NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET v. LOUISVILLE ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.; CONCERNED CITIZENS COALITION; AND KENTUCKY RESOURCES COUNCIL, INC.
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C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002406-MR
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
CABINET
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-01779
LOUISVILLE ENVIRONMENTAL
SERVICES, INC.;
CONCERNED CITIZENS COALITION;
AND KENTUCKY RESOURCES COUNCIL, INC.
AND
NO. 1998-CA-002461-MR
KENTUCKY RESOURCES COUNCIL, INC.
AND CONCERNED CITIZENS COALITION
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-01779
LOUISVILLE ENVIRONMENTAL
SERVICES, INC. AND
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
APPELLEES
GUIDUGLI, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
APPELLEES
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
We have before us consolidated appeals from a
July 6, 1998 order of the Franklin Circuit Court reversing a
decision by the secretary of the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet (the “Cabinet”).
The secretary
had vacated the operator’s permit of Louisville Environmental
Services, Inc. (“LES”), a hazardous waste treatment facility
located in southwestern Jefferson County, on the ground that LES
had failed to pay an application fee in a timely manner.
The
circuit court rejected this ground of disqualification,
reinstated LES’s permit, and remanded the matter to the agency
for further review.
We agree with the circuit court and, hence,
affirm.
LES requested, and on August 31, 1993, received a
modification to a hazardous waste permit for a hazardous waste
facility located in Jefferson County, Kentucky.
The permit
modification reflected a change in ownership to LES and carried
an expiration date of September 28, 1994.
On March 23, 1994 (six
months prior to its expiration), LES filed an application with
the Division of Waste Management (“DWM”) of the Cabinet to renew
its hazardous waste permit.
On September 30, 1994, DWM notified
LES that the permit application was incomplete in several
respects, including that the application was not accompanied by a
Part A application fee of $1,000.00.
LES submitted a Part A
application along with a $5,040.00 fee.
On January 5, 1996, DWM
issued a permit to LES for continued operations.
The Concerned
Citizens Coalition (“CCC”) and the Kentucky Resources Council
(“KRC”) challenged the DWM’s decision to issue the permit.
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A
hearing officer recommended the Cabinet secretary revoke the
permit because LES had not paid the $1,000.00 fee due with Part A
of the application.
The secretary agreed and revoked LES’s
permit, requiring LES to file an application for a new permit
rather than for a continuation of the old permit.
LES appealed to the circuit court, contending that it
was not required to file a Part A application as a new permit
holder but only needed to file a Part B application for
continuing an existing permit.
The circuit court agreed with LES
in a well reasoned opinion which we adopt in part as our own:
“II.
Discussion
The Secretary, in his Final Order, determined that DWM
erred in issuing a renewal permit because, as of the expiration
date of LES’s Part B permit, LES had failed to pay the Part A
application fee due under 401 KAR Chapter 39, as required by 401
KAR 38:040 Section 6.
Accordingly, he found that the conditions
of the expired permit could not be continued and that the permit
was no longer in effect.
The following regulation is at issue:
401.KAR 38:040. Changes to permits;
expiration of permits.
* * *
Section 6. Continuation of Expiring
Permits. (1) The conditions of an expired
permit continue in force until the effective
date of a new permit if:
(a) The permittee has submitted a timely
application under 401 KAR 38:090 and 401 KAR
38:100 and the applicable requirements in 401
KAR 38:150 to 401 KAR 38:210 and which is a
complete (under Section 1(3) of 401 KAR
38:070) application for a new permit, paid
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the appropriate fees due (under 401 KAR
Chapter 39); and
(b) The cabinet, through no fault of the
permittee, does not issue a new permit with
an effective date on or before the expiration
date of the previous permit (for example,
when issuance is impracticable due to time or
resources constraints).
For purposes of this discussion, the Court is primarily
concerned with the part of 401 KAR 38:040 Section 6(1)(a) that
requires the permittee to have paid the “appropriate fees due”
under 401 KAR Chapter 39, as this is the provision upon which the
Secretary based his Final Order.
401 KAR Chapter 39, Hazardous
Waste Fees, provides the fee schedule for hazardous waste
management.
401 KAR 39:120 provides for the payment of Part A
application fee.
Specifically, the regulation provides that
“[t]his administrative regulation establishes the fee schedule
for submitting Part A of the application for storage, treatment
or disposal facility permits.”
401 KAR 39:120.
that regulation, “Applicability,”
Section 1 of
provides that the regulation
applies to “all treatment, storage, or disposal facilities
required by Section 2(1) of 401 KAR 38:070 to submit Part A of
the application for a hazardous waste site or facility permit.”
401 KAR 39:120 Section 2, “Filing Fees,” provides that “[a]ny
owner or operator who submits a part A application for a
treatment, storage, or disposal facility shall submit with the
application a filing fee in the amount of $1,000.00.”
401 KAR
39:120 Section 2.
Therefore, it is clear from these regulations that if a
facility is required to submit a Part A application, then that
facility must also submit the $1,000.00 filing fee.
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However, as a basis for its appeal, LES argues that it
is not required to submit a Part A application fee in order to
continue its permit through the renewal process.
LES maintains
that no Part A application fee is due, and that 401 KAR 38:040
Section 6 itself supports this argument.
We agree.
401 KAR
38:040 Section 6(1)(a) provides that for an existing permit to be
continued in effect, the permittee must have submitted a timely
application under 401 KAR 38:090, entitled “General Contents of
Part B Application,” as well as 401 KAR 38:100, entitled
“Specific Part B Requirements for Groundwater Protection.”
401
KAR 38:040 Section 6(1)(a) also states that the applicable
requirements of 401 KAR 38:150 (“Specific Part B Requirements for
Containers”) to 401 KAR 38:210 (other Part B requirements) must
be met.
There is no reference to any Part A application or fees.
The only mention of Part A in connection with 401 KAR 38:040
Section 6, is where Section 6 references 401 KAR Chapter 39 which
deals with hazardous waste fees.
However, while 401 KAR 39:120
provides for Part A application fees, this does not mean that it
is required to be paid in a 401 KAR 38:040 situation.
401 KAR
Chapter 39 references many types of fees that apply in different
situations.
The reference to the entire chapter in no way
obligates someone attempting to renew his Part B permit under 401
KAR 38:040 to pay the Part A application fee.
It simply is not
relevant.
Therefore, the Court must determine whether the
Secretary’s decision is based on substantial evidence and is in
conformity with the law.
The Court of Appeals, in Kentucky Board
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of Nursing v. Ward, Ky. App., 890 S.W.2d 641, 642-43 (1994)
summarized the law of administrative appeals in the following
manner:
“The position of the circuit court in
administrative matters is one of review, not
of reinterpretation.” Commonwealth,
Department of Education v. Commonwealth,
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission,
Ky. App., 798 S.W.2d 464, 467 (1990). The
appellate (circuit) court is not free to
consider new or additional evidence, or
substitute its judgment as to the credibility
of the witnesses and/or the weight of the
evidence concerning questions of fact. Mill
Street Church of Christ v. Hogan, Ky. App.,
785 S.W.2d 263 (1990). Thus, if
administrative findings of fact are based
upon substantial evidence, then those
findings are binding upon the appellate
court. Commonwealth, Dept. of Education,
supra. The only question remaining for the
appellate court to address is “whether or not
the agency applied the correct rule of law to
the facts so found.” Starks v. Kentucky
Health Facilities, Ky. App., 684 S.W.2d 5, 6
(1984). If the ruling of the administrative
agency is based on an incorrect view of the
law, the reviewing court may substitute its
judgment for that of the agency. Mill Street
Church of Christ, supra, at 266.
There is no disputed issue of fact in this case, and
the Court must only determine whether the Secretary applied an
incorrect rule of law.
As illustrated by the foregoing
discussion, the Court finds that the Secretary’s interpretation
of the requirements of 401 KAR 38:040 Section 6 is incorrect.
III.
Conclusion
The Secretary’s decision was contrary to law.
LES was
not required by law to submit a Part A application fee, and thus
the question of whether it paid money or how much or for what
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purpose is irrelevant.
The permit continuation/renewal statute
clearly is intended to reference Part B applications and fees
only.
LES’s permit was improperly revoked, and that matter
should be remanded to the Division of Waste Management for
processing in accordance with 401 KAR 38:040 Section 6 as
clarified by this opinion.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner
Louisville Environmental Services, Inc.’s appeal, shall be, and
the same hereby is, SUSTAINED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter is hereby
REMANDED to the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet Division of Waste Management for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.”
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the July 6,
1998 order of the Franklin Circuit Court.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTING: These consolidated appeals
challenge an order by the Franklin Circuit Court that overrides a
Cabinet Secretary’s judgment concerning the process by which one
of the more important decisions entrusted to the Secretary’s
agency is to be made.
Whether this is an appropriate exercise of
judicial authority is as much an issue in this case as whether
the circuit court accurately corrected the Secretary’s reading of
his own regulation.
It is an issue of more than passing concern
to the parties and one to which they have devoted considerable
effort. That concern and that effort merit a full response; I
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write separately in part to provide that response.
I also write
separately because, believing that the administrative process may
not yet have reached an appealable outcome, and agreeing with the
appellants that, if it has, the circuit court’s order
misconstrues the pertinent law, I respectfully dissent.
The parties have addressed themselves to Kentucky
statutory and administrative law, but as a preliminary matter it
is well to note that federal law provides the framework for most
environmental regulation.
The hazardous waste processing at the
heart of this case, for example, is subject to the provisions of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et
seq. (1976 as amended) (RCRA), and in particular to Subtitle C of
that Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934.
In the words of the Supreme
Court,
RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute
that empowers EPA [the Environmental
Protection Agency] to regulate hazardous
wastes from cradle to grave, in accordance
with the rigorous safeguards and waste
management procedures of Subtitle C[.] . . .
Under the relevant provisions of Subtitle C,
EPA has promulgated standards governing
hazardous waste generators and transporters,
. . . and owners and operators of hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities (TSDF’s), see § 6924. Pursuant to
§ 6922, EPA has directed hazardous waste
generators to comply with handling, record
keeping, storage, and monitoring requirements
. . . . TSDF’s, however, are subject to much
more stringent regulation than either
generators or transporters, including a 4 to
5-year permitting process, . . . burdensome
financial assurance requirements, stringent
design and location standards, and, perhaps
most onerous of all, responsibility to take
corrective action for releases of hazardous
substances and to ensure safe closure of each
facility[.]
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City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 33132, 128 L. Ed. 2d 302, 307-08, 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994).
Under RCRA, the EPA is authorized to approve state
hazardous waste regulatory programs that satisfy federal
standards.
42 U.S.C. § 6926.
If a state elects to enact its own program
meeting minimum federal standards and
receives approval from the EPA, then the
state program operates in lieu of the federal
program.
Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1190
(6th Cir. 1995).
To qualify under RCRA, state programs must be
substantially equivalent to the federal program, must be
consistent with it and the programs of other states, and must
provide for adequate means of enforcement.
42 U.S.C. § 6926.
State regulations must be no less stringent than the federal
ones.
42 U.S.C. § 6929.
Kentucky has duly enacted its own hazardous waste
disposal program.
KRS §§ 224.10-010 et seq. (1980 as amended).
Stephens, “Commencing the Decade with Environmental Reform,” 69
Ky. L. J. 227 (1980-81).
The state received interim EPA approval
in 1981 (see 46 Fed. Reg. 19, 819 (1981)) and final approval on
January 31, 1985 (see 50 Fed. Reg. 2550 (1985)).
Numerous
revisions of Kentucky’s hazardous waste laws have since been
approved as adequate responses to changes in the federal law.
See, for example, 61 Fed. Reg. 25799 (1996).
Any modification of
the federal law for which there is not yet an approved state
equivalent applies directly to the state.
Concern v. LWD, Inc., supra.
Coalition for Health
The Kentucky law at issue in this
-9-
case, therefore, operates in lieu of its federal counterpart.
In
construing that law, however, the counterpart serves as a
fundamental guide.
See KRS 224.40-330(3).
The legal background thus sketched in, it is necessary
as well to sketch in the facts underlying this dispute and the
procedural steps by which the parties have come before this
Court.
LES acquired its Jefferson County waste processing and
storage facility from B-T Energy Corporation.
B-T was operating
the facility when RCRA took effect, and in or soon after November
1980 was first accorded “interim status” under the new regulatory
regime.
As noted above, facilities that treat, store, or dispose
of hazardous waste must have a RCRA permit.
“Interim status”
under RCRA is the mechanism for phasing pre-existing facilities
into the program.
A facility in operation prior to November 19,
1980 (the effective date of RCRA), or at the time of a statutory
or regulatory change that first subjects the facility to RCRA,
may preserve its right to carry on its business pending final
agency approval by properly notifying EPA (or the designated
state regulator) of its operation and filing a preliminary permit
application.
State of New Mexico v. Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122
(D.C.Cir. 1992).
B-T Energy received a ten-year RCRA permit for the
storage of hazardous waste on September 28, 1984.
In August
1993, the permit was modified to reflect that ownership and
operational control of the facility had passed to LES.
Apparently, prior to the transfer to LES, B-T had stopped
accepting hazardous waste at the facility.
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LES intended, it
seems, to resume that activity, and so, or in any event, in March
1994, it submitted its preliminary application for a new permit.
We note here that 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(3) provides as
follows:
Any permit under this section shall be for a
fixed term, not to exceed 10 years in the
case of any land disposal facility, storage
facility, or incinerator or other treatment
facility. Each permit for a land disposal
facility shall be reviewed five years after
date of issuance or reissuance and shall be
modified as necessary to assure that the
facility continues to comply with the
currently applicable requirements of this
section and section 6924 of this title.
Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the
Administrator from reviewing and modifying a
permit at any time during its term. Review
of an application for a permit renewal shall
consider improvements in the state of control
and measurement technology as well as changes
in applicable regulations. Each permit
issued under this section shall contain such
terms and conditions as the Administrator (or
the State) determines necessary to protect
human health and the environment.
LES’s application for a new permit was necessitated by
this section and by the state regulations promulgated in
accordance with it.
In particular, 401 KAR 38:040 § 5, Duration
of Permit, provides in part that “[h]azardous waste site or
facility permits shall be effective for a fixed term not to
exceed ten (10) years.”
Section 6 of the same chapter,
Continuation of Expiring Permits, then provides as follows:
(1) The conditions of an expired permit
continue in force until the effective date of
a new permit if: (a) The permittee has
submitted a timely application under 401 KAR
38:090 and 401 KAR 38:100 and the applicable
requirements in 401 KAR 38:150 to 401 KAR
38:210 and which is a complete (under Section
1(3) of 401 KAR 38:070) application for a new
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permit, paid the appropriate fees due (under
401 KAR Chapter 39); and (b) The cabinet,
through no fault of the permittee, does not
issue a new permit with an effective date on
or before the expiration date of the previous
permit (for example, when issuance is
impracticable due to time or resource
constraints).
The circuit court’s construction of this regulation is what
prompted the present appeal.
I shall consider the circuit
court’s reading in detail below, but first I must sketch in a bit
more of the background.
The Cabinet, through its Division of Waste Management
(DWM), responded by letter to LES’s application on September 30,
1994, two days after the expiration date of the original B-T/LES
permit.
DWM noted that the application had numerous defects,
including the lack of site maps, a list of industries to be
served, and processing fees.
LES eventually supplied these
defects, and on January 5, 1996, DWM issued Permit No. KYD079661-146 to LES for hazardous waste activities at the Jefferson
County site.
On February 2, 1996, KRC and CCC, pursuant to KRS
224.10-420(2),1 filed an administrative petition challenging the
permit.
Petitioners alleged, among other things, that LES’s
application had not been timely filed and thus that the DWM had
erred by processing the application as one for the renewal of a
1
KRS 224.10-420(2) provides in part that “[a]ny person not
previously heard in connection with the issuance of any order or
the making of any final determination arising under this chapter
by which he considers himself aggrieved may file with the cabinet
a petition alleging that the order or final determination is
contrary to law or fact and is injurious to him, alleging the
grounds and reasons therefor, and demand a hearing.” Cf. 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a).
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continuing permit.
DWM should have considered the application,
the petitioners maintained, as one for a new permit.
The matter was referred to a hearing officer, and a
hearing was scheduled.
Prior to the hearing but after some
discovery, the petitioners moved for summary disposition on the
ground that LES had failed to file a complete application by the
September 28, 1994, deadline, and thus was not eligible for a
continuing-facility permit.
On September 19, 1996, The hearing
officer granted this motion. She recommended that Permit No.
KYD079-661-146 be voided and that the matter be remanded to DWM
for reconsideration as an application for a new-facility permit.
LES had failed, the hearing officer found (and apparently
believed was beyond dispute), to supply required information with
its original application and had failed to pay when due the
requisite filing fees.
DWM was not authorized, the hearing
officer ruled, to excuse these lapses after the fact.
LES had
also failed, the hearing officer continued, to provide the
requisite assurances that the expense of closing the facility
could be met, and again DWM was not authorized to waive or modify
that requirement.
The hearing officer’s report and the parties’
exceptions thereto2 were then submitted to the Secretary.
By
order entered November 11, 1996, the Secretary upheld the hearing
officer’s recommendation that LES’s application be remanded to
2
The parties also submitted various responses to one
another’s exceptions and replies to the responses. One of the
questions on appeal, as we shall discuss below, concerns the
propriety of these responses and replies and their efficacy as
vehicles for the raising and preserving of issues.
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DWM for reconsideration as an application for a new, as opposed
to a renewal, permit.
The Secretary agreed with the hearing
officer that LES had failed to pay a portion of its application
fee on time and that consequently its previous permit had lapsed.
Finding this ground a sufficient rationale for the recommended
disposition, the Secretary declined to discuss the other aspects
of the hearing officer’s report.
It was from the Secretary’s order that LES sought
review in circuit court.
Before I discuss that review, I should
clarify that EPA regulations provide for a two-part permit
application.
Part A
contains information concerning the nature of
the applicant's business, a scale drawing,
photographs and a topographic map of the
facility, a description of its hazardous
waste management processes and the design
capacity of these processes, a specification
of the types and quantities of hazardous
wastes processed, stored, or disposed of at
the facility, as well as information
regarding permits or construction approvals.
United States v. Power Engineering Company, 10 F.Supp.2d 1145,
1147 (D.Colo. 1998).
Part A is an abbreviated document and,
aside from the noted attachments, is to be supplied on forms
provided by EPA.
Part B, on the other hand, is a detailed
document which describes, in narrative form, “how the facility
will comply with substantive regulations governing the operation
of hazardous waste management facilities.”
State of New Mexico
v. Richardson, 39 F.Supp.2d 48, 52 (D.Dist.Colo. 1999).
C.F.R. § 270.1; 40 C.F.R. § 270.10 et seq.
40
Although the states
need not adopt the federal two-part application procedure (40
C.F.R. § 271.), Kentucky has done so. 401 KAR 38:070.
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The Hearing Officer construed the regulations as
requiring LES to submit a complete new application, both part A
and part B.
Filing fees are to accompany both parts, and the
Hearing Officer found LES’s application to have been incomplete
with respect to the information required by both parts as well as
with respect to both fees.
The Secretary focused, however, on
the $1,000.00 processing fee which is to accompany part A. 401
KAR § 39:120(2).
Even if part A had been the only part of LES’s
application due prior to the expiration of the former permit, the
Secretary seems likely to have reasoned, and even if LES’s
incomplete initial submission could be deemed an adequate first
attempt to file part A, LES was clearly on notice prior to the
DWM’s deficiency report that the part-A fee was due as well, and
thus its failure to pay that fee when due rendered its
application inexcusably incomplete until after the expiration of
its permit.
The old permit no longer viable, LES’s application
should have been deemed one for a new permit.
LES sought review of this order in Franklin Circuit
Court.
Before that court, LES maintained (1) that it had in fact
paid the part-A fee and should have been afforded an opportunity
before the hearing officer to prove this; i.e., that summary
disposition of this issue had been inappropriate, and (2) that no
part-A fee had been due because no part A had been due: a renewal
application, LES asserted, requires only part B.
The circuit
court agreed with this second contention and so remanded to the
DWM, “for processing in accordance with 401 KAR 38:040 Section 6
as clarified by this opinion.”
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This is the order from which the Cabinet and the
citizens associations have appealed.
The appellants insist that
LES’s part-A-was-not-due contention was not properly raised
during the administrative proceedings and thus was not preserved
for circuit court review.
They also insist that, in agreeing
with LES on this point, the circuit court misinterpreted the
pertinent regulations.
The Cabinet maintains, moreover, that
LES’s alleged failure to raise this issue during the agency
proceedings amounts to a failure to exhaust its administrative
remedies.
The circuit court, the Cabinet argues, was therefor
without jurisdiction to entertain that question.
I have noted the pertinence of federal law to this
dispute and have sketched the dispute’s factual and procedural
history.
Before I begin my discussion, it remains only to
describe this Court’s standard of review.
The familiar rule in
Kentucky, as observed in Bowling v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406 (1994) is that
"[j]udicial review of an administrative
agency's action is concerned with the
question of arbitrariness." Com. Transp.
Cabinet v. Cornell, Ky.App., 796 S.W.2d 591,
594 (1990) (citing American Beauty Homes
Corporation v. Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Commission, Ky.,
379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1964). Section 2 of the
Kentucky Constitution prohibits the exercise
of arbitrary power by an administrative
agency. Id.
In determining whether an agency's action
was arbitrary, the reviewing court should
look at three primary factors. The court
should first determine whether the agency
acted within the constraints of its
statutory powers or whether it exceeded them.
(citation omitted). Second, the court should
examine the agency's procedures to see if a
party to be affected by an administrative
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order was afforded his procedural due
process. The individual must have been given
an opportunity to be heard. Finally, the
reviewing court must determine whether the
agency's action is supported by substantial
evidence. (citation omitted). If any of these
three tests are failed, the reviewing court
may find that the agency's action was
arbitrary. Com. Transp. Cabinet v. Cornell,
796 S.W.2d at 594. See also KRS 18A.100 (5).
Id. at 409.
The substantive question here is whether the agency
misconstrued one of its own regulations.
In construing statutes
and regulations a reviewing court seeks first to give effect to
the legislative intent.
When that intent is clear, the standard
of review is “de novo”; i.e., without deference to the
interpretation under review, regardless of whether the ruling at
issue is that of an administrative agency or a court.
Mill St.
Church of Christ v. Hogan, Ky. App., 785 S.W.2d 263 (1990).
When
the legislative or regulatory text is ambiguous, however, and the
decision under review is that of an administrative agency, courts
generally do defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation,
particularly where the interpretation benefits from the expertise
which is the agency’s raison d’être.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
Courts must take care, however, that this deference does not
become an abdication of their ultimate responsibility to construe
the law.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet, Ky., 689 S.W.2d 14 (1985); Kentucky Board of
Nursing v. Ward, Ky. App., 890 S.W.2d 641 (1994).
Before addressing the regulatory construction at the
heart of the Cabinet’s and the citizens’ appeals, it is necessary
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first to consider several preliminary questions.
Among these are
questions concerning the propriety of judicial review.
First,
the doctrine of the separation of powers as well as
considerations of procedural efficiency mandate that judicial
review of agency actions generally be confined to final agency
actions.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 18 L. Ed.
2d 681, 87 S. Ct. 1507 (1967).
Indeed, KRS 224.10-470, upon
which LES bases its right to judicial review, provides that
appeals may be taken from “final orders of the Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet.”
“Finality” is thus a
jurisdictional matter that this Court is obliged to address.
Commonwealth, Department of Highways, v. Berryman, Ky., 363
S.W.2d 525 (1962); Payton v. Payton, Ky., 293 S.W.2d 883 (1956).
Was the Secretary’s order remanding LES’s permit
application final and appealable?
The question arises from the
obvious fact that the agency has yet either to issue or to deny
LES’s permit and from the strong policy against piecemeal review
of adjudications. Cf. CR 54.
The circuit court at least
implicitly recognized the problem when it refused to remand the
matter to the Secretary, lest there be successive appeals from
each of the hearing officer’s three grounds for vacating LES’s
permit.
The finality of any given administrative adjudication
depends not upon the label affixed to its
action by the administrative agency but
rather upon a realistic appraisal of the
consequences of such action. The ultimate
test of reviewability is not to be found in
an overrefined technique, but in the need of
the review to protect from the irreparable
injury threatened in the exceptional case by
-18-
administrative rulings which attach legal
consequences to action taken in advance of
other hearings and adjudications that may
follow, the results of which the regulations
purport to control. Thus, administrative
orders are ordinarily reviewable when they
impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix
some legal relationship as a consummation of
the administrative process. Under this test,
a final order need not necessarily be the
very last order.
Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan v. Federal Maritime
Board, 302 F.2d 875, 877 (D.C.Cir. 1962) (internal quotations
marks and citations omitted).
Cf. Tube Turns Division v.
Logsdon, Ky. App., 677 S.W.2d 897 (1984) (reciting a similar
version of this test).
Cf. also Davis v. Island Creek Coal
Company, Ky., 969 S.W.2d 712 (1998) (noting this test, but
holding, in the pre-1996 workers’ compensation context where the
first level of appellate-like review was provided by the agency,
that finality is primarily an attribute of adjudications, not
decisions of intermediate reviewing bodies); and Essex County v.
Zagata, 91 N.Y.2d 447 (1998) (providing a clear statement of New
York’s version of the test).
Can the Secretary’s decision (the
Secretary in this instance is the fact finder) be said to “impose
an obligation, deny a right or fix some legal relationship”?
“It is firmly established that agency action is not
final merely because is has the effect of requiring a party to
participate in an agency proceeding.”
Aluminum Company of
America v. United States, 790 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C.Cir. 1986).
Secretary’s order, therefore, is not final merely because it
The
requires LES to submit to further agency review and perhaps to
stricter agency scrutiny than was originally applied to its
-19-
permit application.
In their briefs and in the oral arguments
included in the record, the parties have suggested that the
gravamen of their dispute is precisely this question about the
standard to be applied to LES’s application.
No standard having
yet been applied and the question not having yet been squarely
put to the agency, this issue clearly is not ripe for judicial
appeal.
Of course a further consequence of the Secretary’s
ruling is the expiration of LES’s right to conduct hazardous
waste operations under its former permit pending a decision on
its new application. 401 KAR 38.040 § 6.
If LES was in fact
conducting such operations, or if it would be capable and
desirous of doing so before the final approval of its new permit,
then the Secretary’s ruling would have the effect of “denying a
right.”
It would thus be final and subject to judicial appeal.
Finality determinations are, however, pragmatic. They are to be
based not on the hypothetical effects of the agency decision, but
rather on whether that decision “had a ‘direct and immediate . .
. effect on the day-to-day business’ of the complaining parties.”
Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Company of California,
449 U.S. 232, 239, 66 L. Ed. 2d 416, 424, 101 S. Ct. 488 (1980)
(quoting Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, supra); see also Abbs v.
Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1992).
It is not clear from the record whether LES has in fact
been harmed by having to cease or to postpone hazardous waste
operations as a result of the Secretary’s order.
not alleged such an injury.
The company has
In fact, the record suggests that
-20-
LES planned an essentially new hazardous waste operation for
which its financial assurances would not be due until shortly
before start up at some point in the future.
In any event, the
record as it comes to us suggests that the Secretary’s order may
not be final.
It is thus unclear whether the circuit court’s
jurisdiction was properly invoked.
Accordingly, this Court is
compelled, it seems to me, to remand this matter to the circuit
court for a resolution of this question.
Next, the Cabinet maintains that, even if the
Secretary’s order is final, still the circuit court either lacked
authority to review the particular regulatory question on which
it based its ruling or abused its discretion by exercising its
power of review in this instance.
As noted above, the issue
presented to the hearing officer was whether LES had satisfied
the part-A-fee and other application requirements. The hearing
officer found that in three respects, including the part-A fee,
LES had not met those requirements.
Without ruling on the
hearing officer’s other two findings, the Secretary agreed that
LES had failed to pay within the time allowed the fee associated
with part A of the permit application.
That failure, according
to the Secretary, precluded granting LES interim status under its
prior permit and precluded considering LES’s application as one
for the renewal of an existing permit as opposed to considering
it as an application for a new permit.
In a belated addendum to its exceptions from the
hearing officer’s report, LES argued for the first time that its
alleged failure to pay the part-A fee was immaterial because as a
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renewal applicant it was not obliged to submit a new part A of
the application.
KRC and CCC moved that this argument be
stricken from the record for not having been timely raised, but
the Secretary addressed neither their motion nor LES’s argument.
The circuit court, however, did address the argument
and agreed with LES that a renewal applicant is not required to
file a new part A.
Believing, with relief no doubt, that this
construction of the regulations not only addressed the present
appeal, but also answered the hearing officer’s other deficiency
rulings and thus obviated a remand to the Secretary for
reconsideration of those rulings, the circuit court remanded the
matter to the hearing officer that she might resume the review of
LES’s new permit.
In contesting the circuit court’s decision, the Cabinet
maintains, first, that LES’s failure properly to raise this issue
before the Secretary amounts to a failure to exhaust its
administrative remedies and thus that the issue was not
judicially reviewable.
Next, it argues that the issue was not
properly preserved before the fact finder, and so the circuit
court should have declined to review it. Finally, it argues that
this issue concerns what was essentially an affirmative defense
and that LES waived that defense by failing to include it in its
initial pleading.
I shall consider these arguments in turn.
The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is closely
related to the finality requirement discussed above.
Federal
Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Company of California, 449 U.S.
232, 66 L. Ed. 2d 416, 101 S. Ct. 488 (1980).
-22-
Ordinarily, courts
“should not interfere with an agency until it has completed its
action, or else has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction.”
McKart
v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194, 23 L. Ed 2d 194, 203, 89 S.
Ct. 1657 (1969).
Accordingly, “[e]xhaustion is generally
required as a matter of preventing premature interference with
agency processes, . . .” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765,
45 L. Ed. 2d 522, 538, 95 S. Ct. 2457 (1975).
Premature resort to the courts is not the issue here,
but the exhaustion doctrine may still apply
where the administrative process is at an end
and a party seeks judicial review of a
decision that was not appealed through the
administrative process. Particulary,
judicial review may be hindered by the
failure of the litigant to allow the agency
to make a factual record, or to exercise its
discretion or apply its expertise. . . .
Certain very practical notions of judicial
efficiency come into play as well. A
complaining party may be successful in
vindicating his rights in the administrative
process. If he is required to pursue his
administrative remedies, the courts may never
have to intervene. And notions of
administrative autonomy require that the
agency be given a chance to discover and
correct its own errors. Finally, it is
possible that frequent and deliberate
flouting of administrative processes could
weaken the effectiveness of an agency by
encouraging people to ignore its procedures.
McKart v. United States, supra, 395 U.S. at 194-95, 23 L. Ed. 2d
at 203-04.
As the Cabinet notes, our Supreme Court has applied the
exhaustion principle where parties subjected to adverse agency
decisions have ignored opportunities for administrative review
and have then sought review in court.
In Swatzell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 866 (1998), for example, an NREPC
-23-
hearing officer had recommended penalties against a surface
mining permittee for regulatory violations, and the permittee had
filed no exceptions to the officer’s report or otherwise availed
himself of the opportunity for administrative reconsideration.
When the permittee then sought review in court, the circuit court
summarily dismissed.
Affirming the dismissal, our Supreme Court
explained that the exhaustion principle
requires a party to raise issues before that
particular [administrative] entity . . .
before those issues are available for
appellate review. If a party fails to
exhaust all available administrative
remedies, a reviewing court is without
jurisdiction to consider the contested
matters as the administrative agency did not
have the opportunity to first review them.
Id., at 868.
See also White v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky. App., 940 S.W.2d 909
(1997).
The Cabinet maintains that, under the rule thus
enunciated in Swatzell, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
consider LES’s belatedly raised argument concerning its
obligation under the regulations--or rather its lack of
obligation--to file part A of the permit renewal application.
disagree.
As the discussion in Swatzell illustrates, the
exhaustion of remedies doctrine is closely related not only to
the finality rule, but also to the general rule that reviewing
courts not address alleged errors unless those errors were
preserved (i.e., expressly raised) in the proceedings under
review.
Unlike non-finality or non-exhaustion, however, non-
preservation generally does not raise jurisdictional concerns.
-24-
I
Courts, of course, are under a general duty to exercise their
jurisdiction.3
Lest it narrow its jurisdiction unnecessarily,
therefore, a reviewing court should take care not to apply
exhaustion principles when preservation principles will do.
This is such a case.
Unlike Swatzell, where the
appellant flouted the administrative authority and refused to
participate in the agency’s full, two-part fact-finding
procedure, LES participated in both parts of the administrative
process and recognized its responsibility to assist in the making
of an administrative record.
In these circumstances, we are not
persuaded that LES failed to exhaust its administrative remedies
and thus are not persuaded that the circuit court lacked
authority on this ground to consider LES’s belatedly raised issue
as part of its review.
The matter is not thus settled, however, for the
Cabinet correctly insists that, even if the circuit court had
authority to consider LES’s belated argument, the propriety of
that consideration is doubtful: alleged errors which have not
been properly brought to the fact-finder’s attention are
unpreserved, and unpreserved errors are, as a general rule, not
subject to review.
Urella v. Kentucky Board of Medical
Licensure, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 869 (1997); Regional Jail Authority v.
3
“[F]ederal courts are vested with a ‘virtually unflagging
obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction given them. . . . ‘We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which
is given, than to usurp that which is not given.’” McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146, 117 L. Ed. 2d 291, 300, 112 S. Ct.
1081 (1992) (citations omitted). The principle in Kentucky is
the same: Constitution of Kentucky § 14; Campbell v. Hulett, Ky.,
243 S.W.2d 608 (1951).
-25-
Tackett, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 225 (1989); Taxpayers Action Group of
Madison County v. Madison County Board of Elections, Ky. App.,
652 S.W.2d 666 (1983).
For two reasons, however, I am not persuaded that the
circuit court abused its discretion by reviewing LES’s very
fundamental regulatory question in this case.
clear that the issue was not preserved.
First, it is not
To be sure, LES did not
raise the regulatory interpretation issue within ordinary NREPC
procedures.
But its untimely motion had no bearing on the
Secretary’s jurisdiction, as established by statute, and the
Secretary has considerable discretion to decide how best to
address non-jurisdictional procedural irregularities.
Union
Light, Heat & Power Company v. Public Service Commission, Ky.,
271 S.W.2d 361 (1954); Western Kraft Paper Group v. Department
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Ky. App., 632
S.W.2d 454 (1981).
KRC and CCC, moreover, responded to the
motion on its merits. The Secretary’s silence, therefore, with
respect both to LES’s belated argument and to appellants’
procedural objection to that argument, might well be construed
simply as a rejection of LES’s position.
Cf. Eiland v. Ferrell,
Ky., 937 S.W.2d 713 (1997) (finding untimely objections to a
commissioner’s report nevertheless suitable for appellate
review).
More importantly, I am persuaded that, even if the
part-A issue be deemed unpreserved, the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion by reviewing it.
Under CR 61.02, courts
have a limited discretion to review unpreserved errors in civil
-26-
cases.
Pursuant to that rule, “a palpable error which affects
the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court
on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the error.”
The error
alleged by LES, we believe, was reviewable under this rule.
The unpreserved error rule applies most forcibly to
alleged procedural errors.
Although it is the goal of our system
that all trials be fundamentally fair, as a matter of hard fact,
no trial is procedurally perfect.
It is largely in light of this
fact that the rules of procedure and the rules of evidence
provide litigants with an elaborate means to protect themselves
from unfairness.
Parties routinely waive their rights under
those rules for strategic reasons, however, so that, even if
fact-finding tribunals were able to remedy each lapse from hornbook procedure, the parties would not want them to do so.
The
unpreserved error rule thus protects each litigant’s right,
within limits, to engage in the trial strategy he or she believes
most likely to succeed.
Without the unpreserved error rule,
moreover, parties would be tempted to use procedural error as a
sort of trial insurance.
Procedural errors could pass unremarked
and uncorrected and could then be resorted to on appeal if the
trial turned out badly.
For these reasons the palpable error
rule is rarely applied to procedural errors.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 556 S.W.2d 922 (1977).
Salisbury v.
-27-
The unpreserved error rule also prevents a party from
changing his or her substantive theory of the case on appeal.
A
new cause of action or a new affirmative defense may not be
raised for the first time on appeal after the old one failed at
trial.
An appellant may not, as our Supreme Court has put it,
“feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the
appellate court." Kennedy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 219,
222 (1976); Cabbage Patch Settlement House v. Wheatly, Ky., 987
S.W.2d 784 (1999); Weissinger v. Mannini, Ky., 311 S.W.2d 199
(1958).
This is so because the opponent’s evidence would likely
have been different had the additional claim been tried, and it
is thus ordinarily impossible to say with the requisite
confidence that, had the neglected claim been properly raised,
the result would have been different.
Commonwealth,
Transportation Cabinet v. Roof, Ky., 913 S.W.2d 322 (1996).
A harder question is presented, however, when, as in
this case, a party wishes merely to add an argument to those
arguments raised at trial in support of his or her cause of
action.
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 118 L. Ed. 2d
153, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); The First National Bank of Mayfield
v. Gardner, Ky., 376 S.W.2d 311 (1964); Plesko v. Figgie
International, 528 N. W. 2d 446 (Wis. 1994); Koch v. Rodlin
Enterprises, Inc., 273 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1990); Nutt v. Knutson,
795 P. 2d 30 (Kan. 1989).
A losing defendant may have focused at
trial on the causation element of the plaintiff’s claim, for
example, and then discovered while preparing his appeal
favorable, controlling law on the issue of duty.
-28-
The reviewing
court itself may have discovered a controlling rule neglected by
the parties.
May a reviewing court consider such unpreserved
legal arguments?
Only, our highest court has said, if
application of the unpreserved argument does not implicate
unaddressed questions of material fact, and only if the
unpreserved rule is so basic to the litigation that failure to
incorporate it would result in a misleading application of the
law or a substantial injustice.
Priestly v. Priestly, Ky., 949
S.W.2d 594 (1997); Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Roof,
supra; Mitchell v. Hadl, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 183 (1991); First
National Bank of Mayfield v. Gardner, supra.
Whether, under KRS Chapter 224 and the Cabinet’s
regulations, one applying to renew a hazardous-waste-facility
permit is required to submit both part A and part B of the permit
application or part B only is a question of law utterly basic to
this case and one completely independent of all evidentiary
matters beyond the undisputed fact that LES does indeed wish to
renew its permit.
The parties, LES included, seem initially to
have assumed that part A was required, but if that assumption is
incorrect, as LES now maintains, then conditioning LES’s
application status on its failure to file the part-A fee would be
a misleading application of the law and would be substantially
unjust.
Even if this question was not adequately preserved,
therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion under
CR 61.02 by addressing it.
There is one final preliminary question: characterizing
the part-A issue as an affirmative defense, the Cabinet argues
-29-
that LES waived consideration of that issue by failing to raise
it as such a defense in its original pleadings.4
I disagree.
The original KRC/CCC petition alleged in general terms that LES’s
“application . . . failed to meet the applicable regulatory
requirements . . . .”
Citing 401 KAR chapter 38:040 § 6, the
regulation here at issue, the petition asserted that the
regulations include the requirements that the application be
“complete” and that the fees “due” be paid, but it did not
specify how LES had failed to comply.
petition, LES denied this paragraph.
In its answer to the
That LES had a duty under
the regulations to submit part A of the application and to pay
the part-A fee was thus an element of KRC and CCC’s cause of
action.
That element could be challenged by denial without being
pled as an affirmative defense.
Adkins v. International
Harvester Co., Ky., 286 S.W.2d 528 (1956).
LES did not waive its
part-A issue by failing adequately to plead it.
Having addressed my own and the parties’ procedural
concerns, I shall turn now to the substance of the trial court’s
ruling.
The circuit court focused on the portion of the
regulation that requires renewal permit applications to be
timely.
That portion refers directly to part B.
Finding no
similarly express reference to part A, the circuit court
concluded that
“[t]here is no reference [in 401 KAR 38:040 § 6]
to any Part A application or fees.”
4
That regulation, therefore,
The Cabinet bases its argument on 400 KAR 1:090 § 5(3) and
401 KAR 100:010 which provide in part that the failure to raise
an affirmative defense in a required responsive administrative
pleading “may constitute a waiver of such defense[.]”
-30-
“in no way obligates someone attempting to renew his Part B
permit . . .
not relevant.”
to pay the Part A application fee.
It simply is
The appellants maintain that, by focusing too
narrowly on only a portion of the disputed regulation, the
circuit court distorted its meaning.
I agree.
A more accurate reading emerges from a broader
consideration of the regulatory context.
As the Supreme Court
has observed,
[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic
endeavor. A provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by
the remainder of the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning
clear, . . . or because only one of the
permissible meanings produces a substantive
effect that is compatible with the rest of
the law[.]
United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 98 L. Ed. 2d 740, 748, 108
S. Ct. 626 (1988) (citations omitted).
As noted above, federal
law provides the context for hazardous waste regulation.
It will
be helpful then to set out the pertinent federal regulations and
to juxtapose Kentucky’s virtually identical counterparts.5
5
These citations are to the 1998 edition of the Code of
Federal Regulations and to the 1994 version of the Kentucky
Administrative Regulations. The Kentucky regulations are
controlling and are those in effect at the time LES initiated its
permit application. As the more recent federal regulations show,
however, the law in this area has recently been stable.
-31-
40 CFR § 270.10 General
Application Requirements.
401 KAR 38:070 § 1. General
Application Requirements.
(a) Permit application. Any
person who is required to have
a permit (including new
applicants and permittees with
expiring permits) shall
complete, sign and submit an
application to the Director as
described in this section and
§§ 270.70 through 270.73
[pertaining to interim status.
Cf. 401 KAR 38:020.]. . . .
(1) Permit application. Any
person who is required to have
a permit (including new
applicants and permittees with
expiring permits) shall
complete, sign, and submit an
application to the cabinet as
described in Sections 1
through 6 of this regulation
and 401 KAR 38:020. . . .
(c) Completeness. The
Director shall not issue a
permit before receiving a
complete application for a
permit except for permits by
rule, or emergency permits.
An application for a permit is
complete when the Director
receives an application form
and any supplemental
information which are
completed to his satisfaction.
. . .
(3) Completeness. The cabinet
shall not issue a permit
before receiving a complete
application for a permit
except for permits by rule or
emergency permits. An
application for a permit is
complete when the cabinet
receives an application form
and any supplemental
information which are
completed to the satisfaction
of the cabinet.
(d) Information requirements.
All applicants for RCRA
permits shall provide
information set forth in §
270.13 [part A] and applicable
sections in §§ 270.14 through
270.29 [part B] to the
Director, using the
application form provided by
the Director. . . .
(4) Information requirements.
All applicants for permits
shall provide the applicable
information in compliance with
401 KAR 38:080 [part A]
through 401 KAR 38:210 [end of
part B] to the cabinet, using
the application form provided
by the cabinet. . . .
-32-
401 KAR 38:070 § 5.
Reapplications.
(h) Reapplications. Any HWM
[hazardous waste management]
facility with an effective
permit shall submit a new
application at least 180 days
before the expiration date of
the effective permit, unless
permission for a later date
has been granted by the
Director. (The Director shall
not grant permission for
applications to be submitted
later than the expiration date
of the existing permit.) . . .
40 C.F.R. § 270.50.
of Permits.
Any hazardous waste site or
facility with an effective
permit shall submit a new
application at least 180 days
before the expiration date of
the effective permit, unless
permission for a later date
has been granted by the
cabinet. (The cabinet shall
not grant permission for
applications to be submitted
later than the expiration date
of the existing permit.) . . .
Duration
401 KAR 38:040 § 5.
of Permits.
(a) RCRA permits shall be
effective for a fixed term not
to exceed 10 years. . . .
Duration
(1) Term of Permit. Hazardous
waste site or facility permits
shall be effective for a fixed
term not to exceed ten (10)
years. (See also Section 5 of
401 KAR 38:060.)
(4) Each permit for a land
disposal facility shall be
reviewed by the cabinet five
(5) years after the date of
permit issuance or reissuance
and shall be modified as
necessary, as provided in
Section 2 of this
administrative regulation. . .
.
(d) Each permit for a land
disposal facility shall be
reviewed by the Director five
years after the date of permit
issuance or reissuance and
shall be modified as
necessary, as provided in §
270.41. . . .
-33-
40 C.F.R. § 270.51.
Continuation of Expiring
Permits.
401 KAR 38:040 § 6.
Continuation of Expiring
Permits. [This is the section
at issue.]
(a) EPA permits. When EPA is
the permit-issuing authority,
the conditions of an expired
permit continue in force under
5 U.S.C. 558(c) until the
effective date of a new permit
(see § 124.15) if:
(1) The permittee has
submitted a timely application
under § 270.14 and the
applicable sections in §§
270.15 through 270.29 which is
a complete (under § 270.10(c)
application for a new permit;
and
(2) The Regional
Administrator, through no
fault of the permittee, does
not issue a new permit with an
effective date under § 124.15
on or before the expiration
date of the previous permit
(for example, when issuance is
impracticable due to time or
resource constraints). . . .
(1) The conditions of an
expired permit continue in
force until the effective date
of a new permit if:
(a) The permittee has
submitted a timely application
under 401 KAR 38:090 and 401
KAR 38:100 and the applicable
requirements in 401 KAR 38:150
to 401 KAR 38:210 and which is
a complete (under Section 1(3)
of 401 KAR 38:070) application
for a new permit, paid the
appropriate fees due (under
401 KAR Chapter 39); and
(b) The cabinet, through no
fault of the permittee, does
not issue a new permit with an
effective date on or before
the expiration date of the
previous permit (for example,
when issuance is impracticable
due to time or resource
constraints). . . .
(d) State continuation. In a
(4) State continuation. As
State with an hazardous waste
provided in 40 CFR 270.51(d),
program authorized under 40
an EPA issued permit shall not
CFR part 271, if a permittee
continue in force beyond its
has submitted a timely and
expiration date under federal
complete application under
law if at that time the
applicable State law and
cabinet is the RCRA permitting
regulations, the terms and
authority. . . .
conditions of an EPA-issued
RCRA permit continue in force
beyond the expiration date of
the permit, but only until the
effective date of the State’s
issuance or denial of a State
RCRA permit. . . .
As these provisions show, RCRA permits expire after no
more than ten years.
The facility operator may receive a new
permit thereafter, but only by filing a new application.
If the
operator files the application no later than 180 days before the
old permit’s expiration date (or by another pre-expiration
-34-
deadline set by the administrator), then the conditions of the
old permit may continue in force until the application process is
finished.
The renewal process thus contemplates not simply the
routine continuation of business as usual, but rather a periodic
thorough review of existing hazardous waste facilities.
While
the process does not require that the Cabinet make no distinction
between existing facilities seeking renewal of their permits and
facilities making their first permit application, it does require
that all permit applications, new and renewal, be complete.
A
complete application includes part A, and thus, under 401 KAR
39:120 § 2,6 requires the part-A application fee.
The circuit
court erred, I believe, by concluding otherwise.
It is true, as the circuit court noted, that 401 KAR
38:040 § 6(a) refers expressly to the necessity of a timely part
B but not to a timely part A.
It is also true that the necessary
conditions expressed in a statute are sometimes construed to
create sufficient conditions as well.
Al-Salehi v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995).
Ordinarily, however, the statutory language should be given its
plain meaning.
Shanklin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 173
F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 1998).
In light of the full statutory context
set out above and the clear legislative intent that renewal
applications be meaningfully scrutinized, I am not persuaded that
the expressed necessity of part B in 401 KAR 38:040 § 6(a)
implies the sufficiency of part B.
6
Part A is necessary too.
“Any owner or operator who submits a part A application for
a treatment, storage, or disposal facility shall submit with the
application a filing fee in the amount of $1,000.00.”
-35-
This reading, I believe, comports better than does the circuit
court’s with the rest of the regulatory scheme.
LES defends the circuit court’s reading by claiming
that the information contained in part A is so basic (“name” and
“address”) and unchanging that resubmission would be a waste of
time.
On the contrary, an applicant with an existing facility is
required to submit on part A, among other information,
a scale drawing of the facility showing the
location of all past, present, and future
treatment, storage, and disposal areas; . . .
[a] description of the processes to be used
for treating, storing, and disposing of
hazardous waste, . . . a specification of the
hazardous wastes [and] an estimate of the
quantity of such wastes to be treated,
stored, or disposed annually, . . .[and] a
listing of all permits or construction
approvals received or applied for under
[various regulatory programs].
40 CFR § 270.13.
None of this information is likely simply to
carry over from a prior application.
See Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing the virtually
identical permit renewal provisions (40 CFR. § 122.6) under the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System).
To summarize, the parties’ underlying dispute concerns
LES’s eligibility for a new permit to operate a continuing or
resuming hazardous waste storage, treatment, or disposal
facility.
The parties disagree about the standards governing
that eligibility.
This is an important question, the answer to
which is not yet clear.
See 42 U.S.C. §6925(c)(3), supra;
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
-36-
Environmental Protection Agency, supra; Sanders, “Kentucky Adopts
Risk Assessment for Closing Hazardous Waste Units,” 22 N. Ky. L.
Rev. 37 (1995); and Robertson, “If Your Grandfather Could
Pollute, So Can You,” 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 131 (1995).
not the question before this Court, however.
That is
We are asked to
decide only whether LES, in order to postpone the expiration of
its existing permit and perhaps to qualify for more lenient
consideration of its “renewal” application than it would
otherwise receive, was required to file part A of the application
form and to pay the accompanying fee.
This purely procedural
question strikes me as a quintessentially administrative matter
best left to the branch of government to which, under the
constitution, it has been assigned.
Judicial review of agency
proceedings, moreover, must await a final agency outcome.
in this case may well have been premature.
Review
Finally, judicial
interference with agency procedures is only justified upon a
clear showing that the agency has deviated from its statutory
mandate.
Regulatory construction, therefore, demands of courts
that they place the regulation under review in its statutory
context.
The Secretary’s decision that we have repudiated in
this case not only does not deviate from the underlying mandate
of our hazardous-waste-control legislation, but it comports with
that mandate far better than does the result we have substituted.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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BRIEF FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
CABINET:
BRIEF FOR LOUISVILLE
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.:
Robert P. Benson, Jr.
Timothy D. Lange
Louisville, Kentucky
Richard K. Eisert
Office of Legal Services
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR LOUISVILLE
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
KENTUCKY RESOURCES COUNCIL,
INC. AND CONCERNED CITIZENS
COALITION:
Robert P. Benson, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas J. FitzGerald
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CABINET:
M. Lee Turpin
Frankfort, Kentucky
-38-
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