WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DEBORAH ROBERTSON
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RENDERED:
March 12, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1997-CA-002920-MR
WAL-MART STORES, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-000321
DEBORAH ROBERTSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE and KNOX, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
Appellant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart),
appeals from a judgment entered by the Hopkins Circuit Court upon
a jury verdict in favor of appellee, Deborah Robertson, in a
personal injury case.
We affirm the decision of the trial court.
This case arose out of an incident which occurred at a
Wal-Mart store located in Madisonville, Kentucky.
On November
18, 1995, while appellee and her mother were shopping at WalMart, two wooden ladderback chairs fell from a display and hit
appellee, who was in a wheelchair at the time, on her head,
shoulders, and right ear.
In June 1996, appellee filed a
complaint against Wal-Mart, alleging negligence and ultimately
requesting $50,000.00 in compensatory damages plus medical
expenses.
Wal-Mart filed a third-party complaint against an
unknown defendant who, Wal-Mart alleged, was shopping at Wal-Mart
on November 18, 1995, and was solely responsible for the incident
which occurred that day.
The matter was tried before a jury on
September 30, 1997.
Appellee, who suffers from multiple sclerosis, had been
using a wheelchair to get around on the date of the accident.
She testified her mother was pushing her down an aisle at WalMart when, suddenly, she felt a “bang” on her head, which knocked
her head to her shoulder and made her think her right ear had
been “jerked off.”
She was dazed momentarily, and then began
feeling intense pain on the top of her head and shoulders, and a
burning in her ear.
Shortly thereafter, it appeared to her that
two wooden ladderback chairs had fallen from a display above her
head. Appellee’s mother drove her to the emergency room at the
Regional Medical Center in Madisonville, where appellee’s ear was
examined.
She was given some Tylenol for her pain and was sent
home.
Two days later, appellee testified, she went to her
hometown doctor because she was experiencing pain in her ear,
neck, back, and head.
X-rays were taken of her skull.
One week
later, she returned for a follow-up visit, and this time, a CT
scan was performed on her spine.
scan revealed any damage.
Neither the x-rays nor the CT
Appellee testified, however, that
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although she had been able to take a few steps without the aid of
a cane or walker prior to the incident, she was no longer able to
do so.
When asked whether she had seen any other customers in
the area, or whether she had seen the wooden chairs on display,
appellee testified that she had observed neither the display nor
any customers.
Ona Robertson (Ona), appellee’s mother, corroborated
appellee’s version of the events.
She testified there was no
forewarning that the chairs would fall, nor did she see anyone in
close proximity to her and her daughter.
Ona testified that
after the incident, she looked up and saw several chairs on a
shelf high above her head.
The chairs were stacked in twos, seat
to seat (one chair right side up and the other bottom side up).
Two eyewitnesses to the accident, sisters Reva May
(Reva) and Eva Dean May (Eva), also testified.
Eva testified
that she and her sister were walking up the aisle toward appellee
and her mother when, suddenly, two chairs fell on appellee’s
head.
Eva noticed no immediate reaction from appellee, and
proceeded to check on her.
She noticed blood on appellee’s right
ear which, by then, had turned black.
Eva testified she had
noticed at least four (4) chairs on the display shelf, which she
estimated to be at shoulder height.
She further stated that a
man in a blue jean jacket had been looking at the chairs,
although she did not see him actually touch them.
After the
accident, she testified, the man remained in close proximity,
evidently concerned about appellee.
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Reva testified she had seen a gentleman looking at some
ladderback chairs.
He had one of them down on the floor. . . .
When he finished looking at this chair, he
started to put it back and, when he did, the
legs flipped off and flipped over, and hit
Ms. Robertson. . . . When he finished, he
picked the chair up and proceeded to set it
bottom side up on another chair, just like
the others were setting, and they were real
close to the edge.
Reva described the gentleman as approximately five (5) feet ten
(10) inches tall, with wavy brown hair and glasses, wearing blue
jeans and a blue jean jacket.
She testified there was no
forewarning and no time to prevent the accident.
Reva thought
appellee’s neck was broken, and immediately began looking for
help.
The gentleman in the blue jean jacket, she testified,
“stood around awhile” to see if appellee was alright.
She
pointed the man out to two (2) Wal-Mart employees (including the
manager), but did not see either of them attempt to speak with
him.
By that time, she testified, appellee’s ear had swollen,
turned black, and was bleeding.
Reva corroborated Eva’s
testimony that the display shelf was approximately shoulder
height.
Gerald White (Gerald), the co-manager of the
Madisonville Wal-Mart at the time, was paged concerning the
accident and arrived shortly thereafter.
He testified he
observed a “little bruise” on appellee’s right ear.
Gerald
stated that Wal-Mart’s policy regarding displays was that
merchandise was to be stacked in a “safe and stable” manner.
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These particular wooden ladderback chairs had been on display
since August 1995, approximately two (2) months prior to the
incident.
He testified that although certain merchandise in the
store is secured in some way to a fixture, the ladderback chairs
were not bolted or secured in any way to the shelf.
Contrary to
other testimony, Gerald testified he did not believe the man in
the blue jean jacket stayed at the scene of the accident for any
appreciable length of time.
Gerald did, however, “walk the
store” to see if he could locate the man.
At the close of the evidence, Wal-Mart moved for a
directed verdict on the issue of liability, arguing that the man
in the blue jean jacket was solely responsible for appellee’s
injuries.
Further, Wal-Mart maintained its only legal duty to
appellee was to take reasonable steps to discover any unsafe
conditions created by third parties on the premises, and to
remedy them upon discovery.
Wal-Mart argued there was no time
for its employees to have discovered any unsafe condition the man
in the blue jean jacket may have created, given Reva May’s
testimony that the accident happened too quickly for even those
on the scene to have prevented it.
Thus, Wal-Mart argued, it
should not be held responsible for appellee’s injuries.
The trial court found the evidence established that
based upon the testimony, Wal-Mart had no time to discover the
unsafe condition in which the chairs had been returned to the
display shelf.
It sustained Wal-Mart’s motion to that extent.
However, the court denied a directed verdict on the broad issue
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of liability, finding there was a factual issue as to whether
Wal-Mart’s stacking of the wooden ladderback chairs on the
display shelf created an unsafe condition in the first place,
i.e. as the trial court stated, “Was the stacking itself
negligent?”
The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee.
Specifically, the jury found that Wal-Mart employees knew, or by
the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that “stacking
the chairs in the manner described in the evidence created an
unsafe condition to its business invitees, including the
plaintiff, Deborah Robertson.”
Further, the jury found that the
unknown defendant had breached his duty of ordinary care to
appellee, and that his conduct was a “substantial factor” in
causing appellee’s injuries.
The jury awarded appellee her
medical expenses of $1,210.65 and awarded her $15,000.00 for pain
and suffering.
The jury then apportioned fault 99% to Wal-Mart
and 1% to the unknown defendant.
Judgment in the matter was
entered on October 9, 1997.
Wal-Mart has appealed the judgment, arguing: (1) the
trial court erred in refusing to grant Wal-Mart a mistrial as a
result of an improper reference during voir dire to liability
insurance; (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a
directed verdict on the issue of liability; (3) the verdict is
contrary to the evidence; and, (4) the trial court improperly
instructed the jury as to the appropriate standard of care to be
applied in this case.
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Mistrial
During voir dire, the trial court questioned potential
jury members whether they or any member of their families had
ever been sued or had a claim for damages made against them.
One
potential juror answered, “We had a suit filed against us because
an insurance company decided not to pay the claim, but it was
settled out of court between the insurance company and the
parties.”
Wal-Mart moved for a mistrial on the basis that
reference had improperly been made to liability insurance.
The
court overruled Wal-Mart’s motion and proceeded with the trial.
Wal-Mart maintains the juror made an improper reference
to liability insurance.
Further, Wal-Mart notes that appellee
testified she had previously worked for an insurance company, and
argues that given the totality of the circumstances, the issue of
liability insurance was impermissibly brought to the attention of
the jurors.
Wal-Mart maintains that KRE 411 prohibits such
references and, as such, Wal-Mart was entitled to a mistrial.
Appellee argues that the potential juror’s reference to
a lawsuit filed against him when his insurance carrier refused to
pay a claim was innocuous and in no way deprived Wal-Mart of a
fair trial.
We agree, and adopt the trial court’s reasoning that
the comment made by the juror had no connection to this case nor
was there any direct questioning of the jurors concerning the
issue of insurance.
The comment was made in response to the
question whether any potential jurors had been parties to
lawsuits in the past.
The juror who responded merely referenced
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the substance of the lawsuit in which he was involved.
believe the comment was prejudicial.
We do not
Further, we recognize the
necessity of affording the trial court “wide discretion” in these
matters.
Meadors v. Gregory, Ky., 484 S.W.2d 860, 863 (1972).
As concerns Wal-Mart’s argument that KRE 411 is
applicable to inquiry made during voir dire, we adopt the
reasoning set forth below that it is not:
Inquiry on Voir Dire: KRE 411 controls the
admissibility of evidence of liability
insurance and has no direct bearing on what
can or cannot be asked on voir dire
examination of jurors. The Kentucky cases on
voir dire examination indicate that inquiry
about possible association of jurors with
insurance companies is appropriate if
conducted in “good faith,” with good faith
measured by the following standard: “[T]he
question should never be asked, unless asked
in good faith . . . [which] will depend on
whether or not [plaintiff’s counsel] has
reasonable grounds to believe that defendant
carries indemnity insurance, and that one or
more of the jurors are in some way interested
in the insurance company.”
Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.60 (3d
ed. 1993) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The question
posed in this case had nothing to do with whether the jurors were
associated in some way with an insurance company and, further,
had nothing to do with whether the defendant in this case, WalMart, carried indemnity insurance.
We believe the comment made
by the juror was harmless and had no prejudicial effect
whatsoever on the proceedings.
Directed Verdict
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Wal-Mart argues the trial court erred in refusing to
grant a directed verdict on the issue of liability.
Specifically, it alleges: (1) the evidence established that the
conduct of the unidentified customer constituted a superseding
cause, thereby relieving Wal-Mart of any liability; and, (2)
appellee presented no proof that Wal-Mart deviated from its
standard of care.
We disagree.
Both Eva and Reva May testified the display shelf on
which the wooden ladderback chairs were located was at least
shoulder height.
The chairs were stacked seat to seat and, as
Reva testified, were “real close” to the edge of the shelf.
As
Gerald White testified, the chairs were neither bolted down nor
in any other way secured to the shelf.
Further, Gerald testified
he and his employees were well aware that after handling
merchandise, customers do not always return the items they do not
wish to purchase to the location in which they originally found
those items.
He stated that the merchandise “ended up
everywhere.”
Finally, Gerald testified the display of wooden
ladderback chairs had not been inspected for at least a 48-hour
period preceding the incident on November 18, 1995.
The trial court was to consider this evidence as true,
and determine whether it was of “such substance that a verdict
rendered thereon would be ‘palpably or flagrantly’ against the
evidence so as ‘to indicate that it was reached as a result of
passion or prejudice.’”
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Hornung, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 855, 860 (1988) (citations omitted).
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“Generally, a trial judge cannot enter a directed verdict unless
there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue. . . .”
Bierman v. Klapheke, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 16, 18 (1998).
In NKC Hosp., Inc. v. Anthony, Ky. App., 849 S.W.2d 564
(1993), this Court defined a superseding cause as “an intervening
independent force.”
Id. at 568.
We added, however, that an
intervening force does not necessarily constitute a superseding
cause: “[I]f the resultant injury is reasonably foreseeable from
the view of the original actor, then the other factors causing to
bring about the injury are not a superseding cause.”
Id.
We
believe a material issue in this case is whether Wal-Mart should
have foreseen the type of accident that occurred on November 18,
1995, given the manner in which the wooden ladderback chairs were
stacked.
In light of the testimony given, we believe the
evidence was sufficient to submit to the jury the issue of
foreseeability, and believe the trial court correctly submitted
that issue to the jury.
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence,
the appellate court must respect the opinion
of the trial judge who heard the evidence. A
reviewing court is rarely in as good a
position as the trial judge who presided over
the initial trial to decide whether a jury
can properly consider the evidence presented.
Bierman, 967 S.W.2d at 18.
In light of the evidence before the
trial court, we believe Wal-Mart’s motion for directed verdict
was properly denied.
The issue was squarely presented to the
trial judge, who heard and considered the evidence, and we will
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not substitute our judgment for his.
Id.
Further, Wal-Mart owes
its business invitees the duty “to have the premises in a
reasonably safe condition.”
S.W.2d 33, 35 (1962).
Rojo, Inc. v. Drifmeyer, Ky., 357
While Wal-Mart maintains there was no
evidence that it breached the standard of care owed appellee, we
believe the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the
issue of whether Wal-Mart maintained its premises in a reasonably
safe condition.
Verdict
In its post-trial motions, Wal-Mart moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that the verdict was
contrary to the evidence.
motion.
The trial court denied Wal-Mart’s
Wal-Mart argues the physical facts of the case can lead
to only one conclusion: the unknown defendant was the cause of
the incident on November 18, 1995, and is responsible for
appellee’s injuries.
We disagree.
A trial court may not set
aside a jury’s verdict unless the evidence to the contrary is so
strong that reasonable men could not have differed.
Combs, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 775, 777 (1967).
Sutton v.
We do not believe the
evidence before the jury, as it has been summarized above,
established liability on the unknown defendant’s part to the
extent that reasonable men could not have believed Wal-Mart to
have been negligent in displaying the wooden ladderback chairs.
Wal-Mart further argues the jury’s verdict was based
upon appellee’s physical condition, i.e. her multiple sclerosis
and her dependence upon a wheelchair.
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Wal-Mart maintains the
trial court was obligated to set aside the verdict under Brothers
v. Cash, Ky., 332 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1959), wherein our former
Court of Appeals stated, “it is the duty of the court to set
aside a jury verdict which imposes liability, upon sympathetic
considerations, where fault is not shown.”
However, we see no
evidence that the jury rendered its verdict based upon appellee’s
physical disability and, thus, need not address the issue
further.
Jury Instruction
The trial court, in Instruction No. 1, advised the jury
that as to Wal-Mart, “ordinary care . . . means the degree of
care the jury would expect of an ordinarily prudent business and
all its employees serving business invitees to exercise under
similar circumstances.”
Instruction No. 2 stated as follows:
You will find for the Plaintiff, Deborah
Robertson, if you are satisfied from the
evidence as follows:
(A). That the Plaintiff’s injuries were
caused by the falling chairs at the Wal-Mart
Store in Madisonville, Kentucky, on November
18, 1995; and,
(B). That the Defendant’s employees knew,
or by the exercise of ordinary care should
have known[,] that stacking the chairs in the
manner described in the evidence created an
unsafe condition to its business invitees,
including the Plaintiff, Deborah Robertson;
or
Otherwise, you will find for the
Defendant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
The jury unanimously found in favor of appellee under this
instruction.
Wal-Mart argues the instruction deviates from
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Kentucky’s “bare bones” standard, and improperly enunciates a
duty more specific than the duty to keep the business premises
reasonably safe, in violation of Rogers v. Kasdan, Ky., 612
S.W.2d 133 (1981).
Wal-Mart maintains the instruction
inappropriately called the jury’s attention to various ways in
which Wal-Mart might have acted.
We disagree, and distinguish Rogers from the present
case.
The instruction at issue in Rogers concerned a hospital’s
duty to its patients.
The trial court instructed the jury that
the hospital had a duty to exercise the degree of care ordinarily
used by hospitals under like circumstances.
However, the court
continued by enumerating additional specific duties owed the
patient, e.g.: (1) monitoring the staff’s maintenance of medical
records; (2) providing nurses with knowledge of adequate patient
care; (3) monitoring staff physicians for proper conduct
consistent with good medical practices; (4) monitoring the
nursing staff for proper fluid input and output of the patients;
(5) monitoring the nursing staff for proper dispensing of drugs
and proper use of the Physicians Desk Reference; and, (6)
monitoring the nurses for proper conduct consistent with good
medical and hospital care.
The Supreme Court found that the instruction provided
too much detail, gave undue prominence to facts and issues, and
improperly listed various methods by which a defendant must
conduct himself in order to meet his duty.
The Court noted that
while the list “constituted criteria that the jury might use to
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decide the question of ordinary care, listing them in this manner
was not necessary to pose the issue of the hospital’s duty.”
at 136.
Id.
The Court concluded:
In the instant case, the listing of
various means by which the plaintiff
contended the hospital failed to exercise the
proper standard of care begged the jury to
find some minor or technical error. It could
have given them the false impression that
unless all these procedures were complied
with exactly, the hospital breached its duty.
The effect of the instruction was to demand
more of the hospital than the law requires.
Id.
(Citation omitted).
We do not have before us an instruction similar to that
in Rogers.
As we noted above, Wal-Mart had a duty to “use
ordinary care to have the premises in a reasonably safe
condition.”
Rojo, Inc., 357 S.W.2d at 35.
Instruction No. 2
does nothing more than call attention to that duty insofar as it
affected the manner in which Wal-Mart displayed the wooden
ladderback chairs.
Unlike the instruction in Rogers, Instruction
No. 2 does not reference any specific duties Wal-Mart owed
appellee, e.g., there is no mention that Wal-Mart had a duty to
secure the chairs to the shelf, maintain a railing on the shelf,
display the chairs at a lower height, maintain a sign warning of
the danger, or take any other specific action to prevent such
incidents.
We find that the instruction does not violate the
standard set forth in Rogers.
Wal-Mart further argues the trial court should have
instructed the jury that appellee’s prior medical condition, i.e.
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her multiple sclerosis, was not to be considered in its
deliberation of damages.
Wal-Mart relies upon Carlson v.
McElroy, Ky. App., 584 S.W.2d 754 (1979), a case in which there
was conflicting testimony concerning whether the plaintiff’s
injuries were truly the result of the accident which was the
subject of the litigation, or whether they were caused by a preexisting medical condition or two other accidents in which the
plaintiff was involved, one before and one after the accident at
issue.
In Carlson, the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries was
undeniably in question.
In the present case, however, there was
no testimony indicating that appellee’s injuries were caused by
any event or condition other than two chairs having fallen on
appellee while she was shopping at Wal-Mart on November 18, 1995.
Further, the medical expenses submitted by appellee appear to
have been incurred as a result of the incident at Wal-Mart, and
did not represent treatment for appellee’s multiple sclerosis.
Finally, it does not appear from the verdict that the damages
awarded appellee represented any pain or suffering she may have
experienced as a result of having multiple sclerosis.
We do not
find Wal-Mart’s argument to have merit.
Appellee’s Request for Sanctions
Appellee asks this Court to award her sanctions under
CR 73.02(4):
If an appellate court determines that an
appeal or motion is frivolous, it may award
just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee or respondent. An appeal or
motion is frivolous if the court finds that
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it is so totally lacking in merit that it
appears to have been taken in bad faith.
We have considered appellee’s argument.
However, we do not
believe that sanctions are justified under the facts and
circumstances of this case.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Hopkins Circuit Court.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew J. Baker
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Dick Adams
Madisonville, Kentucky
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