WAYNE C. DAUB AND FRED ELLER V. BAKER CONCRETE; SPECIAL FUND; HON. BEN CHANDLER, ATTORNEY GENERAL; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD; AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DONNA H. TERRY; HON. MAHLIAN GRINSTEAD
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 1999; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002299-WC
WAYNE C. DAUB AND
FRED ELLER
APPELLANTS
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-73511
v.
BAKER CONCRETE; SPECIAL FUND;
HON. BEN CHANDLER, ATTORNEY GENERAL;
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD; AND
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DONNA H. TERRY; HON. MAHLIAN GRINSTEAD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON AND MCANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Fred Eller (Eller), the claimant, and Wayne C.
Daub (Daub), his attorney, have petitioned this Court to review
the final decision of the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Board
(Board) which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ)
decision to award an attorney’s fee of $2,000.00.
Daub and Eller
contend that the ALJ erred in ruling the attorney’s fee was
limited to $2,000.00 pursuant to the provisions of Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.320(2)(a)(4), amended effective
December 12, 1996.
Daub and Eller also challenge the
constitutionality of KRS 342.320.
We affirm the award of
attorney’s fees and hold KRS 342.320 to be constitutional.
The material facts are as follows.
Attorney Daub
contracted on June 23, 1997, with Eller to represent him
concerning his claim for workers’ compensation benefits due from
injuries sustained on May 13, 1996.
Eller was found by the
arbitrator to be 100% occupationally disabled, with 70% of the
responsibility for the loss attributable to the employer and 30%
to the Special Fund.
$295,765.70.
The total award to Eller was approximately
After the award was final, Daub moved the
arbitrator to approve an attorney’s fee in the amount of
$15,000.00.
The arbitrator applied the $2,000.00 maximum to the
attorney’s fee award pursuant to KRS 342.320, as amended on
December 12, 1996.
Upon appeal to Chief Administrative Law Judge
Donna H. Terry (CALJ), she found as follows:
Upon review pursuant to KRS 342.320, it is
apparent that there was a high quality of
legal skill and service rendered in this
case, and that a substantial amount of work
was required in undertaking representation
following withdrawal by other counsel.
Consideration of the nature, scope, and
quality of legal services in conjunction with
a recognition that the fee was contingent in
nature and no fee would have been payable in
the event that an award had not been
rendered, lead to a conclusion that a very
substantial attorney fee should be awarded
herein. The agreement between Eller and Daub
executed on June 23, 1997 provided that Daub
would receive a fee in accordance with the
following schedule 20% of the first
$25,000.00, 15% of the next $10,000.00, and
5% of the remainder recovered in past and
future benefits.
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On December 12, 1996, KRS 342.320 was
amended to provide for a maximum attorney fee
of 20% of the award, not to exceed $2,000.00,
for services performed up to and including
the date of a written benefit review
determination by an Arbitrator. KRS
342.320(2)(a). Further, the statute was
amended to provide that any contract for the
payment of attorney fees otherwise than as
provided in the statute would be void.
Daub seeks payment of an attorney fee of
$15,000.00 under the contract executed on
June 23, 1997. However, the undersigned
Administrative Law Judge is constrained by
the provisions of KRS 342.320(2)(a) and (4)
to award a maximum fee of $2,000.00 for
servies [sic] rendered before the Arbitrator.
Daub has propounded a constitutional argument
against the amended provisions hereinabove
[sic]. However, an Administrative Law Judge
is without authority to render decisions on
the constitutionality of a legislative
provision. Any issue relating to the
constitutionality of a statute is reserved
for Courts of Justice. Blue Diamond Coal
Company v. Cornett, Ky., 189 S.W.2d 963
(1945); Kentucky Alcohol Beverage Control
Board v. Jacobs, Ky., 269 S.W.2d 189 (1954).
The undersigned therefore declines to rule on
the constitutional issue raised by the
parties.
On appeal to the Board, Daub and Eller continued to
argue that the attorney’s fee limitation of KRS 342.320, as
amended by the 1996 Extraordinary Session of the Kentucky General
Assembly, was unconstitutional.
The Board ruled, similar to the
CALJ below, that “[a]s an administrative body, the Board is
powerless to rule on the constitutionality of a statute.”
This
petition for review followed.
Daub and Eller first argue that Daub’s attorney’s fee
claim is not limited by the $2,000.00 maximum that became
effective on December 16, 1996.
They rely upon Hamilton v.
Desparado Fuels, Inc., Ky., 868 S.W.2d 95 (1993), and note the
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general rule that the allowance of attorney’s fees is governed by
the law in existence at the time of the injury.
In this case,
Eller’s injury occurred on May 13, 1996.
In Hamilton, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
[W]e believe that what constitutes an
authorized attorney’s fee for prosecuting a
claim for those particular benefits also
should be determined by the law in effect on
the date of the injury. A contract that
provides otherwise is void. KRS 342.320(2).
KRS 446.080(1) provides that statutes are
to be liberally construed in order to promote
their objectives and the legislative intent,
and KRS 446.080(3) provides that no statute
is to be applied retroactively absent an
express legislative directive. In Peach v.
21 Brands Distillery, Ky.App., 580 S.W.2d 235
(1979), the court emphasized that the rule
against the retroactive application of
statutes should be strictly construed.
Particularly where a statute creates new
rights or duties, it should be presumed that
the legislature intended for the statute’s
application to be prospective only. The 1990
amendment to KRS 342.320(1) exposes injured
workers to liability for substantially
greater attorney’s fees in relation to the
size of their awards than was authorized at
the time the maximum amount of the award was
fixed. We find no indication, whatever, that
the legislature intended for the 1990
amendment to KRS 342.320 to apply
retrospectively to awards of attorney’s fees
relative to injuries which occurred before
its effective date.
Id. at 97.
However, Hamilton is easily distinguishable from the
case sub judice since the amendment that became effective on
December 12, 1996, specifically stated that “[t]he provisions of
. . . 342.320 . . . are remedial.”
Where the words of the statute are clear
and unambiguous and express the legislative
intent, there is no room for construction or
interpretation and the statute must be given
its effect as written. Griffin v. City of
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Bowling Green, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 456 (1970).
An unambiguous statute must be applied
without resort to any outside aids. Delta
Airlines, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Revenue Cabinet, Ky., 689 S.W.2d 14 (1985).
Lincoln County Fiscal Court v. Dept. Of Public Advocacy, Ky., 794
S.W.2d 162, 163 (1990).
“We have a duty to accord to words of a
statute their literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an
absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion.”
Bailey v. Reeves,
Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1984), (citing Department of Revenue v.
Greyhound Corporation, Ky., 321 S.W.2d 60 (1959)).
In Napier v. Scotia Coal Company, Ky., 874 S.W.2d 377
(1993), the Supreme Court held that since the 1988 amendments to
KRS 342.320 were “remedial,” they were to apply not only
prospectively to those claims that arose after the effective date
of the amendment, but also retrospectively to those claims that
arose before its effective date.
Based on Napier, supra, and the
remedial language in KRS 342.320, we believe that the December
12, 1996 amendments apply retrospectively to Daub’s claim for
attorney’s fees, thereby limiting those attorney’s fees to
$2,000.00, even though Eller’s injury occurred before the
effective date of the amendments.
Furthermore, and of equal importance, is the language
in the amended KRS 342.320 concerning the date of the contract.
KRS 342.320 states in pertinent part as follows:
(1) All fees of attorneys and physicians,
and all charges of hospitals under this
chapter, shall be subject to the approval of
an administrative law judge or arbitrator
pursuant to the statutes and administrative
regulations.
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(2) Attorney’s fees for services under
this chapter on behalf of an employee shall
be subject to the following maximum limits:
(a) Twenty percent (20%) of the award not
to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) for
services performed up to and including the
date of a written determination by the
arbitrator. This fee shall be paid by the
employee from the proceeds of the award or
settlement.
(b) Upon an appeal by an employee from a
written determination of an arbitrator or an
award or order of an administrative law
judge, a fee to be fixed by the
administrative law judge upon consideration
of the extent, quality, and complexity of
services not to exceed twenty percent (20%)
of the first twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000) of any increased income benefits
awarded, ten percent (10%) of the next
fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) of
increased income benefits, and five percent
(5%) of the remainder of the additional
income benefits awarded and not to exceed in
all ten thousand dollars ($10,000). This fee
shall be paid by the employee from the
proceeds of the award or settlement and shall
be in addition to the fee, if any, awarded
under paragraph (a) of this subsection.
(c) Upon an appeal by an employer or
carrier from a written determination of an
arbitrator or an award or order of an
administrative law judge, if the employer or
carrier does not prevail upon appeal, the
administrative law judge shall fix an
attorney’s fee to be paid by the employer or
carrier for the employee’s attorney upon
consideration of the extent, quality, and
complexity of the services rendered not to
exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) per
level of appeal. This attorney’s fee shall
be in addition to any fee awarded under
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection.
(d) Attorney-client employment contracts
entered into and signed prior to December 12,
1996, for injuries or date of last exposure
occurring prior to December 12, 1996, shall
not be subject to the conditions of
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this
subsection, and the law existing at the date
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of the injury or last exposure to the hazards
of an occupational disease shall apply.
(3) In approving an allowance of
attorney’s fees, the administrative law judge
or arbitrator shall consider the extent,
complexity, and quality of services rendered,
and in the case of death, the Remarriage
Tables of the Dutch Royal Insurance
Institute. An attorney’s fee may be denied
or reduced upon proof of solicitation by the
attorney. However, this provision shall not
be construed to preclude advertising in
conformity with standards prescribed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court. The date of injury
or last exposure shall control the applicable
maximum attorney’s fee.
(4) No attorney’s fee in any case
involving benefits under this chapter shall
be paid until the fee is approved by the
arbitrator or administrative law judge, and
any contract for the payment of attorney’s
fees otherwise than as provided in this
section shall be void . . . . [emphases
added].
The language in subsection (2)(d) of the statute
clearly provides that for the $2,000.00 limit not to apply to a
contract, the “[a]ttorney-client employment contract[] [must have
been] entered into and signed prior to December 12, 1996, for
injuries or date of last exposure occurring prior to December 12,
1996.”
For emphasis, subsection (4) of the statute further
provides that “any contract for the payment of attorney’s fees
otherwise than as provided in this section shall be void.”
While
Eller’s date of injury was before the effective date of the
amendment, the employment contract was entered into after the
effective date of the amendment.
Therefore, Daub’s attorney’s
fee claim fails to meet the requirements of the amended statute
and is limited to $2,000.00.
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In the alternative, Daub and Eller argue that KRS
342.320 is an unconstitutional attempt by the Legislature to
encroach upon the authority of the Supreme Court of Kentucky by
regulating and disciplining attorneys for charging and receiving
payment of fees in excess of the limits imposed by statute.
The
Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) is a mechanism
provided by the Legislature as an option for a worker in this
Commonwealth to pursue a claim for benefits for an injury arising
out of his employment.
Before the injury occurs, the worker can
choose to reject coverage under the Act.
If a worker rejects
coverage under the Act, then he retains his common-law tort
rights.
See KRS 342.395.
We do not believe KRS 342.320 to be an unconstitutional
regulation of the legal profession or of fees charged by
attorneys, but believe that it is an option provided by the
Legislature for workers.
If a worker chooses to participate in
the legislative remedy, then his participation necessarily must
be within the parameters set forth by the Legislature.
Therefore, the cases cited by Daub and Eller Foster v.
Overstreet, Ky., 905 S.W.2d 504 (1995), Drumm v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990),
O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, Ky., 892
S.W.2d 571 (1995), Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky., 609
S.W.2d 682 (1980), and American Insurance Ass’n v. Kentucky Bar
Ass’n, Ky., 917 S.W.2d 568 (1996), to the extent that they
prohibit encroachment on the powers of the Supreme Court, are
inapplicable here.
We hold that KRS 342.320 is not an
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unconstitutional interference with the attorney-client
relationship.
Daub and Eller also contend that KRS 342.320 violates
Sections 2, 14, 19, 28, 29, 109, and 116 of the Kentucky
Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the United States
Constitution on the grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious.
In deciding whether an act of the General Assembly is
unconstitutional, we necessarily begin with the strong
presumption in favor of constitutionality.
United Dry Forces v.
Lewis, Ky., 619 S.W.2d 489, 493 (1981), and Sims v. Board of
Education of Jefferson County, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 491, 493 (1956).
In Estridge v. Stovall, Ky. App., 704 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1985), the
Court stated:
A statutory classification in the area of
social welfare is not unconstitutionally
arbitrary if it has a legitimate objective
and it is rationally related to that
objective. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971). The
constitutional protections of due process or
equal protection are offended “only if the
resultant classifications or deprivations of
liberty rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to
a reasonable state objective.” Kentucky
Association of Chiropractors, Inc., v.
Jefferson County Medical Society, Ky., 549
S.W.2d 817 (1977).
The purpose of KRS 342.320 “is to benefit the claimant
in allowing him to satisfy his present debt to his attorney for
representation in the case.”
A & K Coal Company v. Blankenship,
Ky., 708 S.W.2d 638 (1986).
This is a legitimate state objective
and we believe KRS 342.320 is rationally related to that purpose.
As such, we hold that KRS 342.320 is constitutional.
We are also
persuaded by the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
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held constitutional a federal statute limiting to $10.00 the fee
that may be paid to an attorney or agent who represents a veteran
seeking benefits for service-connected death or disability.
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985).
The opinion of the
Board is affirmed.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MCANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
MCANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURRING: Although I agree with the
result reached by the majority, I must take exception to the
majority’s contention that the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Walters v. National Association of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985), is persuasive in this case.
This
is an inappropriate analogy for several reasons.
In Walters, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute
limiting to $10.00 the fee for an attorney or agent who assists a
veteran seeking benefits for service-connected death or
disability.
The Court stressed that this process is intended to
be both informal and nonadversarial.
Id. at 323.
There is no
formal questioning or cross-examination and there are no formal
evidentiary rules.
Id. at 311.
The liberal appeals process is
structured so that veterans have up to one year to perfect their
appeal.
Id.
By limiting the amount an attorney can recover, the
fee reflects a government interest:
that the system for administering benefits
should be managed in a sufficiently informal
way that there should be no need for the
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employment of an attorney to obtain benefits
to which a claimant was entitled. . .
Id. at 321.
In fact, the Court refers to VA statistics showing
that only two percent of claimants are represented by lawyers.
Id. at 311.
On the other hand, workers’ compensation involves a
more extensive and formalized procedure.
Upon filing a claim, an
employee is responsible for initiating discovery, drafting
motions, and preparing for a prehearing conference.
25:011 §§ 4-8.
803 KAR
The actual hearing may include witness testimony,
cross-examination, and opening and closing statements.
§ 10.
See id.
In addition, the employee must file his petition for
reconsideration within 14 days and any appeal within 30 days.
See id. §§ 11-12.
The procedures behind the workers’
compensation system generate a necessity for attorneys and it is
not reasonable to suggest that employees could obtain equitable
relief without active representation.
Employees inevitably
benefit from an attorney’s knowledge and assistance.
The procedures available to employees and veterans can
certainly be distinguished and therefore the justification for
the fee limitations is not the same.
The reasoning behind
Walters is irrelevant to the case at hand.
Apart from the aforementioned, I find this Court’s
reasoning to be legally sound and concur with the result.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, SPECIAL FUND:
Hon. Wayne C. Daub
Louisville, KY
Hon. David R. Allen
Louisville, KY
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