Seaman in that amount,
and K.A.S.P. filed an appeal to this court after the trial court
denied its motion for a new trial.
While the appeal was pending, Seaman exchanged part of
his anticipated recovery for a cash advance from Judgment
Purchase Corporation (JPC).
JPC advanced Seaman $150,000,
$50,000 of which was split equally between Nims and Dykeman as a
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partial fee payment.
During this pendency period, the case was
settled for $1,500,000.
Evans filed a petition for the
determination of the extent of his attorney’s lien, and he, Nims,
Dykeman, and Linda Sullivan1 executed an agreement wherein they
agreed to divide the fees, which had been placed in escrow, with
interest, in accordance with the ruling of the trial court.
On April 2, 1998, the trial court entered an order
concluding that Dykeman was entitled to a fee of 16.66% of the
total recovery of $1,500,000 based upon his written contract with
Seaman.
The trial court also noted that there was no opposition
to an award of that fee to Dykeman.
Evans also argued that he
was entitled to a 16.66% fee based upon his agreement with
Dykeman, but the trial court disagreed and held that Evans was
only entitled to a fee based on a quantum meruit theory because
he withdrew from the case before its completion.
The trial court
also held that Nims was entitled to a fee based on a quantum
meruit theory.
Following an evidentiary hearing wherein Nims and Evans
presented their claims, on September 4, 1998, the trial court
entered an opinion awarding Nims and Evans each $125,000 in fees.
The trial court stated that the fee was divided “based on the
legal principles set out in LaBach v. Hampton, Ky. App., 585
S.W.2d 434 (1979) and SCR 31.130, Rule 1.5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.”
Concerning Evans, the court held
that he was “constructively discharged” because Seaman had
1
Sullivan was a divorce attorney for Shirley Seaman, Cecil
Seaman’s wife, whose claim for attorney fees was later ruled
invalid. Sullivan is not a party to this appeal.
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injected Sims into the case as counsel without Evans’s consent.
The court further found that Evans and his associate, Duane
Osborne, did a substantial amount of work in investigating the
case.
Concerning Nims, the court also found that she did
substantial work in assisting Evans and developing the damage
portion of the case, although the court refused to enforce the
purported agreement she had with Seaman to receive one-third of
Evans’s fee.
The court also noted that Nims made a significant
contribution in trial preparation after Dykeman’s entry into the
case.
In accordance with the court’s judgment entered on
September 18, 1998, the $500,000 attorney fee was divided as
follows:
Dykeman--$250,000, Evans--$125,000, Nims--$125,000.
Accrued interest was also divided in proportion to the awards.
Evans appealed and Nims cross-appealed from the judgment dividing
the fees, and Seaman appealed from an order of the court denying
his motion to amend the judgment and require Evans to pay him
$15,000 pursuant to their fee contract.
We will address Evans’s appeal first.
His first
argument is that the trial court erred by failing to honor his
valid and enforceable fee contracts with Seaman and Dykeman.
Concerning his agreement with Dykeman that he and Dykeman would
split one-third of the recovery as a fee, the trial court
correctly noted that any agreement between Evans and Dykeman was
unenforceable because neither of them had the authority to
contract for Seaman or for Nims.
-6-
Concerning Evans’s contingent
fee contract with Seaman, Evans likewise cannot rely upon this
contract to collect a full fee.
In LaBach, 585 S.W.2d 434, this
court held that “the discharged attorney cannot rely upon the
contract to collect a full fee but must deduct from the contract
the reasonable cost of services of other attorneys required to
complete the contract.”
Id. at 436.
This method of computing
the fee of a discharged attorney has been designated as “quantum
meruit.”
Id., Henry v. Vance, 111 Ky. 72, 63 S.W. 273 (1901).
In short, we agree that the trial court properly followed the
principle of the LaBach case and did not set Evans’s fee based on
his contracts with Seaman and Dykeman.
Evans’s second argument is that the trial court erred
in ruling that Nims’s fee should be paid entirely from Evans’s
contracted portion of the settlement proceeds.
He argues that he
did not have an agreement or a contract to compensate Nims and
that Nims was Dykeman’s co-counsel and employee for purposes of
compensation.
He thus maintains that any fee awarded to Nims
should have been paid from Dykeman’s fee rather than from his
fee.
Because no one contested that Dykeman be awarded his 16.66%
fee pursuant to his contract with Seaman, we disagree.
Evans’s third argument is that the trial court erred in
its assessment of the value of the work performed by Nims and
thereby erred in awarding her as large a fee as it did.
He
contends that Nims’s contribution to the advancement of the case
while he was lead counsel was negligible.
He also asserts that
she violated Kentucky Supreme Court rules and committed other
acts of professional misconduct.
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“[F]or purposes of appellate review, a finding of fact
of a trial judge ranks in equal dignity with the verdict of a
properly instructed jury, i.e., if supported by substantial
evidence, it will be upheld, otherwise, it will be set aside as
‘clearly erroneous’.”
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v.
Golightly, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (1998).
“In this
jurisdiction, ‘substantial evidence’ means evidence of substance
and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable men.”
Id.
We conclude that there was
substantial evidence to support the award of a $125,000 fee to
Nims based upon her work in assisting Evans and developing the
damages portion of the case and her significant work with Dykeman
in trial preparation and organization.
Nims served as co-counsel
in this case for over five years and contributed significantly to
its outcome.
There was substantial evidence in this regard.
Evans’s last argument is that the trial court erred in
failing to award interest to him on the attorney fees taken by
Nims and Dykeman from the JPA transaction in advance of the case
being final.
The trial court denied interest to Evans on the
grounds that “[u]nder no circumstances could Evans’ potential fee
exceed $400,000, the amount currently in escrow.
Thus, Nims’ and
Dykeman’s previous payment did not prejudice Evans in any way.”
We conclude that the trial court did not err in this regard.
Nims’s first argument in her cross-appeal is that the
trial court erred in finding that Evans was discharged by Seaman
as his attorney rather than finding that Evans voluntarily
withdrew from the case without just cause.
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As we have noted, the
trial court found that Evans was “constructively discharged” when
Seaman injected Nims into the case without Evans’s consent
although Evans had been retained pursuant to a contract between
him and Seaman.
Again, we note that, for purposes of our review,
the trial court’s finding of fact will be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence.
Golightly, 976 S.W.2d at 414.
Because
Evans was hired by Seaman as his attorney and Seaman thereafter
hired Nims to assist with the case, we conclude that there was
substantial evidence for the trial court to have found that
Evans’s withdrawal from the case amounted to a discharge without
cause.
Nims, who has reciprocated Evans’s allegations of
professional misconduct with allegations of her own that Evans
repeatedly lied to the court, also argues that the trial court
clearly erred in dividing the remaining fee of $250,000 equally
between her and Evans.
She asserts that the weight of the
evidence clearly showed she should have been awarded a greater
portion of the fee.
She notes that she was in the case for over
five years and alleges that Evans’s acts to advance the case were
negligible.
The trial court found that “[t]here is no doubt that
substantial work had been done which advanced the case and that
both Evans and Nims contributed significantly to that work.”
We
conclude there was substantial evidence to support this finding.
Golightly, supra.
Finally, Seaman alleges in his appeal that the trial
court erred by not requiring Evans to repay $15,000 in expenses
to him pursuant to their contract.
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The settlement agreement
contract contained a provision, however, which provided that
Seaman and the attorneys released and discharged each other from
further liability.
Seaman therefore released Evans from any
liability arising out of the lawsuit, including his claim for the
$15,000 reimbursement.
For this reason, the trial court did not
err in denying Seaman’s motion to amend the court’s judgment.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court dividing the
attorney fees and the order of the court denying Seaman’s motion
to amend the judgment are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR CECIL SEAMAN:
BRIEF FOR SARAH NIMS:
Cecil O. Seaman, Pro Se
Lexington, KY
Sarah M. Nims
Versailles, KY
BRIEFS FOR K.A.S.P. and
ERIC EVANS:
BRIEF FOR WILLIAM DYKEMAN:
William A. Dykeman
Winchester, KY
Eric V. Evans
Lexington, KY
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