AND GLENN HOLBROOK v. LUTHER GREEN CARPENTER
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RENDERED: December 29, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1998-CA-002044-MR
AND
1998-CA-002166-MR
GLENN HOLBROOK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MAGOFFIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANNY P. CAUDILL, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00076
LUTHER GREEN CARPENTER
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Glenn Holbrook has filed two appeals that have
been consolidated.
Since the appellee, Luther Green Carpenter is
deceased and no action was taken to revive the action against
him, we must reverse the judgment and remand with directions to
dismiss the complaint and counterclaim.
This case concerns a dispute over lease payments and
the termination of the lease.
Holbrook and Carpenter entered
into a lease agreement on September 29, 1976, whereby Holbrook1
leased two lots located near the City of Salyersville, Kentucky,
from Carpenter for a period of five years for a monthly rent of
$100.00.
The lease was renewable for four additional five-year
periods with the monthly rent increasing to $125.00, $150.00,
$175.00 and $200.00 per month for each five-year period
respectively.2
On April 20, 1994, Carpenter filed a complaint in the
Magoffin Circuit Court against Holbrook alleging that Holbrook
had defaulted on the lease by failing to make certain payments.
Carpenter demanded a judgment for $3,350.00, cancellation of the
lease and attorney’s fees.
On June 23, 1994, Holbrook filed an
answer and a counterclaim.
Holbrook denied failing to pay his
rent and claimed the lease had been wrongfully terminated.
Holbrook sought damages for “lost profits in his business and
damages in an amount equal to the difference in the lease payment
of $175.00 per month and the fair market rental value of that
property or similar property.”
On June 15, 1995, the trial court ordered the matter
submitted to a “Special Commissioner to hear evidence and decide
on the facts and issues of this case.”
The case was tried by
depositions and an agreed order was entered on April 4, 1996,
1
The actual lessee was Park G.H.J. Enterprises, but it is
agreed that Holbrook is the successor in interest.
2
Both parties have failed to comply with Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv) by failing to support their
arguments “with ample supportive references to the record.”
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submitting the case to the Special Commissioner for a
recommendation.
On May 1, 1996, the Special Commissioner filed
his recommendations and recommended the following relevant
findings of fact:
4. Although there is conflicting evidence,
the undersigned finds that from the records
submitted there was due for calendar year
1989 the sum of $1,800.00 upon which there
was paid $750.00; for calendar year 1990
there was due $1,800.00 upon which there was
paid $1,350.00; for calendar year 1991 there
was due the sum of $1,900.00 upon which there
was paid $2,300.00; for calendar year 1992
there was due the sum of $2,100.00 upon which
there was paid $1,750.00; and for the first
three months of 1993 there was due the sum of
$525.00 upon which there was paid $700.00.
As this lease was terminated by Plaintiff,
any applicable rental due for the month of
April is deemed to be waived.
The total deficiency from the foregoing
is $1,275.00.
5. Defendant presented no competent evidence
in support of his counterclaim which would
justify and offset from the amount of the
above deficiency. The only evidence
presented was from a “sales associate” not a
competent real estate appraiser.
. . .
RECOMMENDED JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing findings and
conclusions, the undersigned respectfully
recommends entry of judgment in favor of
Plaintiff for the sum of $1,275.00; that the
Defendant’s counterclaim be dismissed and
held for naught; that the Plaintiff also
recover from Defendant his costs herein
expended, including the sum of $320.00 paid
as Commissioner’s fees.
Holbrook filed exceptions to these findings on May 2, 1996.
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On January 23, 1997, the Honorable John Robert Morgan
disqualified himself as judge on the case and on February 6,
1997, the Honorable Danny P. Caudill was appointed special judge.
On July 30, 1998, Special Judge Caudill entered an order
overruling Holbrook’s exceptions.
Holbrook filed a notice of
appeal on August 12, 1998, and the case was designated in the
Court of Appeals as case number 98-CA-002044-MR.
On August 15,
1998, Special Judge Caudill entered another order whereby “the
recommended judgment filed by the . . . Special Commissioner . .
. is hereby adopted in full by this court.”
This second order
stated that it was “a final and appealable order and there is no
just reason for the delay of its entry.”
On August 26, 1998,
Holbrook filed a second notice of appeal that was designated in
the Court of Appeals as case number 98-CA-002166-MR.
This Court
in an order entered on September 23, 1998, consolidated the two
appeals.
In his brief, Holbrook has failed to comply with CR
76.12(4)(c)(iv) since he has failed to set out each of his
arguments separately and he has failed to make appropriate
references to the record to show where the issue was properly
preserved for appellate review.
arguments.
Holbrook basically makes three
He claims the judgment for $1,275.00 was based on
hearsay evidence consisting of Carpenter’s business ledger which
did not meet the business records exception under KRE3 803(6) and
3
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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that generally the trial court’s findings were not supported by
substantial evidence of record.
Holbrook also claims that the
trial court erred in denying his counterclaim for damages since
Holbrook contends that his “expert’s” testimony should have been
accepted by the trial court.
For his final argument, Holbrook
claims “[t]his action should have been dismissed by the Trial
Court due to the Appellee[’]s failure to join an indispensable
party to this action in accordance with Civil Rule 12.02 and
Civil Rule 19 . . . [T]he Appellant states that Luther Green
Carpenter is now deceased and the Appellee failed to amend the
pleadings to name the Estate as the proper party to this action
by and through the Executor or Administrator.”
In his brief, the attorney who purports to represent
the decedent, Carpenter, argues that the ledger sheets were
properly admitted as evidence as business records and that the
findings by the trial court were supported by substantial
evidence and therefore not clearly erroneous.
We agree.
The
Carpenter brief also contends that Holbrook’s counterclaim was
properly denied because the trial court was within its discretion
to find the evidence presented by Holbrook’s “expert” witness to
not be competent.
We agree.
However, the most troublesome aspect of this case
concerns the death of Carpenter.
The only response to Holbrook’s
argument concerning “failure to join an indispensable party” is
in Carpenter’s brief as follows:
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The Defendant[’]s failure to argue
indispensable party until after the proof was
then [sic] and after the Judgment was issued
by the Special Commissioner should constitute
waiver of this argument. In any event, the
lease subject of the action [sic] was
properly terminated due to failure of
Appellant, Glenn Holbrook[,] to pay rent and
therefore the counterclaim of Appellant,
Glenn Holbrook[,] was properly dismissed and
this dismissal should be upheld by this
court.
The parties are incorrect in their references to
“indispensable party.”
revive the action.
The issue instead involves the failure to
KRS 395.278 provides:
An application to revive an action in
the name of the representative or successor
of a plaintiff, or against the representative
or successor of a defendant, shall be made
within one (1) year after the death of a
deceased party.
CR 25.01(1) provides:
If a party dies during the pendency of
an action and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court, within the period
allowed by law, may order substitution of the
proper parties. If substitution is not so
made the action may be dismissed as to the
deceased party. The motion for substitution
may be made by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party or by
any party, and, together with the notice of
hearing, shall be served on the parties as
provided in Rule 5, and upon persons not
parties as provided in Rule 4 for the service
of summons.
Our Supreme Court in Hammons v. Tremco, Inc.,4 held
that the one-year period set forth in KRS 395.278 “operates as a
4
Ky., 887 S.W.2d 336 (1994).
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statute of limitations; therefore, the period set forth in the
statute is mandatory and not subject to enlargement.”5
If a motion to revive the action and to
substitute the successor or personal
representative of the deceased party is not
made within the prescribed time, the action
may be dismissed as to the deceased party.
CR 25.01(1). The word “may,” as it appears
in CR 25.01(1) does not allow for
discretionary dismissal but provides for an
exception in those instances in which the
right to have the action dismissed has been
lost, such as by waiver, estoppel, or
consent. Snyder v. Snyder, Ky.App., 769
S.W.2d 70 (1989). Therefore, when considered
together, KRS 395.278 and CR 25.01(1) require
that when a plaintiff dies any action pending
on the part of the deceased plaintiff must be
revived by the decedent’s successor or
personal representative within one year, and
the successor or personal representative must
be substituted as the real party in interest.
Although an opposing party may, by its
action, lose the right to require the timely
revival of an action, a party cannot, by such
action, confer personal jurisdiction over a
successor or personal representative who has
not appeared or been substituted as a party.
Mitchell v. Money, supra. Likewise,
jurisdiction could not be conferred over
dependents who had not asserted their rights
to survivors’ benefits and moved to be
substituted as parties to the action.6
Thus, Carpenter’s argument that Holbrook waived his objection to
the revival of the action concerns whether any attempt by the
estate to revive the action should be granted even though it
would not now be timely.
As a matter of law, we fail to see
anything in the record that would support a finding by the trial
5
Hammons, supra at 338 (citing Mitchell v. Money, Ky.App.,
602 S.W.2d 687 (1980)).
6
Hammons, supra.
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court on remand that Holbrook had waived the one-year
requirement, and Carpenter’s brief fails to identify any such
grounds.7
Accordingly, the judgment of the Magoffin Circuit Court
is reversed and this matter is remanded with directions for the
circuit court to dismiss the complaint and the counterclaim.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Teddy L. Flynt
Salyersville, KY
Gordon B. Long
Salyersville, KY
7
See Daniel v. Fourth and Market, Inc., Ky., 445 S.W.2d 699,
701 (1968) (Fact that defendants took depositions did not operate
as waiver or estop defendants from asserting right to have action
dismissed for failure to timely revive).
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