COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET v. FRANK GUFFEY, WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD, ROGER D. RIGGS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, DOUGLAS KENNEDY, M.D., and JOHN W. HARDIN
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RENDERED: December 10, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000753-WC
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
TRANSPORTATION CABINET
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-90878
FRANK GUFFEY,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD,
ROGER D. RIGGS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE,
DOUGLAS KENNEDY, M.D., and
JOHN W. HARDIN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Commonwealth of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
(Cabinet) asks us to review an opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board (board) rendered March 8, 1999.
Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.290.
Kentucky
We affirm.
On March 17, 1997, Frank Guffey suffered injury after
tumbling down a 30-foot embankment while in the employ of the
Cabinet.
At the time of the accident he was 35 years old and
weighed approximately 450 pounds.
Guffey, who has not returned
to work since the accident, filed for benefits under the Kentucky
Workers’ Compensation Act.
KRS Chapter 342.
His claim was
originally reviewed by an arbitrator and then transferred to an
administrative law judge (ALJ).
In an Opinion and Award dated
November 10, 1998, the ALJ found that Guffey suffered from a back
injury and traumatic post-concussive syndrome as a result of the
March 1997 accident.
The ALJ further determined that these
ailments render Guffey 100% occupationally disabled.
ensued to the board.
An appeal
The board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and
remanded the cause for “consideration of a motion for attorney
fees by [Guffey’s] attorney for defending [the] appeal.”
This
appeal followed.
The Cabinet asserts the following points of error:
1) the ALJ erred in finding Guffey 100% occupationally
disabled,
2) the ALJ erred in failing to “carve out” a portion of
Guffey’s award for the natural aging process,
3) the ALJ erred in failing to order Guffey to attend
vocational rehabilitation; and,
4) the ALJ erred in ruling that Guffey’s counsel was
entitled to attorney fees under KRS 342.320(2)(c).
Where the party who bears the burden of proof is
successful before the ALJ, the question on appeal is whether the
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
See Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d
735 (1984).
Substantial evidence is evidence of relevant
consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds
of reasonable people. See Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chemical Co.,
Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367 (1971).
The ALJ, as fact finder, has the
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sole authority to determine the weight, credibility, substance,
and inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See Paramount
Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky. 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985).
The ALJ has
the absolute right to believe part of the evidence and disbelieve
other parts even when it comes from the same witness or the same
party’s total proof. See Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores,
Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15 (1977).
In reviewing a decision of the board,
our review is limited to whether the board has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling law or committed an error in assessing
the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.
Western
Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685 (1992).
The Cabinet contends that the ALJ erred by finding
Guffey 100% occupationally disabled.
We disagree.
Dr. L.
Douglas Kennedy testified that Guffey had a disk herniation with
foramen compression at L4-5.
This diagnosis was based on the
results of an MRI performed of Guffey’s low back.
Dr. Kennedy
also diagnosed cervical and lumbar strain with persistent
radicular pain including the left upper and left lower
extremities.
Dr. Kennedy believed these conditions to be the
result of the work-related accident and assessed Guffey to have
an 11% impairment under the American Medical Association
guidelines.
Dr. James Phifer, a clinical neuropsychologist, also
examined Guffey.
He conducted numerous tests on Guffey.
Many of
these were also performed by the Cabinet’s witness, Dr. Robert
Granacher.
Based on these tests and that Guffey had a higher IQ
before the accident, Dr. Phifer opined that the accident caused
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Guffey brain injury.
Dr. Phifer assessed Guffey to have a 7%
impairment rating based on his cognitive dysfunction and 5%
impairment rating based on emotional problems directly
attributable to his brain injury.
After reading Dr. Phifer’s
reports, Dr. Kennedy also diagnosed Guffey with post-concussion
disorder and traumatic brain injury.
We believe the above evidence constitutes “[o]bjective
medical findings” pursuant to KRS 342.0011(33).
We further
believe this evidence sufficient to support the ALJ’s finding
that Guffey is permanently and totally disabled and; thus, unable
to perform any type of work.
That is, under KRS 342.0011(34), he
is unable to provide services for anyone on a “regular and
sustained basis in a competitive economy.”
In sum, we cannot say
the board misconstrued the law or erred in assessing the evidence
as it relates to this issue.
The Cabinet next maintains that the ALJ erred in
failing to “carve out” a portion of Guffey’s award for the
“natural aging process” pursuant to KRS 342.0011(1).
We disagree
and adopt the following ratiocination of the board in affirming
the ALJ on this issue:
[T]he express exclusion of the “natural aging
process” in defining “injury” is not an
alteration of that which has always been
compensable. That which is a dormant, nondisabling condition has not now become “the
natural aging process.” When a claimant has
degenerative changes that were dormant and
non-disabling but were aroused by a workrelated trauma, it is not the effects of the
natural aging process that is compensated but
rather the disabling effects of the injury
upon those dormant and non-disabling
conditions that is compensated. The 1996 Act
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merely codifies the law as it had been
interpreted prior thereto.
The 1996 amendments also abolished KRS
342.120 thereby eliminating the Special Fund
and its availability to pay for such
conditions. The Legislature, by its
abolition of the Special Fund’s liability for
such conditions, did not intend to render
those conditions noncompensable any more than
it intended, by the abolition of the Fund’s
liability for occupational diseases, for
those claims to be noncompensable. Hence, we
conclude that the findings made by the ALJ in
Guffey’s case with regard to the “natural
aging process” are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Special Fund v.
Francis, [Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986)].
The Cabinet next asserts that the ALJ erred in failing
to order Guffey to undergo vocational rehabilitation.
KRS
342.710(3) states in relevant part:
The arbitrator or administrative law judge .
. . may refer the employee to a qualified
physician or facility for evaluation of the
practicability of, need for, and kind of
service, treatment, or training necessary and
appropriate to render him fit for a
remunerative occupation. Upon receipt of
such report, the arbitrator or administrative
law judge may order that the services and
treatment recommended in the report, or such
other rehabilitation treatment or service
likely to return the employee to suitable,
gainful employment, be provided at the
expense of the employer or his insurance
carrier. [Emphases added.]
We are of the opinion that whether an “employee” undergoes
rehabilitation is within the sound discretion of the ALJ.
Considering Guffey’s physical maladies and that his intellectual
functioning is borderline, we believe the ALJ’s decision not to
order vocational rehabilitation is based upon substantial
evidence.
same.
Hence, we cannot say the board erred in affirming
See Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685.
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Finally, the Cabinet avers that the ALJ erred in ruling
that Guffey’s counsel was entitled to attorney fees under KRS
342.320(2)(c).
Said statute requires the employer or its
insurance carrier to pay up to $5,000 of the employee’s attorney
fees if the employer unsuccessfully appeals an award by an
arbitrator or ALJ.
The Cabinet first contends that said statute
unfairly distinguishes between employers and employees and, thus,
amounts to “legislation arbitrary in impact and unequal in
effect.”
Therefore, the Cabinet argues, it is unconstitutional.
We disagree.
We are of the opinion that this disparate treatment
is reasonable given the employers’ greater financial resources.
The discrepancy of financial resources between employer and
employee is sufficient reason to require employers to pay
attorney’s fees upon losing an appeal. See Leeco, Inc. v. Baker,
Ky. App., 920 S.W.2d 79 (1996).
The Cabinet also argues that it is immune, as an agency
of the State, to the imposition of attorney fees under the 1996
amendment to KRS 342.320(2)(c).
We cannot agree as KRS 342.630
specifically states that the “state”, and “any agency thereof,”
shall constitute an “employer” subject to the provisions of the
Workmens’ Compensation Act.
Hence, we deem the Cabinet’s
argument to be without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/FRANK
GUFFEY:
W. David Shearer, Jr.
Louisville, KY
John W. Hardin
Versailles, KY
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