ROBERT H. MEYERS, M.D. v. FRED WRIGHT AND BARBARA WRIGHT
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RENDERED: March 3, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002319-MR
ROBERT H. MEYERS, M.D.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00450
v.
FRED WRIGHT AND BARBARA WRIGHT
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, HUDDLESTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Dr. Robert Meyers appeals from a judgment
holding him liable for injuries to a Rottweiler dog owned by Fred
and Barbara Wright and the awarding of punitive damages to the
Wrights.
The Wrights, who reside next to a cattle farm owned by
Dr. Meyers, filed this action after someone shot their Rottweiler
on Meyers’s property while the dog was chasing cattle.
Because
KRS 258.235 authorizes the killing of any dog worrying or
pursuing any livestock, we reverse and remand for an order of
dismissal.
The Wrights live in an upscale residential development
which borders the Meyers’s farm.
Dr. Meyers lives in Illinois
but has farm hands to run the day-to-day operations of his cattle
farm.
On March 19, 1996, Mr. Wright was in his living room when
he noticed his dog, Tucker, walking in the deep snow in Meyers’s
field.
In the distance, about 250 yards, he saw Mr. Thomas’s
truck and a person he assumed was Wendell Thomas, a field hand.
The field hand was feeding the cattle when the dog, at 150 yards,
ran toward the cattle.
A short time later the truck was leaving
and Tucker was dragging himself back across the field.
Mr.
Wright took Tucker to a veterinarian for treatment of a gunshot
wound.
The Wrights filed suit against Dr. Meyer and Wendell
Thomas for costs of surgery and medical expenses, lost wages,
transportation costs, attorney fees and costs.
Discovery was
taken in which Dr. Meyers admitted that he called Fred Wright on
five occasions and talked to him in person once.
Dr. Meyers
apparently had seen Tucker chasing his cows on numerous occasions
and was blaming Tucker for numerous deaths and injuries.
Dr.
Meyers told Mrs. Wright that if Tucker kept chasing his cows, he
would have him shot.
The Wrights’ attorney made a motion to set for jury
trial and Meyers’s attorney made a motion to withdraw as attorney
for nonpayment of fees.
on December 17, 1997.
Both motions were heard at motion hour
The court set the matter for trial on
January 22, 1998, and the clerk certification shows a copy to
“All Counsel”.
On the same date, the clerk entered an agreed
order signed by the attorneys and the judge allowing defendants’
counsel to withdraw.
The judge added, “Defendant granted 30 days
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to obtain new counsel.”
This order was not certified by the
clerk as being served on anyone.
There is nothing in the record
prior to trial to indicate defendants were given the notice of
the trial date or that counsel had withdrawn.
On January 23,
1998, the date set for trial, the Wrights appeared, as well as
Wendell Thomas, the co-defendant.
Dr. Meyers failed to appear.
Mr. Wright testified as to the above events and damages.
Mr.
Wright did admit he didn’t see who shot Tucker, but right before
and after the shooting, he saw Thomas’s truck in the field and
saw it leave.
Dr. Meyers.
Mrs. Wright testified as to her conversation with
Wendell Thomas testified that he didn’t have an
attorney and hadn’t received notice of the trial.
He testified
without objection, that Mr. Duffy saw the Wrights’ dog chasing
cattle, that someone in the trailer saw the dog chasing and
eating cattle.
The judge struck this testimony as hearsay and
then asked Mr. Thomas if he shot either the cattle or the dog, to
which Mr. Thomas testified, “no.”
He offered that he hadn’t
heard the doctor order any dog shot.
He admitted he owned a
number of vehicles and one similar to the truck Mr. Wright
described.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge ruled that
using his best guess, Dr. Meyers more likely than not had a
direct involvement in having the dog shot and that Mr. Thomas did
not shoot the dog, even though either Dr. Meyers or someone else
did.
Judgment was granted for requested relief plus, sua sponte,
$500 in punitive damages because the dog was shot where it didn’t
put cattle in danger.
The judge did explain that if evidence was
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introduced that the dog killed a cow or was eating a cow, the
Wrights would not have received anything.
On motion to alter, amend or vacate by Dr. Meyers’s
attorney, he alleged his clients hadn’t received notice of the
trial and sought to have the default set aside.
The judge
reviewed the order setting for trial and the motion to withdraw
as counsel and concluded that even though the attorney withdrew,
he had an obligation to notify his clients and if he didn’t, the
plaintiffs shouldn’t suffer.
There are a number of issues raised in this appeal, but
we can dispose of this case by citing KRS 258.235 which allows a
person to shoot a dog “pursuing, worrying, or wounding any
livestock, . . .”
Id., Section 1.
The trial court in its
findings said that the dog would have had to kill or eat the beef
before it could be shot.
We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of
KRS 258.235 and, therefore, reverse that part of the judgment
which was against Dr. Robert Meyers.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
HUDDLESTON, Judge, CONCURS IN PART IN RESULT AND
DISSENTS IN PART BY SEPARATE OPINION.
HUDDLESTON, Judge, CONCURRING IN PART IN RESULT AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
Fred and Barbara Wright sued Dr. Robert Meyers and his
farm hand, Wendell Thomas, in Logan District Court to recover
compensatory damages for injury to their Rottweiler dog.
The
complaint does not state a cause of action against either of the
defendants.
The plaintiffs simply allege that on March 19, 1996,
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Fred Wright saw a rust colored truck belonging to Thomas leaving
a neighboring farm owned by Dr. Meyers.
Immediately thereafter,
according to the complaint, Fred Wright discovered that his dog
had been shot.
The plaintiffs do not allege that either Thomas
or Dr. Meyers, or any of Meyers’s employees, shot the dog.
They
only allege that “approximately one month prior to their dog
being shot, Robert Meyers, M.D., called the Wright’s [sic] home
and stated ‘I’m ordering your dog shot.’”
Meyers and Thomas, by counsel, denied the essential
allegations of the complaint in their answer and demanded a trial
by jury, but they did not move to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1
Meyers filed a counterclaim seeking damages for the destruction
of his cattle by the Wrights’ dog and later amended it to seek
damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the district
court.
Both defendants again demanded a trial by jury.
The
district court ordered the amended counterclaim filed and
transferred the case to Logan Circuit Court.
On August 7, 1997, counsel for Meyers and Thomas moved
the circuit court for permission to withdraw as their attorney of
record because he had not been paid.
The record does not reflect
that the motion was served on either defendant (or on counsel for
the plaintiffs) or that it was scheduled for a hearing.
On
December 1, 1997, the Wrights moved to set this case for a jury
trial and noticed the motion for a hearing on December 17, 1997.
Counsel for Meyers and Thomas renewed his motion for permission
1
See Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 12.02(f).
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to withdraw as their attorney of record.
This time he certified
that the motion, which was also scheduled for a hearing on
December 17, 1997, had been served by mail on both defendants and
upon counsel for the plaintiffs.
On December 22, 1997, two orders were entered, one
permitting counsel for Meyers and Thomas to withdraw and giving
the defendants thirty days to obtain new counsel, and the other
setting this case for a bench trial on January 22, 1998.
The
order scheduling the case for trial reflects the court’s
instruction that it is to be sent to “All counsel,” while the
other order contains no service instructions.
The docket sheet
prepared by the clerk states that these two orders (as well as
all other orders generated by the court) were served on “all
counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel.”
The case came on for trial before the court as
scheduled on January 22, 1998.
The Wrights and their counsel
were present, as was Wendell Thomas.
was not represented by counsel.
Dr. Meyers was absent and
The only proof that implicated
Dr. Meyers was that he had called the Wrights on more than one
occasion to complain that their dog had attacked and destroyed
his cattle and that on at least one occasion he had threatened to
have the Wrights’ dog shot if it continued to come upon his
property.
There was no proof that he was present when the dog
was shot or that he had ordered Thomas or any of his other
employees to shoot the dog.
Nevertheless, the court granted
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judgment2 for the Wrights against Dr. Meyers awarding them
compensatory damages in the sum of $1,081.00, punitive damages
amounting to $500.00,3 and court costs totaling $140.00.
The
Wrights’ claim against Wendell Thomas was dismissed because of a
lack of proof that he had anything to do with the shooting of the
dog.
Although the judgment did not address Dr. Meyers’s
counterclaim, it was made final and appealable.4
In rendering
its judgment, the court made no written findings of fact and
reached no conclusions of law, but it did find orally upon the
record that:
(1) more likely than not, Dr. Meyers had direct
involvement in causing the dog to be shot; (2) Wendell Thomas did
not shoot the dog; and (3) more likely than not, Dr. Meyers or
some other employee shot the dog.
Within ten days following entry of judgment, Meyers
employed new counsel and moved to alter, vacate or amend the
January 27, 1998, order/judgment on the ground that he was not
notified that the case had been set for trial.
He also alleged
generally that the plaintiffs’ case was not ripe for judgment
because “this dispute involves master[-]servant relationships,
trespassing, and factual issues.”
Meyers submitted four
affidavits with his motion, including his own, his wife’s and
those of his Illinois and Kentucky office managers, attesting to
the fact that he was never served with notice that the case had
2
The judgment was entered on January 27, 1998. It is
denominated an “order,” but is, nevertheless, a final judgment.
CR 54.01.
3
The plaintiffs did not seek recovery of punitive damages.
4
See CR 54.02(1).
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been set for trial.
Meyers’s post-judgment motion was “overruled
[sic — denied],” and this appeal followed.
The essence of Dr. Meyers’s argument on appeal is that
he was denied due process when the court proceeded to trial in
his absence and without giving him notice that a trial was
scheduled and that the court erred as a matter of law in granting
judgment for the Wrights after it dismissed their claim against
Thomas, the only Meyers employee alleged to have been present
when the dog was shot.
Although findings of fact are not required when the
court rules on a motion such as Dr. Meyers’s post-judgment motion
to vacate, etc.,5 it would have been helpful to this Court had
the circuit court determined the factual issue of whether Meyers
did or did not receive notice that the case had been set for
trial.
However, there was no request for such a finding, and in
denying Meyers’s post-judgment motion the court inferentially
determined that proper notice of the trial date was given.
A party to an action tried by the court without a jury
may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
finding without first having made in the trial court an objection
to such findings or having moved to amend them or having moved
for a new trial.6
In this case, there is absolutely no support
in the evidence for a finding that Dr. Meyers had direct
involvement in the shooting of the Wrights’ dog, nor is there any
evidence whatever that Dr. Meyers or one of his employees (other
5
CR 52.01.
6
CR 52.03.
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than Thomas, who the court found not liable) shot the dog.
The
findings should, therefore, be set aside and this case remanded
to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the Wrights’
complaint.
There is another reason why the judgment under review
cannot stand involving a question of law which we review de
novo.7
In my view, the court erred in granting judgment against
Dr. Meyers after it had dismissed the Wrights’ claim against
Thomas, the only other person alleged to have been involved in
the shooting of the Wrights’ dog.
This issue was addressed by this Court in Copeland v.
Humana of Kentucky, Inc.8 and in Floyd v. Humana of Virginia,
Inc.9
In Floyd we said that:
On appeal, Floyd first argues that it was error
for the Jefferson Circuit Court to grant University of
Louisville and University of Louisville Hospital, Inc.,
summary judgments following the dismissal of Dr. Lucas.
Floyd attempts to hold those defendants liable for
conduct by physicians other than Dr. Lucas.
None could
dispute that ordinary agency law makes a master liable
for the negligent acts of his servant; however, in this
case, Floyd alleged no negligent acts of servants of
University of Louisville and University Hospital, Inc.,
7
Cinelli v. Ward, Ky. App., 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (1998).
8
Ky. App., 769 S.W.2d 67 (1989).
9
Ky. App., 787 S.W.2d 267 (1990).
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other than Dr. Lucas.
Accordingly, the summary
judgment was proper.10
In Copeland, we offered the following rationale for a
like decision:
It matters little how the servant was released
from liability; as long as he is free from harm, it
appears to us that his master should also be blameless.
This result is required for either or both of two
reasons: “that such a result will avoid circuity of
action or that since the liability of the master or
principal is merely derivative and secondary,
exoneration of the servant removes the foundation upon
which to impute negligence to the master or
principal.”11
There is simply no allegation nor any proof in this
case that Dr. Meyers shot the Wrights’ dog or directed or
conspired with anyone else to do so.
Thus, he can only be held
liable vicariously if one of his employees was guilty of the act.
Since the only employee identified as a possible perpetrator of
the act, Thomas, was dismissed from the lawsuit, it follows that
Meyers cannot, as a matter of law, be held liable to the Wrights.
The majority decides that the circuit erred court erred
when it failed to apply Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 258.235(1)
to the facts of this case.
That statute, which allows a person
10
Id. at 269 (citation omitted).
11
Copeland, supra, n. 8, at 69 (citations omitted).
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to shoot a dog that is “pursuing, worrying, or wounding any
livestock
. . . ,” can only come into play after it is first
determined that Meyers or one of his employees actually shot the
Wrights’ dog; but, as has been noted, there is no evidence to
support such a finding.
In this respect, KRS 258.235(1) is not
dissimilar to a self-defense plea in a criminal case where the
defendant admits that he shot the victim but justifies having
done so because he was acting in defense of his person.
In my
view, the statute has no relevance to this case given the
evidence heard by the circuit court.
I also believe that this case should be remanded to the
circuit court to consider Dr. Meyers’s counterclaim.
The circuit
court did not dismiss the counterclaim, so it is still pending.
Meyers’s claim is not a compulsory counterclaim since it does not
arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the Wrights’ claim, that is, the shooting of their
dog.12
In fact, it is because Meyers’s counterclaim is a
permissive one13 that the court could properly make its judgment,
which did not adjudicate all the rights of all the parties in the
action, final and appealable.14
I would reverse the final judgment in favor of the
Wrights and remand this case to Logan Circuit Court with
directions, first, to enter judgment dismissing the Wrights’
12
See CR 13.01.
13
See CR 13.02.
14
CR 54.01; CR 54.02(1).
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complaint and, second, to schedule a jury trial to resolve
Meyers’s counterclaim.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Charles R. Orange
Russellville, Kentucky
Elizabeth D. Wilson
Russellville, Kentucky
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