NICK A. COOLEY v. VIRGINIA ANN RIDDLE COOLEY VIRGINIA ANN RIDDLE COOLEY; LAWSON & LAWSON, P.S.C.; SUSAN C. LAWSON, ATTORNEY; LANDRUM & SHOUSE; STOLL, KEENON & PARK, L.L.P.; HISLE & COMPANY, CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS; JOE D. WEDDINGTON REAL ESTATE AND APPRAISAL CO.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 15, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001210-MR
NICK A. COOLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00202
v.
VIRGINIA ANN RIDDLE COOLEY
AND:
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-001211-MR
VIRGINIA ANN RIDDLE COOLEY;
LAWSON & LAWSON, P.S.C.;
SUSAN C. LAWSON, ATTORNEY;
LANDRUM & SHOUSE; STOLL, KEENON &
PARK, L.L.P.; HISLE & COMPANY,
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS;
JOE D. WEDDINGTON REAL ESTATE
AND APPRAISAL CO.
v.
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00202
NICK A. COOLEY
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART; REVERSING IN PART;
VACATING IN PART; AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by Nick Cooly and a cross-
appeal by Virginia Ann Cooley from a judgment of the Harlan
Circuit Court in a dissolution of marriage action.
The issues
raised relate primarily to the valuation of the marital estate
and the determination of marital and non-marital interests
therein.
Various other issues, however, are also raised.
As to
Nick’s appeal, we vacate and remand on the issues of Nick’s
nonmarital interest in Premium Elkhorn Coal Company, Inc. and
the valuation of Gossage Farm.
As to Ann’s appeal, we reverse
and remand on the issue of the trial court’s failure to award
interest on the unpaid balance of her share of the marital
property.
We affirm as to all other issues.
Nick A. Cooley (Nick) and Virginia Ann Riddle Cooley
(Ann) were married on August 18, 1979.
They have three children,
Stewart, born February 23, 1980; Lindsay, born January 28, 1981;
and Mitchell, born July 22, 1983.
Nick was a multi-millionaire
at the time the parties married, and the parties also accumulated
a multi-million dollar marital estate.
At the conclusion of the
trial proceedings, the marital estate was determined to be almost
$12,000,000.00, and Nick’s nonmarital estate was determined to be
in excess of $25,186,225.00.
The large estates stem primarily
from Nick’s coal business operations.
Nick filed a petition to dissolve the marriage on
August 17, 1990, in Wayne Circuit Court.
Following this, the
parties reconciled for a period of time.
In the summer of 1992,
Ann reinitiated proceedings by amended pleadings.
In September
1992 a Special Judge, Judge Daniel Venters, was appointed to
preside in the proceedings.
Thereafter, the matter again
remained dormant until July 1993, when Ann again reactivated the
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divorce proceedings by filing a motion for temporary support and
for other temporary orders.
In June 1994, the matter was transferred from the Wayne
Circuit Court docket to the Pulaski Circuit Court docket.
Thereafter, discovery commenced and continued through 1994 and
1995.
Also during this time, extensive litigation occurred
relating primarily to visitation issues, and Ann sought to have
Judge Venters disqualified from presiding in the case.
Ultimately, Judge Venters elected to have himself disqualified,
and in April 1995 Judge Ron Johnson was appointed as Special
Judge.
The matter was tried before Judge Johnson in January
1996.
The initial Judgment of the trial court was entered on
February 12, 1996, granting the dissolution and addressing issues
of custody, visitation, and child support.
Pending the filing of
expert evidentiary depositions, the trial court reserved rulings
as to valuation and distribution of property and maintenance.
The depositions were completed, and in May and June
1996, respectively, Nick and Ann filed their memoranda as to all
issues of valuation, tracing, and the proposed distribution of
the marital estate.
The trial court then appointed a Special
Domestic Relations Commissioner and referred the matter to him.
The Commissioner’s report was filed on July 9, 1997, and each
party excepted thereto.
On October 15, 1997, the trial court entered an order
accepting the Commissioners Report in part, modifying it in part,
and reserving several issues for further consideration. The order
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distributed the marital property 70% to Nick and 30% to Ann.
On
January 9, 1998, the trial court entered a “Final Judgment”
wherein it ruled on all outstanding issues, including those
relating to the valuation and distribution of assets.
Each party
then filed a post-judgment motion to alter, vacate, or amend.
By order dated March 24, 1998, the trial court ruled on the
motions and made substantial modifications to its original
judgment.
Nick and Ann then filed these appeals.
Issues Raised In Nick Cooley’s Appeal
Premium Elkhorn Coal Company, Inc.
Nick contends that the trial court erred in determining
that 50% of his 100% interest in Premium Elkhorn Coal Company,
Inc. (Premium Elkhorn), was marital property.
At the time the parties were married, in August 1979,
there were 200 shares of outstanding stock in Premium Elkhorn.
One hundred (100) shares of that stock were owned by Nick, and
one hundred (100) shares were owned by Nick’s sister, Carol
Cooley Martin.
On December 31, 1983, an agreement was entered
into under which Premium Elkhorn would purchase Martin’s 100
shares of stock, thereby retiring Martin’s stock and leaving Nick
as the sole shareholder in the corporation.
Under the terms of
the agreement, Martin was to be paid $500,000.00 immediately,
with an additional $3,150,000.00 to be paid over time based upon
a percentage of the coal sales of Premium Elkhorn.
Pending full
payment, the stock certificates were required to be held in
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escrow, but Nick was, with certain exceptions, generally given
the right to vote the stock in any transaction affecting the
normal course of business.
In addition, as the company’s sole
shareholder, Nick was entitled to all of the company’s profits.
In his July 9, 1997, report, the Commissioner
determined that the 1979 value of Premium Elkhorn was
$10,059,595.00, with Nick’s 50% share valued at $5,029,798.00;
that the present value of the corporation was $11,041,105.00;
that Nick was now the sole owner of Premium Elkhorn; that there
had been an increase in the value of Nick’s interest of
$6,011,307.00; and that the increase in value was marital
property, of which Ann should be awarded 50%, or $3,005,803.50.
Both sides excepted to the Commissioner’s
recommendation, and in its October 15, 1997, order the trial
court reserved this issue for subsequent determination.
In its
June 9, 1998, order the trial court determined that there had
been no increase in the value of Premium Elkhorn because the
significant depletion of the company’s coal reserves between 1979
and 1996 precluded the possibility that there had been an
increase in the
company’s value.
Ann challenged this
determination in her post-judgment motion to alter or amend.
In its March 24, 1998, post-judgment order, the trial
court granted Ann’s motion to amend on the basis that its June 9
order had not considered that during the marriage Nick’s interest
in Premium Elkhorn increased from 50% to 100%.
Upon
reconsideration, the trial court determined that the 50% interest
in Premium Elkhorn which accrued to Nick as a result of the
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retirement of Martin’s stock was marital property.
The trial
court accepted Nick’s valuation of Premium Elkhorn of
$11,011,767.00.
50% of this amount was restored to Nick as his
non-marital property, and the remaining 50%, or $5,505,883.50,
was divided 70% to Nick and 30%, or $1,651,765.00, to Ann.
Nick raises three arguments in opposition to the trial
court’s treatment of Premium Elkhorn.
First, Nick argues that
“[t]he undisputed evidence is that the asset owned by Mr. Cooley
in 1979 consisting of 100 shares of Premium Elkhorn Coal
Corporation stock had a value greater than the value of the
entire corporation presently.”
Nick’s contention that the
evidence is “undisputed” does not appear to be accurate.
To the
contrary, as illustrated by Exhibit 4 of Nick’s brief, it appears
to be Ann’s contention that the value of Nick’s 1979 50% interest
was $5,059,595.00 and that the value of his 1995 100% interest
was $16,070,903.00.
Nick’s second argument advocates a “Brandenburg
approach” to this issue.1
Such an approach was used with respect
to several of the other assets in this case,2 and we agree with
Nick that this would be an appropriate method to use in
separating out the ownership of Premium Elkhorn into its marital
and nonmarital components. The trial court did, in fact, use a
Brandenburg approach; however, it does not appear that the trial
1
See Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, Ky. App., 671 S.W.2d
871 (1981).
2
See, for example, the discussion of Transfinancial CD
5118 at pages 18-20, infra. Included therein is a discussion of
the “Brandenburg approach” as the parties and trial court have
used that term in this case.
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court sufficiently broke down the Premium Elkhorn transaction
into its component parts.
It is undisputed that the 50% interest in Premium
Elkhorn that Nick owned at the time of the marriage is his
nonmarital interest.
The trial court assigned Nick this 50%
using the October 1995 valuation of $11,011,767.00, a valuation
provided by Nick’s experts.
At issue is whether there is any
portion of the other 50% interest (the Martin interest) which is
nonmarital.
This requires a separate examination of (1) the
initial $500,000.00 payment to Martin; (2) the payments made to
Martin between December 1, 1983, and the 1995 valuation; and (3)
post-divorce (post valuation date) payments to Martin.
If some
portion of these components is nonmarital, then Nick should
rightly be credited with a nonmarital interest in the Martin
interest.
The initial payment was made in conjunction with the
acquisition of the stock, presumably sometime around December 31,
1983.
This was four years and three months into the marriage.
By then a large volume of marital funds had flowed into and
through the company.
The 1979 Premium Elkhorn Balance Sheet,3
reflects that at that time the company had current assets in
excess of $595,000.00, including $566,198.00 in cash.
We do not
have a December 1983 Balance Sheet, however, it appears that
under a Brandenburg approach, some percentage of the initial
$500,000.00 payment to Martin may be traceable to the 1979
nonmarital liquid assets. We therefore remand this issue for a
3
See Appellant Brief Appendix 4.
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determination as to whether any percentage of the initial
$500,000.00 payment to Martin is attributable to Nick’s
nonmarital interest in the company, if any.
The analysis should
take into consideration the tracing rules of Allen v. Allen, Ky.
App., 584 S.W.2d 599 (1979).
The source of the payments made to
Martin between December 1, 1983, and the valuation date, was
marital funds, and that portion of the Martin interest acquired
by the payment of those funds is marital property.
During this
time Nick was the sole stockholder of Premium Elkhorn.
Nick was
entitled to all of the profits of the company, and those profits
were marital income.
Payments to Martin during this period were
indexed to company profits.
It follows that the portion of the
Martin interest acquired with profits generated during this time
period
is marital property.
Finally, there was a balance owing to Martin at the
valuation date of $762,609.00.
Since this amount will be, or has
been, paid-off post-divorce, it will be, or has been, paid off
with nonmarital funds.
nonmarital property.
This portion of the Martin interest is
Nick’s valuation, the valuation accepted by
the court, takes this into account.
The October 1995 valuation
of Premium Elkhorn includes a deduction for the remaining
principle owed to Martin for the purchase of her interest.4
This deduction credits Nick for the nonmarital portion of Premium
Elkhorn which will, or has been, paid for out of post-divorce
nonmarital funds.
4
See Appellant Brief, Appendix 5, Note 7.
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Based upon the foregoing, with the exception of the
initial payment, the trial court’s assignment of the marital and
nonmarital components of Premium Elkhorn was neither clearly
erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. This issue is remanded for
a determination as to whether there is a nonmarital component
included in the initial $500,000.00 payment to Martin.
Gossage Farm; Shearer Farm; McCutchen Properties; Conley
Bottom/Top Stop.
Next, Nick contends that the trial court erred in its
valuation and distribution of certain tracts of real property.
Specifically, Nick objects to the trial court’s treatment of four
tracts of real property: the Gossage farm; the Shearer farm; the
McCutchen Farm; and Conley Bottom/Top Stop.
Gossage Farm.
is 100% marital property.
It is undisputed that the Gossage farm
The property was appraised by Ann’s
expert, Joe Weddington, Jr., at $160,000.00.
Nick, acting as his
own expert, appraised the property at $100,000.00.
The
Commissioner did not attempt to resolve the discrepancy, but
instead recommended that the property be sold as “the most
effective and accurate means of obtaining the fair market value
of the property.”
In its January 9, 1998, order the trial court stated
the it “finds that the fair market value of this property is
$125,000.00.
Despite the flaws in Mr. Weddington’s assumption of
acreage, his appraisal, after Court’s adjustment, is more
reliable in all other respects than Mr. Cooley’s inexperienced
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effort.”
In its March 28, 1998, order, the trial court sustained
Ann’s motion to amend the valuation of the Gossage property to
the value as appraised by Weddington.
The trial court stated
that this “is done after revisiting the proof on the value of
this property and concluding that the Court did intend to use Mr.
Weddington’s figure as the more reliable one, in this instance,
as opposed to the figure argued by Mr. Cooley, who acted as his
own appraiser.”
Weddington based his appraisal on a 249-acre tract
valued at $642.57 per acre.
Gossage farm is 184 acres.
However, according to the deed, the
The trial court’s January 9, 1998,
order recognized this “flaw” in Weddington’s appraisal, and
seemed to indicate that it was accepting Weddington’s per acre
valuation adjusted for Weddington’s overstatement in acreage.
It is unclear why, in its March 28, 1998, order the
trial court decided to accept Weddington’s appraisal of
$160,000.00 when that value was based on acreage inconsistent
with the deed and the inconsistency was previously identified as
a flaw by both the Commissioner and the trial court.
Nick
attributes the trial court’s valuation to a “clerical error.”
Because of the confusion surrounding the trial court’s valuation
of the Gossage Farm, we vacate as to this issue and remand for
additional findings as to how the trial court came to accept an
appraisal premised upon an incorrect acreage assumption and, if
necessary, a correction of that determination.
Shearer Farm.
The Shearer Farm is a large tract of
real estate in excess of 700 acres located in Wayne County.
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The
trial court accepted Nick’s valuation of the farm of $595,000.00.
Nick contends that the trial court was clearly erroneous in
accepting Ann’s marital property calculations rather than his
own.
In her cross-appeal, Ann challenges the valuation of the
farm.5
Before the trial court, Nick argued that the Shearer
property contained a marital competent of 23.29% and a nonmarital
component of 76.81%.
Ann’s experts argued that those percentages
were 36.42% and 63.58%, respectively.
The Commissioner,
determined that the Shearer property had a marital component of
19.39% and a nonmarital component of 80.71%.
In its order of October 15, 1997, the trial court
stated, “[Ann] objected to the recommendation of the Commissioner
that [Nick’s] non-marital [sic] interest in this property was
19.39%.
The Court will ascertain subsequently the non-marital
portion of Mr. Cooley in and to this property after a review of
the testimony in this case.”
In its order of January 9, 1998,
the trial court stated that it “confirms the Commissioner’s
finding of [Nick’s] non-marital interest of 19.39 [sic] percent
. . . .”
In its order of March 24, 1998, the trial court stated
that “[Nick’s] motion to revise the marital and non-marital
percentages relating to the Shearer Farm is GRANTED.
However,
the Court adopts the expert testimony provided by [Ann]
concerning the marital and non-marital percentages relating to
this property, with 63.58% being Mr. Cooley’s non-marital
percentage and 36.42% being the marital percentage.”
5
See page 45, infra.
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The experts employed by Nick and Ann to do the tracing
calculations with respect to the Shearer property arrived at
conflicting marital percentages.
The trial court was in the best
position to judge the credibility of the experts and to resolve
the dispute between them.
CR 52.01;
App., 830 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1992).
Chalupa v. Chalupa, Ky.
The professionals made
different assumptions regarding the tracing of the proceeds from
the sale of the Cooley Coal and Land Company, and the
professional analysis of the transaction by Ann’s experts
supports the trial court’s decision.
There is substantial
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding as to
the marital component of Shearer Farm, and the finding was
therefore not clearly erroneous.
Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis,
Ky. App., 6 S.W.3d 843, 852 (1999).
We will not disturb the
trial court’s conclusion as to the marital and nonmarital
components of the Shearer property.
Heller v. Heller, Ky. App.,
672 S.W.2d 945, 947 (1984).
McCutchen Properties. The McCutchen properties consist
of a 260-acre farm purchased during the marriage, and three
smaller adjacent tracts acquired thereafter.
For purposes of
appraisal and Brandenburg calculations, Ann lumped the four
properties together.
separately.
Nick’s experts appraised the tracts
In his report, the Commissioner mistakenly
determined that the principal tract was Nick’s nonmarital
property, and this recommendation was rejected in the trial
court’s order of October 15, 1997.
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In its order of January 8, 1998, the trial court found
that the minor tracts, valued at $53,500.00, were 100% marital
property.
With regard to the principal 260-acre tract, the trial
court determined Nick’s nonmarital portion to be 59.3%, which was
the percentage as determined by Ann’s expert.
$250,000.00 was
originally paid for the property, so Nick’s nonmarital portion of
the original purchase price was determined to be $148,250.00.
($250,000.00 x 59.3%).
The trial court determined the current fair market
value of the property to be $425,000.00.
The trial court
concluded that “[t]herefore, the non-marital portion of the fair
market value of the McCutchen Farm is 35% . . . making that part
assignable to [A]nn to be 30% of 65%[.]”
In his brief, Nick
expresses confusion as to where the 35% figure came from.
It
came from the rounding of the calculation
$148,250.00/$425,000.00.
As we interpret its order, the trial court determined
that the only nonmarital property attributable to the entirety of
the McCutchen properties was $148,250.00.
It is undisputed that
the three minor properties were 100% marital.
As to the
appreciation in the principal 260-acre farm, the trial court
considered the entire $175,000.00 ($425,000.00 - $250,000.00) in
appreciation which occurred during the marriage to be
attributable to “active” appreciation due to the joint efforts of
the parties.
Since the appreciation was not “passive”
appreciation, it was not subject to the Brandenburg formula.
In
other words, Nick’s original marital portion did not appreciate,
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but, rather, remained at $148,250.00.
Goderwis v. Goderwis, Ky.,
780 S.W.2d 39, 40 (1989).
Significant improvements were made to the “barn house”
during the marriage through the joint efforts of the parties.
This would account for, and support, the trial court’s conclusion
that the appreciation to the property was active appreciation.
We will not disturb the trial court’s valuation and assignment of
marital property as to the McCutchen Properties.
Heller, supra.
Conley Bottom/ Top Stop. The Conley Bottom/Top Stop
properties is a collective reference used by the parties in the
course of the valuation process for five separate tracts of real
property located in the Conley Bottom section of Wayne County.
The property includes, among other things, a boat dock, a
convenience store, boat storage facilities, and several tracts
upon which are located houses.
Ann’s expert valued the properties at $800,000.00.
Nick’s expert valued the properties at $498,500.00.
The
Commissioner recommended that the property be sold, but this was
rejected by the trial court in its order of October 15, 1997.
In
its January 9, 1998, order the trial court found the fair market
value of the property to be $600,000.00, stating that “[t]he
Court sympathizes with the Commissioner and is equally perplexed
by [the] great range between the two valuations, but does find
that the appraisal made by Mr. Zimmerman [Nick’s expert] is not
as conservative as Mr. Weddington’s [Ann’s expert] is liberal.”
Nick’s argument on appeal relates primarily to the lack
of credibility of Mr. Weddington.
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Nick cites to errors allegedly
made by Weddington in his appraisal, including his attribution of
a nonexistent residence to a tract of property, his overvaluation
of the convenience store, and his overvaluation of the boat dock.
The trial court appears to have largely agreed with Nick as we
note that the trial court came down $200,000.00 from Weddington’s
appraisal while coming up only $101,500.00 on Nick’s appraisal.
In effect, the trial court found Nick’s appraisal to be 2/3 more
credible than Ann’s.
Since the trial court valued the property
within the range as appraised by the competing experts, we
discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Roberts v.
Roberts, Ky. App., 587 S.W.2d 281 (1979).
Transfinancial CD 5118 and Transfinancial CDs 10784, 10785, and
10786.
Next, Nick contends that the trial court erred in
allocating the marital and nonmarital components of certain
certificates of deposits.
Transfinancial CD 5118.
5, 1980.
CD 5118 was acquired on June
It represents a rollover of CD 4132, which was
purchased on March 6, 1980, for $400,000.00.
According to Nick’s
tracing, the funds used to purchase CD 4132 came from one of his
personal accounts; that account contained $154,000.00 in August
1979 at the time the parties married; $707,815.00 in nonmarital
funds representing the sale of Nick’s interest in Chapparal Coal
Company was deposited into the account on September 4, 1979; and
additional deposits totaling $439,000.00 were deposited through
March 6, 1980.
As we understand Nick’s tracing, no other
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deposits or withdrawals were made, and therefore the account
balance on March 6, 1980, was $1,300,815.00, $816,815.00 (66.25%)
of which was his nonmarital property and $439,000.00 (33.75%) was
commingled marital property.
It is Nick’s position that there
was in excess of $400,00.00 in his nonmarital funds in the
account when CD 4132 was purchased on March 6, 1980, from the
account, and therefore CD 4132 was nonmarital and, similarly,
roll-over CD 5118 is nonmarital.
The Commissioner agreed with Nick’s tracing and
determined that CD 5118 was Nick’s nonmarital property.
In its
order of October 15, 1997, the trial court rejected the
Commissioner’s recommendation and, instead, using what it termed
a “Brandenburg approach,” allocated 33.75% as marital property
and 66.25% as Nick’s nonmarital property.
The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in so doing.
Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, Ky. App., 617 S.W.2d 871
(1981) sets forth guidelines for the apportionment of property
into marital and nonmarital components.
The approach is most
commonly used to allocate appreciated equity between its marital
and nonmarital components by establishing base percentages for
each component.
However, the approach has also been used to
establish the base percentages irrespective of any appreciation
in the asset. See
Lampton v. Lampton, Ky. App. 721 S.W.2d 736
(1986) (Brandenburg apportionment method used to allocate gifted
stock into marital and nonmarital components).
In support of his position that CD 5118 is 100%
nonmarital, Nick relies on Allen v. Allen, Ky. App. 584 S.W.2d
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599 (1979).
In Allen we determined that tracing was satisfied,
as far as money in a bank account was concerned, when it was
shown that nonmarital funds were deposited into an account and
commingled with marital funds and the balance of the account was
never reduced below the amount of the nonmarital funds deposited.
Nick attempts to use Allen beyond its intended scope.
The
tracing approved in Allen begins and ends with a single money
account and does not reach the tracing beyond the account as
attempted here by Nick.
For example, if the bank account from
which CD 4132 was purchased had never fallen below $816,815.00,
the total amount of nonmarital funds traceable to the account,
Nick would have been entitled to apply Allen to prove that amount
as his nonmarital funds.
But once his nonmarital funds were
mixed with marital funds, if a purchase is made from the account,
it cannot be said that exclusively marital, or nonmarital, funds
were used in the purchase.
Transfinancial CDs 10784, 10785, and 10786.
Trans-
financial Bank CDs 10784, 10785, and 10786 were acquired in July
1983.
Each CD is for $100,000.00.
Nick contends that in May 1983 he sold 750 shares of
First Guaranty Bank nonmarital stock for $487,500.00; that the
proceeds from this sale were deposited into his account at First
Guaranty Bank of Martin (which subsequently changed its name to
Transfinancial Bank); that this deposit brought the balance in
the account to $617,909.33; that on July 23, 1983, a debit memo
was entered charging the account $300,000.00 for the three CDs;
and that since the purchase price of the CDs was less than his
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recent deposit, pursuant to Allen v. Allen, supra, he had traced
the purchase of the CDs to nonmarital funds and, therefore, the
CDs were nonmarital property.
The Commissioner concluded that Nick had not adequately
traced his First Guaranty Bank stock sale into the three CDs.
The Commissioner noted that a significant amount of marital funds
had flowed into the account subsequent to the marriage and that,
most importantly, Nick had failed to adequately document the sale
of the First Guaranty Bank stock in terms of the date of sale,
the amount received, and the deposit of the stock proceeds into
the First Guaranty account.
The Commissioner stated that “no
documentary evidence was produced to establish the date or sales
price of the stock.
The Commissioner finds this to be out of
character for the petitioner and finds it difficult to believe
that a transaction supposedly valued at nearly one-half million
dollars was not thoroughly documented.”
In his October 15, 1997,
order the trial court accepted the Commissioner’s recommendation,
stating that “[t]he Court finds [Nick’s] proof was not clear and
convincing that these CD’s were his non-marital property[.]”
As discussed in the section of this opinion addressing
CD 5118, even if Nick had traced the proceeds from his nonmarital
stock sale into the account, Allen does not support a
determination that the CDs purchased from the account were 100%
nonmarital.
Further, just because the nonmarital stock proceeds
were the last funds deposited, that is no basis to presume that
those funds were, exclusively, used to purchase the CDs to the
exclusion of the marital funds in the same account.
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If Nick, contrary to the finding of the trial court,
did in fact trace $487,500.00 in nonmarital proceeds into the
account, then a Brandenburg approach similar to that used in
evaluating CD 5118 would be appropriate.
All property acquired
by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree of legal
separation is presumed to be marital property.
KRS 403.190(3).
The presumption must be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. Brosick v. Brosick, Ky. App. 974 S.W.2d 498, 502
(1998).
The remaining issue, therefore, is whether the trial
court was clearly erroneous, under the clear and convincing
standard, in determining that Nick had failed to trace the
proceeds of the nonmarital stock sale into the First Guaranty
bank account.
In his brief, Nick asserts that his documentation of
the $487,500.00 deposit from his sale of nonmarital stock was
attached as Exhibit 2 of Mike Caudill’s testimony.
We have
carefully reviewed Exhibit 2 of Caudill’s February 6, 1996,
deposition, and we agree with the Commissioner and the trial
court that those documents do not clearly and convincingly trace
the sale of the nonmarital stock sale into the First Guaranty
bank account from which the three CDs were bought.
In
particular, we cannot locate within this exhibit the major source
of proof cited by Nick, namely a February 6, 1996, deposit ticket
documenting the $487,500.00 deposit.
If such a document
otherwise exists in the record, Nick should have provided a page
number cite.
Nick has failed to meet his tracing burden with
respect to these three CDs.
There was no reversible error in the
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trial court’s determination that CDs 10784, 10785, and 10786 were
nonmarital property.
Dissipation of Assets.
Nick’s final argument is that the trial court erred in
failing to account for the marital estate assets dissipated,
usurped, or concealed by Ann during the pendency of the action.
Nick contends that Ann persistently sought to effectively
embezzle from the marital estate as it was being collected and
valued.
The only allegedly dissipated assets Nick identifies
with sufficient specificity for us to review are those associated
with the marital business, Denim Mill, Inc.
corporation started in the late 1980's.
Denim Mill was a
It was managed by Ann
and sold western-style clothing she designed.
At the time of the cessation of
business by Denim
Mill, Inc., it had both inventory and cash assets.
Nick
apparently took some, or all, of the business inventory.
Ann
charges that Nick has never accounted for the assets he took.
While in his brief Nick states that Ann admits to taking $169,245
from Denim Mill, as we understand her brief and the issue as
addressed below, Ann admits to having taken only $99,031.00 in
cash assets from the business.
While Ann admits she took these funds from Denim Mill,
she contends that she used the money to provide food, housing and
other expenses for herself and the children during the period
following the parties’ separation in January 1993 and prior to an
award of temporary spousal maintenance and child support in July
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1994.
The Commissioner agreed with this, stating “the
Commissioner finds that with respect to any assets of Denim Mill,
Inc., taken by [Ann], these were used for her support, and that
of her children, at a time when [Nick] was not contributing to
their support.”
In its order of October 15, 1997, the trial
court adopted the recommendations of the Commissioner in their
entirety with regard to Denim Mill.
The court may find dissipation when marital property is
expended (1) during a period when there is a separation or
dissolution impending;
and (2) where there is a clear showing of
intent to deprive one's spouse of her proportionate share of the
marital property.
Robinette v. Robinette, Ky.App., 736 S.W.2d
351, 354 (1987);
Brosick v. Brosick, Ky. App., 974 S.W.2d 498,
500 (1998).
The trial court determined that Ann used the assets
which she took from Denim Mill for the support of her and her
children, and that her intent was not to deprive Nick of his
proportionate share of the marital property.
The record
discloses that during the parties separation from January 1993
through July 1994, Ann had custody of the children, was not
working, and was not receiving court ordered maintenance or child
support.
While $99,031.00 seems like an excessive amount for
support during this period, in relation to Ann and her children’s
normal life-style, it was not.
The trial court’s findings with
respect to this issue were not clearly erroneous.
CR 52.01.
We
cannot say that Nick has met his burden of making a clear showing
that Ann’s taking of the assets from Denim Mill was with the
-21-
intent to deprive him of his proportionate share of the property
and was not for her and the children’s support.
Issues Raised In Virginia Cooley’s Cross-AppealProportional
Division of Marital Property
Ann contends that the marital estate was not divided in
just proportions.
The Commissioner recommended that the property
be divided fifty-fifty.
While, certain of the property was
divided fifty-fifty, namely such property in which Ann
contributed to the accumulation of in addition to her role as a
homemaker, the trial court generally awarded 70% of the marital
property to Nick, and 30% of the marital property to Ann.
Ultimately, of an $11,966,307.00 marital estate, Nick was awarded
$8,011,092.00, or 66.95%, and Ann was awarded $3,955,215.00, or
33.95%.
Ann contends that the trial court’s award was an abuse
of discretion in that it failed to adequately consider her
contributions as a homemaker; penalized or degraded her primary
function in the marriage; and diminished her role as a wife to a
junior partnership.
Ann contends that all the marital property
should have been distributed on a fifty-fifty basis.
KRS 403.190(1) requires the trial court to
divide the marital property . . . in just
proportions considering all relevant factors
including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to
acquisition of the marital property,
including contribution of a spouse as
homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each
spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse
when the division of property is to become
-22-
effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for reasonable periods to the spouse
having custody of any children.
With certain exceptions, “‘marital property’ means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage[.]”
KRS
403.190(2).
The trial court explained its decision to, generally,
award Ann 30% of the marital property as follows:
Kentucky law does not presume or require an
equal division of all marital assets. [Ann]
testified that most of her time during the
marriage was devoted toward raising the three
children of the parties. [Ann] testifies she
was not really aware of much regarding the
businesses that were operated during the
marriage. [Nick] was in the coal business
prior to 1979 when the parties were married,
which made him a multi-millionaire prior to
the marriage. [Ann’s] primary contribution
to the marriage was as a mother and
housewife. The contributions of [Ann] as a
mother and housewife, from an economic
standpoint, do not justify an equal division
of all the marital property, even though
raising children is a lot of hard work. The
Cooley family is dysfunctional. Mr. Cooley
did not exert much effort in raising the
children, but he is not totally to blame.
[Ann] intentionally or unintentionally had an
impact on her children’s negative attitude
toward their father. But for [Ann’s]
activities as a housewife and mother, [Ann]
did little to increase the marital estate.
Accordingly, the Court does not agree with
the Commissioner that [Ann] should receive
50% of the marital estate in its entirety.
The Court is inclined to award the Respondent
30% of the marital value of the coal business
assets, if any, and 30% of the marital
business real estate in which [Ann] did not
contribute outside her contributions as a
wife, mother and homemaker. However, there
are certain assets of a personal nature and
other business assets in which [Ann]
participated and for those a 50-50
distribution is appropriate.
-23-
There is no statutory basis requiring that property be
divided equally.
Wood v. Wood, Ky. App., 720 S.W.2d 934, 935
(1986) (award of $1,024,525 to husband and $512,000, including
$300,000 cash, to wife upheld).
“This court cannot disturb the
findings of a trial court in a case involving dissolution of
marriage unless those findings are clearly erroneous.”
Cochran
v. Cochran, Ky. App., 746 S.W.2d 568, 569-570 (1988);
Johnson v.
Johnson, Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d 221 (1978).
The division and
valuation of property is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Cochran at 570.
Wood, supra, supports the trial court’s percentage
distribution to Ann.
In Wood the wife received a one-third
distribution of the marital property, including a $300,000.00
cash award.
Here, the trial court set forth its reasons for its
award to Ann, and those reasons were consistent with the factors
set forth in KRS 403.190.
While Ann sets forth reasonable
arguments as to why the trial court should have awarded her fifty
percent of the marital property, and even though we may agree
with those arguments, we cannot say that the trial court’s award
to her, which was nearly $4 million, of which a sizable sum was
cash, was either clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
Auction of Recreational Property.
Ann contends that the trial court erred by ordering a
public auction of certain recreational property.
At the time of
their separation, the parties had an extensive array of
recreational property, including various motorcycles, jet skis,
-24-
Honda 4-tracks, ski boats, a houseboat, and a motor home.
By
order entered on June 14, 1996, the trial court ordered that all
recreational vehicles belonging to the partes at issue in the
case be sold at the Courthouse door of the Pulaski County
Courthouse.
In the course of the discovery process, the parties had
stipulated as to the value of the recreational property.
At
auction, the property sold for less than the stipulated values.
The gross proceeds from the auction were $247,900.00 less
expenses of $7,215.80.
According to Ann’s calculations, her
distribution of one-half of the proceeds at the auction price
yielded her $13,948.50 less than she would have received if the
distribution had been based upon one-half of the stipulated
values.
Nick purchased all but two of the recreational items
sold at the auction.
Ann attended the auction, but did not bid
on any of the items.
Ann contends that Nick’s windfall at her
expense should be remedied by requiring an additional $13,958.50
award in her favor so as to reflect the distribution of the
recreational property at the stipulated values.
There was an ongoing dispute throughout the litigation
as to the utilization of the recreational property.
A long
series of motions concerning the use of the property were filed
in the case.
The trial court eventually ordered the auction to
put an end to the time-consuming, expensive, and acrimonious
litigation surrounding the property.
Ann did not object to the
judicial sale and attended the auction.
Ann’s dissatisfaction
with the sale arose after the fact when the auction did not bring
-25-
as much in proceeds in comparison with what the parties had
stipulated the values of the property to be.
Nick’s
participation in, and domination of, the auction also appears to
be a reason for Ann’s dissatisfaction.
However, the record
discloses that the auction was carried out in accordance with the
requirements of a judicial sale.
The auction was adequately
advertised, and it appears that it was well attended.
While Ann does not seek to have the judicial sale setaside, but, rather, seeks only to be compensated at the
stipulated values of the property, we believe it would be useful
to reference the standards applicable to the setting aside of a
judicial sale by way of illustrating the deference normally
accorded such a sale.
Inadequacy of price alone is not a
sufficient ground for setting aside a judicial sale, where the
interested parties labor under no disabilities, unless the
inadequacy is so great as to shock the conscience or create the
presumption of fraud.
(1961).
Gross v. Gross, Ky., 350 S.W.2d 470, 471
A judicial sale ought not to be lightly disapproved
where it was conducted in a fair and regular manner, and
confirmation ought not to be refused except for substantial
reasons. Id.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to confirm or vacate a sale and its exercise of that
discretion will not be disturbed unless it appears to the
appellate court to have been abused in the judicial sense. Id.
It is
a reasonable possibility that the parties’
initial stipulations as to the value of the property overstated
the actual value of the property. On the whole, when considering
-26-
such factors as the possibility of additional expensive
litigation concerning the property and the possibility that the
parties’ stipulated valuations may have been overstated, we
cannot say that the trial court erred in ordering the
recreational assets sold and basing its corresponding
distribution
upon the values brought at auction.
Interest on Cash Judgment.
Ann contends that the trial court erred as a matter of
law when it refused to award her interest on the judgment.
The
trial court entered its “Final Judgment” on January 9, 1998.
After consideration of the trial court’s March 24, 1998, order on
post-judgment motions, Ann was to receive a total distribution of
marital property of $3,955,214.56.
The unpaid balance of a marital property award should
bear interest at the statutory rate for judgment interest as
prescribed by KRS 360.040.
Ridge v. Ridge, Ky., 572 S.W.2d 859
(1978); Johnson v. Johnson, Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d 221 (1978);
Hardin v. Hardin, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 863 (1986).6
In its order
of March 24, 1998, the trial court denied Ann’s request to add a
provision for interest on the Judgment.
There being no reason
why an award of interest on the judgment would be inequitable to
6
However, if factors are present which would make an
interest award inequitable, it may be disallowed. See Young v.
Young, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 20 (1971); Courtenay v. Wilhoit, Ky. App.,
655 S.W.2d 41 (1983); and Louise E. Graham & James E. Keller, 16
Kentucky Practice Domestic Relations Law, (2d ed. 1997) § 19.7,
p. 88.
-27-
Nick, that ruling is reversed and remanded for an award of
interest consistent with Ridge and KRS 360.040.
Child Support.
Ann argues that the amount of child support awarded
erroneously failed to continue the children’s lifestyle they had
during the marriage.
Whereas Ann had sought $6,000.00 per month
in child support, the trial court awarded her $5,000.00 per
month.
Stewart was born in February 1980 and Lindsay was born in
January 1981.
Since Stewart and Lindsay have attained the age of
eighteen and graduated from high school, this issue is moot as to
them.
Undoubtedly additional child support proceedings have
occurred during the pendency of this matter in this court.
Nevertheless, we will address the issue.
Nick’s annual gross income is $737,000.00 per year, or
in excess of $61,000.00 per month.
The combined monthly income
of the parties far exceeds the uppermost limits of the child
support guideline tables as set forth in KRS 403.212.
The trial
court may use its judicial discretion in determining child
support in circumstances where combined adjusted parental gross
income exceeds the uppermost levels of the guideline table.
KRS
403.212(5).
It is evident that the trial court applied careful
consideration to the matter of child support.
The trial court
took into consideration that Nick was to be responsible for all
of the dental and medical expenses of the children, and, in its
judicial discretion, awarded Ann $5,000.00 in monthly child
-28-
support rather than the $6,000.00 she had requested.
In regard
to this the trial court stated that, “[a]n amount higher than
[$5,000.00], at the present time and under the present
circumstances, would be pure and unmitigated extravagance.”
Contrary to Ann’s contention, it appears that the trial court did
take into consideration the children’s lifestyle during the
marriage.
We cannot say that the trial court abused its judicial
discretion in awarding Ann $5,000.00 per month in child support
for the three children.
Trust Information.
Ann contends that the trial court erred by failing to
require Nick to produce trust information regarding the children.
The paternal grandparents established trusts for Stewart and
Lindsay.
A comparable trust was later set up for Mitchell.
In
the course of the proceedings, Ann requested information relating
to the trust and periodic updates regarding the status of the
trusts.
Nick refused to provide her this information.
As
authority for her entitlement to have access to the trust
information, Ann relies on KRS 386.715 which provides that “[t]he
trustee shall keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably
informed of the trust and its administration.”
In its July 10, 1996, order the trial court denied
Ann’s motion to provide her with information relating to the
trusts; however, the trial court stated that it “notes that
[Nick] has represented to the Court in response to Mrs. Cooley’s
-29-
motion that the trusts contain sufficient assets to provide for
the college education for the parties’ children at the
institution of their choice.
To the extent that Mr. Cooley has
made such representation, he is bound thereby and is bound by his
representation to that effect.”
Judicial proceedings may be initiated by interested
persons concerning the internal affairs of trusts. KRS 386.675.
Proceedings which may be maintained under this section are those
concerning the administration and distribution of trusts, the
declaration of rights and the determination of other matters
involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts. Id.
under
Proceedings
KRS 386.675 are initiated by filing a petition in the
court and giving notice pursuant to KRS 386.665(3) to interested
persons. KRS 386.700.
Stewart and Lindsay are emancipated and it would appear
that the issue is moot as to them.
They may share their trust
account information with Ann as they deem appropriate.
As to
Mitchell, it would appear that if Ann, as a third party to the
trust, seeks to access information relating to Mitchell’s trust
accounts, the appropriate method would be as set forth in the
above statutes.
For purposes of this divorce action, we discern
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s disposition of the
issue.
Attorney and Expert Fees.
Ann contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to award her requested attorney fees and expert fees.
-30-
In the course of the divorce proceedings, Ann incurred attorney
fees and expert fees of $340,992.44.
Nick contends that he has
paid $232,000.00 of these fees; Ann contends that Nick has paid
approximately $216,000.00 of the fees.
It is Ann’s position that
Nick should be responsible for all of her legal and expert fees,
primarily because of the discrepancy in financial resources and
because of Nick’s alleged dilatory tactics in the course of the
proceedings.
“The court from time to time after considering the
financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a
reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining
or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorney's
fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs
incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after
entry of judgment.” KRS 403.220.
“The allocation of court costs
and attorney fees is entirely within the discretion of the trial
court.” Tucker v. Hill, Ky. App. 763 S.W.2d 144, 145 (1988).
“All that is expressly required is that the trial court consider
the financial resources of the parties when ordering a party to
pay a reasonable amount in attorney's fees.” Poe v. Poe, Ky. App.
711 S.W.2d 849, 852 (1986).
In its January 9, 1998, Final Judgment, the trial court
stated, “All those sums heretofore awarded Ms. Cooley for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses, pendente lite, shall
constitute what the Court believes, in its sound discretion to be
a fair and equitable amount sufficient to meet her reasonable
needs in that regard and to balance the resources.
-31-
The part of
the marital estate hereinafter awarded to her and that already
awarded and distributed to her is more than adequate to meet her
obligations incurred as a result of defending this litigation.”
Even using Ann’s figures, Nick has been required to pay
in excess of 63% of her attorney and expert fees.
While Ann
charges that Nick caused her to incur substantial fees because of
his dilatory tactics, Ann has not been a model of virtue in
regard to her litigation decisions.
Ann’s distribution of the
marital property, which she is to receive primarily in cash, is
almost $4,000,000.00, and this was specifically considered by the
trial court in its decision to award attorney and expert fees.
Ann has failed to successfully demonstrate any abuse of the trial
court’s discretion in regard to its awarding of attorney and
expert fees.
Failure to Strike or Exclude Evidence.
Ann contends that the trial court erred by denying her
motions to strike or exclude certain evidence.
Pikeville National Bank Certificates of Deposit Nos.
515, 492, and 19612.
These three CDs total $1,200,000.00.
The
CDs were purchased on October 10, 1981, during the marriage.
Ann
claimed that the CDs were marital property, while Nick claimed
they were nonmarital.
The Commissioner determined that Nick had
established, through tracing, that the CDs were nonmarital
property.
This recommendation was accepted by the trial court.
Ann timely filed a motion to exclude certain of Nick’s tracing
evidence as untimely filed.
The substance of Ann’s argument is
-32-
that all evidence relating to nonmarital property claims was due
by October 10, 1995, and that Nick did not file certain documents
substantiating the claim until March 12, 1996.
It appears clear
from the record that Nick did not claim for the first time that
these CDs were nonmarital until after October 10, 1995;
rather,
Nick presented tracing evidence relative to these CDs in his case
in chief through the testimony of Mike Caudill.
CR 43.02(d) authorizes the trial court to permit the
introduction of evidence in chief at the rebuttal stage upon
“good reasons in furtherance of justice.” Commonwealth, Dept. of
Highways v. Ochsner, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 446, 448 (1965).
Here,
evidence was presented that Nick did not have the March 1996
documents prior to the close of his case in chief, but, rather,
the bank did not provide him with those documents until
afterward.
There having been a showing of good reasons in
furtherance of justice in this instance, it is our opinion that
there was no abuse of discretion. Id.
Coal Valuation.
Ann contends that Nick did not present
any qualified testimony concerning the value of coal owned or
leased by his various companies immediately prior to the marriage
during his case in chief.
She contends that rebuttal testimony
relating to coal value presented by Nick, Milton Goolsby, and
Marvin Parrish should have been offered in Nick’s case in chief
and should therefore be stricken.
With the exclusion of this
evidence from the record, Ann argues, the value of Unit Coal
Corporation must be reconsidered.
-33-
We disagree.
An issue in the valuation of Unit Coal was the value of
its coal holdings at the time of the marriage and at the time of
divorce.
Nick introduced his valuations through the testimony of
Ertel L. Whitt, while Ann introduced her valuations through Joe
Weddington, Sr.
Following Weddington’s testimony, in the course
of rebuttal, additional evidence was presented regarding the
value of coal by Nick, Goolsby, and Parrish.
Weddington had
specifically referred to Parrish in his testimony, so his
testimony in rebuttal was proper.
In addition, the testimony of
Nick and Goolsby was directed toward rebutting Weddington’s
valuations, hence we believe it was not an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to decline to strike this testimony.
Personal Property and Real Property.
Ann argues that
certain testimony relating to the value of the parties’ household
furnishings and Nick’s testimony relating to the condition and
values of various tracts of real estate should be stricken
because the testimony could have been offered in chief rather
than in rebuttal.
The parties clearly had an enormous task in
addressing all of the property issues in this case.
While it
appears that portions of this testimony was proper rebuttal, to
the extent that any of this testimony should have been presented
in Nick’s case in chief, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s decision not to strike the testimony.
Ochsner,
supra; CR 43.02(d).
Expert Testimony.
Ann contends that the testimony of
Ertel L. Whitt, Jr. should have been stricken on the basis that
-34-
he “is a mining engineer, but not a mineral appraiser.”
Ann
contends that Whitt “had absolutely no qualification regarding
the value of coal in 1979 and he clearly lacked the knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education to value the multimillion dollar coal properties held by Unit Coal or Premium
Elkhorn.”
Kentucky Rule of Evidence 702 provides that “[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
“It is within the
discretion of the trial judge to decide the qualifications of
expert witnesses, and such a ruling is seldom disturbed on
appeal.”
Gentry v. General Motors Corp., Ky. App., 839 S.W.2d
576, 578 (1992);
Murphy by Murphy v. Montgomery Elevator Co.,
Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 297, 298 (1997).
“[T]he initial decision as
to whether a witness is a qualified expert and the limits of his
expertise are matters within the sound discretion of the trial
court.”
Commonwealth v. Craig, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 387 (1990);
Cormney v. Commonwealth., Ky. App., 943 S.W.2d 629, 634 n 2
(1996).
In his testimony Whitt sets forth credentials that
establish that he has experience in the coal mining business.
Whitt testified that he has been involved in the mining industry
since 1972 and has kept himself familiar with the value of coal,
both in place and delivered.
Whitt further testified that he has
-35-
regularly been involved in the valuation of coal in place for
clients, that he has testified as an evaluator of coal in
litigation in various forums, and that the determination of the
fair market value of coal in place is a regular and recurring
part of his professional business.
While Ann believes Whitt was
incompetent to testify as to the value of coal in 1979, her
criticisms of his credentials go to the weight of his testimony
and not its admissibility.
Unit Coal Corporation.
Next, Ann argues that the trial court erroneously
concluded that Unit Coal Corporation and its subsidiaries were
Nick’s nonmarital property.
Unit Coal is the parent of various
subsidiary coal or coal related companies.
Unit Coal was the
couple’s primary source of income during the marriage and Nick
was actively involved in its management.
As a result, any
increase in the value of the corporation would be a marital asset
subject to division.
Goderwis v. Goderwis, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 39
(1989).
Ann’s experts, primarily Joe Weddington, Sr.,
determined that the value of Unit Coal and its subsidiaries was
$10,067,155.00 at the time of the marriage, and $16,649,861.00 in
1995, for an increase during the marriage of $6,582,706.00.
Nick’s expert, Ertel Whitt, Jr., determined that the value of
Unit Coal and its subsidiaries decreased by $181,460.00 during
the marriage, from $14,095,213.00 to $13,913,753.00.
-36-
The Commissioner accepted the appraisal offered by
Nick’s expert, and the trial court, in turn, accepted the
Commissioner’s recommendation.
Ann contends the trial court
erroneously accepted Nick’s appraisal, particulary because the
trial court failed to consider various subleases that were
generating revenues inconsistent with the valuation of Nick’s
expert.
The valuation of Unit Coal was a matter to be decided
by expert testimony.
Each side accordingly presented expert
valuations as to the value of Unit Coal.
The valuations were in
significant disagreement, and the trial court chose to believe
Nick’s expert.
The Commissioner, in his report, explained his
rationale for choosing to reject the valuation of Ann’s expert,
Joe Weddington, Sr.,
as follows:
Mr. Weddington stated that it was his opinion
that in 1979 the recoverable reserves on the
leaseholds held by Unit Coal Corporation were
valued at $0.50 per ton. However, Mr.
Weddington also testified that at that same
time he was leasing his own coal for a
guaranteed minimum of $2.50 per ton. He also
admitted that he had testified in various
court proceedings in state and federal court
that during the late 1970s and early 1980s
that it was his opinion that the value of
recoverable reserves in place was $2.00 per
ton, or greater. This is an inconsistency
which the Commissioner cannot reconcile, and
which, in his opinion, renders the testimony
of Mr. Weddington not credible. The
Commissioner would add that the respondent
stresses the high quality of the coal
reserves (low sulphur, high B.T.U.) That
too, would seem to detract from the
credibility of Mr. Weddington’s valuation of
the reserves in 1979.
The primary cause for the difference in the expert
valuations was the price of coal in 1979 at the time of the
-37-
marriage.
A trial court's judgment and valuations in a divorce
action will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly
contrary to the weight of the evidence,
Heller v. Heller, Ky.
App., 672 S.W.2d 945, 947 (1984); Underwood v. Underwood, Ky.
App., 836 S.W.2d 439, 444 (1992); Clark v. Clark, Ky. App., 782
S.W.2d 56, 58 (1990).
Under CR 52.01, the Appellate Court's
review of the trial court's decision is limited to reversing only
clearly erroneous findings, keeping in mind that the trial court
had an opportunity to hear evidence and observe witnesses so as
to judge credibility. Chalupa v. Chalupa, Ky.
391, 393 (1992); Bealert v. Mitchell, Ky.
(1979).
App., 830 S.W.2d
App., 585 S.W.2d 412
Disagreeing with a finding is not sufficient to rule the
finding as clearly erroneous.
In view of the testimony of Mr.
Whitt and the inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr. Weddington,
the valuation accepted by the trial court was not clearly
contrary to the weight of evidence.
We must affirm the trial
court’s valuations of Unit Coal.
Shearer Farm, Valley Farm Center, Monticello 4M.
Ann’s final argument is that the trial court clearly
erred in its valuation of certain tracts of real property.
Shearer Farm.
The Shearer Farm was purchased for
$475,000.00 on February 15, 1984.
According to Ann, at least
$45,000.00 was expended during the marriage on improvements.
Ann’s expert, Joe Weddington, Jr., appraised and valued the
Shearer Farm at $800,000.00.
Nick’s expert, David Meece, valued
the property at $595,000.00.
The trial court determined that the
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appraisal of Mr. Meece was the more credible of the two
appraisals and accordingly valued the property at $595,000.00.
Nick successfully traced nonmarital funds into the acquisition of
the Shearer Farm.
36.42% of the value was determined to be
marital property.
Based upon the trial court’s award to Ann of
30% of the marital property, Ann was awarded a cash distribution
of $65,009.70 as her marital share of the Shearer Farm.
Ann contends that the trial court erred by accepting
Nick’s appraisal to the exclusion of her appraisal.
Citing
Robinette v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Highways,
Ky., 380 S.W.2d 78 (1964), Ann argues that Nick’s appraisal
failed to consider the property’s value at its highest and best
use, specifically, its value as a commercial property.
Ann’s
expert, Weddington, determined that 50 acres of the property
could be developed for industrial or commercial purposes, and,
upon factoring this into the analysis, those 50 acres were
appraised at $10,000.00 per acre.
Nick rebutted Weddington’s analysis by presenting
evidence that it would cost in excess of $3.9 million to landfill
and excavate the property to develop it for commercial use.
The
trial court ultimately accepted the appraisal of Nick’s expert.
The trial court stated that it “finds that the fair market value
of the property given by [Nick’s] appraiser, Mr. David Meece,
when coupled with the testimony regarding the additional cost of
landfill and excavating given by Mr. Bobby Garen, is the more
reliable of the two appraisals, and, therefore, finds the fair
market value of the tract as a whole to be $595,000.00.”
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A trial court's valuation in a divorce action will not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly contrary to the
weight of the evidence,
Heller v. Heller, supra.
The trial
court’s valuation was consistent with Nick’s expert appraisal and
was, therefore, not clearly contrary to the weight of the
evidence.
Valley Farm Center.
Valley Farm Center is a feed and
farm supply store located in Wayne County.
acquired in 1985 for $228,000.00.
The property was
The parties agreed that Nick’s
nonmarital portion of the property was 25.2%.
Nick’s expert
appraised the property at $450,000.00, while Ann’s expert valued
the property at $576,000.00.
The Commissioner rejected Ann’s
valuation on the basis that Ann’s expert had relied upon “certain
speculations on his part.”
The Commissioner valued the property
at $445,237.00, and this valuation was subsequently accepted by
the trial court.
The expert testimony and appraisal of Nick’s expert
supported the trial court’s decision.
While we may have chosen
to believe Ann’s expert, nevertheless the trial court’s decision
was not clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence, and we
have no basis to reverse its valuation of this property.
Monticello 4M Real Estate.
The Monticello 4M Real
Estate property was acquired by Nick prior to the marriage.
Nick’s expert valued the property at $255,000.00 while Ann’s
expert valued the property at $310,000.00.
valued the property at $275,000.00.
The trial court
In so doing the trial court
stated that it “finds that [Nick’s] appraisal is far less
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conservative than [Ann’s] is liberal”.
In her brief, Ann does
little more than argue that her expert should have been believed
over Nick’s expert.
It is not our function to second guess the
trial court’s decision as to which expert to believe.
There
being credible expert testimony to support the trial court’s
valuation, we will not disturb it.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Harlan
Circuit Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in
part, and remanded for additional proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND REPLY BRIEF FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS
APPELLANTS:
Gordon J. Dill
Ashland, Kentucky
Susan C. Lawson
Harlan, Kentucky
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