FRED JACKSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 7, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002284-MR
FRED JACKSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES R. DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00044
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, HUDDLESTON AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE: This is an opinion reversing the conviction of
Appellant Jackson below.
This case arises from a residential search in which
illegal drugs and paraphernalia were found in the home of
Jackson.
The Paducah police department, acting on a tip, went to
the home of Jackson while he was out.
Eleven people in the home
at that time were detained by the police.
were residents of the home.
None of the people
The police officers saw evidence of
illegal drug use through the open door and obtained a search
warrant.
During the ensuing search of the house, illegal drugs
and paraphernalia were found. Jackson was charged with
trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
An initial trial was held on July 2, 1998.
Immediately
prior to the trial, Jackson notified the trial court that the
Commonwealth had failed to timely provide him with the
exculpatory statement of a witness.
This statement was not
turned over until the day before trial in violation of the trial
court’s discovery order and R.Cr. 7.24 and R.Cr. 7.26.
The
Commonwealth claimed that the statement had been “overlooked” by
a secretary.
Jackson declined to ask for a continuance on the
basis of this untimely disclosure on the grounds that he had been
waiting too long already for a trial, and sought dismissal of the
charges.
During the first trial of the case, a mistrial was
granted when a police officer testified before the jury about
prior offenses for which Jackson had been arrested.
The
prosecution argues that because of the mistrial, no prejudice can
be demonstrated by Jackson regarding the failure to timely
disclose the witness statement.
Because of the grant of
mistrial, this Court finds that no prejudice occurred with regard
to the failure of the Commonwealth to provide the witness
statement.
Next, Jackson states that he was substantially
prejudiced and denied due process of law when Detective Jackson,
the investigating officer, testified at the first trial that he
had questioned Jackson after his arrest and that Jackson had
refused to give a statement.
The record reflects that the police
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detective was questioned by the prosecution and asked, “Did you
at any point in time attempt to speak to the defendant?”
The
officer replied, “Yes, Sir, the day after he was arrested, Sir.
He refused to speak to me.”
Jackson asserts that this was
palpable error and subject to review by this Court on those
grounds.
See: Perkins v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 694 S.W.2d 721,
722 (1985) holding that where manifest injustice results,
reversal is required.
Kentucky law is clear in holding that the prosecution
is barred from bringing up a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent at trial.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has
stated:
It is clear that the prosecution is
prohibited from using the defendant’s silence
in its case-in-chief. Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91
(1976). As previously mentioned, the fact of
appellant’s silence was twice brought to the
attention of the jury.
To determine whether this error is harmless,
we must consider the weight of the evidence
and the degree of punishment fixed by the
verdict.
. . .
This is, unquestionably, an error of
fundamental constitutional magnitude. Over
twenty-five years ago the United States
Supreme Court in Miranda held that a
defendant could not be penalized for
exercising his or her Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent. In Green we reaffirmed
that principle, stating that “the right to
remain silent does not truly exist if one may
be penalized for its exercise. . . . “ It is
the obligation of this Court not to uphold a
verdict that may reflect such a penalty.
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Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 321 (1993).
In that case,
the Supreme Court held that because only weak evidence linked the
defendant to the crime charged, and because the jury awarded the
most severe sentence possible in the case, the introduction of
the defendant’s silence was improper and constituted reversible
error.
The Commonwealth points out that this improper
testimony was given in Jackson’s first trial, which resulted in a
mistrial on separate grounds.
For this reason, no prejudice can
result from introduction of this testimony.
Jackson was given a
new trial, with a new jury, almost three weeks later.
This Court
agrees that no prejudice resulted from introduction of this
improper testimony as a mistrial was granted.
During the second trial of this matter, witnesses for
the Commonwealth also testified that the bag containing cocaine
which was found in the house had been examined by the police and
that no fingerprints were found on the bag.
Jackson objected to
introduction of this evidence, arguing that it had not timely
been disclosed to him.
Defense counsel stated that he had never
received the fax containing this evidence allegedly sent by the
prosecution two business days prior to trial.
Various discovery
materials were allegedly faxed to defense counsel by the
Commonwealth, but were never received.
The Commonwealth has
failed to provide an explanation for this error in supplying
properly discoverable material.
At trial, counsel for Jackson failed to request any
remedy for this discovery abuse.
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Jackson asserts that the
failure to ensure that he was provided with this evidence prior
to trial constitutes an abuse of the rules of discovery.
The
Commonwealth asserts that because the jury did hear that there
were no fingerprints on the bag, no prejudice resulted from the
failure to ensure disclosure.
This Court finds that although the
Commonwealth was in error in failing to make sure that this
evidence was received by defense counsel in a timely fashion,
Jackson has demonstrated no prejudice, and thus the
Commonwealth’s carelessness must be found harmless error.
Polk
v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pa., Ky., 816 S.W.2d 178
(1991).
A new trial was held on July 20, 1998.
Prior to trial,
it was again found that the Commonwealth had failed to timely
provide a prior inconsistent statement by a witness.
The first
witness statement disclosed was taken on July 4, 1998.
It was
not provided in accordance with the Appellant’s Bill of
Particulars filed in April and was not received by Jackson until
July 14, 1998.
A second witness statement dated February 21,
1998 was allegedly faxed pursuant to a supplemental discovery
request on July 16, only two business days prior to trial.
Defense counsel denied receipt of any fax sent by the
Commonwealth.
Jackson did not find out about the existence of
this earlier statement until he read the July 4 witness statement
received on July 14th.
The trial court found that the February
witness statement was not provided until late on Friday, July 17,
only one business day prior to trial.
The substance of the
witness statement concerned the linking of Appellant to the
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illegal substances found in the house and Appellant’s conduct
during the time of the investigation.
Because of this late disclosure, Jackson requested that
the trial court exclude the proffered witness testimony as a
result of this delayed provision of evidence.
He reminded the
trial court that the Bill of Particulars was filed in April 1998
and required that all evidence be provided to the defendant
fifteen or more days prior to the pre-trial conference in the
action.
The February 1998 statement of the witness was not
provided pursuant to Jackson’s initial discovery request or
submitted in accordance with the Commonwealth’s “open file”
discovery policy.
Jackson’s motion in limine was denied by the trial
court.
The trial court ruled:
“The police as an agent of the Commonwealth
did fail to timely provide this information
prior to the first trial which was mistried
and that same is a violation of this Court’s
order on discovery and the Criminal Rules of
Procedure, but that the relief requested by
the Defendant of excluding the testimony of
[the witness] at the second trial is not
proper, therefore the motion is overruled on
this ground.”
The Commonwealth argues that the statements were turned
over in accordance with R.Cr. 7.26, which only requires such
evidence be provided forty-eight hours prior to trial.
R.Cr.
7.24(1) requires the Commonwealth to comply with a discovery
request made by a criminal defendant in a timely fashion.
The
discovery request filed by Jackson herein requested this
information fifteen days prior to the pre-trial conference.
The
Commonwealth relies on R.Cr. 7.26(1), which states that witness
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statements must be turned over forty-eight hours prior to trial
as removing any duty of compliance with the Bill of Particulars
or the trial court’s discovery orders.
Jackson argued before the trial court that the witness
statement at issue was not provided until Friday afternoon, and
that the trial began early Monday morning.
Even though this time
period exceeds forty-eight hours, the fact that all but two of
these hours were weekend hours invalidates the Commonwealth’s
reliance on R.Cr. 7.26(l).
Not only does R.Cr. 7.24(l) require
timely disclosure of information in response to a Bill of
Particulars, but R.Cr. 1.10, “Time”, which is not cited by the
parties, states that:
Whenever these rules do not provide otherwise
with respect to time, the following shall
apply:
(a) In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by
order of court or by any applicable statute .
. . [w]hen the period of time prescribed or
allowed is less than seven (7) days,
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays shall be excluded in the
computation.
Id. (Emphasis supplied).
This rule applies to any “act, event or
default “ and so is applicable to the provision of documentary
evidence. Hence, as the forty-eight hour minimum period provided
by R.Cr. 7.26(l) is less than seven days, weekends are not to be
included in that computation.
For this reason, the
Commonwealth’s disclosure was untimely and provided grounds
supporting Jackson’s request to exclude the witness testimony.
The law is clear in holding that the Commonwealth has a
constitutional duty to provide an accused with both exculpatory
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and impeachment evidence in the prosecutor’s possession.
United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481
(1985).
This duty is enforced by the courts of this
Commonwealth.
(1990).
Carter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 597
An action should be reversed where there is “a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”
United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 668.
“[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violations due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).
Kentucky Courts do not require automatic reversal where
a prosecutor has failed to comply with discovery orders.
Prejudice must be shown by the defendant.
Ky. App., 675 S.W.2d 397 (1984).
McRay v. Commonwealth,
The courts have held that a
discovery abuse justifies setting aside a conviction only where
there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been
disclosed, the result at trial would have been different.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 722 (1997).
Weaver
However, we must
take into consideration that in the present case the prosecutor
had repeatedly failed to comply with the discovery orders and
applicable rules of procedure despite the trial court’s warning
regarding this discovery abuse.
This fact supports Jackson’s
contention that the case should be reversed.
Additionally,
Appellant has claimed that the witness statements, if timely
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disclosed, would have changed his trial strategy.
Under such
circumstances, sufficient prejudice has been shown to support a
reversal of this action.
It is a longstanding rule of law that
the Commonwealth must disclose evidence to a defendant in
sufficient time that he can investigate and prepare to use such
evidence.
(1979).
Silverburg v. Commonwealth, Ky., 587 S.W.2d 241
The Commonwealth’s repeated failure to do so in this
case warrants reversal of the conviction below.
As a general rule, the trial court is to use its
discretion in determining whether to permit introduction of
evidence not timely supplied to the defendant in pre-trial
discovery.
R.Cr. 7.24(9).
Sanctions for such negligence are to
be imposed only where the trial court feels they are appropriate.
Berry v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 625 (1990).
In the
present case the trial court found that the Commonwealth’s late
submission of the witness statement was in violation of its
discovery order, but held that this action was not sufficient to
require the suppression of the witness testimony.
In light of
the history of the proceedings in this action, we disagree and
find that sanctions should have been imposed and the testimony of
this witness should have been excluded.
Jackson alleges prejudice resulted from the discovery
abuses.
He asserts that no physical evidence, such as
fingerprints, linked him to any of the controlled substances or
paraphernalia found in the house.
by the record on appeal.
This contention is supported
Further, the testimony of the
investigating officer showed that the persons found in the
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building at the time it was searched acted in a suspicious manner
regarding the evidence.
The detective stated at trial that none
of the people arrested in the house would sit on or stand next to
the chair in which the controlled substances were hidden.
It is
uncontroverted that Jackson was not in the house at the time it
was searched and had not been there for several hours prior to
the search.
Lastly, Jackson shows this Court that he received
the maximum sentence on both counts charged.
Jackson argues that these facts demonstrate the
prejudicial effect of the Commonwealth’s actions.
Jackson claims
that the repeated discovery abuses by the Commonwealth denied him
his Constitutionally protected right to a fair trial.
Timely
objection was made by Jackson to each discovery abuse.
The
discovery abuses include failure to disclose an exculpatory
witness statement until the day before trial, failure to notify
Jackson of fingerprint analysis on the evidence, or the results
of such testing, and failure to provide a prior inconsistent
statement of a witness until immediately prior to trial.
Jackson claims that the cumulative effect of the
complained of errors entitles him to reversal of the conviction
below.
Kentucky courts have held that a prosecutor’s misconduct
or failure to comply with discovery orders does not require
automatic reversal unless some prejudice is found.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 675 S.W.2d 397 (1984).
McRay v.
However, where
multiple failures have occurred, the cumulative effect of the
prosecutor’s actions must be taken into effect.
S.Ct., at 1567.
Kyles, 115
An accumulation of concurrent errors may
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authorize a reversal where no one error taken alone would justify
such a reversal.
31, 35 (1921).
Jones v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 485, 231 S.W.
See also: Funk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 842 S.W.2d
476, 483 (1992).
This Court takes notice that the volume of the
discovery abuses in the present case shows a lack of compliance
with the rules of procedure and the orders of the trial court by
the prosecution in this action.
Two of the four errors claimed
by Jackson were cured by the grant of mistrial in Jackson’s first
trial.
The third error, wherein the Commonwealth failed to
timely disclose lack of physical evidence linking Jackson to the
bag of cocaine, was harmless because the jury learned this fact
through direct testimony, and Jackson had opportunity to crossexamine the witness on this point.
The final claimed error, that being the failure of the
Commonwealth to provide witness statements in its possession for
over six months until one business day prior to trial,
constitutes prejudicial error supporting a claim for reversal.
This is not a case where the evidence unexpectedly came into the
Commonwealth’s possession immediately prior to or during trial.
Under those circumstances, allowing the witness to testify would
have been permissible.
(1992).
Holbrook v. Knopf, Ky., 847 S.W.2d 52
Rather, the Commonwealth had the evidence in its
possession for months, but failed to timely provide it to defense
counsel upon request.
For this reason, the action below is
reversed and remanded.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul J. Neel, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
William L. Daniel, II
Frankfort, Kentucky
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