FRANKLIN COUNTY, FRANKLIN COUNTY FISCAL COURT; DAVID W. HUGHES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS FRANKLIN COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE; AND JAMES KEMPER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS FRANKLIN COUNTY JAILER V. JENNIFER VEST; KAREN POOLE, VICKI HULETTE, JENNY WILSON, AND EVIN EVINS
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 8, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003051-MR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, FRANKLIN COUNTY
FISCAL COURT; DAVID W. HUGHES, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
FRANKLIN COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE;
AND JAMES KEMPER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS FRANKLIN COUNTY JAILER
v.
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. TRUDE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00283
JENNIFER VEST; KAREN POOLE,
VICKI HULETTE, JENNY WILSON,
AND EVIN EVINS
AND:
APPELLEES
NO. 1998-CA-000330-MR
FRANKLIN COUNTY,
FRANKLIN COUNTY FISCAL COURT;
DAVID W. HUGHES, FRANKLIN
COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE;
JAMES KEMPER, JR., JAILER
OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
v.
APPELLANTS
APELLEES
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. TRUDE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00283
JENNIFER VEST; KAREN POOLE;
VICKI HULETTE; JENNY WILSON;
EVIN EVANS; DOROTHY M. PITT;
AND RAYMOND L. SMITH
OPINION AND ORDER
APPELLEES
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Appellants Franklin County (the County),
Franklin County Fiscal Court (the fiscal court), David W. Hughes
in his capacity as Franklin County Judge Executive (Hughes), and
James Kemper, Jr., Jailer of Franklin County(Kemper)(collectively
the Appellants)1 appeal from various orders of the Franklin and
Scott Circuit Courts entered in conjunction with a civil action
filed by Jennifer Vest (Vest), Karen Poole (Poole), Vicki Hulette
(Hulette), Jenny Wilson (Wilson) and Evin Evins
(Evins)(collectively the Appellees).2
We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
BACKGROUND FACTS
While employed at the Franklin County Correctional
Facility, the Appellees herein were subjected to acts of sexual
harassment by Hunter Hay (Hay), the former Franklin County
Jailer, and were retaliated against when they resisted his
advances.
Appellees Vest, Poole, Hulette, and Wilson, all of
whom are female, were subjected to acts of sexual abuse by Hay
during the course of their employment.
Evins, a male, was also a
1
It appears that Hughes and Kemper were substituted for
Robert Arnold, in his capacity as Franklin County Judge
Executive, and Hunter Hay, Franklin County Jailer, by order of
this Court entered December 4, 1998.
2
The civil action was originally filed in the Franklin
Circuit Court. Judge William W. Trude, Jr., was designated as
Special Judge for the purpose of presiding over the matter.
Venue was ultimately transferred to the Scott Circuit Court with
Judge Trude still presiding. Hence, the orders appealed from
were entered in both the Franklin and Scott Circuit Courts.
-2-
victim of sexual harassment as well as retaliation.
Hay was
ultimately convicted and imprisoned for numerous criminal acts
committed in conjunction with his conduct towards some of the
Appellees herein and other individuals.
On December 15, 1994, the Appellees and four other
individuals3 filed an action in the Franklin Circuit Court
against the Appellants herein alleging that they were sexually
harassed in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KRS
Chapter 344 et seq.)(the KCRA) and/or retaliated against in
violation of both the KCRA and Kentucky’s Whistleblower Act (KRS
61.010 et seq.)(the KWA).
The basis of the Appellees’ complaint
was that the County and its elected officials had knowledge of
Hay’s conduct and failed to take steps to end it and/or
acquiesced in or furthered Hay’s conduct.
For purposes of this appeal, the following orders
entered by the trial court are relevant.
On May 23, 1996, the
trial court entered an order of partial summary judgment in which
it found that (a) the County and/or the fiscal court was the
employer of the Appellees; and (b) the Appellants were not immune
from suit under the KCRA.
On January 13, 1997, the trial court entered partial
summary judgement in favor of the Appellees, finding:
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not
the Defendants are collaterally estopped from denying that Hay
subjected the Plaintiffs to sexually harassing conduct and
subjected the Plaintiffs to a sexually hostile work place.
3
These four individuals ultimately accepted offers of
judgment in regard to their claims and are not parties to this
appeal.
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On June 18, 1997, the trial court entered an order
changing the venue of the action from Franklin County to Scott
County.
The reasons given for the change of venue were as
follows:
[T]he plaintiffs cannot have a fair or impartial trial in
Franklin County. This finding is based on the fact that several
of the Defendants are elected officials of Franklin County and is
further based on the fact that recent newspaper articles in
Franklin County have openly discussed the fiscal impact that this
litigation may have on the County. It is clear from these
articles that a potential exists for an increase in tax liability
to the citizens (and jurors) of Franklin County depending on the
outcome of this action.
On July 21, 1997, the trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, “holding
Franklin County liable as a matter of law for the Plaintiffs’
damages related to the quid pro quo and hostile work environment
sexual harassment suffered by the female plaintiffs[.]” The order
further recited that “[t]he only issue left to be resolved during
the trial of this matter, pertaining to the sexual harassment of
the female plaintiffs, is the amount of damages each is entitled
to receive.”
Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment
in accordance with the jury’s verdict on October 23, 1997 (the
October judgment).
The judgment found that Vest, Poole, Hulette,
and Wilson were retaliated against and subjected to sexual
harassment and that they were entitled to damages for
embarrassment, humiliation, and mental distress as follows:
Vest
Poole
Hulette
Wilson
$ 200,000
$ 250,000
$2,000,000
$2,500,000
-4-
The judgement also found that Hulette and Wilson were
constructively discharged and awarded damages representing lost
wages and benefits as follows:
Hulette
Wilson
$21,528
$21,757.44
In regard to Evins, the judgment found that although he
was sexually harassed and retaliated against, he was not entitled
to damages for humiliation and embarrassment.
However, he was
awarded $8,892 for lost wages and benefits stemming from his
claims of retaliation.
Evins was further awarded punitive
damages in the amount of $75,000 for retaliation in violation of
the KWA.
The Appellees were further found to be entitled to
recover their attorneys’ fees and costs.
The judgment further
provided that the damages awarded were subject to a statutory
post-judgment interest rate of 12%.
On January 9, 1998, the trial court entered an order
denying the Appellants’ various post-judgment motions for relief
(the January order).
In the same order, the Appellees were
awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $364,512 and costs in
the amount of $16,956.87, both of which were subject to the
statutory post-judgment interest rate of 12%.
This appeal
followed.
Before discussing the merits of the appeal, we must
first consider a matter which was passed for our consideration by
a three-judge motion panel of this Court.
As noted above, the
first judgement was entered in this case in October 1997.
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It is
clear from a review of that judgement that it is not final and
appealable.
The Appellants filed their motions for post-judgment
relief on November 3, 1997 and a hearing on those motions was
held on November 21, 1997.
Prior to the hearing, the Appellees
contended that the post-judgment motions were defective because
they were improperly served.
Acting on the Appellees’ concerns
and also due to their own belief that the motions, if defective,
would not suspend the time for appealing from the October
judgment, the Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the
October judgment on November 24, 1997.
designated as 97-CA-3051.
This appeal was
On February 5, 1998, the Appellants
filed a notice of appeal from the January order, which was
designated as 98-CA-0330.
On July 10, 1998, the Appellants filed two motions with
this Court regarding its notices of appeal.
The first motion,
filed in 98-CA-0330, asked that the Appellants be given leave to
amend their notice of appeal to include an appeal from the
October judgment as well as the January order.
The second
motion, filed in 97-CA-3051, asked that the notice of appeal in
that case be permitted to relate forward and treated as filed
after entry of the trial court’s January order.
In response to
the Appellants’ motions, the Appellees argued that the motions
should be denied on the ground that they have been prejudiced by
the Appellants’ actions.
We note that 97-CA-3051 and 98-CA-0330
were consolidated by order of this Court entered September 9,
1998.
-6-
After reviewing the parties’ arguments relating to this
issue, we feel the proper way to resolve this dispute is to allow
the notice of appeal filed in 97-CA-3051 to relate forward.
There is little doubt that the notice of appeal taken from the
trial court’s October judgment is premature as that judgment is
not final and appealable.
We also find that the Appellants’
action in filing the notice of appeal prematurely was taken in
good faith in regard to the concerns raised regarding the filing
of their motions for post-judgment relief.
In Johnson v. Smith, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 944 (1994), the
Kentucky Supreme Court construed the Kentucky rules of appellate
procedure to allow a prematurely filed notice of appeal to relate
forward and mature as of the date on which the trial court enters
final judgment.
In so holding, the Court stated:
[I]n the leading case on the subject, Ready
v. Jamison, Ky., 705 S.W.2d 479 (1986), we
held that defects in the notices of appeal
consisting of “fail[ure] to properly
designate a final judgment” . . . did not
require automatic dismissal. As here, the
notices of appeal, albeit defective, were
sufficient to put the appellees on notice of
the intent to appeal. In Ready, we stated:
While our court continues to have a
compelling interest in maintaining
an orderly appellate process, the
penalty for breach of a rule should
have a reasonable relationship to
the harm caused. Likewise, the
sanction imposed should bear some
reasonable relationship to the
seriousness of the defect.
. . .
With this new
recognize, to
further three
objectives of
policy we seek to
reconcile and to
significant
appellate practice:
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achieving an orderly appellate
process, deciding cases on the
merits, and seeing to it that
litigants do not needlessly suffer
the loss of their constitutional
right to appeal.”
Id. at 482.
Consistent with the policy announced in
Ready, there is no reason why, even assuming
these appeals should be deemed “premature,”
this should require dismissal. . . . [T]he
notices of appeal filed here put appellees on
notice of the intent to appeal before
expiration of the thirty day time limit in CR
73.02(1)(a), and thus served the essential
purpose of the rule. A rule of relation
forward, as in the federal courts, invoking
appellate jurisdiction as of the time postjudgment motions are ruled on, is adequate to
protect the needs of the appellees.
Johnson, 885 S.W.2d at 949.
We will address each of the Appellants’ arguments on
appeal separately .
Further facts will be developed where
necessary.
I.
SHOULD ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON
THE GROUND OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY?
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, all claims
brought against the state for monetary damages are precluded by
Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides:
The General Assembly may, by law,
direct in what manner and in what
courts suits may be brought against
the Commonwealth.
The protection afforded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity
extends not only to the state, but also to counties, county
agencies, and elected county officials when sued in their
capacity as such.
See First National Bank v. Christian County,
-8-
Ky., 106 S.W. 831 (1908)(holding that doctrine of sovereign
immunity precludes suits for damages against counties); Franklin
County, Kentucky v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195 (1997)(holding
that any action filed against elected county official in his
official capacity is precluded by doctrine of sovereign
immunity).; Cullinan v. Jefferson County , Ky. App., 418 S.W.2d
407 (1967)(holding that protection of sovereign immunity extends
to county school board).
Thus, there is no question at the
outset that the Appellants are protected by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
However, the analysis does not end there.
Once we determine that an entity is entitled to
sovereign immunity protection, we cannot refuse to apply it or
otherwise ignore the protection it affords.
Withers v.
University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 344 (1997).
However, we are entitled to “consider whether or in what manner
there has been a legislative waiver of immunity.”
SW.2d at 344.
Withers, 939
In determining whether a waiver of sovereign
immunity has occurred due to legislative action, the Withers
Court adopted the following test enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court:
[W]e will find waiver only where
stated “by the most express
language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other
reasonable construction.”
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1361, 39
L.Ed.2d 662, 678 (1974), citing Murry v. Wilson Distilling Co.,
213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 464-465, 53 L.Ed 742, ____
(1909).
In light of the foregoing standard, the Appellants’
-9-
argument that a waiver of sovereign immunity by the General
Assembly must be express in nature as opposed to implied is
without merit.
If the Appellees can show that a particular
statute waives sovereign immunity by overwhelming implication,
their claims are properly allowed to proceed.
We will now
evaluate each of the Appellees’ claims under the Withers standard
to determine whether sovereign immunity has, in fact, been
waived.
KENTUCKY CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Appellants contend that there is nothing in the KCRA
which can possibly be construed as a waiver of their sovereign
immunity protection.
We disagree.
At the outset, we note that the Appellants correctly
argue that there is nothing in the KCRA which acts as an express,
straightforward waiver of sovereign immunity.
However, there are
several provisions of the KCRA which, when read and considered as
a whole, constitute an overwhelming implication that the General
Assembly intended to waive sovereign immunity for purposes of
claims brought against the state under the KCRA.
Under KRS 344.040, it is unlawful:
for an employer:
(1) To fail or refuse to hire, or
to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against
an individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of
the individual’s . . . sex[.]
KRS 344.010(1) (emphasis added).
Under KRS 344.030, “employer”
is defined for purposes of KRS 344.030-344.110 as:
-10-
a person who has eight (8) or more
employees within the state in each
of twenty (20) or more calendar
weeks in the current or proceeding
calendar year and an agent of such
a person[.]
KRS 344.030(2) (emphasis added).
Finally, for the purposes of
the KCRA, “person” is defined to specifically include “the state,
any of its political or civil subdivisions or agencies.”
344.010(1).
KRS
Thus, when construing KRS 344.040 alongside the
relevant definitions contained in KRS 344.030 and KRS 344.010, it
becomes clear that sovereign immunity has been waived by
overwhelming implication to allow claims for violation of the
KCRA to proceed against the state.4
To interpret the KCRA to
hold that it is unlawful for the State to discriminate against
its employees on the basis of sex but then find that there is no
remedy for state employees who have been discriminated against
would be absurd.
Federal courts construing the same provisions of the
KCRA have reached the same conclusion.
In Lococo v. Barger, 958
F.Supp. 290 (E.D. Ky. 1997), the federal court utilized the same
definitions of “employer” and “person” in finding that both Perry
County and its elected officials were “not immune from suit under
KRS Chapter 344 and are considered an employer if they employ
either (8) or more persons[.]” Lococo, 958 F.Supp. at 294.
Pursuant to KRS 344.020, the general purposes of the KCRA include
4
The same conclusion was reached by a three-judge panel of
this Court in the unpublished opinion of Furr v. Department of
Corrections, 1997-CA-002550-MR, rendered January 29, 1999, which
was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Department of
Corrections v. Furr, Ky., ___ S.W.3d ____ (2000).
-11-
providing “for execution within the state of the policies
embedded in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended
[Title VII][.]” KRS 344.020(1).
Although the KCRA and Title VII,
its federal counterpart, are not identical, this Court has noted
that due to the many similarities between the two pieces of
legislation, federal case law construing the provisions of Title
VII “are most persuasive, if not controlling, in interpreting the
Kentucky statute.”
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v.
Commonwealth, Department of Justice, Bureau of State Police, Ky.,
586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (1979).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in
allowing Appellees’ claims under the KCRA to proceed.
KENTUCKY WHISTLEBLOWER ACT
Like the previous argument, the Appellants contend that
there is nothing in the KWA which acts as a waiver of sovereign
immunity.
Again, and for reasons quite similar to our previous
analysis, we disagree.
Under KRS 61.102:
No employer shall subject to
reprisal, or directly or indirectly
use, or threaten to use, any
official authority or influence, in
any manner whatsoever, which tends
to discourage, restrain, depress,
dissuade, deter, prevent, interfere
with, coerce, or discriminate
against any employee who in good
faith reports, discloses, divulges,
or otherwise brings to the
attention of the Kentucky
Legislative Ethics Commission, the
Attorney General, the Auditor of
Public Accounts, the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky or any of its members or
employees, the Legislative Research
-12-
Commission or any of its
committees, members, or employees,
the judiciary or any member or
employee of the judiciary, any law
enforcement agency or its
employees, or any other appropriate
body or authority, any facts or
information relative to an actual
or suspected violation of any law,
statute, executive order,
administrative regulation, mandate,
rule, or ordinance of the United
States, the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, or any of its political
subdivisions, or any facts or
information relative to actual or
suspected mismanagement, waste,
fraud, abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to
pubic health or safety. No
employer shall require any employee
to give notice prior to making such
a report, disclosure, or
divulgence.
KRS 61.102(1).
For purposes of the KWA, “employee” is defined
as:
a person in the service of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any of
its political subdivisions, who is
under contract of hire, express or
implied, oral or written, where the
Commonwealth, or any of its
political subdivisions, has the
power or right to control and
direct the material details of work
performance[.]
KRS 61.101(1).
“Employer” is defined as:
the Commonwealth of Kentucky or any
of its political subdivisions.
Employer also includes any person
authorized to act on behalf of the
Commonwealth, or any of its
political subdivisions, with
respect to formulation of policy or
the supervision, in a managerial
capacity, of subordinate
employees[.]
KRS 61.101(2).
-13-
Once again, in construing KRS 61.102 in light of the
definitions contained in KRS 61.101, it becomes clear that
sovereign immunity has been waived by overwhelming implication to
allow claims for violation of the KWA to proceed against the
state.
Like our holding regarding the KCRA, it would be absurd
to hold under the KWA that it is illegal for the State to
retaliate against a “whistleblowing” state employee but provide
no cause of action for redress.
II.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN CHANGING
VENUE OF THE TRIAL FROM FRANKLIN
COUNTY TO SCOTT COUNTY?
On February 13, 1997, some two years after the filing
of their original action, the Appellees moved the trial court for
a change of venue from Franklin County.
In the motion, the
Appellees stated the following grounds for the change sought:
a.
Fear that the citizens of Franklin
County will be unwilling to award the
Plaintiffs adequate compensation for
their injuries for fear that their taxes
will be raised.
b.
Plaintiffs’ belief that it will be
impossible to obtain a jury that
does not include people who voted
for or support Hunter Hay, Robert
Arnold, or any of the other fiscal
court magistrates, who have sternly
and aggressively denied liability
in this action.
The Appellees indicated that the granting of the change of venue
would not affect the pending trial date.
The Appellants responded to the motion of the Appellees
on February 27, 1997.
The Appellants argued that the allegations
in the Appellees’ motion were unsupported by any evidence, namely
affidavits from individuals stating their belief that the
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Appellees would not receive a fair and impartial trial in
Franklin County.
Appellants further contended that the
Appellees’ motion was untimely.
The Appellants supplemented their motion on May 21,
1997, to include two newspaper articles from the Frankfort State
Journal.
The first article, dated May 14, 1997 and titled
“County pay raise remains hot issue,” dealt with topics discussed
during a County budget meeting.
The article briefly discussed
the Appellees’ law suit, in particular the concerns of one county
magistrate that “We are in a big lawsuit that we may wind up
spending a lot of money on very soon.”
The balance of the
article dealt with other budget concerns which did not address
the Appellees’ law suit.
The Appellees alleged that after this
article appeared, one of the non-appellee plaintiffs was
approached by other co-workers with their concern that it was the
plaintiffs’ fault that county employees may not get pay raises.
The second article was an editorial entitled “Not a
dime” which appeared on May 18, 1997.
The editorial focused on
the payment of a total of $530,000 to the four plaintiffs who
settled their claims against the Appellants from the County’s
surplus fund.
The focus of the article was not the payment of
the settlement itself, but rather that no payment should be made
unless and until concerns regarding conflicts of interest
regarding several of the defendants and their ties with the
County’s insurer could be addressed.
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The trial court heard the parties’ arguments concerning
the change of venue in a telephonic hearing on April 18, 1997.5
The trial court entered its order changing venue on June 18,
1997.
The Appellants claim that based on their affidavits,
there was no showing that the Appellees would have been unable to
receive a fair trial in Franklin County.
We note at the outset
that the decision as to whether to change venue is soundly vested
in the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on
appeal unless an abuse of that discretion can be shown.
Adm’r v. Leachman, Ky., 105 S.W.2d 1043, 1044 (1937).
Lemings’
We do not
believe that an abuse of discretion has occurred in this case.
Pursuant to KRS 452.010, a change of venue is
appropriate “when it appears that, because of the undue influence
of his adversary or the odium that attends the party applying or
his cause of action or defense, or because of the circumstances
or nature of the case he cannot have a fair and impartial trial
in the county.”
KRS 452.010(2).
Once a party decides that a
change of venue is warranted, he is to petition for it by filing
a verified motion with the trial court which sets forth the
grounds as to why a change of venue is appropriate.
KRS 452.030.
The trial court is then required to hold a hearing, and either
5
The hearing was heard over the telephone pursuant to a
scheduling order dated January 5, 1996, which provided that all
motions would be heard telephonically unless a party tendered a
motion requesting that the matter be heard in open court. As the
Appellants never requested that the arguments on this motion be
heard in person and raised no objection to the proceedings until
after the trial court entered its order changing venue, they
cannot now be heard to complain that the telephonic hearing was
somehow improper.
-16-
party may at that time present witnesses to support his position.
Id.
Contrary to the Appellants’ assertions, there is nothing in
the statutes dealing with venue and the change thereof which
required the Appellees to submit affidavits in support of their
motion.
The Appellants are correct in their assertion that the
fact that those called to serve as jurors in this case if tried
in Franklin County had an indirect interest in the matter as
county taxpayers is not enough to warrant a change in venue.
See
Rand, McNally & Co. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 106 S.W. 238, 239
(1907); Graziani v. Burton, Ky., 97 S.W. 800, 801 (1906).6
Had
that been the only ground on which the trial court could have
based its finding, we may have been inclined to agree with the
Appellants that a change of venue was inappropriate.
But there
are other factors involving this case which we believe support
the trial court’s decision.
All of the parties in this case are
either former or current county employees and/or elected county
officials.
The facts of this case involve a county jailer who
subjected county employees to sexual harassment and humiliation
and county officials who allegedly looked the other way.
It goes
without saying that the facts of this case, both salacious and
otherwise, have been the source of widespread publicity
throughout the community and the state not only during the
pendency of this case but also before and during Hay’s criminal
6
The cases of Big Sandy Ry. Co. v. Floyd County, Ky., 101
S.W.2d 354 (1907) and City of Pikeville v. Riddle, Ky., 230
S.W.2d 37 (1921) relied on by the Appellants have no application
here as both deal with the issue of disqualification of jurors
and not the issue of change of venue.
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trial.
Although the trial court named the potential for an
increase in taxes in Franklin County as grounds for change of
venue, there are other factors which support the trial court’s
holding that the Appellees “cannot have a fair or impartial Trial
[sic] in Franklin County.”
“The trial court’s decision [as to
venue] must be given great weight due to the fact that it was
present in the county and aware of the environment.”
Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293, 299 (1997).
Bowling v.
We find no abuse
of discretion in regard to the change of venue in this case.
III. DID THE JURY’S VERDICT
IMPERMISSIBLY HOLD THE APPELLANTS
LIABLE FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF
HUNTER HAY?
During the trial, the Appellees testified in regard to
the incidents for which Hay had been indicted and convicted.
Vest testified regarding two instances of sexual assault
inflicted upon her by Hay, one in 1987 and one in 1990.7
Hulette
testified that Hay was indicted for sexual assault and attempted
rape, and she further described the acts to the jury.8
The
testimony of Wilson and Poole was along similar lines.9
Evins, who brought causes of action for both sexual
harassment and violation of the KWA, testified that Hay
7
As to Vest, the grand jury charged that Hay committed first
degree sexual abuse by subjecting her to sexual contact through
forcible compulsion.
8
As to Hulette, the grand jury charged that Hay committed
first-degree attempted rape and first-degree sexual abuse.
9
As to Wilson, Hay was charged with first-degree rape,
first- degree sodomy, and first-degree attempted rape. As to
Poole, Hay was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual
abuse.
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repeatedly made comments about wanting to have sex with Evins’
wife and on several occasions hinted that Evins’ job security
hinged on his giving consent.
Evins also alleged that Hay
retaliated against him when he contacted the state police, FBI,
and Department of Corrections regarding Hay’s conduct.
At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed that
the Appellees were victims of both quid pro quo sexual harassment
and hostile environment sexual harassment inflicted by Hay, that
they were all County employees, that the County knew about Hay’s
conduct, and that the County failed to take corrective measures
and was therefore liable for the damages, if any, resulting from
Hay’s conduct.
The jury was further instructed to award damages
to the female appellees if it found that (a) Hunter’s conduct was
a substantial factor in causing their injuries; and (b) if it
believed they were retaliated against for opposing Hay’s conduct.
As set forth earlier, the jury awarded damages to all of the
female appellees, with Wilson and Hulette receiving the largest
verdicts.
The Appellants contend that because the female
appellees only testified in regard to the criminal acts committed
against them by Hay, the jury’s verdict impermissibly holds them
liable for Hay’s criminal activity.
In support of their
argument, the Appellants cite Southeastern Greyhound Lines v.
Harden’s Adm’x, Ky., 136 S.W.2d 42 (1940) for the proposition
that an employer is not liable for its employee’s commission of
an intentional criminal act against a third person.
As proof of
their argument, the Appellants point to the fact that the
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verdicts awarded to each of the female appellees reflect the
seriousness of Hay’s conduct as to them (ranging from an award of
$2,500,000 to Wilson for rape, sodomy, and attempted rape to $0
for Evins because no proof of criminal conduct was set forth).
We disagree.
In the seminal and oft-cited case of Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49
(1986), the United States Supreme Court recognized a cause of
action for hostile environment sexual harassment.
Under that
decision, an employer can be held liable for sexual acts of an
employee “which are sufficiently severe or pervasive “to alter
the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive
working environment.”[citation omitted].”
Vinson, 477 U.S. at
67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d at 60, citing Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982).
The Court further held that Vinson’s
allegations that she had sexual relations with a supervisor some
40-50 times at his request out of fear that refusal would cost
her her job, “are plainly sufficient to state a claim for hostile
environment sexual harassment.”
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, 106
S.Ct. at 2405-2406, 91 L.Ed.2d at 60.
As the Appellees point out
in their brief, there is a veritable myriad of case law which
holds that a criminal act such as the rape of one employee by
another is sufficient to show the existence of a hostile
environment.
We believe that in making this argument, the Appellants
lost sight of the fact that their liability hinges not on the
acts of Hay alone, but on the fact that they knew about his
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atrocious behavior and failed to do anything to end it.
If the
evidence showed that Hay committed his acts and that the
Appellants had no knowledge whatsoever of what he was doing, we
would be inclined to agree with the Appellants’ argument that
they were being punished solely for Hay’s criminal conduct.
Unfortunately for the Appellants, that is not the case.
IV.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN AWARDING
STATUTORY POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST TO
THE APPELLEES?
The Appellants argue that even if we find that
sovereign immunity has been waived as to the Appellees’ causes of
action, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity which would
allow an award of post-judgment interest at the rate of 12%
pursuant to KRS 360.040.10
We agree.
This Court addressed this same issue in Powell v. Board
of Education of Harrodsburg, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 940 (1991).
We
held:
Merely because a state agency has
waived its sovereign immunity for
purpose of suit, it does not
necessarily follow that the agency
has also waived its liability for
payment of interest in such suit.
. . .
Since a state can be sued only with
its consent, a statute waiving
10
Although the Appellees argue that this issue is not
preserved for our review because it was not presented to the
trial court, we note that the defense of sovereign immunity “is a
constitutional protection that can be waived only by the General
Assembly and applies regardless of any formal plea.” Wells v.
Commonwealth, Department of Highways, 384 S.W.2d 308, 308 (1964).
Thus, this is one case where the fact that the Appellants did not
raise this particular issue before the trial court does not
preclude us from reviewing it on appeal.
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immunity must be strictly construed
and cannot be read to encompass the
allowance of interest unless so
specified. [citations omitted].
Furthermore, we do not believe that
the general interest on judgment
statute . . . applies to state
agencies without an explicit
declaration by the legislature or
contract provisions expressly so
stating.
Powell, 829 S.W.2d at 941.
See also Kenton County Fiscal Court
v. Elfers, Ky. App., 981 S.W.2d 553 (1998)(holding that general
interest on judgment statute does not apply to judgment against
state or its subdivisions).
Appellees argue that Powell does not automatically bar
interest in all actions based on the “it does not necessarily
follow” language cited above.
In support of their argument, the
Appellees cite Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Young,
Ky., 380 S.W.2d 239 (1964), for the proposition that an award of
interest is proper in this case.
However, Young, is easily
distinguished from the case at hand because it is a Board of
Claims action.
In that case, it was noted that under the Board
of Claims Act (KRS Chapter 44.070 et seq.), any judgment entered
“shall have the same effect and be enforceable as any other
judgment of the court in civil cases.”
citing KRS 44.140(2).11
Young, 380 S.W.2d at 240,
Based on its interpretation of that
statute, the Court held:
KRS 44.140(2) prescribes the nature and
effect which a judgment of the circuit court
shall have when entered on appeal from the
Board of Claims . . . . [Thus, under the
language of the statute], if any other
11
The current counterpart to KRS 44.140(2) is KRS 44.140(5).
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judgment in the Nelson Circuit Court would
draw interest from the date of its entry,
then so would this one.
Young, 380 S.W.2d at 240.
The Powell Court recognized that the
exception set forth in Young is only applicable to Board of
Claims cases, noting that interest is recoverable in those
instances “because KRS 44.140(5) expressly provides that such
judgment shall be “enforceable as any other judgment”.”
Powell,
829 S.W.2d at 942, citing Bush v. Department of Highways,
Transportation Cabinet, Ky. App., 777 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1989).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in awarding postjudgment interest in its October judgment and January order, and
the portions of those orders awarding interest are hereby
reversed.
In regard to the motions of the Appellants filed in
with this Court, the Appellants’ motion to allow their notice of
appeal in 97-CA- 3051 to relate forward is granted, and their
motion to amend their notice of appeal in 98-CA-0330 is dismissed
as moot.
Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
orders of the Franklin and Scott Circuit Courts are affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
Daniel T. Guidugli
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
ENTERED: September 8, 2000
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
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Armer H. Mahan, Jr.
Raymond L. Smith, Jr.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Armer H. Mahan, Jr.
Melanie A. Kennedy
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Raymond L. Smith, Jr.
Dorothy M. Pitt
Ruby D. Fenton-Iler
Louisville, KY
James E. Boyd
Frankfort, KY
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