JESSIE R. KEMPLIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: February 12, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002832-MR
JESSIE R. KEMPLIN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-000714
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Appellant, Jessie R. Kemplin (“Kemplin”),
appeals from a final judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court
imposing a sentence of seven years upon a jury verdict convicting
her of two counts of first-degree criminal abuse.
Upon reviewing
the record, we affirm.
In January of 1993, the Kentucky Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) placed a group of siblings, ranging from age six
months to three years of age, with Kemplin and her husband who
had applied to become foster parents.
The children had various
special needs, and had been removed from their natural parents
due to abuse.
On August 31, 1993, DDS placed newborn A. E., a
half-sister to the three children in the Kemplin home, with the
Kemplins.
The Kemplins made plans to adopt the four children.
Mike Henderson of the paramedic unit of the
Lexington-Urban County Fire Department responded to a 911 call at
the Kemplin residence on May 17, 1996.
He found A. E.
unconscious, gasping for air, and exhibiting a bluish tint on her
arms and legs.
Medical Center.
He rushed her to the University of Kentucky
On the way to the hospital, Henderson revived
A. E. who had stopped breathing.
mouth.
A. E. also had blood in her
The paramedics noticed a large number of bruises and red
marks on A. E.
A. E., who was totally unresponsive, was admitted to
the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit.
A CT scan revealed severe and
diffuse swelling in A. E.’s brain.
Dr. Benjamin Warf labeled the
head injury as life threatening due to the pressure being placed
on the brain.
This condition was treated for three to four days
at which time A. E. regained consciousness.
Officer Stella Plunkett of the Crimes Against Children
Unit (“Officer Plunkett”) began an investigation regarding A.
E.’s injuries and the possibility of child abuse.
On May 20,
1996, Officer Plunkett spoke with Kemplin at Kemplin’s home.
During this interview, Kemplin told Officer Plunkett that A. E.’s
injuries were a result of her falling several times hitting her
head.
After doing further investigation, Office Plunkett, along
with Sergeant Eastin, went back to the Kemplin house the next
day, May 21, 1996, to interview Kemplin.
Before beginning the
interview, Officer Plunkett read Kemplin her rights as mandated
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by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1692, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966), and Kemplin indicated that she understood these
rights.
It was during this interview that Kemplin alleges she
repeatedly asked Officer Plunkett if she needed her attorney
present.
Kemplin contends that Officer Plunkett told her that
she did not because she was not being charged with a crime.
Upon
being confronted with photographs of A. E.’s injuries, Kemplin
admitted hitting A. E. repeatedly with a flyswatter to discipline
her.
Kemplin also admitted pinching A. E. on the inner thighs in
an attempt to get her to talk.
Finally, Kemplin admitted
forcibly jerking A. E. off the sink counter top causing her to
strike her head on the floor.
On July 25, 1996, a Fayette County grand jury indicted
Kemplin with one count of assault in the first degree and three
counts of criminal abuse in the first degree.
Following a
two-day trial in September of 1997, the jury convicted Kemplin of
count two, alleging criminal abuse in the form of striking A. E.
with a flyswatter, and count three, alleging criminal abuse for
pinching A. E. on the inner thighs.
(7) years’ imprisonment.
She was sentenced to seven
She raises five claims of error in this
appeal.
Kemplin alleges that the trial court erred in allowing
in her May 21, 1996 statements.
She testified in an October
24,
1996, hearing on her motion to suppress, that during this second
interview she repeatedly asked if she needed her attorney
present.
She alleges Officer Plunkett told her that she was not
charged with a crime; therefore, she did not need an attorney.
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However, Officer Plunkett testified that Kemplin never asked her
anything about an attorney.
Sergeant Eastin also testified that
Kemplin never asked about an attorney, but he stated he missed
about five minutes of the interview while making a phone call.
However, thereafter, Sergeant Eastin, appearing confused about
the question being asked, stated that Officer Plunkett told
Kemplin that she was not being charged with a crime so she did
not need an attorney.
Nonetheless, he again clearly stated that
he did not recall Kemplin asking for an attorney.
The burden is on Kemplin to show that the trial court’s
ruling was clearly erroneous.
868 S.W.2d 101 (1993).
Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
Generally, a trial court’s ruling in
suppression matters is conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence.
Canler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 219, 221
(1994); Crawford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 847, 849
(1992).
In Miranda, supra, the United States Supreme Court
extended the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent to include
the right to counsel during interrogation.
Ky., 844 S.W.2d 417, 419 (1992).
Dean v. Commonwealth,
However, the rights as outlined
in Miranda only attach to custodial interrogation.
Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. ___, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 114 S.Ct. 2350
(1994).
Thus, the court must determine whether the May 21
interview constituted a custodial interrogation.
Secondly, the
court must determine whether Kemplin actually asserted her right
to counsel.
Dean, 844 S.W.2d 417.
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The United States Supreme Court has held “that a
defendant is ‘in custody’ when there has been a restriction on
that person’s freedom such that [she] is in a coercive
environment.”
Farley v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 880 S.W.2d 882,
884 (1994) (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct.
711, 50 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)).
The test for determining whether
the interrogation is custodial is how a reasonable person in
Kemplin’s position would have understood the situation.
Id.
In the present case, Officer Plunkett read Kemplin her
Miranda rights prior to the May 21 interview.
During the October
24, 1996, suppression hearing, Officer Plunkett stated that she
did so because she perceived that Kemplin was in custody.
However, it is not Officer Plunkett’s perception that is at
issue.
Instead it is Kemplin’s perception that is tested.
At
the time Officer Plunkett read Kemplin’s rights, unbeknownst to
Kemplin, Officer Plunkett had interviewed numerous persons with
relevant information about A. E. and had photographs of the
numerous injuries on A. E.’s body.
Kemplin was interviewed at
her home where no force, restraint, or coercion was placed on
her.
Farley, 880 S.W.2d at 885.
She indicated that she
understood her Miranda rights, yet voluntarily spoke with Officer
Plunkett.
It was not until the end of the interview, after
Kemplin admitted injuring A. E., that Kemplin asked whether she
would be arrested.
With these facts before the court, we cannot
say that Kemplin reasonably believed that she was in custody
during the interview.
Thus, no right to counsel attached.
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Alternatively, even if we determined that the May 21
interview was a custodial interrogation, we find that Kemplin
failed to invoke her right to counsel.
In Dean, 844 S.W.2d at
420, the Kentucky Supreme Court enunciated the standard for
invoking the right to counsel.
The Court held that the request
must be “unambiguous and unequivocal.”
Id.
Thus, “custodial
interrogation must cease when an accused who has received Miranda
warnings and has begun responding to questions ‘has clearly
asserted his right to counsel.’” Id. (citing Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)).
As held in Davis, 512 U.S. ___, 129 L.Ed.2d at 371, 114 S.Ct.
___:
Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel
“requires, at a minimum, some statement that
can reasonably be construed to be an
expression of a desire for the assistance of
an attorney.” But if a suspect makes a
reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances would have
understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel, our precedents
do not require the cessation of questioning.
Rather, the suspect must ambiguously request
counsel. As we have observed, “a statement
either is such an assertion or it is not.”
(Citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
In Davis, the Court upheld the lower court’s finding
that defendant’s remarks that “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer”
was not a request for counsel.
In the present case, Kemplin
alleges that she asked Officer Plunkett if she needed a lawyer.
The statement made by the suspect in Davis was more closely an
affirmative request for a lawyer than Kemplin’s inquiry into
whether she needed one.
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme
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Court held that Davis’ statement did not constitute a request for
counsel.
Under this standard, we cannot find that Kemplin’s
inquiry into the status of her need for counsel was unambiguous
or unequivocal.
Thus, Officer Plunkett was not required to cease
questioning.
Not to belabor the issue, we are also not convinced
that Kemplin even made the statements regarding whether she
needed an attorney.
Both Officer Plunkett and Sergeant Eastin
testified during the October 24, 1996 suppression hearing that
Kemplin did not mention an attorney.
Although at one point in
the questioning Sergeant Eastin testified otherwise, he appears
confused when answering the question and thereafter, reaffirms
that he did not recall Kemplin’s asking for an attorney.
Thus,
substantial evidence existed for finding that Kemplin did not
even ask whether she needed an attorney.
Kemplin also appeals the trial court’s decision to
allow the Commonwealth to introduce twenty-nine (29) photographs
of A. E.’s injuries as unduly prejudicial and inflammatory.
Testimony given during the trial indicated that A. E. had
thirty-four (34) bruises and abrasions scattered all over her
body.
She had bruises behind her ear and under her chin.
had numerous pinch marks on her upper thighs.
covered with bruises.
She
Her back was
A. E. also had numerous marks all over her
body from being hit with a flyswatter.
Thus, because of the
large number of injuries A. E. had, we can find no abuse in
allowing the photographs.
Moreover, many of the photographs were
necessary to illustrate patterns to prove that injuries were
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caused by the flyswatter.
Additionally, numerous photographs
were relevant to show that the injuries were intentionally
inflicted.
Finally, ten of the photographs were introduced
because they were used during Officer Plunkett’s May 21, 1996
interview with Kemplin.
Thus, we find nothing clearly erroneous
in the trial judge’s admission of the photographs.
Kemplin also raises arguments that her actions were a
continuing course of conduct and that the three separate counts
of criminal abuse in the first degree should have been
consolidated.1
We disagree.
Each count was specifically
directed at a separate and distinguishable action initiated
against A. E.
Count two addressed Kemplin’s use of the
flyswatter to “discipline” A. E.
Count three concerned Kemplin’s
pinching A. E. on the inner thighs in attempt to make the toddler
talk.
Count four regarded Kemplin’s striking A. E. in the
bathroom.
Each count identified a separate course of conduct and
a separate purpose for the injuries inflicted.
Thus, we find no
abuse by the trial court in refusing to consolidate the counts.
Kemplin also argues, maintaining again that her actions
were a continuing course of conduct, that the counts were
inconsistent in that count one for assault in the first degree
requires wanton conduct while the remaining three counts for
criminal abuse require intentional conduct.
also fail.
This argument must
As noted above, we do not believe Kemplin’s actions
were a continuous course of conduct.
1
Moreover, the jury took the
Count one was assault in the first degree for the
allegation that Kemplin wantonly caused A. E. to sustain a severe
closed head injury.
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evidence of A. E.’s injuries into consideration and found Kemplin
guilty on only two charges of criminal abuse.
Thus, we affirm.
Finally, Kemplin argues that she was denied the right
to a speedy trial.
the Commonwealth.
The trial court granted three continuances to
The first was in November, 1996 for a
psychological evaluation to be conducted on Kemplin.
The second
was in March, 1997 because the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney
assigned to the case was changing employment.
The third was in
July, 1997 because Officer Plunkett was on medical leave.
Thus,
there was a delay of fourteen (14) months from the time of the
indictment until the trial.
On July 18, 1997, Kemplin filed a
motion for a speedy trial, less than three months before her
trial.
In Preston v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 898 S.W.2d 504
(1995), the Court, following United State Supreme Court
precedents, listed four factors to be utilized in analyzing
claims of denial of speedy trial.
They are as follows: “(1) the
length of the delay; ;(2) whether the delay was more the fault of
the defendant or the government; (3) the defendant’s assertion of
his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant
suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.”
Id. at 506.
“In order to trigger the speedy trial analysis, a
defendant must establish that the delay between the accusation
and trial was ‘presumptively prejudicial.’” Id. (citing Doggett
v. United States, 505 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690, 120 L.Ed.2d
520, 528 (1992)).
Kemplin only presents a conclusory statement
on this issue without a supporting argument.
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We cannot say that
on its face a fourteen (14) month delay is presumptively
prejudicial; nor are we required to.
However, since “no single
factor is ‘either necessary or sufficient condition of the
finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial,” Id.
(citing United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1427 (10th Cir.
1990)), we will review the remaining factors.
Kemplin also conclusorily asserts that the delay was
more the fault of the Commonwealth.
However, the first delay was
the result of Kemplin’s October 31, 1996 notice of her intent to
introduce evidence of mental disease or defect at trial which was
less than one month before the trial was scheduled.
Since
Kemplin put the Commonwealth on notice of such, the Commonwealth
was entitled to prepare a defense and an evaluation completed on
Kemplin.
While the other two delays were not Kemplin’s fault,
they can hardly be deemed as within the control of the
Commonwealth.
If Kemplin’s counsel or an important witness was
not available for trial as was the case for the Commonwealth,
Kemplin would have rightfully asked for a continuance.
The
Commonwealth was certainly entitled to the same without being
penalized for such.
Moreover, upon reviewing the video tapes in
the record, the court notes that on August 23, 1996, the trial
court attempted several times to set the trial.
However, it was
defense counsel who had conflicts on various dates.
Kemplin cannot meet the third factor either, regarding
her assertion of the right to a speedy trial.
motion for a speedy trial until July 17, 1997.
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She did not file a
Her trial was
thereafter held within three months, well within the 180 day
mandate of KRS 500.110.
Finally, Kemplin cannot show prejudice as a result of
the delay.
In fact, she presents no argument on this issue other
than just to say that she was prejudiced.
This is fatal as
“[t]he possibility of prejudice alone is not sufficient to
support the position that speedy trial rights have been violated.
It is the burden of the defendant to establish actual prejudice.”
Preston, 898 S.W.2d at 507 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk,
474 U.S. 302, 315, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 654 (1986)).
She asserts that three times she served over ten subpoenas for
witnesses because of the delays.
However, she does not allege
that this prejudiced her in any manner.
Moreover, the record
indicates that Kemplin was free on bond pending the trial.
we find that Kemplin has failed to meet her burden.
Thus,
Based upon
the foregoing, we hold that no speedy trial violation occurred.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard R. Melville
Lexington, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Christopher M. Brown
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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