AND KENNETH LAPRADD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: June 9, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1998-CA-002095-MR
AND
1999-CA-000722-MR
KENNETH LAPRADD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN R. JAEGER, JUDGE
HONORABLE RAYMOND E. LAPE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CR-00531
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON, and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Kenneth LaPradd (LaPradd) appeals the order of the
Kenton Circuit Court denying RCr 11.42 relief from his conviction
of six (6) counts of using a minor in a sexual performance and of
one (1) count of being a second-degree persistent felony offender
(PFO II).
He also filed a separate appeal from an order of the
court denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis for the
purpose of obtaining a copy of his court record.
These appeals
have been consolidated and are addressed together in this
opinion. Having throughly reviewed the record on appeal, we
affirm as to both appeals.
LaPradd was indicted in September 1993 on eleven counts
of using a minor in a sexual performance and one count of being a
PFO II.
The charges followed a Kentucky State Police
investigation of a complaint filed by the victim’s grandmother.
In August 1993, the victim, an eight-year-old little girl,
confided in her grandmother that LaPradd had taken her and her
brother from their Grant County home to his apartment in
Covington, Kentucky.
While en route, LaPradd stopped and
purchased several pairs of women’s and girl’s panties.
The
victim described some of these panties has having no “middle” in
them and stated that LaPradd had explained that there would be a
cloth “there” when the pictures were taken; therefore, he would
be unable to “see anything.”
The victim’s grandmother immediately reported the
incident to Detective Ronald Harrison of the Kentucky State
Police.
Coincidentally, Detective Harrison had personal
knowledge that in 1983, LaPradd, while a resident of Grant
County, was convicted of using a minor in a sexual performance
and of distributing material depicting a minor in a sexual
performance.
Detective Harrison confirmed LaPradd’s Covington
address, presented an affidavit to Kenton County District Court,
and obtained a search warrant for LaPradd’s residence.
A search of LaPradd’s premises produced virtually
thousands of photographic negatives stored in a safe.
Many of
these negatives depicted nude or partially clothed children.
-2-
Negatives were found of the victim posing in sexually provocative
positions with her genitalia exposed.
Numerous other
photographic negatives were found, portraying children in
lingerie inappropriate for their age.
LaPradd pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Prior to
his scheduled trial date, he moved for a suppression hearing,
which was held on February 22, 1994.
Upon LaPradd’s motion, the
court held another suppression hearing on January 11, 1995.
At
this time, LaPradd entered a conditional plea of guilty to the
amended charges of six (6) counts of using a minor in a sexual
performance and of being a PFO II — for which he was sentenced to
twenty-years’ incarceration.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed LaPradd’s conviction in an unpublished opinion.
250-MR.
95-SC-
LaPradd then moved for RCr 11.42 relief, a full
evidentiary hearing, the right to proceed in forma pauperis, and
an opportunity for a personal appearance in the circuit court.
LaPradd alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
On July 23,
1998, the court entered its order denying all motions on the
basis that LaPradd had failed to raise any ground upon which the
court could grant relief.
Appeal No. 1998-CA-002095 followed.
In February 1999, while this appeal was pending,
LaPradd moved the trial court for the right to proceed in forma
pauperis for the purpose of obtaining a copy of his court record.
He argued that he was entitled to the record in order to prepare
and perfect his appeal.
The trial court denied the motion, and
appeal No. 1999-CA-000722-MR followed.
-3-
In appeal No. 1998-CA-002095-MR, LaPradd contends that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney “failed to prepare a defense and make necessary pretrial
motions that could have changed the outcome.”
LaPradd also
contends that the incriminating evidence against him was obtained
by means of an illegal search and seizure.
Throughout his
appellate brief, LaPradd alleges that the affidavit in support of
the search warrant issued for his residence was based upon false
and fraudulent statements.
However, as he failed to raise this
issue before the trial court, we will not address it here and
restrict our discussion to the allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
“The burden of proof [is] upon the appellant to show that he
was not adequately represented by appointed counsel.”
Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878, 879 (1969).
Jordan v.
In order to
establish that counsel’s assistance was so deficient as to
require reversal, the appellant must satisfy a two-part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made error so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be
said that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 667-668, 80 L. Ed.2d 674, 693,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
(Emphasis added.)
-4-
The record reflects that LaPradd’s trial counsel moved
the court to suppress evidence of: (1) LaPradd’s prior felony
conviction; (2) the numerous pairs of women’s underwear
discovered during the search of his residence; (3) all
photographs developed from the negatives seized from the safe.
Counsel also moved that LaPradd be charged with only one count of
using a minor in a sexual performance rather than the eleven
brought in the indictment.
Counsel indicated his intent to
introduce evidence of mental illness or insanity as a defense.
All trial strategies were clearly designed to serve the
defendant’s interests in a positive vein.
Our review of the transcript of the suppression hearing
discloses that trial counsel conducted himself competently —
particularly in his cross-examination of Detective Harrison as to
the contents of his sworn affidavit.
LaPradd makes a bare
allegation that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was
procured by fraud.
RCr 11.42(2) requires more than a blanket
assertion or bare-faced allegation:
The motion shall be signed and verified by
the movant and shall state specifically the
grounds on which the sentence is being
challenged and the facts on which the movant
relies in support of such grounds. Failure
to comply with this section shall warrant a
summary dismissal of the motion. (Emphasis
added.)
The trial court did not err in denying LaPradd’s motion
for an evidentiary hearing due to his failure to comply with the
specificity requirements of RCr 11.42(2).
"No evidentiary
hearing is required if the allegations of the RCr 11.42 motion
-5-
are insufficient."
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311,
315 (1998).
In his second appeal, No. 1999-CA-000722-MR, LaPradd raises
seven claims of "injustice" because the trial court denied his
request for a courtesy copy of his complete court record.
We
agree with the trial court that his RCr 11.42 request for relief
on this point was essentially an exercise in futility.
At the
very most, it might have served as the basis for a "fishing
expedition" for some supplementary ground upon which to seek
relief.
In Moore v. Ropke, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 161 (1964) our
highest court addressed this identical issue in language that
remains wholly relevant to the case before us:
The petition in the circuit court
recites as the only basis for petitioner’s
request: "Petitioner states he needs
aforesaid records because he purports to make
a direct attack upon the Judgment of his
Conviction and needs the records to enable
him to prepare an intelligent motion or
petition in his own behalf."
In other words, petitioner is on a
fishing expedition and hopes to find
something that may possibly lay the
groundwork upon which to initiate further
court proceedings.
Only for the purpose of taking a timely
appeal, in the proper case, may an indigent
person be entitled to have furnished to him a
transcript of the record of his conviction.
See also Gilliam v. Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 856, 858
(1983).
LaPradd cannot argue in good faith that he sought a
transcript of his court record in order to meet the timeliness
requirement for filing on appeal.
-6-
Our records reflect that his
appellate brief was received by this Court on January 20, 1999;
he filed his motion requesting the court record on February 8,
1999.
Our review of the record as a whole reveals no legitimate
basis for sustaining his motion.
Thus, we find no error in the
trial court’s denial of this motion.
We affirm the judgments of the Kenton Circuit Court
denying appellant RCr 11.42 relief and his motion for a copy of
his court record.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth LaPradd
Burgin, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
