WENDELL T. WEBB v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001398-MR
WENDELL T. WEBB
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000272
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Wendell T. Webb has appealed from the judgment
of conviction entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on May 29,
1998, that convicted him of trafficking in a controlled substance
in the first degree1 (cocaine), possession of marijuana2 and
possession of drug paraphernalia.3
Having concluded that the
trial court did not err in denying Webb’s motion to suppress
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412.
2
KRS 218A.1422.
3
KRS 218A.500.
evidence and in allowing the Commonwealth to play the tape
recorded statement of a witness, we affirm.
On February 19, 1997, a Fayette Circuit Court Grand
Jury indicted Harris for (1) trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree (cocaine); (2) trafficking in
marijuana under eight ounces;4 (3) possession of marijuana; and
(4) possession of drug paraphernalia.
These charges arose out of
an incident that occurred shortly before midnight on December 2,
1996.
Officer Jeff Jacobs of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Police Department went to an apartment complex in response to a
dispatch call regarding a noise complaint.
As Officer Jacobs
approached the third floor apartment of Victoria Johnson, he
heard a television and people laughing and talking loudly and
smelled the odor of marijuana.
Since the officer believed his
knocking on the door might result in the apartment’s occupants
destroying evidence of drugs, he waited outside the apartment.
When the officer heard the elevator opening, he hid behind a wall
and watched Victoria Johnson approach the apartment and enter.
Officer Jacobs walked behind Johnson as she entered the apartment
so he could look inside.
In plain view, Officer Jacobs saw Webb,
Jermain Harris and Norlisha Johnson5 sitting on a sofa and
smoking marijuana.
a coffee table.
He also noticed a bag of marijuana sitting on
Having observed Webb, Harris and Norlisha
Johnson in the process of committing a crime, Officer Jacobs
4
KRS 218A.1421(2).
5
Norlisha Johnson and Victoria Johnson are sisters.
-2-
entered the apartment, called for assistance and arrested Webb,
Harris and Norlisha Johnson.
When Webb was searched, Officer Jacobs found $1,388 in
cash in Webb’s front right pants pocket and Webb admitted to a
second officer that he had 4.7 grams of marijuana in his right
sock.
Officer Jacobs also noticed that Webb had been sitting on
the couch on a green jacket.
As Officer Jacobs prepared to take
Webb to jail, he retrieved the green jacket for Webb to wear
since it was approximately 30 degrees outside.
Before giving the
jacket to Webb, the jacket was searched and Officer Jacobs found
51.5 grams of crack cocaine.
Webb told Officer Jacobs that the
jacket did not belong to him.
Webb was tried jointly with Harris before a jury on
April 27, 1998.
Webb was convicted of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine), possession of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, but acquitted of
trafficking in marijuana.
Instead of allowing the jury to set
the penalty, Webb accepted the Commonwealth’s offer of a fiveyear prison sentence, which the trial court imposed on May 29,
1998.
This appeal followed.
We will first address Webb’s claim that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.
Webb claims
that the trial court erred in ruling that it was proper: (1)
under the “plain view” exception, for the police officer to enter
the apartment without a warrant and to seize the bag of marijuana
sitting on the coffee table; and (2) on the basis that the search
was either incident to an arrest or consensual, for the police
-3-
officer to search the green jacket without a warrant and to seize
the cocaine from the jacket.
Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress is limited to determining whether the trial court’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.6
Thus,
the burden is on Webb to demonstrate that the trial court’s
ruling was clearly erroneous.7
In Hazel v. Commonwealth,8 our Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Spain, succinctly stated the elements
that must exist for the “plain view” warrantless search exception
to apply.
The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Section Ten of the
Kentucky Constitution provide safeguards
against an unwarranted and unreasonable
search and seizure by the state. Through the
years, however, the courts have allowed
several exceptions for seizures without
warrants--one of these being evidence found
within “plain view.” Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2002, 29
L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
Several elements must exist for this
exception to be allowed. First, the law
enforcement officer must not have violated
the Fourteenth Amendment in arriving at the
place where the evidence could be plainly
viewed. Second, “not only must the officer
be lawfully located in a place from which the
object can be plainly seen, but he or she
must have a lawful right of access to the
object itself.” Finally, the object’s
“incriminating character must also be
‘immediately apparent.’” Id., at 2038; Cf.
6
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78.
7
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 665, 668 (1985).
8
Ky., 833 S.W.2d 831, 833 (1992).
-4-
Com. v. Johnson, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 876, 879
(1989).
In his brief, Webb argues that the trial court erred in
finding that the required elements for a valid “plain view”
search existed:
Under the facts as stated by Officer
Jacobs at the hearing, the case at bar does
not present a situation for a valid plain
view seizure. The officer by his actions
basically created his own plain view
opportunity. This was not a situation where
an officer was lawfully where he was supposed
to be and incidentally observes illegal
contraband. Officer Jacobs, though
legitimately present on the scene to
investigate a noise complaint, did not knock
on the apartment door to investigate.
Rather, he waited several minutes and then
went around a corner when he heard the sound
of an elevator. He then emerged behind the
back of the female subject who was going to
enter the apartment. Jacobs said she appeared
startled [citation to the record omitted].
After claiming to see marijuana on the table,
Jacobs then entered the apartment itself.
Certainly, occupants of an apartment
have an expectation of privacy and should not
expect police officers to be secretly lurking
about their doors waiting for someone to
enter so the officers can peek inside.
Webb apparently contends that even though Officer
Jacobs was “legitimately present on the scene to investigate a
noise complaint,” that Webb had “an expectation of privacy and
should not expect police officers to be secretly lurking about
[the] door[] waiting for someone to enter so the officers can
peek inside.”
While Webb cites no authority to support his
argument, he is partially correct when he states “occupants of an
apartment have an expectation of privacy.”
-5-
In its brief, the Commonwealth identifies the real
issue and provides the correct statement of the law as set forth
in the often-cited case of Katz v. United States.9
Because of the misleading way the issues
have been formulated, the parties have
attached great significance to the
characterization of the telephone booth from
which the petitioner placed his calls. The
petitioner has strenuously argued that the
booth was a “constitutionally protected
area.” The Government has maintained with
equal vigor that it was not [footnote
omitted]. But this effort to decide whether
or not a given “area,” viewed in the
abstract, is “constitutionally protected”
deflects attention from the problem presented
by this case [footnote omitted]. For the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection
[citations omitted]. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected [citations
omitted].
Thus, the issue is whether Webb, Harris and Norlisha
Johnson knowingly exposed to public view their smoking of
marijuana and the bag of marijuana that was sitting on the coffee
table.
Since the trial court found that the contraband was in
plain view, it obviously concluded that Webb, Harris and Norlisha
Johnson knowingly exposed the contraband to public view.
In
light of the fact that Webb, Harris and Norlisha Johnson were
sitting in the front room of the apartment near the door with the
knowledge that Victoria Johnson was not home but obviously
possessed a key and might be returning to her apartment, the
9
389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 581-82
(1967).
-6-
trial court’s finding that Webb, Harris and Norlisha Johnson had
knowingly exposed the contraband to public view was supported by
substantial evidence.
While it was Officer Jacobs who happened
to be standing behind Victoria Johnson as she unlocked her
apartment door, it could just as well have been a neighbor or
another visitor to the apartment complex, so the occupants’
expectation of privacy was limited by what was within “plain
view” from the hallway.10
We affirm the trial court’s findings
that under the “plain view” exception the seizure of the bag of
marijuana was constitutional.
Webb also argues that the trial court erred in refusing
to suppress as evidence the 51.5 grams of crack cocaine found in
the green jacket.
Officer Jacobs testified that Webb told the
police that the green jacket was not his.
Byron Smith, who had
been in the car with Webb and Harris that night, testified that
Webb was wearing a brown coat that night and that Webb and Harris
10
See also United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th
Cir. 1993) (“The plain view seizure of the meth pipe was proper.
Since Nohara did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the hallway outside his apartment, Agent Aiu did not conduct a
Fourth Amendment search when he peeked around the corner of the
hallway as Nohara opened the door.”); United States v.
Conception, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]enant has no
reasonable exception of privacy in the common areas of an
apartment building.”); United States v. Peters, 912 F.2d 208,
210 (8th Cir. 1990)(“When an individual voluntarily opens the
door of his or her place of residence in response to a simple
knock, the individual is knowingly exposing to the public
anything that can be seen through that open door and thus is not
afforded fourth amendment protection.”); United States v.
Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14 (2nd Cir. 1989)(“Here the police
entry was into a hallway, an area where there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy.”); and United States v. Wright, 641 F.2d
602, 604 (8th Cir. 1981) (“The fact is that the undercover
officers, by standing at the opened door of appellant’s motel
unit, like any member of the public, could see inside and observe
various items in ‘plain view’.”).
-7-
both left their coats in the car.11
Harris also testified that
Webb had on a brown coat that night and that all their coats were
left in the car and not taken into the apartment.
Webb did not
testify or call any witnesses.
In his brief, Webb states:
Finally, the search of the jackets,
which contained the cocaine and marijuana
that resulted in the placing of charges of
trafficking, was not justified as a search
incident to arrest. The testimony was that
Webb, Harris, and Norlisha Johnson were
arrested for possession of marijuana. Jacobs
called for backup. When Florence arrived,
Webb and Harris were secure and away from the
jackets that they were alleged to be sitting
on. They were not in a position to get to
them. The jackets were not in the area of
control of the person being arrested. Even
assuming the entry and arrests were lawful
under the plain view exception, a warrant
should have been obtained for a search of the
jackets.
The trial court disagreed with this
defense assertion because the officer claimed
Victoria Johnson gave consent to a search of
the premises and because Webb and Harris
denied ownership of the jackets [citation to
the record omitted]. But Victoria Johnson
never testified at the hearing or at trial
and the evidence of any consent to search is
hearsay and should not have been relied on.
Webb is incorrect when he states that “[t]he trial
court disagreed with [his claim that]” “[t]he jackets were not in
the area of control of the person being arrested” “because the
11
We note that Webb’s brief failed to comply with Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure 76.12(4)(c)(iii) by failing to make
“ample references to the specific . . . digital counter number in
the case of untranscribed tape-recordings, supporting each of the
statements narrated in the summary.” For example, in referring
to Smith’s testimony about Webb’s jacket the brief refers to
“Tape, 14:30:00 - 14:43:00.” The correct cite is 14:34:56 14:36:10.
-8-
officer claimed Victoria Johnson gave consent to a search of the
premises and because Webb and Harris denied ownership of the
jackets.”
Webb is confusing and incorrectly mixing three
separate grounds relied upon by the trial court to hold that the
search of the jackets was proper.
First, as the Commonwealth correctly points out, there
was a sufficient basis for the trial court to find that the
search of the jacket was incident to Webb’s arrest:
The facts of this case indicate that
appellant was subject to a lawful arrest, for
the offense of possession of marijuana;
because he committed it in the presence of an
officer. See KRS 431.005. Consequently,
Officer Jacobs was entitled to search the
area within appellant’s “immediate control.”
Chimel [ ]; Collins [ ]12. The jackets were
clearly within that area because appellant
could have easily accessed them at the time
he was arrested.
When police have made a lawful arrest, they may search
an arrestee and the area “within his immediate control,” which
means the “area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.”13
In United States v.
Robinson,14 the Court also held that a search of the area within
the arrestee’s immediate control is permissible regardless of
whether the circumstances of a particular case indicate that it
12
Chimel v. Commonwealth, 395 U.S. 752, 763 89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969); Collins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 574
S.W.2d 296 (1978).
13
Chimel, supra at 395 U.S. 763.
14
414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440
(1973).
-9-
is probable that either weapons or evidence would, in fact, be
found.15
Second, as the Commonwealth states, the trial court
also found that after Webb’s arrest Victoria Johnson gave the
police her consent to search her apartment, and the jackets would
have been searched as a part of the consensual search of the
apartment and the contraband would have been seized at that time.
Webb argues that the trial court’s finding of consent was not
supported by substantial evidence because Victoria Johnson’s
alleged oral consent for the police to search her apartment was
hearsay and not admissible at the suppression hearing.
This
argument is also without merit.
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 104(a) provides that
“[p]reliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court . . . [and] [i]n making
its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence . . .
.”
This Kentucky rule is the same as Federal Rules of Evidence
104(a), and the Unites States Supreme Court has held hearsay
testimony to be admissible evidence at a suppression hearing.
There is, therefore, much to be said for the
proposition that in proceedings where the
judge himself is considering the
admissibility of evidence, the exclusionary
rules, aside from rules of privilege, should
not be applicable; and the judge should
receive the evidence and give it such weight
as his judgment and experience counsel
[footnote omitted]. However that may be,
certainly there should be no automatic rule
15
See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61, 101
S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 774-75 (1981)(Arrestee separated from
a car before the search).
-10-
against the reception of hearsay evidence in
such proceedings. . . .16
Thus, the hearsay testimony was properly relied upon by the trial
court and constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that Victoria Johnson gave consent to the police
to search her apartment.
It follows that if the jackets had been
left in the apartment after Webb, Harris and Norlisha Johnson
were taken to jail, whether the jackets belonged to Webb and
Harris or not, they would have been searched when the apartment
was searched and the contraband would have been discovered at
that time.
As a third ground for denying the motion to suppress,
the trial court noted that on the one hand Webb and Harris were
denying possession of the jackets, and on the other hand, they
were asserting privacy rights in the same jackets they denied
possessing.
As an alternative ground for denying the motion, the
trial court opined that if they did not possess the jacket their
rights were not violated by the warrantless search.
This issue
has not been addressed by the parties in their briefs, and due to
our holding that the search was proper as incident to Webb’s
arrest, we will not address it any further.
Webb also contends that the trial court erred when it
allowed the Commonwealth to introduce as evidence and play for
the jury a tape recorded statement from Norlisha Johnson.
Norlisha was at her sister’s apartment with Webb and Harris and
was arrested by Officer Jacobs for possession of marijuana.
16
When
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175, 94 S.Ct. 988,
39 L.Ed.2d 242, 252 (1974).
-11-
she was called as a witness for the Commonwealth and asked about
the arrests, she testified that she did not “remember much of
that night” and that she had “mentally blocked it out.”
Prior to
testifying at the trial, the Commonwealth allowed Norlisha to
listen to a tape recorded statement that she had given to
Sergeant Weathers, but she testified that listening to the tape
did not help her remember much about that night.
The Commonwealth made numerous futile attempts to get
Norlisha to state that the jackets belonged to Webb and Harris.
The following is a representative excerpt from Norlisha’s
testimony.
Commonwealth-- Were [Webb] and [Harris]
wearing jackets on the way
over there?
Johnson--
I can’t remember
Commonwealth-- Do you remember telling
Detective Sergeant Weathers
that [Webb] had the green
jacket, [Harris] had the black
jacket?
Johnson--
I listened to that on the
tape.
Commonwealth-- Was that you saying that?
Johnson--
Yes.
Commonwealth-- You did tell Detective
Weathers, then, that [Webb]
had the green jacket,
[Harris] had the black jacket?
Johnson--
I think on the tape, from what
I heard this morning, it said
“I believe.” I wasn’t really
for sure who had on what.
-12-
Furthermore, during cross-examination Norlisha stated, “I don’t
remember.
Right now, I can’t say I remember either one of them
having on a jacket.”
At the conclusion of Norlisha Johnson’s testimony, the
Commonwealth moved the trial court through the testimony of
Sergeant Weathers to allow it to introduce as evidence and to
play for the jury Norlisha’s tape recorded statement.17
The
Commonwealth relied upon Wise v. Commonwealth,18 where the
appellant’s convictions for assault were based primarily upon the
tape recorded statements of two “obviously hostile witnesses.”
In affirming the convictions, this Court stated:
The sum of the testimony presented by [the
two witnesses] at trial was, “I don’t
remember.” The trial judge properly
permitted the prior statements by the
witnesses to be admitted as evidence.
The case of Jett v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
436 S.W.2d 788 (1969), and the many cases
subsequently citing Jett, supra, have
throughly settled this issue. For one thing,
the credibility of any witness, including
one’s own witness, may be impeached by
showing that the witness has made prior
inconsistent statements. This rule applies
in both criminal and civil proceedings. CR
43.07. Another point emphasized in Jett,
supra, and relevant to this case is that when
a witness has testified about some of the
facts in a case, the jury is entitled to know
what else the witness has said about this
17
Unfortunately, at the sidebar conference the attorneys and
the judge spoke in whispers such that it is extremely difficult
to hear the arguments and the ruling. We are sensitive to the
time constraints faced by a trial judge in moving a trial along;
however, in this case it is particularly perplexing as to why the
conference was not moved to chambers since the conference
occurred immediately before and immediately after the lunch
break.
18
Ky.App., 600 S.W.2d 470, 472 (1978).
-13-
case, so long as it is relevant to the merits
of the case as distinguished from mere
collateral issues. Probably, the most
important point established by Jett, supra,
is that any out-of-court statement made by a
witness which is material and relevant to the
issues in the case may be received as
substantive evidence through testimony of
another witness. The admission of the
additional testimony need not be limited to
impeachment purposes.
The Jett rule is not only wellestablished in Kentucky, but it appears to be
especially sound. No person should have the
power to obstruct the truth-finding process
of a trial and defeat a prosecution by
saying, “I don’t remember.” The trial judge
has a broad discretion in deciding whether or
not to permit the introduction of such
contradictory evidence, and in this case, we
do not find that he abused that discretion.
Abuse of discretion has been defined as “impl[ying]
arbitrary or capricious disposition under the circumstances, at
least an unreasonable and unfair decision.”19
Based upon
Norlisha Johnson’s evasive answers and the statements that she
did not “remember much of that night” and that she had “mentally
blocked it out,” we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that her previous tape recorded statement
was material and relevant to the merits of the case and could be
received as substantive evidence through the testimony of
Sergeant Weathers and the introduction of the cassette tape.20
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court
is affirmed.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
19
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (1994).
20
Muse v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 779 S.W.2d 229, 230 (1989).
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McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Herbert T. West
Lexington, KY
A.B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Carlton S. Shier, IV
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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