BIANCA SOUCY v. STEPHEN S. SOUCY III
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RENDERED: July 9, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000224-MR
BIANCA SOUCY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HUGH ROARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01384
v.
STEPHEN S. SOUCY III
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, McANULTY, and MILLER, Judges.
MILLER, JUDGE: Bianca Soucy (Bianca) brings this appeal from a
December 30, 1998, order of the Hardin Circuit Court.
We reverse
and remand with directions.
The relevant facts are these:
Germany.
Bianca is a citizen of
Appellee, Stephen S. Soucy III (Stephen), is a citizen
of the United States and a career soldier in the U.S. Army.
The
parties met while Stephen was stationed in Germany and married in
Denmark in March 1992.
Some time thereafter, Stephen was
notified that he would be transferred to the United States for
duty in Georgia.
The couple moved to the States, where their
child, a son, was born in May 1994.
It appears the child
possesses both American and German citizenship.
Bianca obtained
a visa to work in the United States and a Georgia driver's
license.
Stephen contends the couple's intent was to remain in
the U.S. indefinitely.
In December 1996, Stephen was to begin serving a oneyear tour of duty in Korea.
As Bianca and the child were not
permitted to join him, they moved in December 1996 to Bremen,
Germany, to be with Bianca's family.
The record indicates that
Bianca rented an apartment in February 1997.
During leave in
July 1997, Stephen visited his family for 30 days in Germany.
At
that time, Bianca claims that she informed Stephen of her intent
to live separately from him and to remain with the child in
Germany.
Since August 1997, the child has attended school in
Germany and has received medical care from military
installations.
Sometime in 1997, the record reveals that Bianca
and the child visited Stephen in the States.
In January 1998,
Bianca refused to move to the States with Stephen.
On August 7,
1998, Stephen arrived in Bremen, Germany, to visit the child.
During the visit, Stephen requested permission to take the child
for a 14-day visit to the United States.
The parties apparently
agreed that the child would be returned to Bianca in Germany on
August 26, 1998.
On that day, Bianca waited in vain at the
airport for the child's return.
Stephen later telephoned Bianca
to inform her of his intent to keep the child in the States.
On September 3, 1998, Stephen filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in the Hardin Circuit Court and requested
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custody of the child.
In response, Bianca entered a “Special
Appearance to Defend on Jurisdiction Venue and the Hague
Convention,” contending that pursuant to the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened for
signature October 25, 1980 (Hague Convention), the child should
be returned to Germany for custody determination.
Under
Hague
Convention provisions, Bianca claimed that the child's habitual
residence was in Germany and that Stephen was wrongfully
retaining custody of the child.
Thus, she argued, the child
should be forthwith returned to Germany.
Bianca also pointed out
that a German court had concluded that the child was wrongfully
abducted under the Hague Convention and should be returned
promptly to Germany.
Stephen countered that the child's return
was not compelled under the Hague Convention.
Stephen maintained
that the United States was the child's state of habitual
residence and, as such, his retention of the child was not
wrongful.
The court ultimately agreed with Stephen and concluded
that under the Hague Convention the United States was, in fact,
the child's habitual residence; thus, the child's retention was
not wrongful.
This appeal followed.
Both Germany and the United States are contracting
States to the Hague Convention, which was implemented in the
United States by Congressional enactment of the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601 et seq.
The
primary purpose of the Hague Convention is to “protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful
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removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their
prompt return to the State of their habitual residence . . . . “
(Emphases added.)
Hague Convention, Preamble.
Parties to the
Hague Convention consider that
the removal of a child by one of the joint
holders without the consent of the other is
wrongful, and this wrongfulness derives in
this particular case, not from some action in
breach of a particular law, but from the fact
that such action has disregarded the rights
of the other parent which are also protected
by law, and has interfered with their normal
exercise. The Convention's true nature is
revealed most clearly in these situations: it
is not concerned with establishing the person
to whom custody of the child will belong at
some point in the future, nor with the
situations in which it may prove necessary to
modify a decision awarding joint custody on
the basis of facts which have subsequently
changed. It seeks, more simply, to prevent a
later decision on the matter being influenced
by a change of circumstances brought about
through unilateral action by one of the
parties.
Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 664-665 (D. Kan. 1993),
(quoting Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report by Elisa PerezVera, in 3 Actes et documents de la Quatorzieme session 426, 44748 (1982)).1
The Hague Convention requires a child wrongfully
removed from his habitual state of residence to be returned
unless a narrow exception applies.
3, 4, and 13.
Hague Convention, Articles 1,
Under the Hague Convention, the removal or
retention of a child is wrongful where
1
Elisa Perez-Vera was the official Hague Convention
reporter. Her Explanatory Report is recognized as the official
history and commentary on the Hague Convention.
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(a)
it is in breach of rights of custody
attributed to a person, an institution or any
other body, either jointly or alone, under
the law of the State in which the child was
habitually resident immediately before the
removal or retention; and
(b)
at the time
those rights were
jointly or alone,
exercised but for
of removal or retention
actually exercised, either
or would have been so
the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in subparagraph a above, may arise in particular by
operation of law or by reason of a judicial
or administrative decision, or by reason of
an agreement having legal effect under the
law of that State.
Hague Convention, Article 3.
Bianca has the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that the retention was indeed
wrongful.
42 U.S.C. §11603(e)(1).
If Bianca meets this burden,
thereafter Stephen bears the burden of proving that one of four
narrow exceptions apply:
1) by clear and convincing evidence that
there is a grave risk that the return of the
child would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm; Hague Convention, Article
13b, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(c)(2)(A); 2) by clear
and convincing evidence that the return of
the child “would not be permitted by the
fundamental principles of the requested State
relating to the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms”; Hague Convention,
Article 20, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 3) by
a preponderance of the evidence that the
proceeding was commenced more than one year
after the abduction and the child has become
settled in its new environment; Hague
Convention, Article 12, 42 U.S.C.
11603(e)(2)(B); or 4) by a preponderance of
the evidence that . . . (Bianca) was not
actually exercising the custody right at the
time of removal or retention, or had
consented to or subsequently acquiesced in
the removal or retention; Hague Convention,
Article 13a, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B).
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Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993).
As a judicial authority in the State of refuge, our role is to
determine the merits of the abduction claim but not the merits of
the underlying custody claim.
See Friedrich, 938 F.2d 1396.
For the child's retention to be considered wrongful,
Bianca must specifically establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) Germany is the child's habitual residence and
(2) she was exercising parental custody rights over the child at
the time of the removal or that she would have exercised her
parental rights but for the removal under the law of the child's
habitual residence.
We shall first address whether the United
States or Germany is the child's habitual residence.
The circuit court concluded that the United States was
the child's habitual residence and, thus, Stephen's retention of
the child was not wrongful.
We disagree.
We are of the opinion
that Germany was the State of the child's habitual residence.
The Hague Convention does not define the term habitual residence.
The term was intentionally left fluid and undefined.
See
Harsacky v. Harsacky, Ky. App., 930 S.W.2d 410 (1996).
It is
well understood, however, that habitual residence should not be
equated with domicile.
To determine habitual residence, the
courts must look to
the place where he or she has been physically
present for an amount of time sufficient for
acclimatization and which has a “degree of
settled purpose” from the child's
perspective. We further believe that a
determination of whether any particular place
satisfies this standard must focus on the
child and consists of an analysis of the
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child's circumstances in that place and the
parents' present, shared intentions regarding
their child's presence there. (Emphasis
added.)
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995).
The term settled purpose has been elucidated as
follows:
The purpose may be one or there may be
several. It may be specific or general.
All that the law requires is that there is a
settled purpose. That is not to say that the
propositus intends to stay where he is
indefinitely. Indeed his purpose while
settled may be for a limited period.
Education, business or profession,
employment, health, family or merely love of
the place spring to mind as common reasons
for a choice of regular abode, and there may
well be many others. All that is necessary
is that the purpose of living where one does
has a sufficient degree of continuity to be
properly described as settled. (Emphasis
added.)
Levesque, 816 F. Supp. at 666 (quoting In Re Bates, No. CA
122/89, High Court of Justice, Family Division Court, Royal Court
of Justice, United Kingdom (1989)).
The facts indicate that the child and his mother had
been living in Germany from December 1996 to August 1998, a
period of approximately two years.
The child attended
kindergarten in Germany, and his mother and he lived in an
apartment in Germany.
It also appears that in July 1997 Bianca
and Stephen at the least experienced marital difficulties.
In
January 1998, the parties’ marriage was irretrievably broken.
For approximately two years, it is undisputed that the child's
environment was centered in Germany.
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We believe the child's
residence in Germany achieved “a sufficient degree of continuity”
so as to constitute a settled purpose to remain there.
Indeed,
one can glean from the record that such settled purpose was
shared by both Bianca and Stephen.
The mere fact that Stephen
agreed to return the child to Germany after a short visit to the
United States evidences this settled purpose.
Upon the whole, we
are compelled to conclude the evidence overwhelmingly points to
Germany as the child's habitual residence.
Having so concluded,
we shall now address whether the child's removal contravened
Bianca's custody rights under German law.
In Amtsgericht Bremen-Blumenthal Geschäfts-Nr. 72a F
0528/98 [Circuit Court Bremen-Blumenthal], a German Court
determined that the child's removal violated Bianca's custody
rights because (1) German Civil Code §1687 1 Sub. 2BGB, granted
Bianca, as the parent with whom the child habitually resided,
authority and jurisdiction to exclusively decide matters of the
child's daily life, and (2) the parties had entered an oral
agreement that the child be returned to Germany after a short
visit to the United States.
We, therefore, believe Stephen's
removal of the child contravened Bianca's custody rights under
German law.
In sum, we hold that Bianca has proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that Germany is the child's
habitual residence and that his removal violated her custody
rights under German law.
As such, we think the child's retention
in the United States is wrongful under Article 3 of the Hague
Convention.
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Even if the child's retention were indeed wrongful,
Stephen seeks to thwart the child's return to Germany by relying
upon an exception found in Article 13 of the Hague Convention:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding Article, the judicial or
administrative authority of the requested
State is not bound to order the return of the
child if the person, institution or other
body which opposes its return establishes
that
. . .
b
there is a grave risk that his or her
return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the
child in an intolerable situation.
Stephen specifically alleges that Bianca has used marijuana in
the child's presence and “has demonstrated an unwillingness to
find employment.”
The evidence offered by Stephen to support the
marijuana allegation is, at best, scant.
In any event, we do not
believe these allegations rise to a level sufficient to support a
claim of grave risk to the child under Hague Convention, Article
13b.
We simply are unpersuaded that the evidence clearly and
convincingly establishes that the child's physical or mental well
being would be jeopardized by his return to Germany.
See Freier
v. Freier, 969 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
We view Stephen’s remaining contention centering upon
the Uniform Child Custody Act without merit.
Upon remand, we direct that the circuit court order the
child forthwith returned to Germany.
We hold that Stephen should
bear all costs associated with the child's return.
Convention, Article 26.
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Hague
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Hardin
Circuit Court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Michael L. Boylan
Louisville, KY
Paul Musselwhite
Radcliff, KY
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