DUAN C. CALLOWAY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: January 8, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002074-MR
DUAN C. CALLOWAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-003035
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND MILLER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
The appellant, Duan C. Calloway (“Calloway”),
was convicted in Jefferson Circuit Court of robbery in the first
degree (KRS 515.020), assault in the first degree (KRS 508.010),
and assault in the fourth degree (KRS 508.030) after a jury trial
on November 28 and 29, 1997.
He was sentenced to a total of
fifteen (15) years’ imprisonment.
It is the assault in the first
degree conviction that is the subject of this appeal.
On January 14, 1997, Calloway filed a motion to set
aside the judgment pursuant to CR 60.02 alleging that prosecuting
witnesses, Joe Brown, Jr. (“Brown”) and Florence Denning
(“Denning”), knowingly gave perjured testimony at the trial.
Specifically, Calloway argued that both Brown and Denning
testified falsely that Calloway shot Brown in both legs when in
fact Brown had only been shot in the left leg.
Calloway also
filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the matter and for
appointment of counsel.
The trial court denied Calloway’s
motions on the grounds that credibility was a determination for
the jury to make.
This appeal followed.
Calloway contends that the lower court erred in denying
his motions.
He argues that the alleged perjury committed by
Brown and Denning qualifies as a justification for relief under
CR 60.02 which grants discretion to the court to relieve a party
from a final judgment because perjured or false evidence has been
given.
From the record it seems clear that Brown and Denning did
falsely report the extent of Brown’s injuries.
However,
such is
not sufficient grounds to grant the relief requested by Calloway.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently reviewed the
extend of relief available under CR 60.02 in a factually similar
case.
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 932 S.W.2d 359 (1996).
In
Brown the Court reviewed the defendant’s contention that a
medical expert for the Commonwealth had indicated to defense
counsel that portions of his testimony at the defendant’s trial
could have been erroneous.
Nonetheless, the Court affirmed the
trial court’s denial of relief under CR 60.02.
In the present case Calloway must convince the court
that “the real facts as later presented...rendered the original
trial tantamount to none at all, and [enforcement of] the
judgment as rendered would be an absolute denial of justice and
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analogous to the taking of life or property without due process
of law.”
Brown, 932 S.W.2d at 316-62 (quoting Jones v.
Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779, 108 S.W.2d 816, 917 (1937)).
Actions
arising under CR 60.02 are under the “sound discretion of the
court and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed
on appeal except for abuse.”
Brown, 932 S.W.2d at 362 (quoting
Richardson v. Brunner, Ky.App., 327 S.W.2d 572, 574 (1959)).
Portions of Brown’s medical record relevant to the gun
shot wounds he received are in the record.
It appears clear that
the injury Brown received to his right leg was from a previous
gun shot wound.
However, Calloway admits that Brown’s medical
records were introduced into evidence.
Further, it is undisputed
that Brown was in fact shot in the left leg, and that the jury
believed Calloway was responsible for such.
This alone is
sufficient for the assault in the first degree conviction.
Moreover, it is not for the court to “underestimate a jury’s
intelligence in its ability to discern between the multitude of
evidence and testimony presented to it and to evaluate such
accordingly.”
Brown, 932 S.W.2d at 362 (quoting Turner v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 914 S.W.2d 343, 347 (1996)).
Questions of
credibility and weight of the evidence are jury matters.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191, 193 (1997).
Estep
After
reviewing the evidence, this Court believes the trial court
correctly determined that a reasonable jury could fairly find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Calloway was guilty of assault in
the first degree.
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Furthermore, the Supreme court in Brown noted that the
trial court judge who denied the CR 60.02 motion in that case
also presided over the defendant’s trial.
362.
Brown, 932 S.W.2d at
Hence, the Court stated that the trial court judge had the
opportunity to evaluate the witness’ testimony during trial.
Because of this, the Court held that “[the trial judge’s]
judgment should be afforded deference under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review.”
Id.
In the present case, the
record shows that the same judge who presided over Calloway’s
trial also ruled on his CR 60.02 motion.
Thus, we afford a great
deal of deference to his denial of Calloway’s motion and find no
error in his ruling on this matter.
We also agree with the trial court’s denial of an
evidentiary hearing.
Before Calloway is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, “he must affirmatively allege facts which,
if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special
circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.”
Gross v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (1983).
Although it
appears certain that both Brown and Denning lied about the extent
of Brown’s injuries, as stated previously, there was ample
evidence for the jury to find Calloway guilty of assault in the
first degree.
Thus, Calloway has failed to plead facts which
would justify vacating the judgment.
Therefore, the trial court
did not err in denying the evidentiary hearing.
Furthermore,
since Calloway’s CR 60.02 is totally meritless, the trial court’s
failure to appoint counsel is harmless error.
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Commonwealth v.
Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336 (1984).
Thus, for the reasons stated
we hereby affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Duan C. Calloway, Pro Se
Northpoint Training Center
Burgin, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Joseph R. Johnson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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