SOFTBALL CITY, INC. v. ANGELA M. DIXON
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RENDERED: March 17, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002152-MR
SOFTBALL CITY, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-01722
v.
ANGELA M. DIXON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, AND REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, MILLER AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Appellant, Softball City, Inc. (“Softball City”)
appeals from a judgment ordering it to pay $14,692.50 in
compensatory damages and $100,000.00 in punitive damages to
appellee, Angela Dixon (Dixon).
For the reasons set forth
herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Dixon was an employee of Softball City, which is a
fifty-acre softball complex owned by Dixon’s father, grandfather,
and uncle.
Dixon parked her vehicle, a 1994 Toyota Celica (the
Celica), in Softball City’s parking lot on May 28, 1996.
Heavy
rains occurred and Dixon’s vehicle suffered water-related damage.
Dixon had taken possession of the Celica from Holly Dacey (Dacey)
after paying Dacey $13,400.
Liens on the Celica incurred by
Dacey were never released, however, and Dacey was unable to
assign the title to Dixon.
It is undisputed that Dacey held
legal title to the Celica on the date it was damaged.
Dixon filed suit against Softball City and Dacey.1
A
jury returned a verdict awarding Dixon $9,700 from Softball City
for reduction in fair market value of the Celica, $1,792.50 for
loss of use of the Celica, $3,200 for reasonable towing and
storage of the Celica, and $100,000.00 in punitive damages.
The
trial court denied Softball City’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, motion for new trial, and motion to
alter, amend or vacate the judgment, whereupon Softball City
filed this appeal.
Softball City first contends that it was entitled to a
directed verdict due to an alleged lack of evidence to support a
finding that it acted negligently toward Dixon.
A directed
verdict is proper only if there is a “complete absence of proof
on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact exist upon
which reasonable minds could differ.”
967 S.W.2d 16, 18-19 (1998).
Bierman v. Klapheke, Ky.,
Furthermore, when an appellate
court reviews the evidence supporting a judgment entered pursuant
to a jury’s verdict, it is “not at liberty to determine
credibility or the weight which should be given to the evidence,”
and must deem true all the evidence which favors the prevailing
party.
Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Company, Ky., 798 S.W.2d
1
Various insurance companies were parties below.
they are not parties to this appeal.
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However,
459, 461 (1990).
This court may reverse the trial court’s
judgment only if it concludes that the jury’s verdict was
“flagrantly against the evidence so as to indicate that it was
reached as a result of passion or prejudice.”
Bierman, supra, at
19.
The evidence supporting a finding of negligence against
Softball City consists of the following facts:
(1) the parking
lot had flooded during periods of heavy rain prior to May 28,
1996; (2) at least one other vehicle had previously suffered
water-related damage in Softball City’s parking lot; (3) Softball
City posted no warning signs that its parking lot was subject to
flooding; and, (4) it took no affirmative steps to modify its
drainage system to diminish the risk of flooding.
There is
evidence that Softball City did warn its employees and patrons
via an intercom to move their vehicles to avoid flood damage,
that Dixon had prior knowledge that the parking lot was subject
to flooding, and that Dixon delayed moving the Celica for several
minutes following the oral warning.
However, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of Dixon and bearing in mind that
it is a jury’s function to resolve conflicting evidence, we do
not believe that the jury’s verdict is so unsupported by evidence
as to be the product of passion or prejudice.
Id.
Thus, the
trial court did not err in submitting the issue of Softball
City’s negligence to the jury.
Softball City next contends that Dixon had no standing
to bring a property damage claim as she was not the legal owner
of the Celica.
In order to have standing, a party must have a
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judicially recognizable “present or substantial interest” in the
subject matter of the action.
S.W.2d 319, 322 (1996).
Plaza B.V. v. Stephens, Ky., 913
As Dixon had paid Dacey in full for the
Celica prior to the flood, it follows that Dixon had a
substantial, equitable interest in the matter sufficient to give
her standing.
Likewise, Dixon was the real party in interest
under Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 17.01 as that rule focuses on
whether a plaintiff has a “significant interest” in the action.
Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Whittenberg Engineering &
Construction Company, Ky. App., 746 S.W.2d 71, 73 (1987).
A
significant interest “may be less than a legal or title
interest.”
Id.
Therefore, we conclude that Dixon had standing
to prosecute the action and was the real party in interest under
CR 17.01.
Softball City next argues that it was entitled to a
directed verdict on Dixon’s claim for punitive damages.
In order
to recover punitive damages, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
411.184(2) requires a plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing
evidence “that the defendant from whom such damages are sought
acted toward the plaintiff with oppression, fraud or malice.”
It
is clear that Softball City did not defraud Dixon or act toward
her with oppression, as those terms are defined in KRS
411.184(1).
Therefore, in order to recover punitive damages,
Dixon was required to show that Softball City acted with malice.
Malice is defined by KRS 411.184(1)(c) as “conduct that is
carried out by the defendant both with a flagrant indifference to
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the rights of the plaintiff and with a subjective awareness that
such conduct will result in human death or bodily harm.”2
There is no evidence, much less clear and convincing
evidence,
to demonstrate that Softball City acted in an
“intentionally cruel” manner toward Dixon, Bowling Green
Municipal Utilities, supra, at 580, or that it had a “subjective
awareness” that its failure to post warning signs or improve the
drainage of its property would result in human death or bodily
harm.
In fact, no deaths or bodily injuries were sustained as a
result of this flood and the evidence is void of any likelihood
that such injury would occur under the circumstances that were
presented herein.
Initially the trial court ruled in favor of
Softball City on the issue of punitive damages.
Softball City
was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue and the punitive
damage award is hereby vacated.3
Softball City next argues that Dixon’s claims for loss
of use of the Celica, storage costs, and towing costs should have
been dismissed due to Dixon’s failure to fully answer an
interrogatory asking Dixon to specify her damages.
See CR 8.01.
Softball City asserts that Dixon failed to comply with the trial
2
We are aware that KRS 411.184(1)(c) was declared
unconstitutional in Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260
(1998). However, Williams was not final when Dixon’s trial
occurred in May 1998. There is no indication that the parties
challenged the constitutionality of KRS 411.184 at trial. Thus,
this case must be reviewed under KRS 411.184 as it existed at
trial. See Bowling Green Municipal Utilities v. Atmos Energy
Corporation, Ky., 989 S.W.2d 577, 580 (1999).
3
Our conclusion that Softball City was entitled to a
directed verdict on Dixon’s claim for punitive damages renders
moot all other punitive damage-related arguments.
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court’s March 27, 1998, order which required her to provide
supplemental answers to Softball City’s interrogatories at least
thirty days prior to trial.
That order compelled Dixon to
supplement only her answers to interrogatories two, three and
four (which were the interrogatories named by Softball City in
its motion to compel).
However, interrogatory number five asked
Dixon to identify and specify the amount of damages she was
seeking.
Thus, Softball City’s argument is not well taken.
We
further find that any alleged deficiencies in Dixon’s responses
to Softball City’s request for production of documents are
insufficient to merit reversal.
CR 61.01.
Next, Softball City contends that Dixon was not
entitled to recover for loss of use of the Celica as the vehicle
was used for more than business purposes only.
See Wittmer v.
Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885, 889 (1993). (“[a] tort claim . . .
for compensatory damages for ‘loss of use’ of a damaged vehicle .
. . applies only to a vehicle with a business use.”).
This
argument is without merit as KRS 304.39-115 specifically provides
that loss of use of a motor vehicle, “regardless of the type of
use, shall be recognized as an element of damage in any property
damage liability claim.”
Softball City also argues that it was entitled to a
directed verdict on the issue of liability since Dixon was aware
that its parking lot was prone to flood.
Even assuming that
Dixon was aware that the parking lot was subject to flooding,
Softball City’s argument must fail.
The cases cited by Softball
City generally stand for the proposition that a danger as obvious
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and well known to a business invitee as to an owner cannot be the
basis for a recovery.4
However, the case at hand did not involve
a current, manifestly obvious danger (such as the ice in Manis
and Fisher or the open grease pit in Bonn) but rather involved
only a potential, contingent danger as the parking lot was not
flooded when Dixon parked her vehicle.
Therefore, it cannot be
said as a matter of law that the potential of flooding was an
open and obvious danger as envisioned by Bonn, et al.
Softball
City’s related argument that it was entitled to a directed
verdict on liability because flooding is an act of nature beyond
its control is also without merit.
As stated previously herein,
the issue of Softball City’s negligence was properly presented to
the jury and it is clear that recovery can be had for an injury
caused by the combination of an act of nature and negligence.
See e.g. Dunning v. Kentucky Utilities Company, 270 Ky. 44, 109
S.W.2d 6, 9-10 (1937).
Softball City’s next contention is that the trial court
erred in failing to dismiss a juror, Ms. Hemmer, for cause.
Hemmer admitted in voir dire that she had recently consulted
Dixon’s attorney on a matter unrelated to Dixon’s action, but
further stated that she had not hired the attorney and that her
consultation with the attorney would not make it difficult for
her to serve as a juror.
After a considerable delay, Softball
4
Standard Oil Company v. Manis, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 856 (1968);
Bonn v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, Ky., 440 S.W.2d 526 (1969);
Fisher v. Hardesty, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 877 (1952).
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City unsuccessfully moved to strike Hemmer for cause.5
We are
not persuaded that Hemmer’s brief, isolated, consultation with
Dixon’s attorney constituted a “close relationship” mandating her
disqualification.
Butts v. Commonwealth, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 943,
945 (1997).
We disagree with Softball City’s argument that
testimony concerning the flooding of other vehicles was
improperly admitted.
That testimony was relevant to show that
Softball City failed to take corrective action to improve the
drainage of its parking lot despite having knowledge that it had
a propensity to flood and damage vehicles.
Therefore, the
evidence was relevant, admissible, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting the evidence to be introduced.
Green River Electric Corporation v. Nantz, Ky. App., 894 S.W.2d
643, 645 (1995).
We have examined Softball City’s arguments relating to
Dixon’s expert witnesses and have found those arguments to be
without merit.
Any alleged deficiencies in the testimony
relating to the diminution in value of Dixon’s vehicle go to the
weight, not the admissibility of that testimony, and Softball
City was free to cross-examine the experts about their opinions.
Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 703(c).
5
Furthermore, we do not
Softball City raises other issues involving Hemmer in its
brief. However, we will consider only Hemmer’s relationship with
Dixon’s attorney since that is the only reason presented by
Softball City to the trial court in its motion to strike Hemmer
for cause. See Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, Ky., 770
S.W.2d 225, 228 (1989) (“The Court of Appeals is without
authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial
court”).
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believe that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant a mistrial based upon one isolated statement on crossexamination by one of Dixon’s expert witnesses regarding a damage
report prepared by an insurance company.
See Gould v. Charlton
Company, Inc., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734, 741 (1996) (holding that a
trial court’s decision to overrule a motion for a mistrial cannot
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion).
Finally, we believe
that any error regarding Dixon’s expert witness allegedly
testifying from a document not previously provided to Softball
City in discovery is insufficient to merit reversal under CR
61.01.
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court’s
judgment is reversed on the issue of punitive damages and
affirmed as to all other issues.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert E. Maclin, III
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert W. Carran
Alice Gailey Keys
Covington, Kentucky
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