CURTIS COWHERD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: January 8, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003079-MR
CURTIS COWHERD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-001372
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND MILLER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This is an appeal from an order denying
appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.
We affirm.
Appellant, Curtis Cowherd (Cowherd), was indicted on
charges of possession of a controlled substance in the first
degree (cocaine) (KRS 218A.1415), illegal use or possession of
drug paraphernalia (KRS 218A.500), possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana) (KRS 218A.140), and for being a persistent
felony offender (PFO) in the second degree (KRS 532.080).
Cowherd was found guilty of all charges after a two-day jury
trial and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.
Cowherd’s
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in a non-published
opinion rendered December 20, 1996 (Court of Appeals No. 95-CA1514-MR).
On October 21, 1997, Cowherd filed an RCR 11.42 motion
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
In his motion
appellant alleged he was denied his constitutional rights of due
process and equal protection of the law because he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, Cowherd
contends that his attorney represented a co-defendant more
vigorously than himself, all to his detriment and that his
counsel failed to object to a comment made by a Commonwealth’s
witness concerning his silence at the time of his arrest.
Cowherd moved the trial court to appoint him counsel pursuant to
RCr 11.42(5) and for an evidentiary hearing.
On November 10,
1997, the trial court overruled Cowherd’s RCr 11.42 motion.
The
trial court also found that appointment of counsel and an
evidentiary hearing were not necessary, in that, the allegations
made by appellant were refuted by the record.
This appeal
followed.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Cowherd must prove: (1) that his counsel’s performance
was deficient, and (2) that he was so prejudiced by the
deficiencies that there is a reasonable likelihood that, without
his counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord, Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d
37 (1985); cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92
-2-
L.Ed.2d 724 (1986).
The burden is on Cowherd to overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally
sufficient.
Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878 (1969);
McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 874 (1969).
Where the
trial court denies a motion for an evidentiary hearing on an RCr
11.42 motion, our review is limited to whether the motion “on its
face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the
record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.”
Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967).
If the
record refutes the allegations, the circuit court does not need
to hold an evidentiary hearing or appoint counsel.
Hopewell v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 687 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1985).
On appeal, appellant claims he received ineffective
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object and
failed to move for a mistrial after the following exchange:
Counsel: What evidence is there that they
were in possession?
Detective: There is not one of these
defendants that made a statement that they
had nothing to do with the drugs at the time
they were placed under arrest. They didn’t
deny that they were in possession, they
didn’t deny that. Those accusations were
made later... .
Counsel: (To Judge): Judge, may I ask the
court to admonish the witness to be
responsive to the question?
Judge: The Court will instruct you on the law
of the case including of course upon the law
with reference to the defendants right to
remain silent. Under all circumstances,
silence by an accused person should not be
considered as evidence for any purpose
whatsoever.
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This claim of error was addressed by the Court of Appeals in
Cowherd’s direct appeal.
Although the appellate court indicated
that trial counsel had not directly requested an admonition or
mistrial after the detective’s comments, the appellate court
noted that “the trial court, sua sponte, admonished the jury
regarding the co-defendants’ silence and that it was not to be
used as evidence for any purpose whatsoever.”
In the direct
appeal the Court went on to state, “[t]he law presumes an
admonition controls the jury and removes the prejudice which
brought about the admonition.
Carpenter v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
256 S.W.2d 509 (1953); Neeley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 591 S.W.2d
366 (1979).”
In order to grant a mistrial, there must appear in the
record “a manifest necessity for such action or an urgent or real
necessity.”
Turpin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 619, 621
(1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1058 (1990), citing Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672, 678 (1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1130 (1986).
“[T]he trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether a violation of proper courtroom conduct
requires a mistrial.”
Sharp v. Commonwealth, Ky., 849 S.W.2d
542, 547 (1993) (citation omitted).
Cowherd demonstrates no such
manifest necessity nor abuse of discretion.
The trial court
admonished the jury to disregard the detective’s mention of the
co-defendant’s silence.
The admonition was sufficient to cure
the error, if any.
The record refutes Cowherd’s claims.
As such, the
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Curtis Cowherd
Northpoint Training Center
Burgin, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Todd Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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