EH CONSTRUCTION, LLC v. DELOR DESIGN GROUP, INC.; PRESNELL CONSTRUCTION MANAGERS, INC.; KENNETH D. AND DEBRA K.D. DELOR; CREEL BROWN PAINTING CONTRACTORS, INC.; and RUDD DRYWALL COMPANY, INC.
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RENDERED: MARCH 31, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001476-MR
EH CONSTRUCTION, LLC
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00937
DELOR DESIGN GROUP, INC.;
PRESNELL CONSTRUCTION
MANAGERS, INC.;
KENNETH D. AND DEBRA K.D. DELOR;
CREEL BROWN PAINTING
CONTRACTORS, INC.; and
RUDD DRYWALL COMPANY, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, and KNOPF, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
EH Construction, LLC (“EH”) appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing its complaint for
damages against Presnell Construction Managers, Inc.
(“Presnell”), for breach of contract and negligence.
The main
issue involves whether Kentucky courts will adopt the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) (“Restatement”), and allow
negligence claims by contractors against construction managers.
We hold that a contractor may make a claim in tort against a
construction manager based upon negligent misrepresentation,
despite a lack of privity of contract.
Therefore, we reverse and
remand to the trial court.
In May 1996, the Delor Design Group, Inc. (“Delor”),
began a project renovating a commercial building in Louisville,
Kentucky, to be used as its offices.
It engaged an architect and
completed the demolition at the site.
Thereafter, Delor hired
Presnell as a construction manager to oversee the project.
In
January 1997, EH’s proposal for the general trades bid package
was accepted by Delor, and EH became a contractor for the
project.
Work on the project proceeded with great difficulty.
There were numerous disputes relating to the timing and quality
of the work and to the payment of outstanding invoices.
These
conflicts culminated with EH’s filing a mechanics and
materialmen’s lien on the property in the amount of $268,218 for
materials and labor furnished to Delor.
In February 1998, EH filed suit in the Jefferson
Circuit Court against Delor, Presnell, and other lienholders,
seeking satisfaction of its lien and seeking damages from
Presnell.
EH’s complaint, as it related to Presnell, asserted
claims based on theories of breach of contract and negligence.
EH’s theory of recovery was that Presnell negligently supplied
information to it, that it relied on those misrepresentations in
the performance of its contracted service, and that it thereby
incurred damages.
EH also alleged that Presnell was negligent in
its coordination and supervision of the contractors.
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EH claimed
that it was required to restore much of the work it had already
completed due to changes and improper scheduling by Presnell
which led other contractors and subcontractors to destroy work
that EH had already finished.
Presnell filed a motion to dismiss EH’s complaint
against it, arguing that the claim for breach of contract was
barred for lack of privity and that the claim for negligence was
barred for lack of any duty owed to EH.
The trial court entered
an order granting Presnell’s motion to dismiss.
The order stated
that the breach of contract claim was dismissed due to lack of
privity because there was no contractual relationship between EH
and Presnell.
As for EH’s negligence claim, the court stated
that “Presnell’s duties and responsibilities under its contract
were to Delor.
It had no duty to EH Construction.
No legal
liability can arise, since no duty existed between Presnell and
EH Construction.
against Delor.”
Relief, if any, for EH Construction would be
This appeal by EH followed.
EH does not contest
the ruling of the trial court dismissing EH’s breach of contract
claim against Presnell.
Its sole argument on appeal is that the
trial court erred by dismissing its negligence claim.
As we have noted, the trial court dismissed EH’s
negligence claim against Presnell on the ground that all of
Presnell’s duties were under its contract to Delor and that
Presnell had no duty to EH.
EH argues that there does not have
to be privity between EH and Presnell in order for a duty to
arise.
It urges this court to adopt § 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which imposes liability for those who, in the
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course of business, negligently gather and distribute information
intended for reliance by others.
Section 552, entitled “Information Negligently Supplied
for the Guidance of Others,” states as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his
business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their
justifiable reliance upon the information, if
he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3),
the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited
group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information
or knows that the recipient intends to supply
it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a
transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so
intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a
public duty to give the information extends
to loss suffered by any of the class of
persons for whose benefit the duty is
created, in any of the transactions in which
it is intended to protect them.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).
According to
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn.
1991), a majority of jurisdictions have adopted § 552.
594.
Id. at
See Bronster v. United States Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294
(Haw. 1996) (extensive discussion of § 552); John Martin Co. v.
Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991) (specifically
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adopting § 552 in a construction manager case); Ritter v. Custom
Chemicides, Inc., 912 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. 1995) (expanding § 552 to
apply to nonprofessionals who negligently supply false
information); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822
S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991) (adopting § 552 regarding accountant
liability); Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1997)
(recognizing § 552 but declining to extend its application to
casual advice given by an attorney to a non-client); McCamish,
Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d
787 (Tex. 1999) (specifically adopting § 552 for negligent
misrepresentation of an attorney); Safeway Managing Gen. Agency,
Inc. v. Clark & Gamble, 985 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)
(recognizing attorney liability under § 552); James V. Facciolla,
JVF, Inc. v. Linbeck Constr. Corp., 968 S.W.2d 435 (Tex Ct. App.
1998) (citing § 552 as supporting the tort of negligent
misrepresentation, but declining to extend to the facts of that
case); Marcus Bros. Textiles, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, LLP,
513 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 1999) (specifically adopting § 552 as
imposing liability on accountants); Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555
(Pa. 1999) (recognizing § 552 as a viable means for imposing
liability, but choosing not to do so based on the facts of the
particular case); G.A.W., III v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing the tort of negligent
misrepresentation and citing § 552 as reference); Guardian
Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1990) (adopting § 552 for suit by subcontractor
against design engineer between whom there was no privity of
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contract); Detweiler Bros. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp. 416
(E.D. Wash. 1976) (acknowledging the viability of tort for
negligent misrepresentation under Washington law, but remanding
for resolution of genuine issues of material fact); Davidson &
Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 255 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979) (specifically adopting § 552 in construction case);
Berkel & Co. Contractors v. Providence Hosp., 454 So.2d 496 (Ala.
1984) (privity of contract not required for negligence suit by
subcontractor against the architect); Gutler, Hebert & Co. v.
Weyland Mach. Shop, Inc., 405 So.2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1981) (subcontractor had viable cause of action against architect
without privity of contract); Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. OrrSchelen-Mayeron & Ass’n., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(no privity of contract required for negligence suit by
subcontractor against engineering firm); National Sand, Inc. v.
Nagel Const., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
(contractor can maintain negligence action against engineer
absent privity of contract); Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739
(Wyo. 1999) (stating that § 552 dispenses with privity
requirement in negligent misrepresentation cases).
Although
this court has cited § 552 with favor, Seigle v. Jasper, Ky.
App., 867 S.W.2d 476, 482 (1993), this is an issue of first
impression in Kentucky.
Kentucky courts have recognized that privity is not a
prerequisite for tort actions.
Tabler v. Wallace, Ky., 704
S.W.2d 179, 186 (1985) (recognizing the error in requiring
privity of contract as a prerequisite for tort liability); Hill
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v. Willmott, Ky. App., 561 S.W.2d 331, 334 (1978) (addressing
attorney liability to parties who lack privity); Seigle, 867
S.W.2d at 483 (citing Hill for the proposition that an attorney
may be held liable to a third party who lacks privity with the
attorney); Sparks v. Craft, 75 F.3d 257, 261 (6th Cir. 1996)
(addressing attorney liability to parties who lack privity under
Kentucky law).
Further, as we have stated, this court has
previously cited § 552 with favor.
Seigle, 867 S.W.2d at 482.
Moreover, when the court in Ingram Industries v. Nowicki, 527
F.Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981), was obligated to predict what the
Kentucky Supreme Court would decide if it were confronted with
the issue of whether a third party plaintiff not in privity of
contract could recover against an accountant for negligence
causing loss, it held that Kentucky would adopt the standards in
§ 552.
Id. at 684.
In support of its argument that Kentucky should adopt
§ 552 of the Restatement, EH cites Morse/Diesel, 819 S.W.2d 428,
a case where the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed this same
issue as one of first impression in that state.
Morse/Diesel is
similar to this case in that in Morse/Diesel a subcontractor made
a claim against a construction manager for damages caused by
negligent misrepresentations.
Id. at 430.
In Morse/Diesel,
Provident Insurance Company hired Morse/Diesel as a contract
manager to act on its behalf to employ subcontractors, to
coordinate their schedules, and to supervise their work.
429.
Id. at
Provident then employed the John Martin corporation to
provide concrete and rough carpentry for the superstructure.
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Id.
at 430.
Morse/Diesel was not a party to the contract between
Provident and John Martin, but Morse/Diesel was to supervise the
work.
Id.
In the course of the construction of the building,
difficulties arose over the amount of concrete necessary for John
Martin to complete its work.
Id.
John Martin then filed suit
against Morse/Diesel, alleging negligent misrepresentation upon
which it relied and which caused it to be damaged.
Id.
The
court held that the applicable law in Tennessee, absent privity,
was found in § 552 of the Restatement.
Id. at 431.
It also held
that
[b]ecause this Court has previously dispensed
with privity as a prerequisite for actions in
tort based upon negligent misrepresentation
against title examiners, surveyors, and
attorneys, the rule must extend to other
professions whose business is to supply
technical information for the guidance of
others.
. . . . The Restatement makes no
distinction based upon the nature of the
profession. Neither do we.
Id. at 433-34.
In line with the inclination of Kentucky courts to
dispense with the requirement of privity as a prerequisite for
actions in tort in other cases, we follow the approach taken by
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Morse/Diesel and adopt § 552 of
the Restatement.
In so doing, we hold that the trial court erred
in determining that EH, a contractor, could not maintain an
action for negligent misrepresentations and supervision against
Presnell, the construction manager, with whom EH had no privity
of contract.
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Presnell contends that it does not oppose the adoption
of § 552 of the Restatement, and it even concedes that the
section might apply to a construction manager under other
circumstances.
It argues, however, that it had no duty under
these facts to provide information to EH.
The contract between
Presnell and Delor provided, however, that Presnell
shall provide administrative, management and
related services to coordinate scheduled
activities and responsibilities of the
Contractors with each other and with those of
the Construction Manager, the Owner and the
Architect to endeavor to manage the Project
in accordance with the latest approved
estimate of Construction Cost, the Project
Schedule and the Contract Documents.
. . . .
[S]hall coordinate the sequence of
construction and assignment of space in areas
where the Contractors are performing Work.
. . . .
Shall schedule and coordinate the sequence of
construction in accordance with the Contract
Documents and the latest approved Project
construction schedule.
These contract provisions establish that Presnell was to be in
charge of coordinating the sequence of construction.
Although
these contract provisions are indicative of the type of duty
owed, Presnell’s duty to EH does not rest on these contractual
duties to Delor.
Likewise, it does not rest on any professional
duty, but it is “based on an independent duty to avoid
misstatements intended to induce reliance.”
Safeway Managing
General Agency, Inc. v. Clark & Gamble, 985 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1998).
Under § 552 of the Restatement, Presnell had a
duty to EH to exercise reasonable care or competence in its
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supervision, collection, and distribution of information and
directions that it provided to EH for guidance.
Although
Presnell argues that its duties were strictly those set forth in
its contract with Delor and that no duty was owed to EH, we
conclude that it had additional, independent duties pursuant to §
552.
Presnell further argues that Penco, Inc. v. Detrex
Chemical Indus., Ky. App., 672 S.W.2d 948 (1984), is authority
for its position.
In Penco, a contractor sued a party who
allegedly made negligent misrepresentations to the contractor’s
subcontractor.
Id at 950.
The facts in Penco are not the same
as the facts in this case because in Penco, the contractor and
the party advising the subcontractor had no relationship.
951.
Id. at
In this case, however, EH and Presnell had a relationship
whereby Presnell was giving information and supervision directly
to EH for EH’s reliance.
The result in Penco may or may not have
been different had Kentucky adopted § 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts at that time.
In order to prevail on its claim against Presnell for
negligent misrepresentation, EH must prove that (1) Presnell was
acting in the course of its business, profession, or employment,
or in a transaction in which it had a pecuniary (as opposed to
gratuitous) interest; (2) Presnell supplied faulty information
intended to guide others in their business transactions; (3)
Presnell failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or
communicating the information; and (4) EH justifiably relied upon
the information and thereby incurred pecuniary loss.
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See
Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tenn. 1997); Morse/Diesel,
819 S.W.2d at 431; Federal Land Bank Ass’n. v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d
439, 442 (Tex. 1991); American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951
S.W.2d 420, 436 (Tex. 1997).
or more of these elements.
There are fact issues regarding one
“A claim for negligent misrepresen-
tation is ordinarily one for a jury, unless the undisputed facts
are so clear as to permit only one conclusion.”
Golber v.
Baybank Valley Trust Co., 704 N.E.2d 1191, 1192 (Mass. App. Ct.
1999).
Since there are genuine issues of material fact to be
resolved, summary judgment is not appropriate.
Kentucky Rule of
Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03; Dossett v. New York Mining & Mfg.
Co., Ky., 451 S.W.2d 843, 845 (1970).
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed,
and this matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE OPINION.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Stephen E. Smith
Michael F. Lawrence
Louisville, KY
Walter J. Swyers, Jr.
Louisville, KY
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