SONJA ROCHELLE FORTENBERRY (NOW HUDSON) v. DONALD CRAIG FORTENBERRY
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RENDERED: JULY 21, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002447-MR
SONJA ROCHELLE FORTENBERRY (NOW HUDSON)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00139
v.
DONALD CRAIG FORTENBERRY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON, KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
This is a post-dissolution child custody
proceeding in which Sonja Rochelle Fortenbery1 (Sonja) appeals
from an order of the Calloway Circuit Court modifying joint
custody to award primary residential custody to the appellee,
Donald Craig Fortenbery (Craig).
Sonja also appeals from an
order of the trial court setting aside her supersedeas bond to
stay enforcement of the custody modification order pending
appeal.
1
Now Sonja Rochelle Hudson.
The parties were married on June 2, 1990.
The marriage
produced two children, Donald Seth (Seth), born April 2, 1991,
and Zachary Ryan (Zachary), born October 13, 1993.
Sonja has a
son from a previous relationship, Anthony Roy Fortenbery
(Anthony), born April 15, 1987.
On May 1, 1996, Craig filed a
petition to dissolve the marriage.
On July 2 the parties entered
into a “Separation Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement.”
The agreement provided that the parties would have joint custody
of Seth and Zachary, and that the children, including Anthony,2
would reside with each parent on an alternating week basis.
On
July 17 the divorce decree, into which the separation agreement
was incorporated, was entered.
The shared-custody arrangement succeeded for about a
year, but then began to fail.
On June 20, 1997, Craig filed a
motion which sought to have Sonja held in contempt for failure to
comply with the separation agreement and, further, requested
“that the Court enter an Order awarding him primary joint
custody[.]”
Sonja, thereafter, likewise requested modification
of custody so as to designate her as the primary residential
custodian.
The case was referred to the Calloway County Domestic
Relations Commissioner (Commissioner).
Following a series of
custody hearings, on August 4, 1998, the Commissioner entered his
report recommending that the parties share joint custody of Seth
2
The agreement provides that “the parties agree that
[Anthony Roy Fortenbery] will be treated as a child of the
parties for custody and visitation purposes as hereinafter
stated.” However, in the agreement’s provision relating to joint
custody, only Seth and Zachary are named. Presumably the parties
intended that they would likewise share joint custody of Anthony.
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and Zachary with Craig being designated as the primary
residential custodian.
On September 11 the trial court entered
an order adopting the Commissioner’s recommendation.
Sonja filed her notice of appeal.
Thereafter, Sonja
attempted to stay the custody modification by filing a $100.00
supersedeas bond.
The trial court denied the bond and the stay.
Sonja then filed a motion with this Court seeking an order
requiring the trial court to accept her supersedeas bond and stay
the judgment.
On December 14, 1998, we denied Sonja’s motion.
Sonja contends that the trial court’s designation of
Craig as the primary residential custodian was based primarily on
evidence that was irrelevant and which therefore should have been
excluded.
Sonja identifies two areas of improperly admitted
evidence: (1) evidence concerning events which preexisted the
initial joint custody decree; and (2) evidence presented by a
mental health expert, Dana Hardy.
Sonja contends that the trial court erred by
considering evidence predating their July 1996 separation
agreement.
Sonja “submits that the current de novo standard for
joint custody modification proceedings is too liberal and should
have some boundaries.
She respectfully requests that this Court
change the law by limiting the modifying court’s review to events
which have occurred since the entry of the initial custody
decree.”
There are two procedural problems with Sonja’s
argument.
First, Sonja does not cite us to her contemporaneous
objection to the admission of pre-July 1996 evidence.
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While
Sonja did raise the issue in her objections to the Commissioner’s
report, she does not cite us to her objections before the
Commissioner.
Sonja’s failure to object to the admission of the
evidence at trial failed to preserve the error.
76.12(4)(c)(iv);
Baker v. Ryan, Ky. App., 967 S.W.2d 591, 593 (1997).
Second,
Sonja does not specify which evidence is pre-July 1996 evidence
and where this evidence is presented in the record.
While we
have extensively reviewed the hearings, we will not speculate as
to the specific evidence to which this argument refers.
Aside from the procedural problems with this argument,
the parties’ July 1996 custody agreement was summarily accepted
by the trial court.
Pre-July 1996 information had not previously
been presented to or litigated before the trial court.
The
present custody litigation was commenced in July 1997.
If the
trial court was to accomplish a meaningful best interest inquiry,
it was obliged to consider previously unexplored evidence
regarding conduct which occurred prior to July 1996.
The trial
court did not err in considering pre-July 1996 evidence.
In conjunction with the foregoing argument, Sonja
“submits that a trial court’s inquiry in a joint custody
modification proceeding should be governed by the same standard
applicable to sole custody modification proceedings.”
KRS
403.340(2) limits modifications of sole custody after two years
to “facts that have arisen since the prior decree or which were
unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior decree.”
Joint custody may be modified, however, only when there has been
a finding that one or both of the parties is unable to cooperate
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or has engaged in a bad faith refusal to cooperate in carryingout the joint custody arrangement.3
Ky. App., 887 S.W.2d 555 (1994).
Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer,
If the trial court makes this
threshold finding, it may then modify the joint custody decree by
conducting a de novo hearing pursuant to KRS 403.270.
In support
of her position that Mennemeyer should be abandoned in favor of
KRS 403.340, Sonja cites to three sister-state decisions,
Monteleone v. Monteleone, 591 So.2d (La. Ct. App. 1991);
Davenport v. Manning, 675 So.2d 1230 (La. Ct. App. 1996); and
Frafjord v. Ell, 558 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1997).
Our review of this issue is foreclosed, however,
because Sonja’s argument to modify Mennemeyer was not preserved.
When Craig filed his motion seeking to modify custody, Sonja did
not argue for a change in the Mennemeyer standard.
Nor does
Sonja cite us to the record where she raised this issue before
the trial court.
In fact, in contradiction to her position on
appeal, Sonja herself sought to modify the existing joint custody
arrangement.
Sonja may not contend for the first time on appeal
that the Mennemeyer standard should be abandoned in favor of the
KRS 403.340 standard.
McGrew v. Stone, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 5, 8
(1999).
Next, Sonja contends that the trial court committed
reversible error by admitting the report and testimony of mental
health expert Dana Hardy.
Prior to either party’s seeking to
modify custody, Sonja and Craig jointly retained Hardy to
3
See Briggs v. Clemons, Ky. App., 3 S.W.3d 760(1999)
for application of KRS 403.340(2)(c) to joint custody.
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evaluate themselves and the children and to make a report
concerning her findings and opinions.
Sometime prior to the
December 18, 1999, hearing, Hardy completed her report and sent
the report directly to the Commissioner.
The report recommended
that Craig be granted sole custody of the children.
The
Commissioner read a portion of the report until, realizing what
it was, he quit reading it.
At the March 26, 1998, hearing Sonja moved to exclude
Hardy’s testimony or, in the alternative, Hardy’s report “based
on the fact that [the] report got to the court before we even saw
it.”
Sonja contends that the Commissioner personally received a
copy of the report, read at least a portion of it, and had
knowledge of at least some of its contents for several months
before Hardy could be cross-examined.
According to Sonja, the
“portion the [C]ommissioner read became irreversibly tainted as
the personal, extrajudicial knowledge of the [C]ommissioner.”
In
support of her argument, Sonja relies on Wells v. Wells, Ky., 406
S.W.2d 157 (1966) and Carroll v. Carroll, Ky., 469 S.W.2d 885
(1971).
Individual or extra-judicial knowledge on the part of
the judge, not the subject of judicial notice, cannot form the
basis for findings of fact or the decision of a case.
supra;
Wyatt v. Webb, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 883 (1958).
Wells,
The facts
surrounding the Hardy report do not indicate that the
Commissioner impermissibly relied upon extra-judicial knowledge
in forming his recommendation.
In the course of the discussion
at the March 1998 hearing regarding Sonja’s motion to exclude
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Hardy’s testimony and/or report, the following exchange occurred
between Craig’s attorney and the Commissioner:
MR. PITMAN (counsel for Craig): Well, Judge
[referring to the Commissioner], I would like
to ask the Court just for preserving this
particular issue if it happens to go up on
exceptions or appeal, I mean, do you as the
Commissioner, having got this report feel
that having scanned it, a couple of pages a
few months ago that you’re swayed about
what’s in there or do you . . . ?
COMMISSIONER: No.
MR. PITMAN:
Okay.
COMMISSIONER: I can weigh that, you know,
she’s here to testify. She can testify as to
what is in the report and I’ll base my
decision on what I hear today.
When he received the report, the Commissioner read a
few pages of it until, realizing what he was reading, he
immediately stopped.
He read only a few pages accidently.
occurred at least three months prior to the March hearing.
This
The
Commissioner gave his assurance on the record that he would not
be swayed by what little he did read.
Given the accidental
nature of this “extra-judicial knowledge”; the small amount of
relatively unimportant information involved; the length of time
between the Commissioner’s extra-judicial exposure to Hardy’s
report and the Commissioner’s custody recommendation; and Sonja’s
ability to ultimately cross-examine Hardy in front of the
Commissioner we are persuaded that, if there was any error here,
the error was harmless in that it did not affect the substantial
rights of Sonja.
CR 61.01;
Davidson v. Moore, Ky., 340 S.W.2d
227 (1960).
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As an alternative argument, Sonja argues that Hardy’s
report and testimony should have been excluded or given less
weight because of Craig’s “ex parte contacts” with Hardy.
In her
brief, Sonja contends that “the expert’s custody recommendation
in favor of the Father was based primarily on voluminous letters
and information provided by the Father and his family — much of
which was never requested by the expert,” and that “[a]fter the
evaluation of the parties and the children was completed, the
expert visited the Father and children again and admitted that
this additional meeting could be seen as self-serving for the
Father.”
First, according to Hardy’s testimony, she made
additional visits to Craig because he changed his residence
following the first visit.
Further, the potential problems cited
by Sonja are not sufficient to disqualify Hardy from testifying,
or filing her report, in this case.
Otherwise, Sonja had an
unrestricted opportunity to cross-examine Hardy, and to argue
Hardy’s bias to the Commissioner and trial court.
The weight to
be accorded Hardy’s testimony was for the fact-finder to
determine.
Next, Sonja argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in designating Craig as the primary residential
custodian.
Under the law applicable to this case, a modification
of a joint custody decree must be made anew under KRS 403.270 as
if there had been no prior custody determination.
556.
Mennemeyer at
“As a practical matter, joint custody is no award at all
when considering modification of the arrangement."
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Benassi v.
Havens, Ky. App., 710 S.W.2d 867, 869 (1986).
“Thus, where there
has been an award of joint custody under KRS 403.270, a hearing
de novo should be held to determine custody as if no prior
custody determination had been made.
KRS 403.270 provides that
custody should be determined in accordance with the best interest
of the child and that equal consideration should be given each
parent.”
(1989).
Erdman v. Clements, Ky. App., 780 S.W.2d 635, 637
In this case, the trial court properly carried out its
task by conducting a de novo custody determination pursuant to
the factors set forth in KRS 403.270 as if no prior custody
determination had ever been made.
In deciding which parent should have custody, Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 403.270(2) provides that a trial court must
determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the
child and must give equal consideration to each parent.
The
statute lists certain mandatory factors to be considered by the
trial court in determining the best interest of the child,
including the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his
custody; the wishes of the child as to his custodian; the
interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interests; the child's adjustment to his
home, school, and community; and the mental and physical health
of all individuals involved.
The findings of fact in the Commissioner’s report were
primarily concerned with summarizing the testimony of the
witnesses.
In setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of
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law pursuant to KRS 403.270 and CR 52.01, the better practice is
for the fact-finder to make an express determination regarding
which of the conflicting testimony is more credible, and to so
state in its findings of fact.
Nevertheless, the testimony which
the commissioner cited in his findings of fact reveal the factors
which he considered in arriving at his conclusion to award
primary residential custody to Craig.
Consequently, we see no
need for further factual findings.
In reviewing a child custody determination, we may
disturb the factual findings of the trial court only if they are
clearly erroneous.
Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 444
(1986); Largent v. Largent, Ky., 643 S.W.2d 261, 263 (1982); CR
52.01.
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are
manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
Ky, 412 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1967).
Wells v. Wells,
A trial court’s legal decision
on modification will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion.
Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 159, 161 (1970);
Gates v. Gates, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 223, 224 (1967).
The trial court
is in the best position to evaluate the testimony and weigh the
evidence, so an appellate court should not substitute its own
opinion for that of the trial court.
See Reichle, 719 S.W.2d at
444; Bickel v. Bickel, Ky. 442 S.W.2d 575, 576 (1969).
Where the
evidence is conflicting, we must defer to the judgment of the
trial court unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous or
the trial court abused its discretion.
Gates, 412 S.W.2d at 224.
The trial court adopted the findings of fact in the
commissioner’s report without modification.
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Consequently, we
must accept those findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Based upon the evidence presented to the commissioner, we find
that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings of fact.
In particular, the commissioner focused on the
testimony raising concerns that Sonja’s housekeeping skills were
deficient to the point of uncleanliness.
Moreover, the
commissioner gave great weight to the testimony and report by
mental health expert Dana Hardy.
In her conclusion recommending
that Craig be designated the primary residential custodian, Hardy
stated her opinion that Sonja had engaged in conduct intended to
alienate Craig from the children, and that Sonja had a tendency
to act in a hysterical fashion.
Upon considering the character
and quality of the evidence and the findings, we cannot say the
the trial court’s decision to award primary residential custody
of the children to Craig was clearly erroneous.
Finally, following the entry of the custody order,
Sonja filed a $100.00 supersedeas bond in an attempt to stay the
court’s judgment.
Sonja argues that the trial court improperly
set aside her superseadeas bond to stay the trial court’s order
designating Craig as the primary residential custodian of Seth
and Zachary.
“[J]udgments respecting the custody . . . of infants
may not be superseded.”
Franklin v. Franklin, 299 Ky. 426, 185
S.W.2d 696, 697 (1945) (criticized on other grounds in Getty v.
Getty, Ky. App. 793 S.W.2d 136, 137-138 (1990)); See also,
Casebolt v. Casebolt, 170 Ky. 88, 185 S.W. 510 (1916).
While
Franklin and Casebolt predate the adoption in January 1976 of §
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115 of the Kentucky Constitution guaranteeing at least one appeal
to another court as a matter of right, we do not perceive those
cases as being in conflict with the constitutional provision.
Sonja has exercised her right to appeal.
In the meantime, there
has been a judicial determination that it was in the best
interest of Seth and Zachary that Craig serve as their primary
residential custodian.
Under the circumstances, Sonja was not
entitled to stay the custody order by posting a supersedeas bond.
However, nothing prevents a parent from requesting the trial
court to stay the order pending appeal by motion to alter, amend
or vacate pursuant to CR 59.05.
Failing that, upon proper motion
and proof, this Court inherently has equitable powers to stay
orders of lower courts by maintaining the status quo pursuant to
CR 62, CR 65,
CR 76.33 and
CR 76.36(4).
Getty at 138.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Calloway
Circuit Court awarding primary residential custody of the
parties’ children to Donald Craig Fortenbery is affirmed.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David L. Hargrove
Weisenberger, Hargrove &
Foster
Mayfield, Kentucky
Michael M. Pitman
Haverstock, Bell & Pitman
Murray, Kentucky
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