RONNIE REAMS ROSA H. REAMS v. WALLACE CHRISMAN MARJORIE CHRISMAN
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RENDERED: October 1, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002230-MR
RONNIE REAMS
ROSA H. REAMS
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-757
v.
WALLACE CHRISMAN
MARJORIE CHRISMAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE: Ronnie and Rosa Reams (the Reamses) appeal from
an amended and corrected judgment of the Madison Circuit Court
entered on March 19, 1998.
The amended judgment set aside a
prior judgment entered quieting title to a disputed piece of
property in favor of the Reamses and instead found in favor of
Wallace and Marjorie Chrisman (the Chrismans) as to the disputed
property.
We affirm.
The factual and procedural history of this case is
quite complicated, requiring us to spend a considerable amount of
time laying out the events that led to the dispute at hand.
Factually, the Chrismans and the Reamses own adjoining property
in Madison County.
The Chrismans purchased their property in
1970 from Burnam Baker (Baker).
At the time of purchase, Baker
showed the Chrismans the boundary lines of the property.
Specifically, Baker showed the Chrismans the fence line that
separated their property from the property eventually purchased
by the Reamses.
The Reamses purchased their property in 1978 from
Marvin and Kathryn Wethington.
At the time the Reamses purchased
their property, they placed into the records of the Madison
County Clerk’s Office an affidavit from Baker regarding the
boundaries of the property they purchased.
Paragraph two of the
affidavit states:
That this property has been surrounded by a
fence and that portion of the fence adjacent
to the Old Bark Road and Baker property has
been in existence for over 50 years and that
the remaining fence around the perimeter of
the property to the new Bark Road has been in
existence for over forty years and there is a
new fence along the road frontage so that the
entire property is now under fence.
This affidavit was filed immediately proceeding the Reamses’
deed.
In 1992, the Reamses tore down the fence separating their
property from the Chrismans.
Procedurally, the Chrismans filed a complaint in the
Madison Circuit Court on November 25, 1992.
In that complaint
the Chrismans alleged that the Reamses had trespassed upon their
property and sought to quiet title in the disputed area.
In
dispute was the area of property located between the former fence
line and the old mountain road, where the Reamses claim their
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property line extended.1
December 9, 1997.
A trial to the court was held on
Prior to the trial date, on April 1, 1996,
Judge Julia Hylton Adams, the parties (or their representatives)
and their respective counsel physically walked and observed the
property in dispute.
At trial, the court heard testimony from
nineteen witnesses, including two land surveyors.
After
reviewing the testimony and the evidence presented at trial and
upon considering the arguments presented by counsel on both
sides, the trial court entered a Judgment in favor of the Reamses
on January 26, 1998.2
On February 5, 1998, the Chrismans filed two motions
for reconsideration based upon factual errors by the trial court.
The trial court heard the motions on February 12, 1998.
On March
19, 1998, the trial court issued an amended and corrected
judgment Pursuant to CR 52, acknowledging that it had erred in
its reading of the chain of title.
In its Amended and Corrected
Judgment the trial court set aside its previous judgment in favor
of the Reamses and instead found in favor of the Chrismans on the
property dispute.3
Specifically, the trial court found that the
Reamses were aware of the boundaries of their property in 1978
1
The complaint also contained unrelated allegations against
Walter and Flossie Hill(the Hills) for trespass and conversion of
trees and logs.
2
The trial order also resulted in judgment in favor of the
Chrismans as to their claims of trespass and conversion against
the Hills.
3
The trial court let stand its judgment in favor of the
Chrismans with regard to their dispute with the Hills in all
respects except “intent” to convert.
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when they relied upon the affidavit of Baker, which they recorded
at the Madison County Clerk’s office.
Alternatively, the trial
court found that the Chrismans were entitled to the disputed
property by way of adverse possession.
On August 12, 1998, the
trial court overruled the Reamses’ motion to alter, amend and
vacate.
This appeal followed.
Additional facts will be
presented as needed.
The Reamses raise two issues on appeal: (1) the Reamses
argue that the trial court erred in setting aside its original
judgment; and (2) the Reamses argue that they are entitled to the
disputed piece of property through adverse possession.
disagree.
We
On appeal, findings of fact made by a trial court
pursuant to CR 52.01 will be upheld unless found clearly
erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Flint, Ky., 940 S.W.2d 896 (1997).
The trial court has the power to set aside its own
judgment based upon CR 52.02, which states:
Not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court of its own initiative, or
on the motion of a party made not later than
10 days after entry of judgment, may amend
its findings and may amend the judgment
accordingly....(emphasis added).
In its initial judgment, the trial court found that the Chrismans
and the Reamses shared a common source of title from the original
grantors, James E. and Sarah Combs found in Deed Book 66, Page
282.
Based upon the submitted chains of title, the trial court
ruled that the property owned by the Reamses extended beyond the
fenced area to the Combs Mountain Road.
The Chrismans filed a
motion for reconsideration and argued that the trial court erred
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in finding that they and the Reamses shared a common source of
title.
After hearing arguments on the issue, the trial court
acknowledged its error in the Amended and Corrected Judgment.
The trial court found that the Reamses chain of title could not
be traced back beyond 1954.
Thus, the trial court held that the
Reamses were bound by the property description given to them at
the time of purchase, stating:
Given the previous location of the fence, the
lapse in title from 1954 in the Reamses
chain, and the Reamses’ reliance on the
Burnam Baker affidavit filed
contemporaneously with the 1969 (sic) deed
(and affirming the exterior fencing on the
subject of property), together with the
plaintiff’s (sic) [Chrismans] chain of title,
which is continuous and can be traced back to
1879-clearly, the Chrismans have superior
title to the area in dispute, contrary to the
Court’s previous findings.
The trial court’s finding comports with the law in this
Commonwealth which states:
It is well settled that where the boundary
lines of adjoining landowners are not
definitely known or their location is in
dispute, such owners may establish the lines
by either written or by a parole agreement;
such boundary lines may also be established
by their mutual recognition of, and
acquiescence in, certain lines as the true
boundary lines, the courts being reluctant to
interfere therewith after the lines have been
permitted to exist over such a period of time
that satisfactory proof of the true line is
difficult.*** It is well established that if
adjoining landowners occupy their respective
premises up to a certain line which they
mutually recognize and acquiesce in for a
long period of time--usually the time
prescribed by the statute of limitations-they are precluded from claiming that the
boundary line thus recognized and acquiesce
it is not the true one. In other words, such
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recognition of, and acquiescence in, a line
as the true boundary line, if continued for a
sufficient length of time, will afford a
conclusive presumption that the line thus
acquiesced in is the true boundary line.
Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Merchant’s and Manufacturer’s
paint Co., Ky., 209 S.W.2d 828 (1948) (citing Hotze v. Ring, Ky.,
115 S.W.2d 311, 313 (1938)(emphasis added)).
Unquestionably, the trial court spent a considerable
amount of time reviewing the facts of this case and the law
related thereto.
The trial court acted within its discretion
when it amended its previous judgment after the Chrismans filed
for reconsideration.
In so doing, the trial court thoroughly set
out its reasoning and the factual circumstances that led to its
decision to set aside the previous judgment.
The trial court
took under consideration the fact that the Reamses had knowledge
at the time they purchased the property that the fence line was
the boundary to their property. (See Arthur v. Martin, Ky. App.,
705 S.W.2d 940 (1986) where we held that courts must consider the
intention of the parties at the time of conveyance and their
actions thereafter in determining what interest was conveyed).
Moreover, the Reamses recognized the fence line as the boundary
to their property for more than fourteen years.
Considering that
the Reamses were unable to trace their chain of title prior to
1954 while the Chrismans could be traced continuously back to
1879, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that
the former fence line is the boundary to the Reamses property.
In the alternative, the Reamses claim the property in
dispute by way of adverse possession.
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The court found that the
Reamses could not lay claim to the property through adverse
possession because they had not met the requisite time period for
such claim to vest.
The Reamses did not remove the fence line
until 1992 and the Chrismans filed suit in the later portion of
the same year.
The statutory period for adverse possession in
this Commonwealth is fifteen years.
KRS 413.010; see also Tartar
v. Tucker, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1955).
The trial court did
not err in making this decision.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert C. Moody
Richmond, KY
Karen G. Chrisman
Simpsonville, KY
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