CHRIS L. HEADY v. JENNIFER F. HEADY
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RENDERED: July 2, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003211-MR
CHRIS L. HEADY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000612
v.
JENNIFER F. HEADY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, AND MCANULTY, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Chris L. Heady and Jennifer F. Heady were married
in March 1992 and separated in July 1996.
daughters, Julia Grace and Anne Marie.
The couple had two
In order to avoid
prolonged dissolution proceedings, the parties entered into a
separation agreement wherein Jennifer received the marital home
and all its furnishings, the Chrysler van she drove, and a lump
sum settlement of $300,000.00.
The couple further agreed to
joint custody of the children, with Jennifer having primary
physical custody and $3,627.00 per month in child support.
received the condominium in Florida, his Jeep Cherokee and
Porsche 924, and over $4,000,000.00 in investments.
The
Chris
agreement was drafted by attorney Sam Hayward, who represented
Jennifer.
Chris was not represented by counsel when he signed the
document on January 3, 1997.
He retained counsel the following
day and immediately moved to have the instrument set aside as
unconscionable.
His accompanying affidavit claimed that he was
“fraudulently induced” and “pressured” into signing the
agreement.
Chris supported these allegations by informing the
trial court that he had been diagnosed with obsessive compulsive
disorder and under the care of a psychiatrist for some time.
Jennifer, knowing this, supposedly took advantage of appellee’s
impaired mental state and coerced him to sign the agreement
despite the fact that the couple had executed an antenuptial
agreement prior to their marriage.
The trial court held an extensive hearing on the
matter.
Its ultimate decision was that the separation agreement
was not unconscionable and would therefore be enforced with the
exception that child support was reduced to $3,200.00 per month.
Chris appeals, making five arguments.
We affirm.
Appellant first complains that the trial court erred in
failing to set aside the separation agreement.
Chris insists
that he “simply did not possess sufficient mental and emotional
capacity to knowingly enter into a valid agreement with his
wife.”
Chris relies heavily on the deposition of Dr. Gary
Goldblatt, his psychiatrist, which he claims was uncontradicted.
The trial court was not convinced of appellant’s impairment, and
neither are we.
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An examination of Dr. Goldblatt’s testimony reveals
that it was not so forceful as appellant would have us believe.
For example, when asked about Chris’s medication, (viz., Zoloft,
an antidepressant), Dr. Goldblatt stated that the level of the
prescribed amount would be directly related to appellant’s level
of functioning.
The following exchange occurred between
appellee’s counsel and Dr. Goldblatt:
Q: When you saw [appellant] in December of
1996, did he appear to be coping at a
reasonable level?
A: . . . . I’m going to answer yes. He was
coping with his situation at a reasonable
level. It was clear enough to me that he was
distressed.
Q: And did you increase his medication when
you saw him in December of ‘96?
A:
I did not.
Dr. Goldblatt admitted that all divorces are stressful.
Moreover, in spite of claiming that he was legally incompetent in
December of 1996 (when the agreement was drafted and then
discussed between the parties) and in early January of 1997 (when
he signed it), appellant did not seek another appointment with
Dr. Goldblatt until the following March. The trial court analyzed
all evidence pursuant to the “unconscionable” standard enunciated
in KRS 403.180(2) and Shraberg v. Shraberg, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 330
(1997).
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
determination that the separation agreement was enforceable.
KRS
403.180(2).
Chris next argues that the separation agreement fails
to indicate that the parties had reached a joint custody
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arrangement.
In this vein Chris insists that the section
pertaining to custody “is a very thinly disguised sole custody
award giving Mr. Heady mere rights of visitation”; appellant
requests that the language of the agreement “be changed to
reflect such a joint custody determination.”
We cannot agree
with appellant’s characterization of the custody arrangement.
and his ex-wife share joint custody of the daughters.
He
The fact
that Jennifer has primary physical custody does not affect
Chris’s legal rights as joint custodian.
The third issue concerns calculation of the monthly
amount of child support.
There is no dispute that Chris’s
monthly gross income exceeds the uppermost level in the statutory
guidelines.
See KRS. 403.212(6).
He would have the court accept
his own calculation of $2,768.00, rather than the court’s
assessment of $3,200.00.
KRS 403.212(5) states:
“The court may use its judicial
discretion in determining child support in circumstances where
combined adjusted parental gross income exceeds the uppermost
levels of the guideline table.”
Chris has again failed in his
burden of proving that the trial court abused its discretion.
We
affirm the amount of monthly child support.
Appellant fourthly argues that the trial court
“exceeded the relief requested by the parties.”
Appellant does
not elaborate on this topic other than to state that he merely
wanted the agreement set aside and appellee wanted it enforced.
The trial court did enforce the agreement with the exception of
reducing the agreed amount of child support by $427.00 per month
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(a result favorable to appellant).
We fail to see the error in
the trial court’s actions.
Chris’s fifth assertion, that the trial court erred in
determining that Jennifer would have been entitled to
maintenance, is without merit.
As appellee points out, the trial
court’s analysis regarding maintenance was merely done for the
purposes of ascertaining whether the agreement was conscionable
and not manifestly unfair.
We find no error in this analysis.
The judgment of the Oldham Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert G. Stallings
Peter L. Ostermiller
Louisville, Kentucky
James L. Theiss
LaGrange, Kentucky
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