LAKIN RAE TRUCKING v. BENNY SULLIVAN, SPECIAL FUND, HON. RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: December 10, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001199-WC
LAKIN RAE TRUCKING
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-94-31019
v.
BENNY SULLIVAN, SPECIAL FUND,
HON. RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE,
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Lakin Rae Trucking (Lakin Rae) asks us to review
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (board) rendered
April 23, 1999.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.290.
We
affirm.
On June 30, 1994, Bennie Sullivan was driving a coal
truck for Lakin Rae when an oncoming vehicle crossed the center
line and struck Sullivan’s truck.
The driver of the other
vehicle was killed and the passenger was injured.
Sullivan
sustained injury to his low back with radiation into his right
leg.
Subsequent to the accident, Sullivan developed significant
depression and post traumatic stress disorder.
benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
He filed for
KRS Chapter 342.
The administrative law judge (ALJ), in an Opinion and Award
rendered September 21, 1998, held that Sullivan’s physical
problems and post-traumatic stress disorder had resolved.
He
further found, however, that Sullivan’s depression was
significant and precluded him from returning to work as a truck
driver.
The ALJ held that Sullivan’s psychological problems are
the direct result of a work-related event which resulted in
physical injury to him.
As such, the ALJ opined, Sullivan’s
psychological condition constitutes an “injury” under the 1994
amendment to KRS 342.0011(1) and, thus, is compensable.
Based on
said condition, the ALJ determined Sullivan to be 40% permanently
and partially disabled.
Lakin Rae appealed to the board, which,
in turn, affirmed the ALJ.
This appeal followed.
The sole issue on appeal revolves around the 1994
amendment to KRS 342.0011(1).
Said subsection reads in relevant
part as follows:
“Injury” means any work-related harmful
change in the human organism, arising out of
and in the course of employment, . . .
“Injury” when used generally, unless the
context indicates otherwise, shall include an
occupational disease, but shall not include a
psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related
change in the human organism, unless it is a
direct result of a physical injury. (Emphasis
added.)
In his Opinion and Award, the ALJ addressed the emphasized phrase
above as follows:
the . . . appropriate interpretation is that
the psychological or psychiatric stress
related change in the human organism must be
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the direct result of the same work related
injury event that caused the physical injury.
(Emphasis added.)
Lakin Rae challenges this interpretation and maintains
that for a psychological condition to constitute an “injury”
under KRS 342.0011(1), it must stem directly from a physical
injury and not merely from the event in which the injury was
sustained.
It maintains that the uncontradicted evidence proves
that Sullivan’s condition is the result of having been involved
in the death of the other driver — “survivor’s guilt.”
As such,
Lakin Rae asserts that Sullivan’s psychological condition is not
an injury and not compensable, as it was not the direct result of
the physical injuries he sustained in the June 30, 1994 accident.
In affirming the ALJ’s interpretation of KRS
342.0011(1) as amended in 1994, the board stated the following:
[I]t is our opinion that the phrase “physical
injury” as used in the definition of work
injury means a physical incident resulting in
a work-related harmful change in the human
organism including a psychiatric disorder in
the event it is directly attributable to that
physical event.
We believe this interpretation to be justified by the language of
the statute and to be consistent with the purpose behind the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
S.W.2d 435 (1993).
See Newberg v. Weaver, Ky., 866
Hence, we affirm on this issue under the
precepts of Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685 (1992).
On a final note, Lakin Rae states that it seeks to
overturn the ALJ’s order on Special Fund’s Petition for
Reconsideration.
This issue, however, was not addressed by the
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board.
Therefore, we shall not address it.
See Fordson Coal Co.
V. Palko, 282 Ky. 397, 138 S.W.2d 456 (1940).
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is AFFIRMED.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
BY SEPARATE OPINION.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
I concur with the result in this case, but I disagree with the
majority opinion's approval of the board's interpretation of the
definition of “injury.”
While the legislature may have intended
that “injury” be defined in accordance with the board's
interpretation, it did not define it in that manner in the
statute.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR BENNIE SULLIVAN:
William E. Brown, II
Lexington, KY
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, KY
BRIEF FOR SPECIAL FUND:
Joel D. Zakem
Louisville, KY
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