DONALD LEE NEWMAN v. TERRILL WAYNE NEWMAN, BENEFICIARY UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOE R. RIDDELL; FAMILY, INC, OWNED IN PART BY THE LATE JOE R. RIDDELL; DONALD B. HARRIS, CO-EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOE R. RIDDELL; AND DONALD VAZMINA, CO-EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOE R. RIDDELL DONALD LEE NEWMAN; AND ROBERT E. WIER v. TERRILL WAYNE NEWMAN AND FAMILY INC., OWNED IN PART BY THE LATE JOE R. RIDDELL
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RENDERED: January 21, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000343-MR
DONALD LEE NEWMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-02073
TERRILL WAYNE NEWMAN, BENEFICIARY
UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF JOE R. RIDDELL;
FAMILY, INC, OWNED IN PART
BY THE LATE JOE R. RIDDELL;
DONALD B. HARRIS, CO-EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF JOE R. RIDDELL; AND
DONALD VAZMINA, CO-EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF JOE R. RIDDELL
AND:
NO. 1998-CA-001216-MR
DONALD LEE NEWMAN; AND
ROBERT E. WIER
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-02073
TERRILL WAYNE NEWMAN AND
FAMILY INC., OWNED IN PART BY THE
LATE JOE R. RIDDELL
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART - REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
In 98-CA-343-MR, Donald Newman (Donald) appeals
from orders of the Fayette Circuit Court which granted summary
judgment in favor of Terrill Newman (Terrill), Family, Inc. (the
Corporation), and Donald B. Harris (Harris) and Donald Vazmina
(Vazmina) (collectively the Co-Executors).
In 98-CA-1216-MR,
Donald and his attorney, Robert E. Wier (Wier) appeal from an
order entered April 27, 1998, directing Wier to pay $14,000 in
sanctions to Terrill and the Corporation pursuant to CR 11 and CR
37.
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Although these two separate appeals have been
consolidated by order of this Court, we will treat them
separately for purposes of this opinion.
1998-CA-00343-MR
Donald and Terrill Newman are the sons of Durelle
Riddell (Durelle) and the step-sons of Joe Riddell (Joe).
Family, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of
Kentucky which was owned in part by Durelle and Joe.
Durelle died testate in August 1992.
Pursuant to the
terms of her will, all of her property passed to Joe, who was
also named executor of her estate.
Unfortunately for all
involved, Joe died testate in June 1995, before achieving final
settlement of Durelle’s estate.
Under the terms of his will, his
stock in the Corporation passed directly to Terrill, and Donald
and Terrill were to equally divide the remainder of his estate.
Harris and Vazmina were named co-executors of Joe’s estate in his
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will.
On August 23, 1995, Harris and Vazmina were appointed
successor co-executors of Durelle’s estate.
It appears that Donald became increasingly unhappy with
the Co-Executors’ handling of the two estates.
This unhappiness
culminated on or about November 3, 1995 when Donald filed a
motion with the Fayette District Court (the district court)
seeking to remove Harris and Vazmina as the co-executors of Joe’s
estate due to their alleged failure to file an inventory within
60 days and alleged depletion and mismanagement of estate assets.
This was followed by a motion filed on or about March 13, 1996
seeking to remove Harris and Vazmina as co-executors of Durelle’s
estate.
On April 3, 1996 following a hearing, the district
court entered a joint order in Joe and Durelle’s separate estates
requiring the Co-Executors to file a final settlement of
Durelle’s estate with the court prior to March 22, 1996.1
In
compliance with the district court’s order, the Co-Executors
filed a final settlement of Durelle’s estate on or about March
21, 1996 stating that Joe had received his share of her estate as
set forth in the will and that no claims or lawsuits had been
filed against her estate.
Donald responded by filing a notice of
exceptions to the proposed settlement on or about April 2, 1996.
On June 20, 1996, before the district court had an
opportunity to rule on Donald’s motion to remove the Co-Executors
and his exceptions to the final settlement of Durelle’s estate,
1
Apparently the district court ordered the parties to do the
above-mentioned things at the hearing on March 18, 1996 and did
not file the actual order until April 3, 1996.
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Donald filed suit in the Fayette Circuit Court against Terrill as
beneficiary of Joe’s estate, the Co-Executors in their capacity
as such in regard to Joe’s estate, and the Corporation as an
entity owned in part by Joe.
In the complaint, Donald alleged
that (1) the Co-Executors had failed to settle the estates of Joe
and Durelle; (2) the Co-Executors had failed to pursue or protect
assets of Joe’s estate, namely loans from Joe and/or Durelle to
Terrill and/or the Corporation, and rental from Terrill for use
of estate property; (3) the Co-Executors mismanaged Joe’s estate;
and (4) the Co-Executors had improperly favored Terrill in the
administration of Joe’s estate.
Donald asked that Joe’s estate
be settled, that the assets of Joe’s estate be properly
distributed, and that the Co-Executors be ordered to pay damages
for their alleged breach of fiduciary duties.
On August 21, 1996, the Co-Executors filed a motion
with the trial court asking for approval of the final settlement
in Durelle’s estate previously filed in the district court.
The
Co-Executors renewed their motion on August 28, 1996, this time
alleging that Donald had no standing to object or file exceptions
to the final settlement.
Despite the Co-Executor’s claims, the
trial court entered an order on August 28, 1996, giving Donald
fourteen days to serve interrogatories on the Co-Executors “which
shall contain only requests for discovery or information
concerning specific property or properties that [Donald] believes
to have been in the possession of the former Executor Joe R.
Riddell, or which [Donald] believes to have come into the
possession of the Co-Executors of the Estate of Durelle P.
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Riddell.” [emphasis deleted] The trial court ultimately approved
the settlement of Durelle’s estate by order entered September 19,
1996.
It appears that during a document inspection held in
October 1996, Donald discovered what he believed to be evidence
of loans from Joe and Durelle to the Corporation.
Apparently
Donald asked the Co-Executors to pursue collection of the alleged
loans because on October 21, 1996, they filed a motion asking to
be excused from the obligation of “determining the amount of,
payment of, and effect of checks payable to [the Corporation or
Terrill], marked “Loan” and made by Joe Riddell, and the
financial relationship between the parties.”
Although Donald
initially opposed the Co-Executor’s motion, on November 18, 1996
he filed his own motion seeking leave of the trial court to
proceed directly against Terrill and the Corporation to collect
$60,000 in loans allegedly made by Joe and Durelle.
Donald also
asked that Durelle’s estate be reopened to pursue collection of
any loans made by her.
In an order entered December 9, 1996, the
trial court granted Donald’s motion to proceed directly against
Terrill and the Corporation but denied permission to reopen
Durelle’s estate.
Donald filed his amended complaint, which
included an action under Count IV for recovery of the alleged
loans against Terrill and the Corporation, on January 13, 1997.
Immediately following the filing of the amended
complaint, Terrill and the Corporation filed a motion seeking
partial summary judgment as to Count IV.
One of the arguments
made in favor of summary judgement was that the checks relied
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upon by Donald did not constitute written contracts and as such
would fall under the five year statute of limitations for oral
contracts established by KRS 413.120(1).
Following a hearing,
the trial court entered an order on February 19, 1997 in which it
held “that checks written by [Joe and Durelle] do not constitute
written contracts as required by KRS 413.090 and are merely
evidence of potential oral contracts.”
In another order entered
February 24, 1997, the trial court held that Donald lacked
standing to assert claims against Terrill and the Corporation for
loans allegedly made by Durelle or debts allegedly owed to her or
her estate.
On May 13, 1997 the Co-Executors filed two motions
seeking summary judgment in their favor on Donald’s claims.
In
regard to Durelle’s estate, the Co-Executors argued the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact.
In regard to Joe’s estate,
the Co-Executors argued that Donald could only pursue the
collection of any loan made by Joe prior to five years before his
death and that Donald had failed to show reaffirmation of any
alleged corporate debt by the Corporation.
The case continued on in a similar manner for several
more months with all parties involved filing yet more motions for
summary judgment and responses thereto.
Finally, on October 13,
1997 the trial court entered an opinion and order ruling in
pertinent part:
1. On Plaintiff’s claim for sums owed to the
Riddell estate by Terrill Newman and Family,
Inc., judgment for the Defendants;
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2. On Plaintiff’s claim against the coexecutors for failing to pursue the above
sums, judgment for the Defendants[.]
In regard to Donald’s claims against Terrill and the Corporation
for the alleged loans made by Joe, the trial court first
summarized Donald’s evidence as follows:
Discovery has produced the following evidence
of potential oral contracts arising from
these “loans”:
1. checks made to Family, Inc. by Joe or
Durelle containing “loan,” “deposit,” or
other notations on the “for” line;
2. notations regarding “notes payable” on
Family, Inc.’s annual balance sheets, only
some of which name “Joe Riddell” or “JRR” as
creditor;
3. Joe and Durelle’s checkbook registers,
which contained “loan” notations under
various checks written to Family, Inc.;
4. Joe and Durelle’s check stubs containing
“loan” notations;
5. savings account pas [sic] books showing
withdrawals by Joe and Durelle;
6. Family, Inc.’s statements of interest
income;
7. Donald’s affidavit in which he states
that his parents intended Family, Inc. to
repay them;
8. Terrill’s affidavit that Joe and Durelle
made gifts to Family, Inc., without intending
repayment; and
9. a few miscellaneous pages from Family,
Inc. books.
In regard to Donald’s evidence, the trial court first found that
none of the above items rose to the level of a written contract.
In so holding, the trial court stated:
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Due to the lack of terms of repayment,
interest rates, etc., these remain, at best,
evidence of oral contracts.
To prove an enforceable oral contract to lend
money there must be definiteness in the
essential terms of the agreement. In
particular there must be proof of the amount
of money to be loaned, the time within which
the loan will be made, and the term of such
loan, i.e., whether the note will be payable
upon demand or upon a date certain.
In re Louden, 106 B.R. 109, 112 (Bankr.
E.D.Ky. 1989), citing Klein v. Citizens Union
Nat. Bank, Ky., 136 S.W.2d 770 (1940). Of
all the evidence of loans submitted by
Donald, only one loan (made in March 1973, in
the amount of $7,200) could possibly be
sufficiently definite in its terms. No other
evidence indicates whether the money was to
be repaid at all, much less the times for
repayment or the other terms of the loans.
The trial court further held that aside from his
failure to show that the above documents constituted enforceable
contracts, Donald’s claims were also barred by the statute of
limitations, stating:
Under KRS 413.120, oral contracts have a
five-year statute of limitations, while
written contracts are subject to a fifteenyear statute of limitations pursuant to KRS
413.090. As previously discussed, the Court
finds that none of the evidence of contracts
rises to the level of written contracts.
However, even if the loans were held to be
enforceable contracts, the vast majority
would be barred by the five-year statute of
limitations. Note that the January 1, 1975
Statement of Interest Income, the only
document the Court finds could possibly be
contorted into a written contract, would
still be barred by the fifteen year statute
of limitations.
In regard to Donald’s claim that the Corporation had
reaffirmed some of the alleged loans which were otherwise barred
by the statute of limitations, the trial court stated:
-8-
It must be remembered that before reaching
the issue of reaffirmation, the original
transactions must be proven, which as
previously discussed Donald cannot do because
of the lack of terms of repayment. Assuming,
though, that those original contracts could
be established, Kentucky law requires that to
escape the statute of limitations, a
reaffirmation or acknowledgment “must be a
distinct, unqualified, unconditional
recognition of an obligation for which the
person making the admission is liable.”
Vinson’s Ex’xs v. Maynard, Ky., 178 S.W.2d
603, 605 (1944). The acknowledgment must be
so clear and express that the acknowledgment
itself can be sued upon. Plaintiff argues
that the mere recording of “notes payable” on
Family, Inc.’s balance sheet every year is a
reaffirmation of debt owed to Joe by Family,
Inc. There are no express statements in
which a representative or agent of Family,
Inc. says he intends to repay the debt, or
that the debt is correct and owed, and there
are no corporate resolutions regarding debts
owed to Joe.
In regard to Donald’s claims against the Co-Executors,
the trial court held:
In light of the Court’s ruling on Terrill and
Family, Inc.’s summary judgment motion, the
co-executors cannot be held liable for their
failure to pursue and collect these loans.
Thus, to the extent that Donald’s claims
against the co-executors emanate from their
failure to collect the alleged loans to
Family, Inc. and Terrill on behalf of Joe’s
estate, the co-executors’ motion for partial
summary judgment is hereby sustained.
[emphasis deleted]
Summary judgment in favor of the Co-Executors on the
balance of Donald’s claims was entered on December 10, 1997.
The
trial court’s entry of summary judgment was made final by order
entered January 8, 1998.
This appeal followed.
will be developed where necessary.
-9-
Further facts
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN FAVOR OF TERRILL AND THE
CORPORATION?
Donald claims that the alleged loans from Joe to
Terrill and the Corporation fell into three categories: (1) a
long term loan made in 1973; (2) a capital loan for the purchase
of real estate in 1988; and (3) an operating line of credit
consisting of checks written by Joe from 1989 until his death in
1995.
We note at the outset that “[t]he standard of review on
appeal of a summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly
found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
Donald maintains that genuine issues of material fact exist
concerning not only the existence of the loans themselves, but
also the application of the applicable statutes of limitations.
A.
The 1973 Loan
Evidence contained in the record shows that on February
23, 1973, Joe wrote a check to the Corporation from a joint
account with Durelle in the amount of $7,200.
The “memo” line on
the check says “mortgage loan 218 E. Seventh St. Lexington Ky.”
In 1974 Terrill, in his capacity as vice president of the
Corporation, sent Joe a “Statement of Interest Income”
referencing a March 1973 loan in the amount of $7,200 at a yearly
interest rate of 7%.
According to the statement, as of March
1974 $720 had been paid on the principal and $504 had been paid
on interest, leaving a balance of $6,480.
-10-
In further support of his allegation that the 1973
check constituted a loan, Donald submitted two ledger sheets from
the Corporation titled “Note Payable, Joe R. Riddell, Maple
Street.
Those pages reflects the information contained in the
above-referenced interest statement, and also show interest
payments for 1975-1980.
What is interesting to note, however,
besides the difference in addresses between the check and the
ledger sheets, is that the interest payments for 1975-1980 were
calculated at an interest rate of 8.5.% as opposed to 7%.
Donald also alleges that a Balance Sheet for the
Corporation as of April 21, 1986, shows that the Corporation
“began rolling interest into the debt and carried the debt
unchanged from 1981 through 1986.”
This Balance Sheet has a line
stating “Notes Payable to Mr. Joe Riddell” indicating a balance
of $10,376.37.
Donald attached other sheets indicating the
accumulation of interest for 1987 and showing a balance of
$11,242.09, and alleged that this note was “subsumed” within the
alleged 1988 capital loan.
As noted above, the trial court indicated that this was
the only alleged loan which was sufficiently definite in its
terms (apparently based on the check and the interest statement
for 1974) to rise to the level of an oral contract, and that it
could “possibly be conforted into a written contract.”
We need not address Donald’s argument that genuine
issues of material fact exist concerning the existence of the
loan because, even if Donald was able to prevail on this point,
the trial court did not err in finding that the statute of
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limitations has long since expired.
Pursuant to KRS 413.120,
actions upon an oral contract are to be brought within five years
from the accrual of the cause of action.
Under KRS 413.090,
actions based on a written contract are to be brought within 15
years.
The question then becomes when did the cause of action on
the 1973 loan accrue?
It is a long-standing rule in Kentucky that a note
which is silent as to when payment is due is to be treated as a
demand note.
See Kendal v. Talbot, 8 Ky. 237 (1818); Payne v.
Mattox, 4 Ky. 164 (1808).
“A note payable on demand is treated
as a due note, and it is settled rule that the statute of
limitations, [sic] begins to run at the date of the note.”
v. Bank of Independence, Ky., 94 S.W.2d 991, 992 (1936).
Gould
All of
the documents which Donald purports to constitute the 1973 loan
are silent as to when payment is due.
As such, any cause of
action based on the 1973 loan accrued on February 23, 1973, that
being the date of the check.
Based on that date, the fifteen
year statute of limitations would have expired on February 23,
1988, and the five year statute of limitations would have expired
on February 23, 1978.
As Donald did not file suit until June 20,
1996 his claim is clearly time barred.
Because the cause of
action accrued as a matter of law on the date of the alleged
note, any discretion on the part of Joe in delaying or somehow
controlling collection of the note makes no difference.
B.
The 1988 Capital Loan
Donald alleges that in 1988 Terrill purchased a piece
of property at 507 N. Broadway for $165,000.
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Donald further
alleges that $130,000 of the purchase price came directly from
Joe through respective deposits of $80,000 and $50,000.
In
support of his allegations, Donald once again relies on a
compilation of several documents which he alleges constitutes
evidence of a loan.
These documents consist of (a) an
unidentified checkbook register showing check 759 dated May 25
payable to First Security in the amount of $50,000 with the
notation “loan on 507 N. B’way” written on the “for” line; (b) a
ledger sheet from the Corporation showing receipt of $80,000 with
the notation “Cash - Loan to Corp Cash (JRR)”; (c) passbooks for
accounts maintained by Joe and Durelle at Lexington Federal
Savings Bank showing respective withdrawals of $40,000 each on
May 20, 1988 along with a cashier’s check from Lexington Federal
Savings Bank dated May 20, 1988 payable to Joe or Durelle; (d) a
checkstub and check from the Corporation
dated June 2, 1988 in
the amount of $52,276.12 payable to Joe with “payment of
temporary loan on 507 N. Bdway” written on the checkstub and
“repay of temporary loan” written on the check; (e) a ledger
sheet from the Corporation showing payment of $35,000 to Joe with
the notation “Loan expense - repayment to JRR on 507"; and (f) a
comparative balance sheet for the years 1987-1988 showing a
column entitled “Notes Payable” with $11,242.09 listed for 1987
and $92,028.97 listed for 1988.2
2
Donald alleges that the $80,786.88 remaining for 1988 after
subtracting $11,242.09 constitues a principal of $80,000 with
$786.88 in accrued interest. There is no notation on this sheet
as to whom this note(s) was payable to or for what is was
payable.
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As the trial court noted in its opinion, the evidence
produced by Donald in regard to the existence of a 1988 loan
rises only to the level of evidence of a potential oral contract.
While there may, in fact, be a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether an oral contract exists, we note that his claim is
barred by the five year statute of limitations of KRS 413.120.
The statue of limitations for the check of May 25, 1988 would
have run on May 23, 1993.
Likewise, any cause of action in
regard to the $80,000 check of May 20, 1988 would have run on May
20, 1993.
Once again, Donald filed his action too late.
C.
Operating Line of Credit
Finally, Donald alleges that Joe continued to bankroll
the Corporation by extending an operating line of credit from
1989-1995.
As an example of his allegations, Donald introduced
numerous canceled checks written in 1991 to the Corporation with
“Loan” written on the memo line.
Out of all the checks
submitted, one was written by Joe, the rest by Durelle.
Donald
also submitted a checkbook register showing checks written to the
Corporation with “loan” inscribed underneath the entry.
Through
the pleadings submitted in this case, it appears that these
alleged loans total $74,263.51.
Donald freely admitted in his
pleadings filed with the trial court that
“no express written
note has yet surfaced applicable to these operating loans.”
Based on Donald’s admission, we once again agree with
the trial court that the evidence submitted in support of his
allegations rises only to the level of evidence of potential oral
contracts, thus subjecting his cause of action to the five year
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statue of limitations of KRS 413.120.
However, we disagree with
the trial court’s finding that the statute of limitations
precludes Donald’s cause of action as to all the checks.
Donald filed his amended complaint on January 13, 1997.
Based on that date, the statute of limitations would not bar
Donald’s action as to any check written after January 13, 1992.
Thus, Donald is entitled to reinstatement of his cause of action
for any alleged loan made by Joe in the form of a check written
after January 13, 1992.
D.
The Doctrine of Reaffirmation
Donald argues that by acknowledging the amount of debt
owed to Joe on its balance sheets from the early 1980s through
1992, the Corporation reaffirmed the debt and thus tolled the
statutes of limitation.
Donald summarized his evidence of the
Corporation’s reaffirmation as follows in his brief on appeal:
From 1979 through 1992, FI essentially had
one creditor, Joe Riddell. Beginning in
1980, FI annually reported as a “note
payable” on its balance sheet a figure
directly correlating to the amount it owed
Joe Riddell. [citation to record omitted]
Thus, from 1982 through the end of 1985, FI
annually recognized the identical figure of
$10,376.37 in the “notes payable” category.
In 1986, FI expressly labeled that category
as “Notes payable to Mr. Joe Riddell.”
[citation to record omitted] For each year
ending after 1986, the notes payable category
on the FI financial statement directly rose
and fell with the amount of money Joe Riddell
lent to or was repaid by FI. Thus, the
change from 1987 to 1988, a total of
$80,786.88, identically mirrors Joe Riddell’s
loan to FI of $80,000 for the purchase of 507
N. Broadway and $786.88 in interest payable
from the preceding year. [citation to record
omitted] Likewise, the debt change in 1991 is
exactly $21,863.51, the precise amount of
loans from Joe Riddell to FI for that year,
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and the precise amount of the checks
deposited as loans into FI for that year.
[citation to record omitted]
We agree with the trial court that the evidence offered by Donald
does not rise to the level of an affirmation.
Donald is correct that:
one under a moral, as well as a legal,
obligation to pay a note becomes liable upon
a new promise to pay made after the bar of
limitations has become complete, the new
promise creating a new obligation.
Vinson’s Ex’xs v. Maynard, Ky., 178 S.W.2d 603, 605 (1944).
However, what is equally clear is that a party claiming express
acknowledgment of a debt now barred by an applicable statute of
limitations must prove that acknowledgment by clear and
convincing evidence.
Hutsell v. Current’s Adm’r., Ky., 215
S.W.2d 978, 980 (1948).
[A]cknowledgement of a debt to lift the bar
of limitation must be a distinct,
unqualified, unconditional recognition of an
obligation for which the person making the
admission is liable. [citation omitted]. As
said in the early case of Harrison v.
Handley, 1 Bibb 443, and uniformly adhered
to, ‘The acknowledgment from which the law is
to raise a promise, contrary to the
provisions of the statute, must be clear and
express, where the mind is brought directly
to the point — debt or no debt at the present
time, not whether the debt was once an
existing demand.’
Maynard, 178 S.W.2d at 605.
Based on the foregoing, Donald has failed to show
reaffirmation of a debt now barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.
While he may have succeeded in showing that the
Corporation recorded “notes payable” on its books and balance
sheets, there is no evidence that Terrill, the Corporation or
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anyone else ever made a promise to repay any of the alleged
loans.
Merely acknowledging the existence of a debt on corporate
accounting books does not rise to the level of reaffirmation of a
debt now barred by the statute of limitations in the absence of
evidence of some type of promise to pay.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE COEXECUTORS?
Donald challenges the granting of summary judgment in
favor of the Co-Executors on several grounds, which we will
address separately.
A.
The Failure to Pursue the Alleged Loans
Donald argues that if loans existed but were rendered
uncollectible due to some action of the Co-Executors, an issue of
fact exists as to whether the Co-Executors breached their
fiduciary duty.
As to the alleged 1973 loan and the alleged 1988
capital loan, this argument is without merit.
As we have noted,
the statutes of limitation on both of these alleged loans ran
well before Joe’s death, therefore there was nothing for the CoExecutors to collect.
The issue of the operating line of credit,
however, is a different matter.
In regard to all of the checks written by Joe prior to
January 13, 1992, we believe that summary judgment in favor of
the Co-Executors was proper.
As the trial court stated, “[i]n
light of the Court’s ruling on Terrill and Family, Inc.’s summary
judgment motion, the co-executors cannot be held liable for their
failure to pursue and collect these loans.”
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However, in light of
the fact that we have ruled that Donald is entitled to
reinstatement of his cause of action for any checks written by
Joe after January 13, 1992, he is also entitled to the
reinstatement of any claim he may have against the Co-Executors
arising from these checks.
B.
Sale of the Residence
On July 31, 1996, the Co-Executors filed a motion
seeking leave to sell Joe and Durelle’s residence.
According to
the contract attached to the motion, the property was to be sold
for $78,500.
Although Donald objected to the sale of the
property in a response filed August 7, 1996, the trial court
entered an order approving the sale of the property on August 15,
1996.
On appeal, Donald alleges that the Co-Executors
breached their fiduciary duty in regard to the sale of the
property because (1) they failed to pursue sale of the property
in June 1995 when a neighbor expressed an interest in buying the
property; and (2) the Co-Executors knew the sale was invalid
because Joe’s estate was solvent.
Donald further alleges that
had the property sold in July 1995, the purchase price would have
been in the mid to high $80,000s.
Donald alleges that before
they could pursue the sale, Terrilll decided to retain the
property.
The Co-Executors deny knowledge of the neighbor’s
interest in the property.
Based on these facts, Donald argues
that the Co-Executors improperly favored Terrill to his
detriment.
We disagree.
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In regard to the alleged potential sale in July 1995,
Donald has brought forth nothing which shows that the CoExecutors acted improperly.
All he has shown is that some
neighbors expressed an interest in the property but it appears
that no offer was ever made.
Although Donald claims that he
informed the Co-Executors of his objection to letting Terrill
live on the property and urged them to pursue sale of the
property, he never undertook any formal proceedings to force sale
of the property.
Because Donald failed to attempt to protect his
interest in the property prior to the sale he now complains of,
he cannot now be heard to complain of the actions of the CoExecutors.
In regard to his objections in regard to the actual
sale of the property, we note that Donald has not directly
challenged the trial court’s order granting the Co-Executors
leave to sell the property.
As the Co-Executors point out in
their brief on appeal, Donald cannot claim that the Co-Executors
acted improperly when he has not yet shown that the sale was
somehow improper.
C.
Terrill’s Use of the Real Property
Donald argues that it was improper of the Co-Executors
to allow Terrill to live rent free in the residence for over a
year.
Donald also challenges the Co-Executors’ use of estate
funds to pay for Terrill’s utility expenses during the time he
lived in the property.
In support of his allegations, Donald
attached a register report from the estate checking account
showing payments to various utility companies from July 1, 1995
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to October 26, 1996.
In support of their actions, the Co-
Executors argue that they would have been unable to maintain
insurance on the house had it been allowed to remain vacant and
that the house was needed as storage space for the estate’s
personal property.
We agree with Donald that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the Co-Executors breached their
fiduciary duty in allowing Terrill to live rent free on the
property while paying his bills.
Thus, it was improper for the
trial court to grant summary judgment on this issue.
III. WERE THE FEES AWARDED TO THE COEXECUTORS AND/OR THEIR ATTORNEYS PROPER?
On October 21, 1996 the Co-Executors filed a motion
seeking leave of the trial court to pay themselves and their
attorney, Lawrence Sherman, $3,500 each.
It appears that Sherman
was the attorney retained by the Co-Executors to handle the
estates at issue herein.
Donald objected, arguing that the Co-
Executors had already taken $7,000 from the estate as “executor’s
fees,” and that payment of an additional $7,000 to the CoExecutors would result in a fee exceeding the maximum amount
permitted by KRS 395.150.
Donald further alleged that the Co-
Executors had produced no documentation as to the reasonableness
or necessity of any fee paid to Sherman.
The Co-Executors’
motion was granted by order of the trial court entered December
9, 1996.
On November 3, 1997 the Co-Executors filed a motion
seeking an order of the trial court “permitting them to pay the
attorney fees of Julius Rather and A. Lawrence Sherman, [and] to
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pay the Co-Executor fees[.]” Rather was the attorney who
represented the Co-Executors during the current action.
This was
followed by a second motion on November 11, 1997, in which the
Co-Executors sought $5,000 each as executor’s fees, $7,312.50 for
Rather, and $7,040.63 for Sherman.
Donald once again objected.
In regard to the Co-Executors’ fees, Donald alleged that although
the maximum fee for their services should be $12,524, they had
already received $14,000.
As to the attorneys’ fees, Donald
again argued that the reasonableness of the fees sought had not
yet been established.
On November 21, 1997, the Co-Executors
filed a joint affidavit in which they argued that they had spent
an “inordinate” amount of time exercising their duty as CoExecutors, thus justifying payment of the fee sought.
The trial
court entered an order granting the Co-Executor’s motion on
November 25, 1997.
Aside from the motions filed by the Co-Executors,
Donald alleges that the estate check register shows various
payments to the Co-Executors, Rather and Sherman which he
contends were unauthorized by the trial court.
Pursuant to KRS 395.150, the amount paid to an executor
for his services as such is not to exceed 5% of the value of the
decedent’s personal property plus 5% of the value of the income
collected by the executor.
KRS 395.150(1).
However, if the
executor is able to show that he:
has performed additional services in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, the
court may allow to the executor . . . such
additional compensation as would be fair and
reasonable for the additional services
rendered, if the additional services were:
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(a) Unusual or extraordinary and not normally
incident to the administration of a
decedent’s estate[.]
KRS 395.150(2)(a).
Based on the record compiled herein, it
cannot be seriously argued that the Co-Executors did not render
services of an unusual or extraordinary nature.
The Co-Executors
were forced to defend against Donald’s claims in what has been a
hard fought battle from the beginning over the Riddell estates.
Hence, they are clearly entitled to a fee in excess of the 5%
minimum.
The record also supports the payment of fees to
attorneys Rather and Sherman.
We see no error on the part of the
Co-Executors in retaining Sherman to handle the two estates at
issue in this dispute and in also retaining Rather to defend
against Donald’s claims.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court
did not err in its award of fees.
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO
REOPEN DURELLE’S ESTATE?
Finally, Donald argues that the trial court erred in
refusing to reopen Durelle’s estate once he came forward with
evidence of alleged loans from Durelle to Terrill and/or the
Corporation.
We disagree.
First, Donald’s claim in regard to any loans allegedly
made by Durelle suffer from the same deficiency as his claims in
regard to loans allegedly made by Joe - they are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitation.
Secondly, we agree with the
trial court’s holding that Donald lacks standing to assert a
claim against Durelle’s estate as he was not an heir thereto.
Hence, the trial court did not err in refusing to reopen
Durelle’s estate.
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96-CA-1216-MR
In this appeal, Donald and his attorney, Robert E. Weir
challenge the trial court’s assessment of sanctions in the amount
of $14,000 pursuant to CR 11 and CR 37.
On May 5, 1997 Terrill and the Corporation filed a
motion to compel pursuant to CR 37 seeking an order requiring
Donald to respond to outstanding interrogatories and requests for
production of documents.
In its motion, Terrill alleged that he
propounded discovery to Donald on January 29, 1997 for the
purpose of ascertaining the nature of Donald’s claims.
Specifically, Terrill asked Donald to identify each loan which he
claimed needed to be repaid.
Terrill alleges that when Donald
requested that the discovery requests be drafted more
specifically, Terrill complied and forwarded the redrafted
discovery requests to Donald.
In further support of his
allegations, Terrill alleged that Donald was evasive to questions
regarding the identity of any alleged loans.
On May 1, 1997 Donald responded to the motion to compel
by arguing that the redrafted requests constituted a second set
of interrogatories.
It appears that Donald provided responses to
Interrogatories 1-7, but refused to answer interrogatories no. 817 on the ground that they were in excess of the number of
interrogatories allowed by the Rules of Civil Procedure and that
he had already responded to discovery requests.
Donald
maintained that he timely and adequately responded to Terrill’s
first discovery requests, and later voluntarily supplemented his
responses to avoid a discovery dispute.
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Donald argued that when
he received the second set of discovery requests he refused to
respond to any surplus questions.
On May 20, 1997 the trial court entered an order
granting the motion to compel and ordering Donald to specifically
identify each alleged loan and for each to state why it would not
be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
The order
further provided that Terrill’s request for sanctions would be
taken under advisement for resolution at a future date.
In a second order entered April 27, 1998 the trial
court ordered Weir to reimburse Terrill and the Corporation a
total of $14,000; $2,000 attributable to CR 37 and $12,000
attributable to CR 11.3
In regard to the sanctions pursuant to
CR 37, the trial court found that Donald’s “opposition to the
motion to compel was not substantially justified, and that there
are no other circumstances which make an expense award unjust.”
As to the Rule 11 sanctions, the trial court noted that Terrill
had filed an invoice showing accrued attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $24,700.80.
In awarding Terrill $12,000 in attorneys’
fees, the trial court stated:
Although not inclined to grant the entire
cost of the defendse [sic], the Court does
find that Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants were not well grounded in fact and
were not warranted by existing law.
Plaintiff’s evidence of checks, checkbook
registers, corporate ledgers and the like do
not constitute written contracts, and even if
they did, Plaintiff had insurmountable
statute of limitations problems which were
obvious from the beginning of the suit.
3
It appears that Terrill later moved for Rule 11 sanctions
some time after his motion to compel.
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Pursuant to CR 37.01, a party who files a motion to
compel and ultimately succeeds is entitled to an award of
“reasonable attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”
37.01(d)(i).
CR
Based on our examination of the record herein, we
believe there was a genuine and reasonable dispute as to whether
Donald was required to respond to the discovery requests in
question and that his opposition to Terrill’s motion was
justifiable.
Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding costs
pursuant to CR 37.
Pursuant to CR 11:
The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certification by him that he
has read the pleading, motion or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation. . . . If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee.
Once again, based on our review of the record we do not
believe that sanctions are warranted in this case.
Donald had
evidence of what he believed to be loans from Durelle and Joe to
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Terrilll and the Corporation.
While he ultimately did not
prevail on his claim, we believe that his claim was grounded in
fact and warranted by law, particularly in light of the questions
raised regarding the statutes of limitation.
While there is
obviously quite a bit of bad blood between Donald and Terrill, we
have found no evidence that Donald’s claim was filed for an
improper purpose.
Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
orders of the Fayette Circuit Court entered October 13, 1997
granting summary judgment in favor of Terrill, the Corporation
and the Co-Executors is affirmed except to the extent that it
grants summary judgment on Donald’s claim regarding checks
written by Joe after January 13, 1992.
That portion of the order
is reversed and the matter remanded for reinstatement of that
portion of Donald’s claim.
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered
December 10, 1997 granting summary judgment in favor of the CoExecutors is affirmed except to the extent that it grants summary
judgment on Donald’s claim regarding Terrill’s rent-free use of
the residence and the Co-Executor’s payment of Terrill’s utility
expenses from estate funds.
That portion of the order is
reversed and the matter remanded for reinstatement of Donald’s
claim regarding that matter.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, DONALD NEWMAN:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, TERRILL NEWMAN:
Robert E. Wier
Lexington, KY
Thomas D. Bullock
Lexington, KY
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, HARRIS & VAZMINA:
Julius Rather
Lexington, KY
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