WILLIE GLINSEY A/K/A KARIM AZIZ ABDULLAH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
September 3, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002251-MR
WILLIE GLINSEY
A/K/A KARIM AZIZ ABDULLAH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 87-CR-00054 & 87-CR-00056
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This is a pro se appeal by Willie Glinsey,
a/k/a Karim Aziz Abdullah (Abdullah) from an order of the Simpson
Circuit Court entered June 4, 1998, overruling his Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR 60.02) motion to vacate his sentence.
We
affirm.
On August 10, 1987, the Simpson County Grand Jury
indicted Abdullah for robbery in the first degree.
On August 19,
1987, the Simpson County Grand Jury indicted Abdullah as a
persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I).
On
February 3, 1988, the Simpson Circuit Court consolidated these
indictments for trial.
However, on July 1, 1988, Abdullah signed
a waiver of right to trial by jury, an entry of plea of guilty
and a plea agreement whereby Abdullah agreed to plead guilty to
robbery in the first degree and the Commonwealth agreed to
recommend a ten (10) year prison term enhanced to twenty (20)
years on the PFO I.1
The Simpson Circuit Court accepted the plea
and Abdullah was sentenced to twenty (20) years in prison.
Said
twenty year sentence was to run consecutive to time (35 years)
Abdullah was serving in Tennessee on unrelated charges.
On April 25, 1997, after being paroled by Tennessee
authorities, Abdullah filed a motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to CR 60.02.
The trial court denied this motion by
order entered June 4, 1997.
Abdullah then filed a petition and
motion to file a belated appeal.
This court granted his motion
on November 12, 1997, and this appeal followed.
The trial court’s decision in this case will not be
reversed unless there was a clear abuse of discretion.
“Any
action under CR 60.02 addresses itself to the sound discretion of
the court and the exercise of that discretion will not be
disturbed on appeal except for abuse.”
Ky., 327 S.W.2d 572, 574 (1959).
Richardson v. Brunner,
Although not specifically
stated in his motion and brief, Abdullah’s motion to vacate falls
under the provisions of CR 60.02(f).
Under CR 60.02(f), the
court may relieve a person from its final judgment for “any other
reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.”
1
However,
Abdullah faced twenty (20) years in prison for first-degree
robbery, which could have been enhanced to life in prison on the
PFO I.
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relief under CR 60.02(f) “may be invoked only under the most
unusual circumstances...”
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 932 S.W.2d
359, 362 (1996) (citing Howard v. Commonwealth, KY., 365 S.W.2d
809, 810 (1963)).
Abdullah argues on appeal that the trial court should
have vacated his sentence because it originally sentenced him on
the PFO I without sentencing him on the underlying felony as
required by KRS 532.080.
Specifically, the language used in the
judgment of the trial court states:
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Court,
pursuant to the plea of “guilty” by the
defendant, that the defendant is guilty of
the offenses charged in the above-numbered
indictments, and, upon motion of the
Commonwealth’s Attorney, the defendant’s
punishment is hereby fixed as follows:
(A) For the offense of First-degree
Robbery as charged in Indictment
No. 87-CR-054, committed as a
Persistent Felony Offender in the
First-degree, as charged in
Indictment No. 87-CR-056, at
confinement in the State
Penitentiary for a term of twenty
(20) years. (Emphasis added).
In support of his argument, Abdullah refers this Court to Davis
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 505 (1991), and Commonwealth v.
Hayes, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 467 (1987).
In both Davis and Hayes, the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that a defendant may not be convicted
as a persistent felony offender without imposing sentence on the
underlying felony.
Davis, 812 S.W.2d at 506; Hayes, 734 S.W.2d
at 469.
However, the Court in Hulett v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
834 S.W.2d 688 (1992), distinguishes both Davis and Hayes from
-3-
Abdullah’s situation.
In Hulett, the defendant was convicted of
trafficking in cocaine.
Rather than go through a separate PFO I
proceeding, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to the PFO I
charge in exchange for the minimum sentenced allowed by the
statute- ten (10) years- being affixed as the penalty for the
offense.
The defendant moved the trial court for permission to
enter a plea of guilty to PFO I.
Without formally fixing a
sentence on the trafficking conviction, the trial court accepted
the plea agreement.
Thereafter, Hulett appealed seeking to have
his sentence vacated pursuant to KRS 532.080 because he was not
sentenced on the underlying felony.
motion.
The trial court denied his
In affirming that decision, the Court stated:
The present case, furthermore, is
distinguished from Davis v. Manis, Ky., 812
S.W.2d 505 (1991) Commonwealth v. Hayes, Ky.,
734 S.W.2d 467 (1987). Those cases hold that
a defendant cannot be convicted as a
persistent felony offender unless a term of
imprisonment is imposed as the punishment on
the underlying charge. Davis at 506; Hayes
at 469. Both cases, however, involve
situations in which a defendant found guilty
of trafficking in a controlled substance on
the underlying charge received a fine rather
than a prison sentence....
Since the defendants in Davis and Hayes
received fines rather than imprisonment on
their underlying convictions, the Supreme
Court properly held that no predicate existed
for the imposition of a persistent felony
offender sentence. There is, however, no
indication in this case that a fine in lieu
of a prison sentence was even considered as
the penalty for the underlying charge, let
alone imposed.... Thus, Hulett’s situation
fundamentally differs from the scenarios
found in Davis and Hayes.
Id. at 690.
-4-
Abdullah’s situation is analogous to Hulett.
Abdullah
received the sentence to which he bargained for, i.e., ten (10)
years for first-degree robbery enhanced to twenty (20) years by
virtue of the PFO I.
The following is the relevant portion of
the plea agreement signed by appellant on July 1, 1988:
1. I, [Karim A. Abdullah] have been informed
by the Court and I fully understand that I
have been charged with the following
offense(s):
Charge(s)
Maximum Sentence on
Conviction
First Degree Robbery
K.R.S. 515.020
20 years in the
penitentiary
First Degree Persistent
Felony Offender
Life in the
penitentiary
The Commonwealth’s Attorney has advised
me that in the event I enter a Plea of Guilty
to the above charges, he will recommend to
the Court that the following sentences be
imposed:
10 years on 1st degree robbery, Enhanced to
20 years on 1st degree persistent felony
offender. Consecutive to any time to be
served in State of Tennessee.
Thereafter, the trial court imposed the previous stated order
sentencing appellant to “confinement in the state penitentiary
for a term of twenty (20) years.”
The trial court did not
enhance his sentence based upon a fine as in Davis and Hayes.
The fact that the trial court mistakenly stated in the judgment
that he was sentenced to twenty (20) years on the PFO I does not
entitle Abdullah to have his sentence vacated.
A thorough review
of the record clearly shows that Abdullah received the sentence
for which he bargained.
Any mistake in the language of the
judgment itself constitutes harmless error.
-5-
We find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by overruling the motion to vacate.
For the foregoing
reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Karim Aziz Abdullah
Central City, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Shawn C. Goodpaster
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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