STEVEN R. HAYES v. SHIRLEY HAYES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: December 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NOS. 1998-CA-002701-MR
AND 1999-CA-000036-MR
STEVEN R. HAYES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-00377
v.
SHIRLEY HAYES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Because we cannot say that the change in
circumstances is so substantial and continuing as to make the
original maintenance award unconscionable, we affirm the denial
of Steven Hayes’s motion to reduce his maintenance obligation on
grounds that his income has decreased and his former wife’s
income has increased.
We also affirm the lower court’s order
requiring Steven to pay a portion of the expenses of a drug
treatment program for his minor son.
Appellant, Steven Hayes (“Steven”), and appellee,
Shirley Hayes (“Shirley”) were married in 1968.
Three children
were born of the marriage.
Shirley has a Master’s Degree and
worked outside the home until 1985, primarily teaching English at
the college level.
Throughout much of the marriage, Steven was
in college working toward various advanced degrees.
years, Steven worked part-time.
During those
In 1980, Steven began medical
school at the University of Kentucky.
After his internship and
residency, Steven was hired by the University of Kentucky as an
Assistant Professor of Anesthesiology.
In 1991, Shirley filed for divorce.
At that time,
Shirley was 47 years of age and was not employed.
Steven was 45
years old and was earning $123,000 a year, plus a bonus of
$75,000, in his employment with the University of Kentucky.
One
of the parties’ children was emancipated at the time of the
dissolution, while the other two were teenagers.
In the decree
entered in 1991, Steven was ordered to pay Shirley $3,000 a month
in lifetime maintenance.
The court reasoned:
In order for the husband to obtain his goals,
the wife had to abandon her career goals and
suffer the financial sacrifices entailed by
the husband’s extended educational pursuit.
Now, by virtue of his medical degree, the
husband has been able to turn famine into
feast, but he apparently seeks to have his
wife who supported him through all the lean
years, excluded from the family table. . .
The maintenance of $3,000 per month
recommended by the Commissioner is the bare
minimum. . . The Court finds, as did the
Commissioner, that there is no reasonable
prospect that Petitioner will ever be selfsupporting within the meaning of KRS
403.200(1)(b) and that justice requires that
she be awarded maintenance for her lifetime
or until remarriage after considering all of
the factors set out in KRS 403.200(2).
-2-
The parties agreed to share joint custody of the two minor
children, and Steven was ordered to pay $1,500 a month in child
support for the younger child who resided with Shirley.
The
decree also provided that Steven was to maintain health insurance
on the children and was responsible for one-half of any uncovered
medical expenses of the children.
Shortly after the decree of dissolution was entered,
Steven left his job with the University of Kentucky and moved to
Evansville, Indiana where he joined a private anesthesiology
group.
In 1997, he left his position with that group because his
income was decreasing and because his current wife had cancer and
required treatment in Atlanta, Georgia.
Steven then began
working for Immunocomp Laboratory in Georgia.
However, his
employment with Immunocomp was abruptly terminated on March 16,
1998.
As of the date of the hearing in this case, Steven was
employed by the Riverdale Anesthesiology Associates in Georgia,
earning $162,000 a year.
In March of 1998, Steven filed a motion to reduce
maintenance, citing the decrease in his income and the increase
in Shirley’s income.
At the time of the motion, Shirley was
teaching at Eastern Kentucky University earning $31,000 a year.
In August of 1998, Shirley filed a motion for medical
expense arrears, seeking payment for one-half of the expenses for
a drug treatment program in Memphis, Tennessee that their son,
Doug, who was a minor at the time, had participated in for eleven
months in 1994.
Shirley maintained the expenses of the program
totaled more than $14,000.
-3-
After a hearing on the motions, the court entered an
order on September 1, 1998 denying Steven’s motion to reduce his
maintenance obligation.
The court found that there had been a
change in Steven’s financial circumstances as a result of the
decrease in Steven’s income from $198,000 in 1991 to $162,000 in
1998.
The court also found no bad faith in Steven’s decision to
leave the anesthesiology practice in Indiana and take the job in
Georgia.
However, the court found that although Shirley was
earning $31,000 a year, it did not represent a substantial change
in her financial circumstances because the court had taken into
consideration the fact that Shirley would eventually earn a
moderate income in determining the original award of maintenance
in 1991.
As to Shirley’s motion for one-half of the drug
treatment program expenses, the court found that such expenses
were legitimate medical expenses, but that since Steven paid
child support during the eleven months that the child was in the
program, it would be inequitable to require him to pay half of
the program’s expenses.
Thus, the court denied the motion.
Subsequently, Shirley filed a motion to reconsider this ruling.
On September 30, 1998, the court reversed its prior ruling and
ordered that Steven pay half of the costs of the program, less
any expenses related to living expenses for the child while in
Memphis.
In a later order, the court specifically found that
Steven was responsible for $4,625 of the expenses.
From the
orders requiring Steven to pay the drug treatment program
-4-
expenses and the order denying the reduction in maintenance,
Steven now appeals.
We shall first address Steven’s argument that the trial
court erred in not reducing his $3,000 a month maintenance
obligation to Shirley.
KRS 403.250(1) provides that “the
provisions of any decree respecting maintenance may be modified
only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
continuing as to make the terms unconscionable.”
The word
“unconscionable” as used in the above statute has been defined as
“manifestly unfair or inequitable.”
S.W.2d 511, 513 (1974).
Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, Ky., 506
Rulings regarding maintenance are within
the sound discretion of the trial court, and “unless absolute
abuse is shown, the appellate court must maintain confidence in
the trial court and not disturb the findings of the trial judge.”
Clark v. Clark, Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56, 60 (1990), citing Platt
v. Platt, Ky. App., 728 S.W.2d 542 (1987).
Steven contends that since his income has decreased,
Shirley’s has increased, and the court found no bad faith on his
part, the court should have reduced his maintenance obligation.
In our view, the existence of those factors alone does not compel
a reduction in maintenance in this case.
Although Shirley is earning approximately $31,000
teaching college English, Steven, with his reduced income, is
still earning four times more than Shirley.
One of the main
purposes of maintenance is to allow the spouse to live according
to the standard of living established during the marriage.
Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 61; KRS 403.200(2)(c).
-5-
If Shirley’s
maintenance were eliminated or significantly reduced, her income
would be diminished to the point that she could no longer afford
to keep her home or even a middle class lifestyle, whereas Steven
would be living in a $230,000 home enjoying an affluent upper
class lifestyle.
We believe under the facts of this case, that
would be an inequitable result.
As the trial court noted in the
original decree, during their 23-year marriage, Shirley gave up
her career goals and supported Steven while he was in school.
The court also stated in the decree that $3,000 a month was the
bare minimum Steven should have to pay.
With her maintenance and
teaching salary, Shirley will have income of $67,000 a year,
while Steven will have income of $126,000 a year after payment of
his maintenance obligation, which is still almost twice Shirley’s
income.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the change in
circumstances rendered the original maintenance award
unconscionable and, thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to reduce said award.
Steven next argues that the trial court erred in
requiring him to pay half of the expenses of Doug’s drug
treatment program.
Steven maintains that since the drug
treatment program was operated by a religious organization and he
did not give his approval for sending Doug there, it was not a
medical expense for which he should be responsible under the
decree.
A trial court’s findings of fact in a domestic case will
not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.
Ghali, Ky. App., 596 S.W.2d 31 (1980).
-6-
Ghali v.
The evidence established that although the Second
Chance Ministry was a Christian-centered drug treatment program,
it was staffed with licensed medical and mental health
professionals and was a licensed health care facility.
There was
also evidence that Doug’s treating psychiatrist and psychologist
both recommended that Doug be enrolled in the Second Chance
Ministry to treat his drug addiction.
As to Steven’s argument
that it was not a legitimate medical expense because his
insurance company would not cover participation in the program,
there was evidence that many other insurance companies did cover
the program.
Further, the decree specifically contemplated
uncovered medical expenses.
Simply because an insurance company
will not pay a claim does not mean it is not a legitimate medical
expense.
Steven’s position that expenses for drug treatment in
general are not legitimate medical expenses is not well taken.
Being a medical doctor, Steven should recognize both the physical
and mental implications of drug abuse and the serious medical
consequences thereof.
In fact, KRS 403.211(8) specifically
includes “professional counseling or psychiatric therapy for
diagnosed medical disorders” in its definition of “extraordinary
medical expenses.”
Thus, the lower court’s finding that Doug’s
participation in the Second Chance Ministry drug treatment
program was a legitimate medical expense was not clearly
erroneous, especially given the fact that the court did not
require Steven to pay any of the living expenses for the child
while enrolled in the program.
-7-
For the reasons stated above, the orders of the Fayette
Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Kevin West
Tonya S. Conner
Lexington, Kentucky
Natalie S. Wilson
Lori B. Shelburne
Lexington, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
