WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. CHARLES RICHARD CLEMONS
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RENDERED:
November 19, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001740-MR
WAL-MART STORES, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM HOUSTON MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1995-CI-00006
v.
CHARLES RICHARD CLEMONS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, HUDDLESTON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the
appellee in a slip-and-fall claim.
We find that there was
substantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the
hazardous condition was not open and obvious.
We further find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
appellee to amend his claim for damages on the eve of trial.
Hence, we affirm.
During the afternoon of February 11, 1994, the
appellee, Charles Richard Clemons, went to the Wal-Mart discount
department store in Leitchfield.
Upon leaving the store by the
left ramp, he slipped and fell on his left leg.
As a result of
the fall, he broke his ankle.
The night before the accident, a large amount of snow
and ice had fallen in the area as a result of a winter storm.
Wal-Mart employees salted and scraped the entrance ramps earlier
in the day.
Although the temperature did not rise above freezing
that day, some melting occurred during the daylight hours,
causing water and slush to collect on the left ramp.
The
temperature decreased as the sun set and the water on the ramp
had begun to re-freeze when Clemons came out of the store.
Clemons brought this action against Wal-Mart, Inc., for
his medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering.
trial was conducted on June 10, 1998.
A jury
At the close of Clemons’s
proof, Wal-Mart unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict.
The jury found that Clemons incurred $1,320.40 in past medical
expenses, $6,184.70 in lost wages, and $25,000.00 in mental and
physical pain and suffering, for a total of $32,505.10.
The jury
also apportioned fault for the accident equally between Clemons
and Wal-Mart.
Consequently, the trial court entered a judgment
for Clemons in the amount of $16,252.55.
Wal-Mart now appeals.
Wal-Mart first argues that the trial court erred in
denying its motion for a directed verdict.
It asserts that the
ice and slush on the ramp were open and obvious, thereby
precluding any liability on its part.
Clemons responds that
there was substantial evidence that the ice and slush on the ramp
was not open and obvious.
Based upon the evidence presented and
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the applicable law, we find that the issue was properly presented
to the jury.
The prevailing winter weather patterns in this state
have made cases such as the present one fairly common.
However,
our courts have not always been consistent in their treatment of
these cases.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Manis, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 856
(1968), the plaintiff slipped and fell on a wooden platform.
At
trial, the plaintiff testified that at the time of his accident
there was snow and ice on the ground, and that after he fell he
noticed that the platform "was nothing but a glare of ice."
at 857.
The former Court of Appeals held:
[N]atural outdoor hazards which are as
obvious to an invitee as to the owner of the
premises do not constitute unreasonable risks
to the former which the landowner had a duty
to remove or warn against.
*
*
*
*
As we have heretofore noted, the hazard faced
by appellee was created by natural elements.
It was outside, and exposed in broad
daylight. Appellee was thoroughly familiar
with the structure. He was fully aware of
the accumulation of ice and snow in the area.
He saw that the level part of the walkway was
wet, indicating that melting ice had been
there. That there might be on the platform
unmelted ice, or refreezing water, was a
distinct possibility. Under these
circumstances, we are of the opinion
defendant could not have reasonably foreseen
that appellee would proceed without
exercising commensurate caution.
There was no duty on appellant to stay the
elements or make this walkway absolutely
safe. Nor was there a duty to warn appellee
that the obvious natural conditions may have
created a risk. If a "glare of ice" existed
on the platform, whatever hazard it
constituted was as apparent to appellee as it
was to appellant. We are unable to find a
breach of duty by the latter.
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Id.
Id. at 858-59 (Emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court subsequently upheld Manis in Corbin
Motor Lodge v. Combs, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 944 (1987).
The plaintiff
in Corbin Motor Lodge slipped and fell on ice while she was
leaving a restaurant.
The Court held that the condition was
naturally occurring, that the plaintiff was aware of the
treacherous conditions, and that the danger was open and obvious.
Although the doctrine of assumption of risk has been abolished by
the adoption of comparative fault, our Supreme Court found no
reason to alter the rule in Manis.
S.W.2d at 946.
Corbin Motor Lodge, 740
Consequently, the Court upheld the trial court
grant of summary judgment in favor of the property owner.
There have been modifications of the holdings of the
Manis and Corbin Motor Lodge cases.
In Schreiner v. Humana,
Inc., Ky., 625 S.W.2d 581 (1982), the Supreme Court noted that
the obviousness of the hazard may be an issue of fact depending
upon the facts of the particular case.
In Wallingford v. Kroger
Co., Ky. App., 761 S.W.2d 621 (1988), this Court noted that the
plaintiff, an injured vendor, was compelled to traverse an icy
ramp to make a delivery in the course of his employment.
We held
that the plaintiff was entitled to a comparative negligence
instruction in his suit against the property owner.
In Davis v. Coleman Management Co., Ky. App., 765
S.W.2d 37 (1989), this Court reversed a summary judgment in favor
of a landlord whose tenant had slipped on ice outside her
apartment building.
The Davis court relied on the common law
pertaining to the duties of a landlord to keep common areas
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reasonably safe.
Id. at 39.
Yet both Wallingford and Davis were
based on special duties owed by the property owner to the
particular plaintiff, and Schreiner predates the later Supreme
Court ruling in Corbin Motor Lodge.
Clemons contends that the facts of his case are most
similar to those in Estep v. B. F. Saul Real Estate Investment
Trust, Ky. App., 843 S.W.2d 911 (1992).
In that case, the
plaintiff slipped and fell at the defendants' shopping mall.
Evidence at trial established that when the plaintiff and her
husband arrived at the mall, the parking lot had been cleared.
The plaintiff testified that she believed that the sidewalks had
also been cleared, although she did notice a thin coating of snow
on the sidewalks.
There was no question that the plaintiff was
aware of the weather conditions, but the plaintiff testified that
she fell because there was a layer of ice under the snow on the
sidewalk.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the defendant based on the ruling in Manis.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that summary judgment
was improper under Manis because "ice under the snow was not an
obvious natural hazard."
Estep, 843 S.W.2d at 913.
This court
agreed that summary judgment was improper, stating:
...[N]ot "all natural conditions outdoors are
equally apparent to landowners and invitees.
On the contrary, whether a natural hazard
like ice and snow is obvious depends on the
unique facts of each case". Schreiner v.
Humana, Inc., Ky., 625 S.W.2d 580, 581
(1982). As a result, it appears that there
is a genuine issue as to whether [defendant]
knew of the ice under the snow, which was not
obvious to [plaintiff].
Estep, at 913.
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The Estep court held that summary judgment was
inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to defendant's knowledge of the presence of ice under the
snow.
This court went on to address other issues raised by the
plaintiff in the event that the question of whether the defendant
knew of the ice was resolved in favor of the defendant.
In doing
so, the court distinguished Manis on the ground that the
assumption of duty rule applied.
The court noted that because
the defendant had decided to clear ice and snow from the
premises, it was required to do so in a reasonable manner.
The
court reversed the summary judgment granted to the defendant on
the assumption of duty issue, holding that the issue of whether
the defendant acted reasonably in removing the ice and snow was
"a classic jury question, which precludes summary judgment."
Id.
at 914-15.
The only question raised by Wal-Mart regarding
liability is whether there was evidence that the icy condition of
the ramp was open and obvious.
On a motion for a directed
verdict, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion and must give
that party the advantage of every fair and reasonable intendment
that the evidence can justify.
921, 922 (1991).
Lovins v. Napier, Ky., 814 S.W.2d
The court may only grant a directed verdict if
the plaintiff's evidence, whether taken alone or in light of all
the evidence, is not of sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable persons.
Ahlers, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 153, 157 (1972).
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Burnett v.
On appeal, this Court
must determine whether the verdict rendered is palpably or
flagrantly against the evidence so as to indicate that it was
reached as a result of passion or prejudice.
Lewis v. Bledsoe
Surface Mining Co., Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461 (1990).
The facts of this case place it squarely within the
rule set out in Estep.
Having assumed the duty to clear the
ramps, Wal-Mart had a duty to do so in a reasonable manner.
Indeed, when a landowner takes steps to remove ice and snow, an
invitee may be led to believe that the way is safe.
Thus, a
hazardous condition such as re-freezing water may not be readily
apparent.
Under such circumstances, whether a condition is open
and obvious becomes a question of fact.
In this case, Wal-Mart
took affirmative steps to clear the ramp of snow and slush.
Specifically, there was evidence that Wal-Mart employees salted
the ramp twice during the day.
The ice formed on the ramp as a
result of re-freezing water and slush.
Several witnesses,
including Clemons, testified that no ice was visible on the ramp
until they were actually standing on it.
Based upon this
evidence, we conclude that the matter was properly presented to
the jury.
Wal-Mart next argues that the trial court erred in
allowing Clemons to amend his claim for damages.
In his pre-
trial disclosures pursuant to CR 8.01, Clemons claimed $5,000.00
for mental and physical pain and suffering.
During discovery,
the trial court entered an order giving Clemons until April 25,
1998, to supplement his CR 8.01 disclosure of damages.
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Prior to
that deadline, Clemons filed a disclosure which still sought
$5,000.00 for pain and suffering.
On June 9, 1998, the day before the scheduled trial,
Clemons filed a motion to amend his CR 8 disclosure to seek
$50,000.00 for pain and suffering.
that the amendment was untimely.
Wal-Mart objected, arguing
The trial judge offered Wal-
Mart a continuance if the amendment prejudiced the defense.
Counsel for Wal-Mart stated that he did not want a continuance,
only to limit the claim for pain and suffering to $5,000.00.
Wal-Mart’s counsel stated that if the motion to amend the
interrogatory were granted, then he preferred to go to trial that
day.
Based on this response, the trial court granted Clemons’s
motion to amend the interrogatory and the case proceeded to
trial.
CR 8.01(2) provides in part that when a claim is made
against a party for unliquidated damages, that party may obtain
information as to the amount claimed by interrogatories.
If this
is done, the amount claimed shall not exceed the last amount
stated in answer to interrogatories.
The rule prevents a trial
court from awarding additional sums which were not disclosed in
the plaintiff’s pre-trial compliance.
Co.
v. Spain, Ky.
National Fire Insurance
App., 774 S.W.2d 449 (1989).
However, the
Court in Spain also noted that “[i]f the interrogatories are
answered, the amount requested shall not exceed the answer in the
interrogatories, unless, the interrogatories are amended to
conform to the evidence.”
Id. at 451 (Emphasis added).
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The rule
does not specify how long before trial any amendment to a claim
for damages must be made.
In the present case, Clemons moved to amend his damage
disclosure one (1) day before trial, and some six (6) weeks after
the trial court’s pre-trial order required such motions to be
made.
We do not encourage such last-minute amendments to a pre-
trial compliance.
Furthermore, a trial court should take care to
consistently enforce its pre-trial orders.
Nonetheless, a trial
court has considerable discretion in determining how to enforce
compliance with its pre-trial orders regarding discovery.
Thus,
the standard for review is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the amendment.
City of Louisville v.
Allen, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 179, 184 (1964).
In the present case, Wal-Mart was given an opportunity
to continue the trial if the amendment caused undue hardship.
Wal-Mart elected to proceed to trial that day.
Furthermore, Wal-
Mart does not offer any indication how its defense of the case
was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling.
Therefore, we cannot
find that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
Clemons to amend his claim for damages prior to trial.
Wal-Mart also argues that the evidence did not support
the jury’s award of $25,000.00 in pain and suffering.
However,
we find no indication in the record that Wal-Mart preserved this
error by any post-trial motions for a new trial.
Wal-Mart
contends that this ground of error was preserved by its pre-trial
objection to Clemons’ amending his claim for pain and suffering.
Nonetheless, a motion for a new trial pursuant to CR 59.01 cannot
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be made prior to trial.
Rather, the trial court must decide
whether the jury's award appears “to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice or in disregard of the evidence
or the instructions of the court.”
CR 59.01(d).
This is a
discretionary function assigned to the trial judge who has heard
the witnesses first-hand and viewed their demeanor and who has
observed the jury throughout the trial.
Davis v. Graviss, Ky.,
672 S.W.2d 928, 932-33 (1984).
Furthermore, Wal-Mart only made a general objection
after the verdict was returned that the “verdict was inconsistent
with the evidence.”
We do not find this objection sufficient to
preserve a claim of error regarding the amount of damages
awarded.
Since it is not appropriate for an appellate court to
review the grant or denial of a new trial for excessive or
inadequate damages unless the trial court has first considered
the substance of the claim, we must decline to address Wal-Mart’s
ground of error.
Cooper v. Fultz, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 497, 501
(1991).
Lastly, Wal-Mart contends that the trial judge made
improper remarks during the voir dire of the jury.
During voir
dire, the trial court informed the jury panel of the standard for
proving negligence cases, and asked the members of the panel if
they could decide the case based upon the law as proven by the
evidence presented by Clemons.
In concluding this line of
questioning, the trial court asked the panel:
Let us assume, Ladies and Gentlemen, that he
proves all three of the things: Proves a
duty; proves a breach of the duty; and he
proves damages. And in this case he proves
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damages of ten million dollars . . . ten
million dollars. Is there any of you that
could not award that type of money?
Three (3) prospective jurors raised their hands to the
question and were excused from the panel.
objected to the form of the question.
Counsel for Wal-Mart
The trial judge stated
that he was merely trying to determine which jurors were willing
to follow the instructions.
Subsequently, the trial judge asked
the remaining members of the panel if they could follow the
instructions and award damages based solely on the evidence.
From our review of the record, we find that Wal-Mart’s objection
to this question was not preserved.
Wal-Mart’s counsel did not
argue to the trial court that the question was prejudicial, nor
did he ask for a mistrial or for a new jury panel.
He only asked
if the three (3) members of the panel who raised their hands
could be allowed to remain.
Although the trial court denied that
motion, the judge clarified the question for the remaining
members of the panel.
Because Wal-Mart did not preserve its
objection to the question on the ground of unfair prejudice, we
need not consider the issue on appeal.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Grayson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew J. Baker
Stefan Richard Hughes
Cole, Moore & Baker
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Gary S. Logsdon
Brownsville, Kentucky
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