DONALD R. NEWCOMB v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY AND JAMES MORGAN, WARDEN
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RENDERED: December 4, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002072-MR
DONALD R. NEWCOMB
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. SHEWMAKER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00177
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY
AND JAMES MORGAN, WARDEN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE.
Donald Newcomb (Newcomb) appeals pro se from an
order of the Boyle Circuit Court entered on August 4, 1997,
denying his “Motion to Compel,” which was treated as a Petition
for Declaration of Rights under Ky. Rev. Stat. 418.040.
affirm.
We
Newcomb currently is an inmate at the Northpoint Training
Center in Burgin, Kentucky.
In April 1997, Newcomb filed a
motion entitled Motion to Compel seeking an order from the
circuit court preventing the Department of Corrections from
implementing a recently modified procedure for visitation of
inmates.
Under the new procedure, each prison facility compiled
for each inmate an approved visitor list based on the names of
individuals submitted by the inmate.
In order for an individual
to be placed on the approved list, the inmate had to provide a
completed “Visiting Information Form” containing such information
about the visitor as name, address, date of birth, social
security number, sex, race, and relationship to the inmate.
Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) 16.1.
See
Newcomb objected
to providing this information, especially the social security
number, for each prospective visitor.
In May 1997, the Department of Corrections filed a response
to the motion and requested dismissal for failure to state a
claim.
Newcomb filed a reply to the response.
In July 1997, he
filed a motion for summary judgment contending that application
of the new visitation procedure, especially the requirement of
disclosure of a visitor’s social security number, constituted a
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9 and 10.
On August 4, 1997, the
trial court issued an order denying the Motion to Compel as
treated as a Petition for Declaratory Relief.
The trial court
held that the visitation procedures were not unreasonable.
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This
appeal followed.
Newcomb argues on appeal that implementation of the new
visitation procedures constitutes a violation of the due process
clause, the ex post facto clause and the equal protection clause.
He asserts that prison officials have no legitimate authority to
require inmates to provide confidential information, such as a
social security number, about potential visitors.
Newcomb
contends that he has a liberty interest in being able to visit
with his family and the new visitation policy significantly
interferes with this interest.
We disagree.
It is well-established that inmates do not have a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in visitation under
the Due Process Clause.
See Kentucky Department of Corrections
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 104 L. Ed. 2d 506
(1989), and Spear v. Sowders, 71 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 1995).
Similarly, individuals do not have a constitutional right to
unrestricted visitation of prison inmates.
Id.
In addition,
Kentucky prison regulations do not create a protected liberty
interest for inmates in unfettered visitation.
See Kentucky
Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454.
Given the
inherent problems and risks associated with operating a prison,
prisoners’ constitutional rights are significantly constrained in
order to further the legitimate objectives of the penal system,
and prison officials must be given deference in establishing and
carrying out prison regulations.
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984), and Sandin v.
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Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418
(1995) (holding that courts must “afford appropriate deference
and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile
environment”).
“Limitations upon visitation may be imposed if
they are necessary to meet penological objectives such as the
rehabilitation and the maintenance of security and order
[citation omitted].”
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S. Ct. 156, 83 L. Ed. 2d
93 (1984).
In the case at bar, the Department of Corrections stated
that the social security numbers of potential visitors are
requested for security purposes.
Prison officials are better
able to cross-check these identification numbers with
computerized criminal history records.
The Corrections
Department also indicated that the social security numbers of
visitors are not generally available to prison employees after a
particular visitor has been approved for visitation.
We note
that federal prison officials are allowed, as a legitimate law
enforcement function, to obtain the social security numbers of
persons who visit federal prison inmates.
See generally Kuffel
v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 882 F. Supp. 1116 (D.D.C.
1996) (holding that prison officials need not disclose visitors’
social security numbers under Freedom of Information Act).
We
agree with the trial court that these modified visitation
procedures are not arbitrary or unreasonable and, therefore, are
within the prison officials' legitimate discretionary authority.
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Newcomb’s second argument, that implementation of the new
visitation procedures violated the ex post facto clause, is
without merit.
The ex post facto clause protects individuals
against increased punishment for a prior act.
The proper focus
of the ex post facto inquiry is whether the change created by the
procedures “alters the definition of criminal conduct or
increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable,” rather
than upon any “ambiguous sort of disadvantage” or affect on a
prisoner’s “opportunity” to take advantage of prior procedures.
California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,
115 S. Ct. 1597, 131 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1995).
See also Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30
(1990).
The ex post facto clause does not prevent prison
administrators from adopting and enforcing reasonable regulations
that are consistent with such legitimate prison objectives as
security, safety and efficiency.
See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d
302 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977, 113 S. Ct. 472, 121 L.
Ed. 2d 378 (1992), and Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1111, 114 S. Ct. 2112, 128 L. Ed.
2d 671 (1994).
A prisoner is not entitled to have his sentence
carried out under identical prison policies and procedures
throughout his incarceration.
See Morales, 514 U.S. 499.
Modification of the prison visitation procedures was reasonable
and clearly did not rise to the level of an “increased penalty”
for ex post facto purposes.
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Finally, Newcomb has presented no facts or discussion
explaining how the visitation procedures violate equal
protection.
The regulations apply to all inmates; thus we cannot
say they violate equal protection.
The trial court did not err
in dismissing the action.
For the foregoing reason, the order of the Boyle Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No Brief for Appellee
Donald Ray Newcomb, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
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