THOMAS WADE WATKINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: February 19, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002986-MR
THOMAS WADE WATKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. JACKSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CR-000167
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Thomas Wade Watkins (Watkins) appeals from a
Jessamine Circuit Court order denying his RCr 11.42 and CR 60.03
motions to alter, amend or vacate his judgment and sentence.
We
reverse and remand.
On March 26, 1992, following a jury trial, the
Jessamine Circuit Court entered its final judgment, sentencing
Watkins to life imprisonment based upon his convictions for
first-degree manslaughter (KRS 507.030); kidnaping (3 counts (KRS
509.040); possession of a handgun by a convicted felon (KRS
527.040); and the status offense of being a second-degree
persistent felony offender (PFO) (KRS 532.080).
On February 24,
1994, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s conviction
in an unanimous unpublished memorandum opinion.
Thereafter on January 24, 1997, appellant filed a
motion to vacate judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR 60.03,
claiming that his PFO conviction was based upon insufficient
evidence, and that his attorney’s failure to challenge the
admission of judgments from Texas that had not been properly
authenticated constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The
trial court determined that the claim merited a hearing and
appointed counsel to represent appellant.
The trial court found
that the Texas judgments were not properly authenticated but
admitted them into evidence during the PFO phase of the trial
because there was no objection to the admissibility of the
foreign judgments based upon improper authentication.
Further,
the trial court held trial counsel’s failure to require the
Commonwealth to properly authenticate the Texas judgments
pursuant to KRS 422.040 may be considered deficient.
However, on
November 6, 1997, the trial court denied Watkins’ motion for
relief finding that he “obtained a fair trial and the end result
would have been the same.”
This appeal followed.
Both parties argue, and we agree, that Davis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 487 (1995), is controlling in this
matter.
However, whereas appellant argues that Davis is directly
on point and should be followed, the Commonwealth contends that
appellant can show no prejudice since he does not contest the
validity of the Texas judgments.
Under Davis, we do not see the
distinction which the Commonwealth urges.
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Regarding the issue of
introducing a foreign judgment during the PFO phase, the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Davis stated:
Appellant also contends that the
introduction and use of his prior felony
convictions in the State of Arkansas failed
to meet authentication standards which would
allow them to be used for the persistent
felony offense. The prosecution presented
four documents which were certified by the
Arkansas court clerk. These documents,
however, were not exemplified by a judge, as
required for a document to be selfauthenticating, nor were they authenticated
by a witness.
[2] KRS 422.040 provides that
The records and judicial
proceedings of any court of any
state, attested by the clerk
thereof in due form, with the seal
of the court annexed if there be a
seal, and certified by the judge,
chief justice, or presiding
magistrate of the court, shall have
the same faith and credit given to
them in this state as they would
have at the place from which the
records come.
Thus, for a court of this Commonwealth to
properly give full faith and credit to the
judgment of a court of another state,
certification by that court is required.
[Emphasis in original].
[3] To support its argument that
introduction of certified, selfauthenticating records of
conviction is not required to
support a PFO conviction, the
Commonwealth cites both
Commonwealth v. Mixon, Ky., 827
S.W.2d 689 (1992), and Jackson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 703 S.W.2d 883
(1986). While it is true that
these cases allowed PFO conviction
to stand without introduction of
self-authenticating documents,
those circumstances were far
different.
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...
In Mixon and Jackson, sufficient
safeguards were present regarding proof of
former convictions to justify PFO
convictions. Those safeguards are not
present here. The documents were not self
authenticating under our rules of evidence,
nor do they meet the requirements of RCr
9.44, CR 44.01, or KRS 422.040. No one with
any knowledge of the facts surrounding the
documents testified as to their authenticity.
As such, evidence of appellant’s prior
convictions is insufficient to support the
PFO conviction in its present.
The Commonwealth also argues that appellant has failed
to meet the two-pronged test for determining ineffective counsel
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord, Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
702 S.W.2d 37 (1985); cert. denied, 478 Cf. S. 1010, 106 S.Ct.
3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986).
Pursuant to Strickland, the
appellant must demonstrate that the performance of counsel was
deficient, and, second, that the deficiency resulted in actual
prejudice.
As noted by the trial court in the case sub judice,
trial counsel “vigorously litigated this case resulting in, among
other things, a change of venue and the suppression of
convictions from Kentucky and Georgia.
He also challenged the
Texas judgments (pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89
S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)), and required the Commonwealth
Attorney to obtain and produce a trial transcript from the Texas
Court.”
This Court is aware of the well-recognized rule that
“effective assistance of counsel does not guarantee error free
representation,” Hibbs v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 570 S.W.2d 642,
644 (1978).
Despite trial counsel’s vigorous efforts in
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defending appellant, he failed to object to a vital piece of
evidence in the PFO phase which lacked proper authentication
pursuant to KRS 422.040 and the result was an enhancement in
appellant’s punishment from twenty years to life in prison.
These facts, coupled with the ruling set forth in Davis, leads to
only one conclusion - Watkins’ trial counsel was deficient as to
this matter resulting in prejudice to him.
Having determined that the trial court erred in denying
Watkins’ RCr 11.42 motion, the next issue raised by appellant is
that the case should not be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings, but rather, the PFO charge should be
dismissed.
Watkins contends that pursuant to Davis, supra, and
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 57 L.Ed.2d, 1 98 S.Ct. 2141
(1978), that a reversal on appeal due to insufficiency of the
evidence amounts to an acquittal on the charge in question.
Thus, he argues that retrial on the same charge results in double
jeopardy.
However, this is not a case in which there was
“insufficient evidence” but rather one in which there was
sufficient evidence that was improperly admitted.
This
distinction was addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 883 sw 482 (1994), when dealing
with a double jeopardy claim, the Court stated:
The first issue we must confront is
appellant’s double jeopardy claim. He
contends that if the improper hearsay
evidence from Department of Corrections
records had been excluded, the Commonwealth
would have been without any proof of one of
the required prior felony convictions and the
only permissible conviction would have been
PFO in the second degree. He attempts to
distinguish this case from Lockhard v.
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Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102
L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), and Commonwealth v.
Mattingly, Ky., 72 S.W.2d 288 (1986), cert.
denied, Mattingly v. Kentucky, 481 U.S. 1015,
107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987). We
have considered his contentions but are
unable to draw a meaningful distinction.
This Court and the Supreme Court of the
United States have indulged the view that
such error is trial error which results in no
double jeopardy bar. Appellant would have us
conclude that the Commonwealth would have had
no other means of proving that he and
Dickerson were the same person, but Mattingly
permits no such speculation.
Hon v. Commonwealth, [Ky., 670
S.W.2d 851 (1984)], and Hudson v.
State of Louisiana, [450 U.S. 40,
101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30
(1981)], did not involve the
improper admission of evidence
which, when admitted, was
sufficient to sustain the verdict.
In each of those cases there was
simply no evidence, improperly
admitted or otherwise, which was
sufficient to sustain the
conviction. In this case there was
sufficient evidence, albeit
improperly admitted, to sustain the
verdict. This is a case of a new
trial granted because of a trial
error, and the result is controlled
by our decision in Hobbs v.
Kentucky, [Ky., 655 S.W.2d 472
(1983), cert. denied, Hobbs v.
Kentucky, 465 U.S. 1067, 104 S.Ct.
1419, 79 L.Ed.2d 745 (1984)].
722 S.W.2d at 289. Even improperly admitted
evidence is sufficient to defeat a motion for
directed verdict. A reviewing court or a
court considering a collateral attack may not
bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds
because the evidence was improperly admitted.
Johnson, 883 S.W.2d at 482, 483.
Appellant argues that under Davis, supra, the PFO charge
should be dismissed.
In Davis, the Court held:
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We reiterate that conclusion. The
Commonwealth must prove all the requirements
of KRS 532.080 beyond a reasonable doubt. It
cannot, by inference or guesswork, confer PFO
status on anyone. Here, just such an
inference erroneously increased appellant’s
sentence from a term of years to life
imprisonment. When evidence at trial is
insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict,
retrial on the same issue amounts to double
jeopardy. Burk v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), Hobbs v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 655 S.W.2d 472 (1983). As
such, we reverse appellant’s first degree
persistent felony offender conviction with
directions that it be dismissed on remand.
(Emphasis added).
Davis, 899 S.W.2d at 490.
Although the PFO charge was dismissed
in Davis, that case is distinguishable from this case on this
issue.
In Davis, there were two issues presented as to why the
PFO conviction and enhancement should be reversed on appeal.
First, was the issue we addressed earlier as to the prior felony
convictions from foreign jurisdictions not being properly
authenticated.
Second, there was no evidence presented as to the
defendant’s probation or parole status or whether the defendant
had completed service of his prior sentences, as required by KRS
532.080 to sustain a PFO conviction.
The Davis Court determined
that double jeopardy attached, in that, under issue two there was
insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict.
In this case,
as stated previously, the evidence herein was sufficient albeit
improperly admitted.
Therefore, under Johnson, supra, at 484,
“[a] reviewing court or a court considering a collateral attack
may not bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds because the
evidence was improperly admitted.”
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For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jessamine
Circuit Court denying Watkins’ RCr 11.42 motion is reversed and
the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT AND FURNISHES
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN OPINION.
the majority opinion.
I concur in
I agree that appellant has proved he was
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object on the basis that
the Texas judgments were not properly authenticated.
Regarding
the double jeopardy issue, however, I disagree that Davis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 487 (1995), is distinguishable
because there was also insufficient evidence on the question of
his probation and parole status.
Rather, the Davis court
specifically found that “evidence of [Davis'] prior convictions
is insufficient to support the PFO conviction in the present
case” after reviewing the authentication question.
489.
899 S.W.2d at
The case sub judice is distinguishable in that we do not
reverse for insufficient evidence, but for ineffective assistance
of counsel on a collateral attack on the judgment pursuant to RCr
11.42.
In fact, a defendant may not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence in an RCr 11.42 motion.
479 S.W.2d 644, 645 (1972).
Brock v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
We reverse for trial error, not
insufficient proof, and thus the majority is correct in holding
that “a court considering a collateral attack may not bar retrial
on double jeopardy grounds because the evidence was improperly
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admitted.”
(1994).
Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 883 S.W.2d 482, 483
Appellant may be retried on the persistent felon charge.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Milton C. Toby
Lexington, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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