JAMES WALTER LITTLEFIELD v. KIMBERLY DANETTE LITTLEFIELD
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RENDERED: March 19, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001049-MR
JAMES WALTER LITTLEFIELD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALDWELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00041
v.
KIMBERLY DANETTE LITTLEFIELD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, KNOPF AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by James Walter Littlefield
(James) from an order of the Caldwell Circuit Court granting sole
custody of the parties’ child to appellee Kimberly Danette
Littlefield (Kimberly).
The domestic relations commissioner
(commissioner) recommended that the parties be awarded joint
custody; however, the trial court subsequently rejected the
majority of the commissioner’s findings and granted sole custody
to Kimberly.
We affirm.
The parties were married on May 30, 1993.
The marriage
produced one child, Joseph Chandler Warren (Chandler), born
December 28, 1993.
On March 10, 1997, James filed a petition for
dissolution of the marriage which, among other things, requested
custody of Chandler.
Kimberly filed a response which likewise
requested custody of Chandler.
The final hearing in this matter,
held before the commissioner, was begun on June 24, 1997, and
concluded on August 13, 1997.
On October 9, 1997, the
commissioner filed his “Recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Final Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and Orders.”
The commissioner’s recommendation provided, among other things,
that the parties be granted joint custody of Chandler with James
designated as the primary physical custodian.
Kimberly and James
each filed timely exceptions to the commissioner’s
recommendations.
On December 22, 1997, a hearing on the exceptions was
heard before the trial court.
On February 3, 1998, the trial
court issued its order and judgment substantially rejecting the
recommendations of the commissioner and, inter alia, awarding
Kimberly sole custody of Chandler.
James timely filed a motion
to alter, amend, or vacate its judgment, which was denied on
April 7, 1998.
This appeal followed.
James first argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in rejecting the commissioner’s custody recommendation
in light of 56th Judicial Circuit Local Rule 9.04(c), which
provides that:
The Court will adopt the Commissioner’s
Report unless it is shown to be an abuse of
discretion contrary to law or unsupported by
substantial evidence. In this situation, the
Court may modify the Report, may reject it in
whole or in part, and receive other evidence,
or may remand it with the proper instructions
for further actions by the Commissioner.
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Rule 53.06 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) provides that a trial court may adopt a commissioner’s
report, or may modify it, or may reject it in whole or in part,
or may receive further evidence, or may recommit it with
instructions.
In interpreting this rule, the Supreme Court has
stated, “[i]n sum, the trial court has the broadest possible
discretion with respect to the use it makes of reports of
domestic relations commissioners.”
S.W.2d 713, 716 (1997).
Eiland v. Ferrell, Ky. 937
By its clear language, CR 53.06(2)
allows the trial judge complete discretion as to the use of a
commissioner's report.
356 (1978).
Haley v. Haley, Ky. App., 573 S.W.2d 354,
The trial court can adopt, modify or reject the
commissioner's recommendations.
S.W.2d 491, 494 (1993).
Basham v. Wilkins, Ky. App., 851
Local rules must be in accordance with
SCR 1.040 and consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules
of Criminal Procedure, and Rules of the Supreme Court.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 20, 21 (1998).
Brutley
The
authorization to enact local rules pursuant to SCR 1.040(3)(a) is
subject to two conditions:
first, that no local rule shall
contradict any substantive rule of law or any rule of practice
and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court, and second, that
it shall be effective only upon Supreme Court approval.
Abernathy v. Nicholson, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1995).
Appellant’s argument that the trial court’s discretion
in this case was limited by Local Rule, 9.04(c) is in conflict
with the foregoing authorities.
To the extent that the local
rule of the 56th Judicial Circuit purports to limit the trial
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court’s discretion in its use of a domestic relations
commissioner’s report, this is an improper restriction of the
discretion granted to the trial court under CR 53.06.
To that
extent, the local rule was not binding upon the trial court, and
so provides James with no ground for relief.
Cf. Oppenheimer v.
Smith, Ky. 512 S.W.2d 510 (1974) (local court rule providing that
all depositions must be taken at least 10 days prior to the
beginning of term of court in which the case is to be tried was
invalid as inconsistent with state rule governing taking of
depositions, and deposition should not have been excluded from
evidence on the basis of such local rule);
Newdigate v. Walker,
Ky., 384 S.W.2d 312 (1964) (circuit judges may regulate practice
in their courts by adopting local rules not inconsistent with
Civil Rules);
Robinson v. Robinson, Ky., 363 S.W.2d 111 (1962)
(a circuit court cannot make or so construe a local rule as to be
in conflict with the Civil Rules).
James next argues that the trial court improperly
relied upon certain expert testimony.
At the hearing before the
commissioner, Kimberly called as a witness Dr. Linda Flynn, a
clinical psychologist.
When Kimberly asked Dr. Flynn to testify
concerning which party would be the better parent, the
commissioner sustained James’ objection.
Nonetheless, James
asserts that Dr. Flynn proceeded to address that question, and
that the trial court improperly relied upon this testimony.
We are not persuaded that the trial court erred in the
manner which James alleges.
James apparently refers to the
portion of the testimony wherein Linda attempted to ask Dr.
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Flynn, [w]hat do you think would be in the best interest of
Chandler?”
James’ counsel objected, and the commissioner
sustained the objection.
Contrary to James’ assertion, the
record reveals no subsequent testimony by Dr. Flynn concerning
which parent would be “better”, or which should have custody.
To the contrary, at the conclusion of her testimony, under
questioning from the commissioner, Dr. Flynn agreed that she was
“not one way or the other here to give an opinion as to who would
be the most suitable custodian.”
We discern no reversible error
associated with this argument.
James next argues that the trial court erred in
allowing Dr. Flynn to testify at all.
James completed his case
in chief on June 24, 1997, and the matter was then continued.
Dr. Flynn saw Kimberly and Chandler for the first time on July 8,
1997.
James contends that Kimberly was given an unfair advantage
in the commissioner’s hearing in that she was allowed to hear
James’s evidence and then hire a psychologist to rebut it.
It is likely true, as James contends, that Kimberly
benefitted from the continuation of the hearing in that it
afforded her additional time to prepare and to consult with Dr.
Flynn.
Yet James also was given additional time to prepare.
He
had notice that Kimberly would call Dr. Flynn as a witness, and
he had an unrestricted opportunity to cross-examine her.
In
these circumstances, we are not persuaded that Dr. Flynn’s
testimony unfairly prejudiced James’ rights.
James further insists that Dr. Flynn’s testimony
violated the separation of witnesses rule in CR 43.09.
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He
maintains that Kimberly told Dr. Flynn about testimony received
at the June 24 hearing.
James argues that this was a violation
of the separation of witnesses rule and that Dr. Flynn should not
have been allowed to testify.
However, trial courts have broad
discretion in applying the rule respecting separation of
witnesses, and appellate courts will not intervene in such
matters unless that discretion has been abused.
Commonwealth, Ky., 323 S.W.2d 577, 578 (1958).
Moore v.
Here, the long
continuance gave James an adequate opportunity to prepare for Dr.
Flynn’s testimony, which he could anticipate would be based on
the evidence already submitted.
In these circumstances, we are
not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion under
the rule that witnesses be separated by permitting Dr. Flynn to
testify.
James next argues that the trial court considered
inadmissible gender-related evidence to decide in favor of
Kimberly.
James bases his argument on these observations by the
trial court:
First, it appears to this Court that the
Respondent/mother has been the primary
caretaker for Chandler throughout most of his
life; and although the statute no longer
gives preference to the mother for children
of tender age, there is still great weight to
be given to the bonding which occurs with the
parent who is the primary caretaker. The
Clinical Psychologist, Dr. Linda Flynn, who
testified in this case as to this very
critical issue fully threw her support behind
the Respondent as being the primary caretaker
and the one with whom the child has bonded.
The Court also finds and accepts Dr. Flynn’s
statements that, “. . . studies do show that
at this particular age the mother is more
important than the father [and] if by chance
you have to remove one from the situation . .
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. it would be better . . . to have the father
removed.” Here the Court need not adopt the
gender references of Dr. Flynn to accept
fully the testimony as to the Respondent’s
bonding. (emphasis added)
KRS 403.270(1) provides that “[t]he court shall
determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the
child and equal consideration shall be given to each parent.”
In
light of the comments just quoted, James maintains that the trial
court violated the statutory mandate by resurrecting the
discredited presumption that mothers are better able than fathers
to care for children of “tender age.”
We do not agree that the
trial court made this presumption.
The trial court clearly acknowledged KRS 403.270.
interpret the trial court’s “acceptance”
We
of Dr. Flynn’s
statements to be limited to acceptance of the notion that for a
young child, the parent who has been the child’s primary
caretaker and with whom the child has bonded is especially
important.
The trial court explicitly acknowledged that Kentucky
law “no longer gives preference to the mother for children of
tender age” and
rejected the “gender references” of Dr. Flynn.
Moreover, elsewhere in its order the trial court states
“[c]hildren of tender age are inclined to develop a strong
psychological bond with their primary caregiver--be it the mother
or the father.
In this instance, it happens to be the mother.”
The tender years presumption, which dictated that
children of tender years be placed in maternal custody unless the
mother was found to be unfit, was legislatively abolished with
the 1978 amendments to KRS 403.270(1).
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See Graham and Keller,
16 Kentucky Practice § 21.11 Domestic Relations Law, (2nd ed.
1997).
KRS 403.270(1) now proscribes a preference for either
parent.
Reading it in context, we do not believe the trial
court’s “accept[ance] [of] Dr. Flynn’s statements” was a
violation of KRS 403.270(1).
Nor do we believe that the trial
court in fact applied the tender years doctrine.
James next argues that Kimberly should not have been
permitted to call witnesses who had not been present at the June
24, 1997, portion of the hearing.
James contends that these
witnesses were unfairly recruited following his case-in-chief to
rebut his evidence.
James does not cite any authority for this
position, no does he explain how he was prejudiced by any of
these witnesses.
He was apparantly given adequate notice that
they would testify and was afforded an opportunity to cross
examine them.
The ultimate end of all litigation is the
ascertainment and rendition of the truth.
The truth can be determined only through the
sworn testimony of witnesses. Thus, any
person not privileged having knowledge of
issues being tried should be made available
to the parties as witnesses.
Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency of Louisville v.
Fledderman, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 741, 744 (1967) quoting Logan v.
Chatham County, 113 Ga.App. 491, 148 S.E.2d 471 (1966).
We discern no reversible error as a result of these witnesses
being permitted to testify.
Finally, James argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding Kimberly sole custody even though Kimberly
and Dr. Flynn testified that joint custody was appropriate.
Again, we disagree.
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As is well known, the overriding consideration in any
custody determination is the best interest of the child.
KRS
403.270(4) recognizes that the child’s best interest may
sometimes be furthered by joint custody and so authorizes that
custody arrangement, but joint custody is not appropriate unless
the parents demonstrate a sufficient degree of maturity and
cooperation.
Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765 (1993).
Here the trial court found as follows:
In reviewing the evidence, it is also very
obvious that joint custody is a pipedream.
The parties have even been unable to exchange
visitation custody of this little boy without
verbal abuse and physical violence and
disruption. Much of the time, the exchange
has been made through a third party
intermediary. It is unrealistic and totally
unsupported by the evidence that these two
parents are likely to cooperate in making the
major decisions regarding the child’s
upbringing.
Given these findings, which are supported by
substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous, we can not
say that the trial court abused its discretion by deeming joint
custody inappropriate and awarding sole custody of Chandler to
Kimberly.
This is in no way meant to suggest that we doubt
James’s sincere desire to have as close a relationship as
possible with Chandler, nor to suggest that he is not entitled to
such a relationship.
to heart.
As sole custodian, Kimberly must take this
With her authority comes the responsibility to see to
it that James is afforded a full opportunity to develop his
relationship with his son.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the February 3,
1998, order and judgment of the Caldwell Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sarah Perry McGee
Smithland, Kentucky
Rebecca J. Johnson
Marion, Kentucky
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