J.G. WENTWORTH v. SYLVIA JONES; CYNTHIA JONES; BRIAN STANLEY; ODESSA McCOLLUM; INTEGRITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; and NATIONAL INTEGRITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: April 14, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002237-MR
J.G. WENTWORTH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN W. POTTER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 97-CI-005285, 97-CI-005509, 97-CI-005953
AND 98-CI-000007
SYLVIA JONES; CYNTHIA JONES;
BRIAN STANLEY; ODESSA McCOLLUM;
INTEGRITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY;
and NATIONAL INTEGRITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
J.G. Wentworth (a limited partnership) appeals an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court invalidating orders of
garnishment that had been challenged by Integrity Life Insurance
Company and National Integrity Life Insurance Company.
The
appellees were tort victims who had entered into structured
settlement agreements with their respective tortfeasors; the
appellee insurance companies issued annuities to fund those
structured settlements.
Appellant is in the business of
purchasing from the tort victims their alleged right to receive
monthly payments in exchange for a one-time lump-sum payment.
The appellees rely on an anti-assignment provision in their
original structured settlement agreement as a bar to the
enforceability of their assignments to Wentworth.
We are asked
to determine the validity of the assignments to Wentworth and
consequently the enforceability of Wentworth’s orders of
garnishment to collect the payments.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the 1980's, Integrity Life Insurance Company and
National Integrity Life Insurance Company (hereinafter
"Integrity"), appellees, issued annuities to fund structured
settlements entered into by four successful tort litigants:
Odessa McCollum, Cynthia Jones, Sylvia Jones, and Brian Stanley.
We shall review the specific facts of each transaction with the
exception of that involving Brian Stanley, about whom no relevant
information appears of record.
In January 1986, Odessa McCollum released her tort
claims against the New Jersey Transit Corporation by entering
into a structured settlement agreement.
Pursuant to her release
and settlement agreement, New Jersey Transit agreed to make to
McCollum or to her estate payments of $54,090 within thirty days
— plus monthly and other periodic lump-sum payments — until the
year 2011.
In order to fund these payments, New Jersey Transit
agreed to purchase an annuity contract from Integrity.
The terms
of the settlement agreement permitted New Jersey to assign its
obligation to make the periodic payments to Equitable Life
-2-
Assurance Society of the United States ("Equitable").
Equitable
was to be the sole owner of the annuity policy, to exercise all
rights of ownership; McCollum was to have no legal interest,
vested or contingent, in the contract as its owner.
Under the assignment agreement between and among New
Jersey Transit, McCollum, and Equitable, the "payee" agreed not
to "accelerate, defer, increase or decrease any payment."
Equitable Assignment and Assumption Agreement at 2.
The
agreement provided that "[t]he Releasor (McCollum) further agrees
that upon the mailing of a valid check to the Payee at the
address designated by the Releasor, the obligation to Equitable
to make each payment when due shall be discharged to the extent
of the amount of the check."
Id.
Further, the agreement
provided that Equitable would "instruct the issuer of the Annuity
to make the payments thereunder directly to the Payee [or the
Payee's beneficiary] at the address provided in writing by
Releasor."
Id.
The agreement was to bind New Jersey Transit,
McCollum, Equitable, "and their respective personal
representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns."
Id.
The annuity policy was issued by Integrity on February
27, 1986, and McCollum was listed as the annuitant.
While New
Jersey Transit was listed as the owner of the annuity on the
policy application, the contract indicated that its ownership
would be assigned to Equitable.
The policy is stamped
"ASSIGNED."
Similarly, the administrator of the Estate of Johnnie
Mae Jones released claims against the New York City Health and
-3-
Hospitals Corporation and the City of New York by entering into a
structured settlement agreement.
Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, the defendants (tortfeasors) agreed to pay to Sylvia
and Cynthia Jones $10,000.00 each upon the signing of a court
order — plus monthly payments for fifty years.
To fund these
payments, the defendants agreed to purchase an annuity contract
from Integrity.
Under the settlement agreement, the defendants
were to be the sole owners of the annuity contracts.
Further,
the defendants were permitted to make a "qualified assignment"
within the meaning of § 130(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended; they accordingly assigned their obligation to
make the periodic payments to Equitable.
Again, under the assignment agreement between and among
the tortfeasors, the Jones Estate, and Equitable, the "payee"
agreed not to "accelerate, defer, increase or decrease any
payment."
Equitable Assignment and Assumption Agreement.
The
agreement provided that "[t]he Releasor (the Jones Estate)
further agrees that upon the mailing of a valid check to the
Payee at the address designated by the Releasor, the obligation
to Equitable to make each payment when due shall be discharged to
the extent of the amount of the check."
Id.
Further, the
agreement provided that Equitable would "instruct the issuer of
the Annuity [Integrity] to make the payments thereunder directly
to the Payee [or the Payee's beneficiary] at the address provided
in writing by Releasor."
Id.
The agreement was to bind the
tortfeasors, the Jones Estate, Equitable, "and their respective
personal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns."
-4-
Id.
The annuity policy appears to have been issued by
Integrity on December 29, 1980.
Zebedee Asa Jones, the
administrator of the Jones Estate, was listed as the annuitant.
The City of New York was listed as the owner of the annuity on
the policy application, but the contract indicates that the
policy was assigned.
Cynthia Jones and Sylvia Jones were listed
as additional payees.
In 1996, Wentworth sought to purchase the right to
receive annuity payments from the annuitants.
It made lump-sum
payments to McCollum, to the Joneses, and to Stanley (whose case
history was not in the record) in exchange for the right to
receive the annuity payments to which they as payees were
entitled under their respective settlement agreements.1
As part
of the separate purchase agreements with Wentworth, the
individual payees agreed to direct Integrity to send those
monthly payments to Wentworth.
If the payees failed to direct
the periodic payments to be mailed to Wentworth, their contracts
provided that Wentworth could obtain confessed judgments against
them for the periodic payments.
When the payees failed to honor their agreements with
it, Wentworth obtained cognovit judgments in Pennsylvania against
each of the payees.
The judgments were registered in Kentucky,
and Wentworth sought to enforce them by causing non-wage
1
Transfers of structured settlement payment rights are now
governed by KRS 454.430-435. Among other requirements, this
provision mandates a detailed disclosure statement explaining the
transaction and advanced court approval of the transfer. This
provision became effective July 15, 1998, subsequent to events
giving rise to this action.
-5-
garnishments to be issued against Integrity.
the garnishments on a variety of grounds.
Integrity resisted
After the cases were
consolidated, the trial court upheld Integrity's objections to
the garnishments.
The trial court concluded that each of the payees did
have a legal interest in the respective annuity contracts and
that Integrity was under a continuing obligation to provide the
periodic payments.
However, the trial court held that the
purchase agreement between Wentworth and the payees did not
constitute a valid legal assignment.
It determined that
Equitable, as the owner of the annuities, was the only party
entitled or empowered to assign or re-direct the payments.
Additionally, the trial court ruled that the attempted
garnishments did not comport with Kentucky’s statutes or public
policy.
The court reasoned that the garnishments were not served
during the brief period between the time that the monthly
obligation ripened and the time when the monthly payment was
mailed to the payee; in other words, the judgment debtor's
property was not properly attached while in the possession of the
garnishee.
Finally, the court determined that the proceeds of
the annuities were exempt from garnishment and that Integrity did
have standing to raise this issue.
followed.
II.
DISCUSSION
-6-
This appeal by Wentworth
Wentworth argues that the trial court erred by
concluding that the annuitant-payees were unable to sell or
assign their rights to receive periodic payments under the
structured settlements.
While it agrees with the trial court's
conclusion that only Equitable, as owner of the annuity contract,
could assign or otherwise affect Integrity's obligation to make
the annuity payments, Wentworth emphasizes that the individual
payees could and did effectively assign their rights to receive
those payments.
Integrity counters that the payees are not
parties to the annuity contracts and that by virtue of the
settlement agreements, they do not actually possess the right to
receive the annuity payments.
As a result, it contends, the
payees cannot assign or pledge the right to receive the stream of
payments to anyone — including Wentworth.
In general, a contractual right to receive a future
stream of payments is assignable.
E. Allan Farnsworth,
Farnsworth on Contracts §11.2 (1990).
Kentucky law expressly
provides that an annuity contract "may be assignable or not
assignable, as provided by its terms."
KRS 304.14-250(1).
However, we find the annuity contracts involved in this case to
be of a unique character and, therefore, distinguishable from all
other species of contracts — especially with respect to the issue
of assignability.
We are persuaded that the attempt by Wentworth
to enforce its putative assignments from these tort victims must
fail based on our analysis of pertinent provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, Kentucky garnishment statutes, the
Kentucky Insurance Code, and public policy considerations.
-7-
These settlement agreements were carefully crafted in
contemplation of the strict provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code (26 U.S.C. §104(a)(2) 130 (1988 & Supp. 1999) providing tax
concessions to encourage such settlements between tort victims
and tortfeasors.
Underlying these "tax breaks" is the public
policy purpose of providing income over the long term for an
impaired class of citizens who would otherwise be in grave danger
of indigency.
The stability of their long-term financial
security is assured by such agreements and, therefore, that very
interest in stability serves as the motivator for the special tax
considerations.
Grieve v. General American Life Insurance
Company, 58 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Vt. 1999).
A transfer or
assignment of the character of Wentworth’s was never contemplated
nor authorized by the Internal Revenue Code and thus involves
serious pre-emption implications.
Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §130 (c)(2)(B), the payees had
agreed not to "accelerate, defer, increase or decrease any
payment . . . ."
In order that the payments not be treated as
taxable income, the payees’ only possessory interest in the
proceeds had to consist of periodic payments as opposed to any
other form of receipt — thus assuring a continuing cushion of
income to prevent "binging away" of an asset that would
effectively render tort victims indigent.
In consideration for
the ability to guarantee adequate income for this protected class
of beneficiaries, the Internal Revenue Code provided for one
qualified assignment of liability for making the periodic
payments to a qualified assignee (Equitable).
-8-
In the settlement agreements, Equitable as assignee
agreed to purchase an annuity contract from Integrity and to
assume thereby all obligation for payment of proceeds to the
plaintiff-payees.
The McCollum agreement at page 4 specifically
stated (in keeping with the dictates of Section 130 of the
Internal Revenue Code): "Plaintiff shall have no legal interest,
vested or contingent, in such annuity contract as owner."
(Emphasis added.)
Further reinforcing the absence of ownership
in the payees, the annuity contracts restricted the right of
assignment to Equitable alone.
Appellees argue that so complete
were Equitable’s ownership rights that even the right to receive
payments "shall rest and remain solely in Equitable . . . ."
(McCollum agreement, page 2, paragraph 2).
Thus, although
Equitable clearly owed a duty to the obligor-tortfeasors to make
payments to the tort victim-payees, the right to receive payments
flowed from Integrity to Equitable, rendering the payees
incidental third-party beneficiaries who retained none of the
incidents or accouterments of ownership in the annuities.
Appellees contend that since they had absolutely no
ownership interest in the annuity contracts, they had no interest
susceptible of assignment.
We agree.
The interest obtained by
Wentworth by its attempted assignment agreements with these
payees was wholly illusory.
Allstate Insurance Company v.
American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, 882 F.2d 856, 860
(4th Cir. 1989).
Furthermore, they argue that Equitable alone
had the exclusive right to assign these agreements.
We are
persuaded that they are correct both as to the terms of the
-9-
agreements themselves and as to the restrictions imposed by
Section 130 of the Internal Revenue Code stripping the plaintiffpayees of all legal interest in the annuity contracts.
We are
without jurisdiction to tamper with Internal Revenue Code
restrictions that form the basis or genesis for the tax
concessions built into these agreements.
A distinct but related argument is that even if the
annuity contracts were subject to assignment, the proceeds paid
to these annuitants would be exempt under the Kentucky statutory
law on garnishment.
KRS 425.501 provides:
(1) Any person in whose favor a final
judgment in personam has been entered . . .
may . . . obtain an order of garnishment to
be served in accordance with the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
. . . .
(5) If the court finds that the garnishee
was, at the time of service of the order upon
him, possessed of any property of the
judgment debtor, or was indebted to him, and
the property or debt is not exempt from
execution, the court shall order the property
or the proceeds of the debt applied upon the
judgment. (Emphasis added.)
Appellees argue that the annuity payments at issue defy
garnishment because of their exempt status.
They maintain,
however, that even if they were not exempt, a separate order of
garnishment would have to issue at precisely the fleeting moment
when the check went out in the mail from Integrity to the payees.
Appellant disagrees, contending that these assets are not exempt
and that they are furthermore subject to a continuing order of
garnishment as opposed to the opinion of the circuit court that a
separate garnishment must issue for each separate payment:
-10-
Integrity argues that even if it owes an
obligation to the settling plaintiffs, its
indebtedness arises when the payment is due
and is discharged when the check goes in the
mail. Therefore, the garnishments can only
be valid if served during this brief window
of time. Integrity is correct.
However, under the present state of the
record, there is no proof any of the
garnishments arrived during this brief
interval.
Opinion and Order of Judge John W. Potter, Jefferson Circuit
Court, July 20, 1998, pp.4-5.
We need not reach the issue of separate orders of
garnishment, however, until we first determine the threshold
issue of the exempt status of the annuity proceeds.
If the
assets are not exempt from garnishment, the form of the
garnishment has relevance; if they are exempt, the point is moot.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the
annuitants’ payments are exempt from garnishment pursuant to the
Kentucky Insurance Code (KRS Chapter 304).
Specifically, KRS
304.14-330 addresses this issue as follows:
Exemption of proceeds, annuity contracts —
Assignability of rights.
(1) The benefits, rights, privileges and
options which under any annuity contract
heretofore or hereafter issued are due or
prospectively due the annuitant, shall not be
subject to execution nor shall the annuitant
be compelled to exercise any such rights,
powers, or options, nor shall creditors be
allowed to interfere with or terminate the
contract, except:
. . . .
(b) The total exemption of benefits presently
due and payable to any annuitant periodically
or at stated times under all annuity
contracts under which he is an annuitant,
-11-
shall not at any time exceed $350 per month
for the length of time represented by such
installments, and that such periodic payments
in excess of $350 per month shall be subject
to garnishee execution to the same extent as
are wages and salaries.
(c) If the total benefits presently due and
payable to any annuitant under all annuity
contracts under which he is an annuitant,
shall at any time exceed payment at the rate
of $350 per month, then the court may order
such annuitant to pay to a judgment creditor
or apply on the judgment, in installments,
such portion of such excess benefits as to
the court may appear just and proper, after
due regard for the reasonable requirements of
the judgment debtor and his family, if
dependent upon him, as well as any payments
required to be made by the annuitant to other
creditors under prior court orders.
(2) If the contract so provides, the
benefits, rights, privileges or options
accruing under such contract to a beneficiary
or assignee shall not be transferable nor
subject to commutation, and if the benefits
are payable periodically or at stated times,
the same exemptions and exceptions contained
herein for the annuitant, shall apply with
respect to such beneficiary or assignee.
(Emphasis added).
The statute unequivocally exempts $350 per month from
collection; it then leaves any sum in excess of that $350 ceiling
to the discretion of the trial court as to the availability for
garnishment.
The trial court in this case had the best
opportunity to review the evidence and to analyze the Draconian
and clandestine methods employed by Wentworth to prey upon this
vulnerable group of annuitants.
It was in the best position to
evaluate that record, and we believe that the court reasoned
correctly that Wentworth was not entitled to collect any of the
discretionary amount exceeding the $350-exempted proceeds.
-12-
Finally, in addition to the statutory provisions
rendering these payments non-assignable and exempt from
garnishment with respect to these appellees2, we are mindful of
the public purpose and philosophy underlying the law of
structured settlements: to protect a class of injured plaintiffs
beyond the moment of trial and the award of damages by extending
that monetary umbrella over the span of their lives far into the
future.
Thus is the very analysis in which the trial court
correctly engaged in arriving at its decision not to allow any
funds exceeding $350 to be attached, not to allow Wentworth "to
accomplish by sleight of hand" what the law forbids otherwise.
The last argument raised by appellant urges us to
conclude that Integrity as garnishee had no standing to assert
that the proceeds destined to Wentworth’s judgment debtors was
exempt from execution.
Wentworth relies on Central Supply of
Virginia, Inc. v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., Ky. App., 787
S.W.2d 273 (1990), where this Court re-affirmed that an exemption
may be claimed only by the debtor and not by another for his
benefit.
We find that case to be distinguishable, however, as a
single payment of life insurance cash surrender proceeds was at
issue whereas in the present case Integrity was directly besieged
by an ongoing barrage of continuing garnishments.
Integrity
indeed had an immediate and possibly long-term prospect of
2
As noted earlier in this opinion, effective as of July 15,
1998, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted specific statutes at
KRS 454.430-435 governing transfers of such payments. These
statutes, however, while an interesting commentary on general
public policy considerations inherent in this controversy, do not
determine this case as these assignments arose before passage of
that legislation.
-13-
responding to a series of garnishments over time with exposure to
liability on multiple occasions for wrongful payment.
As such,
we find that Integrity indeed faced a justiciable controversy
that conferred standing upon it.
We therefore affirm the order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES INTEGRITY
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND
NATIONAL INTEGRITY LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY:
Brent L. Caldwell
Stephen G. Amato
Lexington, KY
William Jay Hunter, Jr.
Thomas W. Frentz
Augustus S. Herbert
Terri E. Phelps
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Stephen G. Amato
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES
INTEGRITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY AND NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY:
William Jay Hunter, Jr.
Louisville, KY
-14-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.