LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND FREDERICK POTTER v. TRAK INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND THOMAS EQUIPMENT, LTD.
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RENDERED: January 15, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003014-MR
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
AND FREDERICK POTTER
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELLEN B. EWING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-005271
v.
TRAK INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AND THOMAS EQUIPMENT, LTD.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND MILLER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Frederick M. Potter (Potter) appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered November 5, 1997,
which denied his motion to intervene in a lawsuit filed by
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) against Trak
International, Inc. (Trak) and Thomas Equipment, Ltd. (Thomas).
We affirm.
Potter sustained a work-related injury on October 7,
1993, while operating a piece of equipment manufactured by Thomas
and marketed by Trak.
Potter filed a workers’ compensation claim
and received an award of benefits which was paid by Liberty as
his employer’s compensation carrier.
On October 7, 1994, Liberty filed a products liability
suit against Trak seeking recovery of workers’ compensation
benefits paid to Potter.
Thomas was added as a third-party
defendant when Trak filed a third-party complaint on
September 18, 1995.
Potter was deposed by Thomas on December 5,
1996.
On August 21, 1997, Liberty filed a motion seeking
permission to file an amended complaint changing the name of the
plaintiff from Liberty to Potter.
Under the terms of the amended
complaint, Potter affirmed Liberty’s allegations under the
original complaint and additionally sought damages for pain and
suffering, lost wages, and permanent impairment of his power to
work and earn money.
In support of its motion, Liberty argued
that it was entitled to prosecute the action in Potter’s name
under KRS 342.700.
Liberty argued that even though the one year
statute of limitations for personal injury had expired, Potter’s
additional claims could relate back to the original complaint
under CR 15.03.
The trial court addressed Liberty’s motion to
amend at a hearing on October 12, 1997.
At the hearing the trial
court held that Liberty’s motion was untimely because Liberty
waited three years to raise the issue.
A written order denying
Liberty’s motion to amend was entered on October 31, 1997.
Following denial of the motion to amend, Liberty filed a motion
seeking to merely substitute Potter as the plaintiff in the
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original complaint.
The trial court denied Liberty’s motion on
the ground of timeliness by order entered November 5, 1997.
After Liberty’s attempts to insert Potter into the case
failed, Potter filed a motion seeking permission to file an
intervening complaint on October 30, 1997.
Potter’s motion was
also held to be untimely by order entered November 5, 1997.
Liberty and Potter filed a notice of appeal with this
Court on November 25, 1997.
Liberty appealed from the trial
court’s denial of its motion to amend and motion to substitute.
Potter appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion to
intervene and the denial of Liberty’s motion to amend.
All of the parties agree in their respective briefs
that Liberty has settled with Trak and Thomas.
It also appears
that Liberty did not join with Potter in his brief on appeal.
However, none of the parties have formally moved this Court to
dismiss Liberty as a party to this appeal.
As a preliminary matter, the trial court’s orders of
October 31, 1997 and November 5, 1997, disposing of Liberty’s
motions are interlocutory in nature.
As the jurisdiction of this
Court is limited to the review of final judgments, we cannot
review the propriety of those orders.
S.W.2d 883, 884 (1956).
Payton v. Payton, Ky., 293
That leaves us with the question of
whether the trial court erred in denying Potter’s motion to
intervene.
Intervention by a nonparty is governed by CR 24.
A
party can seek to intervene as a matter of right under CR 24.01
or with permission of the trial court pursuant to CR 24.02.
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However, in either case the party’s motion to intervene must be
timely.
Ambassador College v. Combs, Ky., 636 S.W.2d 305, 308
(1982).
The question of whether a motion to intervene is timely
is one of fact which is left to the discretion of the trial
court.
Ambassador College, 636 S.W.2d at 308.
We will not
reverse a trial court’s finding that a motion to intervene is
untimely absent abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial court.
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Clark, Ky.,476 S.W.2d 202, 205 (1972).
The record in this case clearly supports the trial
court’s ruling that Potter’s motion to intervene was untimely.
Although Potter argues that he did not realize he had a cause of
action against Thomas and Trak until he was deposed in December
1996, we note that roughly ten months passed before he sought to
intervene.
This is in addition to the fact that three years had
passed since the date of his injury.
While we realize that
Potter’s failure to seek intervention may have resulted from his
reliance on Liberty’s actions to substitute him as plaintiff in
its complaint against Thomas and Trak, Potter should have acted
to assert his own rights instead of waiting to come in on
Liberty’s coattails.
Potter’s arguments regarding the statute of limitations
and relation back are not well taken.
The trial court denied
Potter’s motion on the ground of timeliness.
The question of
whether the statute of limitations has expired or whether
Potter’s intervening complaint can relate back under CR 15.03 has
no effect on the outcome of this matter due to the fact that
Potter’s motion to intervene was not timely.
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Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, POTTER:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, TRAK:
William A. Miller, Jr.
Louisville, KY
Ronald L. Gaffney
Michael D. Ekman
Louisville, KY
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLANT,
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, THOMAS
EQUIPMENT, INC.:
Nancy E. McElwain
Carol Dan Browning
Louisville, KY
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