JAMES EDWARD HOLLAND v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: May 28, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000186-MR
JAMES EDWARD HOLLAND
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00212
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
James Edward Holland (Holland) brings this
direct appeal of a final judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court
entered on January 20, 1998, sentencing him to ten years
following a conviction on first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance.
Finding no error, we affirm.
In July 1996, Officer Jim Osborne was working as an
undercover agent in a drug investigation operation in Paducah,
Kentucky.
On the night of July 17, 1996, Officer Osborne went to
an area on Ruth Lane known for drug activity with two female
confidential informants.
After arriving at the scene, one of the
female informants called out to a black man using the name “Uncle
Buddy”.
When he came to the car, she discussed with him the
purchase of some rock cocaine and gave him some money.
He then
went to an apartment nearby, returning a few minutes later, and
gave her one piece of rock cocaine.
At that time, the two
females were in the front seat of a car and Officer Osborne was
in the back seat where he witnessed the drug transaction.
The next day, Osborne returned to the Ruth Lane area
with Officer Eric Jackson and pointed out Holland as the person
who had sold crack cocaine to the female informant the previous
night.
Officer Jackson then had Officer Welch, who was a patrol
officer familiar with the area, immediately perform a field
interview of Holland to obtain direct information on his identity
and place of residence.
Officer Welch then gave the information
to Officers Jackson and Osborne.
In November 1996, an arrest
warrant was issued for Holland on the charge of drug trafficking,
but he was not actually arrested until June of 1997.1
In July 1997, the McCracken County Grand Jury indicted
Holland on one felony count of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance (cocaine) (Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
218A.1412).
Following a one-day trial on November 26, 1997, the
jury convicted Holland of trafficking in cocaine and recommended
a sentence of ten years.
In January 1998, the trial court
sentenced him to serve ten years in prison for first-degree
1
Officer Osborne indicated that the delay in taking out the
arrest warrant was necessary to protect both his and the
informants’ identities while the undercover operation was still
being conducted. The delay in serving the warrant was caused by
the inability of the police to locate Holland, who had moved from
the area.
-2-
trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine).
Holland filed
this appeal of the judgment.
Holland argues that the trial court erred by failing to
grant his motion for a directed verdict.
The sole issue on
appeal is whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence
linking Holland to the illegal drug transaction that occurred on
July 17, 1996, to withstand the defense motion for a directed
verdict.
In Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991),
the Kentucky Supreme Court delineated the approach for handling a
motion for directed verdict as follows:
On a motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
Id. at 187 (citing Commonwealth of Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3
(1983)).
See also Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 933 S.W.2d 811,
815 (1996).
The standard for appellate review of a denial of a
motion for directed verdict alleging insufficient evidence
dictates that if under the evidence as a whole it would not be
clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty, he
is not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
S.W.2d at 187;
Benham, 816
Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 54, 55
(1998).
-3-
In the case at bar, Holland argues that the
Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence of his identity
as the person who sold the drugs at issue to support the
conviction.
He challenges the validity of Officer Osborne’s
identification of him, especially given the time gap between the
date the offense was committed in July 1996, and the date of the
trial in November 1997.2
Holland correctly points out that the
Commonwealth has the burden of proving each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See, e.g., Brown v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 890 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1994);
In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).
He also
further posits that identification of the defendant as the person
who committed the crime is an essential element of an offense.
See Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 674 (1990),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 831, 112 S. Ct. 107, 116 L. Ed. 2d 76
(1991).
Based on these principles, Holland contends that the
conviction should be reversed because the evidence on identity
did not provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Holland’s argument, however, misconstrues the standards
applicable to a motion for directed verdict.
As indicated above,
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and the standard of review is reasonableness.
The
major issue during the trial was Holland’s identity as the
perpetrator, and defense counsel sought to undermine Officer
Osborne’s identification.
While the Commonwealth must convince a
jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the
2
See infra note 1.
-4-
trial court cannot grant a directed verdict and take the case
from the jury unless it is unreasonable for the jury to find the
defendant guilty.
Kentucky courts have long recognized that the accuracy
of an identification of a person by a witness is a factual issue
generally within the province of the jury.
As the Court stated
in Stephens v. Commonwealth, Ky., 489 S.W.2d 249, 252 (1972):
We recognize the distinct possibility of
mistaken identity in a case of this kind.
But after the able closing argument of
appellant’s counsel there can be no doubt
that the twelve jurors who heard the case
were fully aware of it also. The accuracy of
an identification, though it is based on
memory and the senses alone, still lies
within the inherent province of the jury to
assess.
(quoting Burton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 442 S.W.2d 583, 585
(1969)).
See also Pankey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 485 S.W.2d 513,
522 (1972);
Merritt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 727, 729
(1965);
Beecham v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 594 S.W.2d 898, 899
(1979).
The accuracy of an identification implicates the
traditional jury questions dealing with witness credibility and
the weight of the evidence.
See Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
514 S.W.2d 115, 118 (1974) (weight accorded an identification is
a matter for the jury);
Dell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 433 S.W.2d
872, 873 (1968) (circumstances of identification affect witness’s
credibility).
During the trial, Officer Osborne stated that he had a
good look at the man who sold the cocaine, and the transaction
occurred in a well-lighted area.
He said that he was trained to
pay special attention to the physical features of suspects during
-5-
the undercover drug buys.
At trial, Officer Osborne positively
identified Holland as the person who sold the cocaine on July 17
and as the person that he pointed out the next day as being
involved in the drug transaction.
Officer Jackson also
identified Holland at trial as the man Officer Osborne recognized
and pointed out on July 18th as the person who had sold cocaine
to the confidential informant as “Uncle Buddy”.
Finally, Officer
Welch identified Holland at the trial as the person he
interviewed on July 18th after being notified by Officer Jackson.
More importantly, Officer Welch stated that he was already
familiar with Holland from seeing him in the neighborhood and
that he knew Holland as “Uncle Buddy”.
Meanwhile, Holland testified that he had lived in the
area of Ruth Lane and that he frequently had been in the area
where the drug transaction occurred during the day, but he denied
any involvement in the incident or being known as “Uncle Buddy”.
However, Holland admitted that he had talked with and been
interviewed on July 18th by Officer Welch.
The question of the accuracy of Officer Osborne’s
identification of Holland was an issue for the jury and was
challenged by the defense at trial.
Defense counsel argued this
issue before the jury in closing argument.
Taking all of the
evidence into account in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we feel there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to believe that Holland was the person who sold
cocaine to the informant on July 17, 1996.
See Compton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 150 (1980) (trial court properly
-6-
denied directed verdict motion based on challenge to
identification of defendant);
S.W.2d at 249.
Stephens v. Commonwealth, 489
The trial court did not err in denying Holland’s
motion for directed verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Irvin J. Halbleib
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Paul D. Gilbert
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.