JELKA S. JAMES; RICHARD M. JAMES; NADA J. MAULDIN (F/K/A NADA J. KUNKEL); AND JELKA JAMES REALTY COMPANY, A KENTUCKY GENERAL PARTNERSHIP V. DELANEY WOODS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; M. FREDERICA GODSHALK; DEAN WARDEN; SHERRY WARDEN; SUSAN B. FEAMSTER; AND JENNIFER PONDER WOLKEN
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C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001877-MR
JELKA S. JAMES; RICHARD M. JAMES;
NADA J. MAULDIN (F/K/A NADA J. KUNKEL);
AND JELKA JAMES REALTY COMPANY,
A KENTUCKY GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
v.
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. JACKSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1992-CI-00410
DELANEY WOODS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION;
M. FREDERICA GODSHALK;
DEAN WARDEN; SHERRY WARDEN;
SUSAN B. FEAMSTER;
AND JENNIFER PONDER WOLKEN
AND
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-001881-MR
JESSAMINE COUNTY-CITY OF WILMORE
JOINT PLANNING COMMISSION; PETER W. BEATY;
KENNETH HOUP; JUDITH M. METCALF;
MELVIN BOWDAN; JOSEPH L. POAGE;
JOHN BLACKFORD; DAVID CROUSE;
C.V. ELLIOTT; CHARLES KESTEL, JR.;
AND WAYNE MCCRAY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT W. JACKSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1992-CI-000471
DELANEY WOODS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION;
M. FREDERICA GODSHALK; DEAN WARDEN;
APPELLANTS
SHERRY WARDEN; SUSAN B. FEAMSTER;
JENNIFER PONDER WOLKEN;
JELKA S. JAMES; RICHARD M. JAMES;
NADA J. MAULDIN (F/K/A NADA J. KUNKEL);
AND JELKA JAMES REALTY COMPANY
AND
NO.
APPELLEES
1998-CA-001882-MR
JELKA S. JAMES; RICHARD M. JAMES;
NADA J. MAULDIN (F/K/A NADA J. KUNKEL);
AND JELKA JAMES REALTY COMPANY
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. JACKSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1992-CI-00471
v.
DELANEY WOODS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION;
M. FREDERICA GODSHALK;
DEAN WARDEN; SHERRY WARDEN;
SUSAN B. FEAMSTER;
AND JENNIFER PONDER WOLKEN;
JESSAMINE COUNTY-CITY OF WILMORE
JOINT PLANNING COMMISSION; PETER W. BEATY;
KENNETH HOUP; JUDITH M. METCALF;
MELVIN BOWDAN; JOSEPH L. POAGE;
JOHN BLACKFORD; DAVID CROUSE;
C.V. ELLIOTT; CHARLES KESTEL, JR.;
AND WAYNE MCCRAY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
IN APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-001877
AFFIRMING IN RESULT
IN APPEAL NOS. 1998-CA-001881 AND 1998-CA-001882
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
These are consolidated appeals from a judgment in
a declaratory judgment action allowing neighboring property
owners to enforce a deed restriction; and from an appeal of a
planning commission’s approval of a preliminary subdivision plat.
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In the declaratory judgment action, we find that the trial court
acted correctly by allowing the neighboring property owners to
enforce a deed restriction prohibiting subdivision of lots.
However, we also find that the trial court interpreted the deed
restriction more broadly than permitted by the terms of the
covenant.
Hence, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand
for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In the
appeal from the trial court’s judgment setting aside the approval
of the preliminary plat, we find that the trial court misapplied
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
We
further find that the planning commission’s record supported its
approval of the preliminary plat on several grounds.
However, we
agree with the trial court that the preliminary plat did not
comply with the subdivision regulations in several significant
aspects.
Hence, we affirm in result.
Factual Summary
In 1978, developers Thomas H. Heilbron and his wife
Mary S. Heilbron (Heilbron), and Robert C. Sims and his wife
Dorothea R. Sims (Sims) submitted an application for a
subdivision plat approval to the Jessamine County-City of Wilmore
Joint Planning Commission (the Planning Commission).
They
proposed to divide a 431 acre tract of land located on Delaney
Ferry Road into 32 tracts ranging in size from 5 acres to 67
acres, and to be known as the Delaney Woods Subdivision (Delaney
Woods).
Following a public hearing on the application, the
Planning Commission granted final subdivision approval on June 5,
1979.
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Since all of the lots in the development were five
acres or larger, as required by the existing A-1 (general
agricultural) classification, no zoning change was required.
The promotional materials for the subdivision emphasized the
benefits of the larger lot sizes, and stated that privacy and
security would be provided by having only one point of access
into the development and that a gatehouse at the entrance would
offer additional security and attractiveness.
In addition,
Heilbron and Sims adopted certain deed restrictions for Delaney
Woods, which were recorded in the Jessamine County Clerk’s office
on June 8, 1979.
Among other things, the deed restrictions
specified requirements for construction and appearance of
dwellings, fences, mailboxes and landscaping.
The twentieth
restriction, which is pertinent to this action, provides as
follows:
No lot in Delaney Woods may be subdivided
into additional lots without the express
written consent of the Developer.
By 1991, Heilbron and Sims completed the sale of most
of the property within the subdivision, and brought their
partnership to a close.
Sims became the owner of Lot No. 20,
Unit 3 (Lot 20), consisting of 31.7 acres.
On March 25, 1992,
the Heilbrons executed a resignation of their position as
developers of the Delaney Woods.
Prior to this time, the
Heilbrons had represented to a number of the Delaney Woods
homeowners that they would not consent to further subdivision of
any of the lots.
However, on the day of their resignation as
developers, the Heilbrons wrote to Sims and stated that they held
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the position “of neither supporting or opposing any resubdivision in Delaney Woods.”
On March 31, 1992, Sims executed a deed of Lot 20 to
Jelka James Realty Company (Jelka James).1
The conveyance was
made subject to “any and all easements, conditions and
restrictions affecting the property herein conveyed and contained
on any plat or instrument of record . . . .”
The day before this
transfer Sims executed a document entitled “Consent of Developer
Pertaining to Restrictions of Delaney Woods Subdivision.”
The
purpose of this document was to give written consent to divide
Lot 20 into separate lots of no less than five acres.
The
resignation, the deed and the consent were all recorded with the
Jessamine County Clerk’s office.
At this point, the paths of the respective actions
begin to diverge.
On August 7, 1992, Jelka James submitted a
preliminary subdivision plat application to the Planning
Commission.
The plat depicted 43.7 acres, comprising all of Lot
20 along with 12 acres of an adjoining farm also owned by Jelka
James.
Jelka James proposed to divide this property into eight
tracts of more than five acres each, and to build an access road
along one side of the property.
On September 8, 1992, the
Planning Commission voted 4-3 to deny approval of the subdivision
plat.
No appeal was taken from this action.
On September 21, 1992, Jelka James filed a second
application for a subdivision plat approval.
1
This application
Jelka James is a Kentucky general partnership, the
partners in which are Jelka James, Richard M. James, and Nada J.
Kunkel.
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proposed to divide only the 31.7 acres of Lot 20 into five lots
of more than five acres each.
The application also sought
permission to construct a public road providing access to the new
lots on the north side of Lot 20.
The Planning Commission held
public hearings on the application on October 13 and November 10,
1992.
On December 8, 1992, the Planning Commission voted 5-3 to
approve the preliminary plat.
However, the approval was based
upon the granting of several waivers to provisions of the
subdivision regulations, and was made conditional upon filing of
corrected water and sewer certificates.
Meanwhile, on October 13, 1992, the Delaney Woods
Homeowners’ Association, and Delaney Woods homeowners M.
Frederica Godshalk, Dean Warden, Sherry Warden, Susan B. Feamster
and Jennifer Ponder Wolken (collectively, the Homeowners’
Association) filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to KRS
418.040 in Jessamine Circuit Court (Action No. 1992-CI-00410).
The Homeowners Association sought a declaration that Jelka James
is prohibited from subdividing Lot 20 based upon: (1) the
restrictions recorded in the deeds of the Delaney Woods
properties; (2) its failure to obtain the express written consent
of all of the original developers (and the invalidity of the
resignation of the Heilbrons as developers); and (3) the doctrine
of equitable estoppel.
The trial court initially found that a declaratory
judgment action was not the proper means to enjoin the approval
of the preliminary plat.
On appeal, this Court reversed, finding
that the trial court erred in finding that this matter was simply
a zoning case which must be decided by an administrative agency.
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Rather, this Court found that there were genuine issues regarding
the deed restrictions and the developers' actions to be decided
separately from the zoning questions.2
On June 24, 1998, the
trial court entered a memorandum order finding that the
subdivision restrictions constitute reciprocal negative easements
which are enforceable by the lot owners who relied on the
restrictions in purchasing their properties in the subdivision.
The trial court further found that Jelka James is equitably
estopped from subdividing Lot 20 based upon the representations
previously made by Heilbron and Sims.
Jelka James filed a notice
of appeal on July 21, 1998. (Appeal No. 1998-CA-001877).
In the other action, the Homeowners’ Association also
brought an appeal from the Planning Commission’s approval of the
preliminary plat on December 10, 1992.
In an order dated
November 23, 1994, the circuit court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal
from a preliminary plat.
This Court reversed, finding that the
Planning Commission's approval of the preliminary action was
final, and that the Homeowners’ Association was entitled to seek
judicial review following the approval pursuant to KRS 100.347.3
Upon remand, the trial court found that the Planning
Commission had acted arbitrarily in approving the preliminary
plat when there was substantial evidence that the application did
2
Delaney Woods Homeowners Association, et al. v. James, et
al., Ky. App., No. 94-CA-001621 (Not-To-Be Published Opinion
rendered 12/15/1995).
3
Delaney Woods Homeowners Association, et al. v. James, et
al., Ky. App., No. 1995-CA-000956 (Not-To-Be- Published Opinion
rendered 03/29/1996).
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not comply with the subdivision regulation.
The trial court
further found that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel bar the Planning Commission from approving the second
application because it “was virtually identical to the August 7,
1992 application that the Planning Commission previously denied.”
(Emphasis in original).
The Planning Commission filed a notice
of appeal from this judgment on July 22, 1998 (Appeal No. 1998CA-001881).
Jelka James also filed a notice of appeal from the
trial court’s order.
(Appeal No. 1998-CA-001882).
The appeal from the declaratory judgment action was
consolidated with the appeal and cross-appeal in the zoning
action because the same property is involved in all these cases.
We shall consider the declaratory judgment appeal first.
Appeal No. 1998-CA-001877
Jelka James appeals from the trial court’s order in the
declaratory judgment action, finding that the deed restrictions
constitute reciprocal negative easements which preclude further
subdivision of Lot 20.
As a preliminary matter, we hold that the
application of the doctrine of reciprocal negative easements does
not arise in precisely the manner in which the parties or the
trial court contemplated.
As explained in First Security
National Bank & Trust Company of Lexington v. Peter, Ky., 456
S.W.2d 46 (1970):
in order for a reciprocal negative easement
to arise, there must have been a common owner
of the related parcels of land, and in his
various grants of the lots he must have
included some restriction, either affirmative
or negative, for the benefit of the land
retained, evidencing a scheme or intent that
the entire tract should be similarly treated,
-8-
so that once the plan is effectively put into
operation, the burden he has placed upon the
land conveyed is by operation of law
reciprocally placed upon the land retained.
Id.
at 50;
See also Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, Ky., 503 S.W.2d
734 (1973).
The doctrine of reciprocal negative easements is a
creature of equity.
It does not arise from an express covenant,
but it is inferred based upon the conduct and representations of
the common grantor.
In the present case, all of the properties
in Delaney Woods, including Lot 20, contain the express
restrictive covenant against further subdivision without the
express written consent of the developer.
not infer the existence of an easement.
As a result, we need
Rather, we must
interpret and apply the express restrictive covenant.
The express terms of that covenant authorize the
developers to grant permission to subdivide lots in the Delaney
Woods.
20.
Jelka James obtained consent from Sims to subdivide Lot
Unless the developers’ authority to waive the deed
restriction is limited in some manner, the Homeowners’
Association has no recourse against Jelka James.
The facts of the present case are very similar to those
presented in Wright v. Cypress Shores Development Co., Inc., 413
So. 2d 1115 (Ala., 1982).
In Wright, the developer, Cypress
Shores, platted and recorded a survey of a subdivision.
The
developer also recorded a declaration of covenants, restrictions
and limitations pertaining to that subdivision.
In pertinent
part, the restrictions limited the use of the properties within
the subdivision to single family residential use, and they
-9-
imposed building requirements for all residences.
In addition,
the developer established an Architectural Control Committee,
whose function was to determine whether any proposed building
plans were in conformity and harmony of external design with the
existing structures in the subdivision.
The declaration further
gave the Architectural Control Committee authority to annul,
cancel, amend or modify any restriction set out in the covenants.
Subsequently, a purchaser of two of the lots in the
subdivision proposed to build a convenience store on his
property.
The Architectural Control Committee set aside the
restrictions as to those lots.
The other property owners in the
subdivision brought suit seeking to enforce the restrictions set
out in the declaration of covenants.
The Supreme Court of Alabama first noted the
traditional view that restrictive covenants accompanied by the
retained right in the grantor to revoke or amend them are
personal in nature, as opposed to covenants running with the
land.
The reservation in the grantor to revoke or amend destroys
the mutuality or reciprocity of the restrictions.
Id. at 1121.
However, in more recent cases, the Alabama court noted that a
different approach has been taken.
Where the owner of a tract of
land adopts a general scheme for its improvement, dividing it
into lots and conveying these with uniform restrictions as to the
purposes for which the lands may be used, such restrictions
create equitable easements in favor of the owners of the several
lots.
Such restrictions are not for the benefit of the grantor
alone, but for the benefit of all purchasers.
Thus, the
reservation of the right to amend restrictions is only one factor
-10-
to be considered in determining whether the grantor intended to
establish a uniform plan of development, and all of the language
in the restrictions should be considered in arriving at the
grantor’s intention.
Id. at 1122.
One of the most practical tests, supported by
common sense and common business experience,
is, whether the restriction imposed by the
grantor or proprietor upon the granted
premises would naturally operate to enhance
the value of his adjacent premises, whether
retained by him or conveyed to another. If
this be so, it is a strong circumstance to
indicate that the restriction was not
intended for the mere personal benefit of the
grantor, but as a permanent servitude
beneficial to the owner of the land, whoever
he may be, and appendant to the premises. ...
The inquiry, in these cases, has generally
been, whether the servitudes or restrictions
imposed were of such a nature as to operate
as an inducement to purchasers; and, if so,
the inclination of the courts has been to
construe them as appurtenant to the estate,
and intended for its protection rather than
personal to the grantor. If appurtenant, it
of course follows the land, being assignable
with it, and each grantee can enforce it in
equity against each other grantee having
notice of it.
Id., quoting Virgin v. Garrett, 233 Ala. 34, 169 So. 711 (1936).
The court in Wright further stated that an elaborate
set of restrictive covenants designed to provide for a general
scheme or plan of development is inherently inconsistent with a
grantor’s reservation of an arbitrary power to waive the
restrictions for specific properties.
Consequently, the court
held that the exercise of a reserved right to alter, amend or
repeal restrictions is valid as long as it is exercised in a
reasonable manner so as not to destroy the general scheme or plan
of development.
Id. at 1123-24.
Turning to the facts of the
case before it, the court found that the language used in the
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declaration of covenants indicated that the grantor intended a
general scheme or plan of development, and thus he could only
amend the restrictions in a reasonable manner consistent with
that scheme or plan.
The court further found that the Cypress
Shores homeowners relied upon the restrictions when purchasing
their lots, and that the proposed convenience store would result
in a significant reduction in the value of those lots.
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that the
Architectural Control Committee’s exercise of the power to waive
the deed restrictions was unreasonable and void.
Id. at 1124.
The analysis by the Supreme Court of Alabama is
applicable in this state.
Kentucky also followed the traditional
view that a reservation by the common grantor of a general power
to dispense with the restrictions on particular lots negatives
the purpose of uniform development from which the mutuality of
right among lot owners in a platted subdivision is deemed to
arise.
Brueggen v. Boehn, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 404, 405 (1961).
Where a grantor reserves the right to alter, modify, or change
restrictive covenants, he or she may amend the covenants without
the consent of the grantee.
A grantor’s retention of the right
to make exceptions to the restrictions imposed is valid, and
hence grantees who purchased with notice of such right cannot
complain when exceptions are made pursuant to the powers
retained.
Id. at 406-07; See also, 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions, § 234, p. 650 (1995).
However, Kentucky also recognizes that the exercise of
the power to waive a restrictive covenant in a particular case
-12-
must be reasonable and not arbitrary.
The determination of
whether the exercise of the power to permit or refuse has been
reasonable or arbitrary is a factual question to be determined in
the light of the circumstances.
Factors to be considered include
whether the proposed project or use: is not consistent with the
general surroundings in the subdivision development; whether it
is in harmony with other buildings and structures therein; and it
is in compliance with the specific restrictions set out in the
plan of development for the subdivision.
La Vielle v. Seay, Ky.,
412 S.W.2d 587, 593 (1966); See also, Annotation, “Validity of
Construction of Restrictive Covenant Requiring Consent to
Construction on Lot,” 40 ALR 3d 864, § 4, pp. 879-81 (1971).
Thus, although the doctrine of reciprocal negative
easements does not directly apply because there is an express
restrictive covenant in effect, the restrictive covenant in the
deed may be treated as an equitable servitude running with the
land.
The grantor’s reservation of the right to waive the
restriction will not automatically negate a general scheme or
plan of development to destroy the mutuality of rights between
the grantor and the grantee.
Rather, the question of whether a
restrictive condition in a deed is inserted for the benefit of
the grantor alone or is for the benefit of common grantees (and
those who take under them) is determined by the intention of the
parties as ascertained from the deed itself in the light of
surrounding circumstances.
Brueggen, 344 S.W.2d at 406.
analysis is essentially the same as is necessary to find a
This
reciprocal negative easement.
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In this case, the stated purposes of the restrictive
covenants are to “maintain uniformity with respect to the use and
occupancy of said property in order to enhance and to maintain
its value, and to render it more attractive in appearance . . .”
The covenants grant a right of action “against any person or
persons violating or attempting to violate any covenant either to
restrain violation or to recover damages.”
In addition, the
restrictive covenants were to remain in effect until January 1,
1998, [at which time the covenants shall be automatically
extended] and for successive periods of ten years thereafter
unless a majority of the lot owners agreed by a written and
recorded instrument to modify or abolish the covenants.
Furthermore, the developer only retained a right to waive the
prohibition against subdivision of lots and the requirement that
all dwellings shall be of predominately masonry construction.
Taken together, these provisions strongly indicate that the
restrictive covenants were intended not for the sole benefit of
the grantor, but for the benefit of all of the lot owners in
Delaney Woods.
However, the trial court interpreted the restrictive
covenants in the deed to prohibit any subdivision of lots within
Delaney Woods.
The plain language of the covenant does not
support this interpretation.
Rather, restriction 20 merely
states that no lot in Delaney Woods may be further subdivided
without the consent of the developers.
As noted above, the
developers’ consent must be reasonable and not contrary to the
general scheme or plan of development.
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The Homeowners’
Association may only enforce the covenant against Jelka James if
the consent given by Sims was unreasonable.
The trial court found that the Delaney Woods homeowners
purchased their lots in reliance upon the restrictive covenants
contained in their deeds.
The record supports this conclusion.
However, the trial court did not find that the proposed
subdivision of Lot 20 would be inconsistent with the general
scheme or plan of development.
Indeed, none of the new lots
would be smaller than the minimum five acres set out in the 1979
plat.
On the other hand, the proposed road may well be
inconsistent with the general scheme of development.
Furthermore, the trial court did not make any findings whether
the proposed subdivision of Lot 20 would adversely affect the
value of the other lots in Delaney Woods.
We find that these are
issues of fact which must be addressed by the trial court.
Accordingly, we must remand this matter for further findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court also found that the Delaney Woods
homeowners relied upon the developers’ representations, and
therefore the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable in
this case.
However, the Homeowners’ Association did not make the
developers parties to the action below or to this appeal.
Consequently, the reasonableness of their consent to the
subdivision of Lot 20 is relevant only to the extent that the
Homeowners’ Association seeks to enforce restrictive covenants
which run with the land.
Generally, equitable estoppel is
applied to transactions where it would be unconscionable to allow
a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he
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or she acquiesced or accepted benefit.
291 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1956).
Tarter v. Turpin, Ky.,
There was no evidence that Jelka
James was a party to or had notice of representations made by the
Heilbrons concerning their intention never to permit subdivision
of any lot in Delaney Woods.
Moreover, any such representation
goes well beyond the recorded provisions in the restrictive
covenants.
See Oliver v. Schultz, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 669 (1994).
Consequently, we find that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
cannot be applied against Jelka James.
While the representations
made by Heilbron and Sims may be evidence reflecting a common
plan or scheme of development, they do not otherwise affect the
validity of Sims’ consent to subdivide Lot 20.
The Homeowners’ Association next argues that the
Heilbrons’ resignation as developer does not alter the provision
in the deed requiring the consent of all of the developers for
further subdivision of any lot.
Jelka James responds by stating
that Sims and Heilbron were entitled to dissolve their
partnership at any time.
Consequently, they assert that the
Heilbrons’ resignation as developers operated as an assignment to
the Sims of the Heilbrons’ right to consent to subdivision of
lots.
The restriction at issue prevents subdivision of any
lot in Delaney Woods without the express written consent of the
developer.
The deed restrictions specifically identify the
developers by name (“Whereas, Thomas H. and Mary S. Heilbron
Robert C. and Dorothea R Sims, hereinafter called ‘Developer’, .
. . are the owners and developers of the property hereinafter
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described;. . .”).
The question thus presented is whether the
Heilbrons’ resignation as developers dispenses with the
requirement that they expressly consent to further subdivision of
any lot in Delaney Woods.
In essence, the Homeowners’ Association argues that the
grantors’ reservation of the right to waive the deed restriction
can only be exercised by the named developers.
As a result, they
assert that the Heilbrons’ resignation effectively extinguishes
the reserved right as to Sims.
We disagree.
By resigning as
developers, the Heilbrons’ interest in the covenants came to an
end.
They no longer have a right to waive the deed restrictions.
Richmond v. Pennscott Builders, Inc., 43 Misc. 602, 606, 251
N.Y.S.2d 845, 849-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div., 1964).
As the
remaining developers, only Sims’ still has a right to grant a
waiver of the deed restrictions.4
In summary, we find that the trial court correctly
interpreted the deed restriction prohibiting further subdivision
of any lot in Delaney Woods as an equitable servitude running
with the land.
However, the trial court did not give effect to
4
Although the issue is not presented in this case, we note
that the deeds do not extend the right to waive restrictions to
the developers’ successors and assigns. See Rosi v. McCoy, 319
N.C. 589, 356 S.E.2d 586 (1987). In addition, upon expiration of
the initial twenty year term, the deeds grant to a majority of
the Delaney Woods homeowners the right to determine whether the
restrictive covenants would remain in effect, or to modify the
covenants. Therefore, it does not appear that the developers’
right to waive the covenants is assignable to a third party, or
that it extends beyond the initial term of the covenants.
Nonetheless, it appears from the record that Sims has assigned to
the Homeowners’ Association their prospective rights to waive the
deed restrictions. Consequently, this will not be an issue in
the future.
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the portion of the covenant permitting the developer to waive the
restriction.
Therefore, we remand this action to the trial court
for further findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning
whether the exercise of that consent was reasonable and in accord
with the general scheme or plan of development.
We further find
that following the resignation of the Heilbrons as developers,
Sims alone was authorized to grant consent for subdivision of Lot
20.
Appeal Nos. 1998-CA-001881 and 1998-CA-001882
In these appeals, the Planning Commission and Jelka
James argue that the trial court erred in reversing the
preliminary plat approval submitted by Jelka James.
They first
argue that the Planning Commission’s consideration of Jelka
James’ second application was not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata or collateral estoppel.
As correctly pointed out by the
trial court, the application of res judicata and collateral
estoppel in zoning matters is not clear.
The doctrine of res
judicata prevents re-litigation of claims.
Fiscal Court of
Jefferson Co. v. Ogden, Ky. App. 556 S.W.2d 899, 902 (1977).
Similarly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues previously determined.
City of Louisville
v. Professional Firefighters Association, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 804,
807 (1991).
The purpose for the application of these doctrines
is to ensure finality in litigation arising from zoning changes,
and to protect the public against repeated and harassing rezoning
applications.
Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Ogden, 556
S.W.2d at 902.
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The trial court stated that Jelka James’ second
application was “virtually identical” to its first application.
The trial court based this statement on the fact that the primary
difference between the two applications was that the first
application included property from twelve acres of an adjoining
farm. The problem with the trial court’s application of res
judicata is that it overlooks the nature of preliminary
subdivision plat applications.
Res judicata is most frequently applied in zoning
matters to applications for a map amendment.
In considering a
map amendment, the planning commission exercises a discretionary
function.
An application for a map amendment seeks to change the
zoning classification for the subject property.
To grant a map
amendment, the planning commission must hold a public hearing and
make findings of fact and conclusions of law that: (1) the
existing zoning classification is inappropriate and the proposed
zoning classification is appropriate; and (2) there have been
major changes of an economic, physical, or social nature within
the area which were not anticipated in the adopted comprehensive
plan and which have substantially altered the basic character of
the area.
KRS 100.211, 100.213.
Furthermore, the planning
commission’s recommendation on the map amendment is subject to
adoption or rejection by the local legislative body.
KRS
100.211(1). If the Planning Commission denied the application
previously, the doctrine of res judicata requires the applicant
to show that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred
from the time of the previous action.
-19-
Ogden, 556 S.W.2d at 903.
By contrast, approval of a preliminary subdivision plat
is a ministerial act.
(1975).
Snyder v. Owensboro, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 663
A subdivision plat generally does not contemplate a
zoning change, but merely a change of use within the permitted
zoning classification.
The planning commission’s role in
approval of a subdivision plat is to determine whether the
application complies with the applicable zoning regulations.
See also KRS 100.277.
Id.
A planning commission’s disapproval of a
subdivision plat is a finding that the applicant’s plat does not
comply with the zoning regulations.
Thus, the statutes
contemplate that the applicant will submit a new plat application
to correct the deficiencies.
The planning commission can then
review the new application to determine whether the amended plat
complies with the zoning regulations.
See also Henry Fischer
Builder, Inc. v. Magee, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 303 (1997).
Since the planning commission’s disapproval of a plat
relates only to the application’s compliance with the specific
provisions of the zoning regulations, res judicata should only
apply if the applicant attempts to submit an identical
application, or if a new application contains defects which were
the basis for the planning commission’s prior rejection of the
plat.
Turning to the facts of this case, the Planning Commission
gave a number of reasons for denying Jelka James’ first
application for a subdivision plat following the public hearing
on September 8, 1992.
The Planning Commission stated that the
proposed subdivision of Lot 20 failed to preserve the existence
of community assets and natural features, and that it did not
-20-
conform to the restrictive covenants and policies of the Delaney
Woods properties.
The Planning Commission also expressed
concerns about the inclusion of the adjoining property, the
adequacy of fire protection and the area was premature for
development.
In considering the second application, the Planning
Commission concluded that the reduction in area from 43.7 acres
to 31.7 acres was sufficient to constitute a change of
circumstances warranting consideration of the second application.
Thus, the second application was not identical to the first.
However, it is unclear whether the second application included
deficiencies upon which the Planning Commission based its denial
of the first application.
Given these circumstances, we find
that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel should
not apply to the Planning Commission’s consideration of Jelka
James’ second application.
Rather, the reasons given by the
Planning Commission when it denied the first application must be
addressed in determining the sufficiency of the Planning
Commission’s approval of the second application.
Jelka James and the Planning Commission argue that the
trial court erred in concluding that the Planning Commission
acted arbitrarily and unreasonably by granting approval of the
application.
Judicial review of the Planning Commission’s
decisions is concerned with the question of arbitrariness.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County
Planning and Zoning Commission, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450 (1964).
The
court is not empowered to undertake a de novo review of the
Planning Commission's actions, but may only determine whether the
-21-
commission acted in excess of its statutorily-granted powers,
whether procedural due process was afforded, and whether there
was substantial evidence in the record to support the
commission's findings and recommendations.
Id. at 456.
If any
one of these three elements is not met, the Planning Commission
acted arbitrarily.
Minton v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County,
Ky. App., 850 S.W.2d 52, 55 (1992).
The ministerial nature of approval of a preliminary
plat presents difficulties in an appellate review.
The process
appears to include both discretionary and ministerial functions.
The essence of a discretionary power is that the person or
persons exercising it may choose which of several courses will be
followed.
(1997).
Franklin County v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195, 201
In contrast, ministerial acts have been defined as those
related to the execution or implementation of policy.
Frankfort v. Byrns, Ky.
City of
App., 817 S.W.2d 462, 465 (1991).
However, an act is not necessarily taken out of the class styled
ministerial because the officer performing it is vested with a
discretion respecting the means or method to be employed.
Upchurch v. Clinton County, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1959).
As a result, the trial court was correct in holding
that the Planning Commission is acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity when it holds a hearing and makes findings of fact.
Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Commission v.
Ogden, 307 Ky. 362, 210 S.W.2d 771, 773 (1948).
So long as the
agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence of
probative value, it is not arbitrary and must be accepted as
binding by the appellate court.
Starks v. Kentucky Health
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Facilities, Ky. App., 684 S.W.2d 5 (1984).
Substantial evidence
is defined as evidence of substance and relevant consequence,
having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable persons.
O'Nan v. Ecklar Moore Express, Inc., Ky.,
339 S.W.2d 466 (1960).
In its role as a finder of fact, an
administrative agency is afforded great latitude in its
evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility of
witnesses, including its findings and conclusions of fact.
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298,
309 (1972).
At the same time, the trial court was also correct in
holding that the decision-making process in approving a
subdivision plat is ministerial, not discretionary.
The Planning
Commission’s decision to grant or deny a plat application may not
be based upon subjective considerations, but only upon whether
the application complies with the specific terms of the zoning
and subdivision regulations.
664.
Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d at
See also Wolf Pen Preservation Association, Inc. v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Planning Commission, Ky.
S.W.2d 310, 312 (1997).
App., 942
Thus, the trial court’s statement that
the Planning Commission has some discretion when considering the
evidence, statutes and zoning regulations is correct as it
relates to the Planning Commission’s findings of fact.
However,
the Planning Commission’s decision to approve the preliminary
plat must be based upon objective criteria from the applicable
statutes and regulations.5
5
Both the trial court and this Court
The trial court and the Planning Commission cite Green v.
(continued...)
-23-
are authorized to review issues of law on a de novo basis.
Mill
Street Church of Christ v. Hogan, Ky. App., 785 S.W.2d 263, 266
(1990).
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
Planning Commission stated that Jelka James’ plat complies with
all requirements of the subdivision regulations “as waived in
part at the request of the applicant.”
The decision further
states that while the water availability and sewage certificates
are not in compliance, approval of the plat would be made
conditional upon submission of corrected certificates.6
The
trial court found that the Planning Commission’s approval of
Jelka James’ second application was not supported by substantial
evidence, in that the evidence showed that the plat violated
several of the subdivision regulations.
We agree with the trial
court’s conclusion, although on somewhat different grounds.
5
(...continued)
Bourbon County Joint Planning Commission, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 626,
629 (1982) and Sladen v. Shawk, Ky. App., 815 S.W.2d 404 (1991)
for the proposition that a planning commission has some
discretion interpreting the statutes and zoning regulations.
However, the issue before the courts in each of these cases was
not whether the planning commission could exercise discretion in
considering subdivision plats. Rather, the issue presented in
these cases was whether the subdivision regulations were contrary
to the statutes.
6
A previous panel of this court found that this matter is
ripe for adjudication because the Planning Commission’s was not a
conditional approval. However, the final paragraph of the
Planning Commission’s Decision of December 8, 1992 states that
the approval of the plat is “contingent upon Jelka James Realty
Company correcting the water and sewage certificates on the
preliminary plat.” Nonetheless, an approval, conditional
approval or denial of a preliminary plat application is a final
action for purposes of KRS 100.347. Thus, whether the Planning
Commission’s approval was conditional is not controlling for
purposes of finality.
-24-
The trial court stated that Section 4.103 of the
subdivision regulations allows the Planning Commission to
exercise discretion in determining whether to approve a
preliminary subdivision plat based on “prematurity for
development.”7
To the extent that the regulation allows the
Planning Commission to grant or deny a plat application based
upon general considerations of “danger or injury to the public
health, safety, welfare or prosperity,” we find that it is an
improper delegation of discretionary authority.
Snyder at 665.
However, to the extent that Section 4.103 merely requires an
applicant to establish that the proposed development includes
adequate public services and infrastructure, the regulation sets
out reasonably specific standards within the scope of the
Planning Commission’s ministerial review.
The Homeowners’ Association argued, and the trial court
agreed, that Jelka James’ application violates Section 4.103
7
In its entirety, Section 4.103 provides as follows:
Areas Premature for Development
The Planning Commission may refuse to
approve what it considers to be scattered or
premature subdivision of land which would
involve danger or injury to the public
health, safety, welfare, or prosperity by
reason of lack of adequate water supply or
sewage treatment capacity, schools, fire or
police protection, proper drainage, good
roads and adequate transportation facilities
or other public services; or which would
necessitate an excessive expenditure of
public funds for the supply of such services
such as undue maintenance costs for adequate
roads.
If the Commission disapproves a plat due
to the prematurity, the applicant may present
to the Commission an analysis of the
community facilities or services, as required
in Section 5.1(c) of the Zoning Ordinance.
-25-
because the water and sewage certificates were not in compliance.
In addition, the Planning Commission found that the water and
sewage certificates were not in compliance with Sections 5.302
and 5.303.
As noted above, the Planning Commission conditioned
its approval of the preliminary plat upon Jelka James submitting
corrected certificates.
Since Jelka James will be required to
certify the availability of water and sewage treatment prior to
approval of the final plat, the Planning Commission was
authorized to conditionally approve the plat on this ground.
However, the trial court also found that the plat
violated Section 4.103 because there was no evidence addressing
the availability of fire protection services to the proposed
development.
The Planning Commission raised this concern during
its consideration of Jelka James’ first preliminary plat.
The
Planning Commission heard no evidence that this deficiency had
been remedied since the time of its denial of the first
preliminary plat application.
Consequently, the trial court
correctly held that the preliminary plat violates Section 4.103.
The Homeowners’ Association further asserts that Jelka
James’ application violates Section 4.104, regarding the effect
of loss of natural features on value of adjacent properties. The
trial court agreed, although it did not state how the plat
violated these regulations.
The Planning Commission cited to
this issue in denying Jelka James’ first preliminary plat.
However, the transcript of the November 10, 1992 meeting of the
Planning Commission shows that this issue was considered.
Although the evidence was conflicting, we find that there was
-26-
substantial evidence supporting the Planning Commission’s
decision on this issue.
Nonetheless, we agree with the trial court that the
plat violates Section 4.205, which sets requirements for the
length and placement of dead-end streets.
The proposed new road
violates Section 4.205 because it ends closer than 100 feet from
the boundary line of Lot 20.
line.)
(It terminates at the boundary
The Planning Commission made no finding that this
regulation was not applicable.
Furthermore, the road appears to
violate the scheme of development set out in the original 1979
subdivision plat.
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that
the plat did not comply with Section 4.205.
The Homeowners’ Association next complains that the
Planning Commission waived several subdivision regulations at the
request of Jelka James.
The Planning Commission appears to use
the term “waiver” and “variance” interchangeably.
However, the
granting of a variance requires specific findings under KRS
100.243. The Planning Commission may conditionally approve a
subdivision plat, subject to the applicant’s obtaining a variance
from certain zoning regulations.
Furthermore, the Planning
Commission is authorized to consider an application for variances
at the same time as an application for preliminary plat approval.
KRS 100.281(6)&(7).
There may be specific circumstances under which a
planning commission is authorized to waive provisions of the
subdivision regulations without treating it as an application for
-27-
a variance.8
The record indicates that the subdivision
regulations for Jessamine County and the city of Wilmore contain
provisions which were intended to be applied only to urban areas.
The Planning Commission’s staff report notes that the waivers
requested by Jelka James “seem to be ‘in-line’ with keeping the
subdivision ‘rural’ in nature and appear to have been granted for
the developed portions of Delaney Woods.”
Yet given the ministerial nature of the plat approval
process, we have concerns about the Planning Commission’s use of
the waiver process.
The Planning Commission is not authorized to
choose which regulations it will enforce.
Nonetheless, we
recognize that the waiver process is authorized by the
subdivision regulations.
Moreover, we have not been referred to
any specific regulations which the waivers would violate.
Consequently, we find that the waivers granted by the Planning
Commission in this case do not invalidate its approval of the
preliminary plat.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly found
that Jelka James’ preliminary plat did not comply with the
subdivision regulations.
Furthermore, the resolution of the deed
restriction issues in the declaratory judgment action may render
the plat application process moot.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Jessamine Circuit
Court in Action No. 1992-CI-00410 is affirmed in part, reversed
in part and remanded for further findings of fact and conclusions
8
For example: As noted above, subdivision regulation 4.205
sets certain length requirements for dead-end streets. However,
the planning commission may waive the length requirement “where
geographical or physical features make the limit not feasible.”
-28-
of law consistent with this opinion.
The judgment of the
Jessamine Circuit Court in Appeal No. 1992-CI-00471 is affirmed
in result.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/ APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS JELKA S. JAMES,
ET AL.:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES/ APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES
DELANEY WOODS HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATION, ET AL.:
William Miles Arvin
Nicholasville, Kentucky
W. Henry Graddy, IV
W.H. Graddy & Associates
Midway, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
JESSAMINE COUNTY -CITY OF
WILMORE JOINT PLANNING
COMMISSION, ET AL.:
Bruce E. Smith
Moynahan, Irvin & Smith, PSC
Nicholasville, Kentucky
-29-
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