SUPERAMERICA, INC. v. CHARLOTTE PENNINGTON; SPECIAL FUND; HON. ZARING P. ROBERTSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD AND ROBERT L. WHITAKER (DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND) v. SUPERAMERICA, INC.; CHARLOTTE PENNINGTON; HON. ZARING P. ROBERTSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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August 13, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002636-WC
SUPERAMERICA, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 96-06852
CHARLOTTE PENNINGTON; SPECIAL FUND;
HON. ZARING P. ROBERTSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
AND
NO.
1997-CA-002763-WC
ROBERT L. WHITAKER (DIRECTOR
OF SPECIAL FUND)
v.
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 96-06852
SUPERAMERICA, INC.;
CHARLOTTE PENNINGTON;
HON. ZARING P. ROBERTSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
CROSS-APPELLANT
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
CROSS-APPELLEES
JOHNSON, JUDGE: SuperAmerica, Inc., (SuperAmerica) petitions for
review of a September 12, 1997 Workers’ Compensation Board
(Board) opinion which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s
(ALJ) award of permanent total disability benefits to Charlotte
Pennington (Pennington).
SuperAmerica contends that it did not
receive adequate notice of the injury, that the benefits should
have been limited by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
342.730(1)(b), and that Pennington’s total disability award was
not supported by sufficient evidence.
We affirm.
In 1988, Pennington, who was a forty-nine-year-old
housewife, got a divorce.
In need of work, she was hired by
SuperAmerica as a floral designer.
Pennington’s job at
SuperAmercia required her to order flowers, make arrangements for
their distribution to convenience stores in several states, and
lift heavy containers of water.
Her job involved frequent
bending and stooping.
On February 9, 1995, Pennington received a large preValentine’s Day shipment of flowers packed in five-gallon buckets
filled with water.
After Pennington assisted the deliveryman in
unloading all of the flowers, she put them in storage.
The next
day Pennington discovered that the roses were unfit for use and
contacted the supplier to pick them up. When the supplier refused
to pick them up, Pennington had to empty this large quantity of
flowers in a dumpster, one bucket at a time.
Pennington then had
to cut the stems of another large shipment of flowers.
Pennington testified that on February 10, 1995, she told her
supervisor that, “I was down in my back,” but that she would work
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until the flowers were distributed to the stores.
Pennington
testified that she continued to work after the incident even
though she was in pain because she was self-supporting and
desperately needed the income.
However, she would take an
occasional day off when the pain flared up.
In October 1995, Pennington unloaded a shipment of
flowers and felt pain in her neck and back which radiated down
her leg.
She visited her family physician who told her to take
off from work for two weeks to recuperate.
Her supervisor worked
out an arrangement whereby she came to work three days a week and
worked at home the other two days.
Pennington followed this work
arrangement from October 1995, to February 1996, and underwent
physical therapy as prescribed by the company doctor.
On January 18, 1996, Pennington was referred by her
family physician to Dr. Bal K. Bansal (Dr. Bansal), a general
surgeon.
On February 13, 1996, Dr. Bansal diagnosed Pennington
with a small disk herniation at C6-7 and ordered her to stop
working immediately.
Dr. Bansal also found arthritic changes in
her spine, as well as depression and anxiety.
Dr. Bansal
assigned Pennington a 30% functional impairment rating,
consisting of a 15% impairment due to a cervical disk herniation,
a 5% impairment for mechanical lower back syndrome and a 10%
impairment for depression which was secondary to the injury.
November 1996, Dr. Bansal considered Pennington to be totally
disabled, but he did not discount the possibility of modest
improvement over a period of time.
-3-
By
On January 24, 1996, at SuperAmerica’s request,
Pennington was examined by Dr. Kenneth Graulich (Dr. Graulich), a
neurologist.
Dr. Graulich preliminarily diagnosed Pennington to
be suffering from a herniated disk and was reluctant to release
her to return to work or to reach any final conclusion about her
condition.
On February 19, 1996, after being provided various
medical records, Dr. Graulich recommended physical therapy and
part-time work for Pennington and opined that she would have no
permanent impairment.
Dr. Graulich restricted Pennington to
lifting no more than 25 pounds at one time or 12 pounds
frequently and to avoid excessive bending, stooping, kneeling,
crawling or overhead work.
In his opinion, Pennington had not
reached her maximum level of medical improvement, but he believed
with physical therapy she would not be permanently impaired.
A
report that Dr. Graulich received in September 1996, confirming a
herniated disk, did not alter his conclusions.
In May 1996, at Dr. Bansal’s request, Pennington was
examined by Dr. James Powell (Dr. Powell), a neurosurgeon.
Dr.
Powell believed that the February 1995 work incident had caused a
disk herniation and that the herniation was aggravated in
November 1995, when she lifted more buckets of water.
did not recommend surgery at that time.
Dr. Powell
However, when he
reexamined Pennington in November 1996, the pain in her arms had
become considerably worse, and he suggested surgery with a
prognosis of a 70% to 80% chance of recovery although there was a
remote possibility of paralysis.
Dr. Powell stated that without
surgery Pennington’s symptoms would periodically flare up and she
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could easily sustain irreversible nerve root damage.
Pennington
refused the surgery.
In November 1996, at SuperAmerica’s request, Dr. Daniel
D. Primm (Dr. Primm) examined Pennington and reviewed her medical
records.
He did not find evidence of any significant injury
which would cause any permanent impairment.
He was unsure
whether Pennington had reached her maximum level of medical
improvement.
He suggested symptom magnification and stated that
Pennington was able to return to work.
Despite this prognosis,
Dr. Primm gave Pennington a temporary 5% impairment rating and
restricted her to lifting no more than 25 to 30 pounds at one
time or 10 to 15 pounds frequently.
At the March 5, 1997 hearing, SuperAmerica raised the issues
of notice, temporary total disability benefits, extent and
duration of disability, apportionment and medical expenses.
The
ALJ made findings of fact and conclusions of law, in pertinent
part, as follows:
The plaintiff’s testimony in regard to
the occurrence of her injury and providing
timely notice is essentially unrebutted. The
defendant has provided, as an attachment to
its brief, a copy of an accident report
filled out in October 1995, but this document
does nothing to refute the plaintiff’s
testimony regarding notice of her February
injury. I conclude that she suffered a workrelated injury on February 10, 1995, as
alleged, and that she provided the defendantemployer with due and timely notice of same.
Regarding the extent and duration of the
plaintiff’s occupational disability, this
Administrative Law Judge does not entirely
agree with the cervical impairment ratings
assessed by Drs. Bansal and Powell. DRE
cervicothoracic category III requires
“significant signs of radiculopathy, such as
-5-
(1) loss of relevant reflexes or (2)
unilateral atrophy with greater than a 2-cm.
decrease in circumference compared with the
unaffected side”. There is no evidence of
decreased reflexes in the record, and the
plaintiff’s only electrical nerve study was
normal. No physician mentions atrophy. At
best, the plaintiff has subjective complaints
of numbness in her arms, which does not
appear to meet the criteria quoted above. On
the other hand, I can make neither heads nor
tails of the opinions expressed by Drs.
Graulich and Primm. Each witness suggested
significant restrictions in January and
December 1996, respectively, but neither
provided a definitive opinion regarding her
permanent condition. The restrictions just
mentioned would prevent the plaintiff from
returning to the type of work she performed
for the defendant-employer, and there is
nothing to suggest that her condition has
improved from then until now. Considering
also her age, education and work experience,
I reluctantly conclude that the plaintiff is
not currently capable of returning to gainful
employment and is thus totally disabled. I
rely upon the opinion of Dr. Bansal in
concluding that the plaintiff’s award should
be apportioned equally between the defendantemployer and the Special Fund, pursuant to
KRS 342.1202.
SuperAmerica filed a petition for reconsideration
arguing that since Pennington had worked for over a
year after the injury occurred and after notice had been given,
pursuant KRS 342.730(1)(b)1 her occupational disability should be
1
KRS 342.730(1)(b) states as follows:
(1) Except as provided in KRS 342.732,
income benefits for disability shall be paid
to the employee as follows:
....
(b) For permanent partial
disability, sixty-six and two-thirds percent
(66 2/3%) of the employee’s average weekly
wage but not more than seventy-five percent
(75%) of the state average weekly wage as
determined by KRS 342.740, multiplied by the
permanent impairment rating caused by the
(continued...)
-6-
limited to a maximum of twice her functional impairment rating.
The ALJ denied the petition by order dated May 28, 1997, and
stated in part as follows:
The defendant-employer is correct that
KRS 342.730(1)(b) became effective April 4,
1994, prior to the date of the plaintiff’s
injury. However, it is abundantly clear that
I entered the plaintiff’s award under
subsection (1)(a) of the statute, and the
defendant-employer’s petition is nothing more
than a reargument of the merits of that
decision. It is therefore OVERRULED.
Francis v. Glenmore Distilleries, Ky.App.,
718 S.W.2d 953 (1986)(emphasis original).
SuperAmerica appealed the matter to the Board and
argued
the ALJ erred (1) in finding that Pennington had given
notice of her injury as soon as practicable, (2) in awarding
benefits in excess of twice her functional impairment rating as
required by KRS 342.730(1)(b), and (3) in finding her 100%
occupationally disabled.
On September 12, 1997, the Board
affirmed the ALJ’s opinion on all three issues, ruling as
follows: (1)Pennington had given due and timely notice of her
injury under KRS 342.185 when she told her supervisor “that she
was down in her back the day of the incident”; (2) SuperAmerica’s
argument that under KRS 342.730(1)(b) Pennington’s benefits
should be limited to twice her impairment rating was misplaced
1
(...continued)
injury or occupational disease as determined
by “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment,” American Medical Association,
latest edition available, times the factor
set forth in the table that follows:....
[In the definition section of Chapter 342, KRS
342.0011(b) defines “permanent partial disability” as “the
condition of an employee who, due to an injury, has a permanent
disability rating but retains the ability to work”].
-7-
because the plain wording of subsection (b) states that it
applies only to permanent partial disability rather than total
disability; and (3) the ALJ’s finding of total disability was
supported by substantial evidence.
Both SuperAmerica and the
Special Fund filed a petition for review with this Court.
We review this case under the standard set forth in
Western Baptist v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (1992),
wherein the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he function of further
review of the WCB in the Court of Appeals is to correct the Board
only where the the [sic] Court perceives the Board has overlooked
or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed
an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice.”
It has long been settled that the ALJ has sole
authority to determine what evidence to believe, Caudill v.
Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15 (1977), and is
charged with determining the quality, character, and substance of
the evidence.
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695
S.W.2d 418 (1985).
Since Pennington had the burden of proof
before the ALJ and was successful, the question on appeal is
whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
It is not enough for SuperAmerica to show that the record
contains some evidence which might support a different result.
McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46 (1974).
The first issue concerns the notice given by
Pennington.
KRS 342.185 states that “no proceeding under this
chapter for compensation for an injury or death shall be
maintained unless a notice of the accident shall have been given
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to the employer as soon as practicable after the happening
thereof....”
In Reliance Diecasting Co. v. Freeman, Ky.App., 471
S.W.2d 311, 312 (1971)(citation omitted), the Court stated that
“notice of injury must be given, and this means notice of ‘the
specific injury for which the employee is claiming
compensation.’”
Pennington told her supervisor on the day of her
injury that she was “down in her back”.
This was the injury for
which she was claiming a right to compensation.
The fact that
she continued to work does not negate the fact she gave notice of
her injury when it happened as required by statute.
involves a mixed question of law and fact.
Notice
When there is
substantial evidence to support the finding made by the ALJ as to
notice, we must affirm.
Newberg v. Sleets, Ky.App., 899 S.W.2d
495, 498 (1995).
The second issue concerns SuperAmerica’s argument that
Pennington’s benefits should have been limited under KRS
342.730(1)(b) to a maximum of twice her functional impairment
rating.
The Board agreed with the ALJ that KRS 342.730(1)(b) did
not apply to Pennington’s claim since that subsection deals with
permanent partial disability.
We agree with the Board.
The
plain language of the statute states that it only applies to
permanent partial disability and Pennington was totally disabled.
See note 1, supra.
SuperAmerica also claims that the finding of total
disability must be reversed because it was not supported by
substantial evidence.
The Board concisely stated SuperAmerica’s
argument as follows:
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Finally, Super[A]merica contends the
ALJ’s finding of total occupational
disability is clearly erroneous and not
supported by the evidence, referring to what
it contends are minimal impairment ratings
assigned to Pennington’s condition, to the
fact that the ALJ totally disagreed with the
impairment ratings assigned to Pennington’s
cervical condition by Drs. Bansal and Powell,
the only physicians who found any permanent
impairment, and yet still found Pennington to
be totally disabled. It also contends that
various inconsistencies apparent in
Pennington’s testimony casts considerable
doubt on her veracity.
We believe the Board throughly addressed this argument, and we
adopt that part of its opinion as our own:
Since Super[A]merica was unsuccessful in
persuading the ALJ that Pennington was
anything other than totally disabled, the
question on appeal is whether the ALJ’s
decision was supported by substantial
evidence. Wolf Creek Colleries v. Crum,
Ky.App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984). Substantial
evidence is evidence that has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the
minds of reasonable men when taken alone or
in light of all the evidence. Kentucky State
Racing Commission v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d
298 (1972), and Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich
Chemical Co., [Ky.,] 474 S.W.2d 367 (1971).
On appeal, Super[A]merica must show there is
lack of substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s decision, and it is not enough to show
that the record contains only some evidence
which would support a reversal. McCloud v.
Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46
(1974). Because the Board may not substitute
its judgment for that of the ALJ on questions
of fact, if the ALJ’s determination is
supported by any evidence of substance, it
cannot be said that the evidence compels a
different result. Special Fund v. Francis,
supra. The ALJ alone is to determine the
weight and credibility of the evidence.
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky.,
560 S.W.2d 15 (1977). To the extent there
are questions about the credibility of
Pennington, those questions were resolved by
the ALJ.
-10-
In making a determination of
occupational disability in a claim, the ALJ
must look at the totality of circumstances
and all the factors enumerated in KRS
342.0011(11) and Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432
S.W.2d 800 (1968). Seventh St. Road Tobacco
Wrhse. v. Stillwell, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 469
(1976). Medical evidence may be probative on
the issue of occupational disability;
however, it is not determinative. The ALJ is
not inexorably bound to be fully persuaded by
the specific testimony of any one medical
witness. Commonwealth Department of Highway
v. Gay, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 508 (1971), and
Hudson v. Owens, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 565 (1969).
Furthermore, where medical evidence may be
conflicting on the issue of occupational
disability, the ALJ has the sole
responsibility to weigh and assess the
credibility of the evidence. Caudill v.
Maloney’s Discount Stores, supra. The ALJ
may reject or accept any testimony and may
believe or disbelieve various parts of the
evidence including evidence from the same
witness. Codell Constr. Co. v. Dixon, Ky.,
478 S.W.2d 703 (1972).
Notwithstanding the fact that the ALJ
disagreed with the impairment ratings
assigned to Pennington’s cervical condition
by Drs. Bansal and Powell, there is still
evidence of substance to support the ALJ’s
finding of total occupational disability.
Pennington has a ninth grade education, and
her only occupational experience is that
attained as a floral designer for
Super[A]merica. Dr. Bansal, at the time he
gave his deposition, did not feel she could
return to that work or any other gainful
employment. Dr. Graulich would restrict
Pennington from lifting more than 25 pounds
maximally and 12 pounds frequently and from
excessive bending, stooping, kneeling,
crawling, or overhead work. Dr. Primm would
restrict her from lifting not more than 25 to
30 pounds maximally or 10 to 15 pounds
frequently although he felt these
restrictions would be temporary and that she
would improve over time. In our opinion, in
light of her educational level and
occupational experience and the medical
evidence in this claim, there is evidence of
substance to support the ALJ’s finding of
-11-
total occupational disability, and that
finding may not be disturbed on appeal.
Since the Board did not overlook or misconstrue
controlling statutes or precedent or commit an error in assessing
the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice, we affirm
the opinion of the Board.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. William P. Emrick
Ashland, Kentucky
Hon. MaLenda S. Haynes
Grayson, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR SPECIAL FUND:
Hon. David R. Allen
Frankfort, Kentucky
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